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I.    INTRODUCTION 
This Article began many years ago, during a time when appellate practice 
as a special area of the law was emerging in the nation and Texas in 
particular.  It has become a highly specialized practice area now.  Appellate 
lawyers are keenly aware that standards of review are vital to success on 
appeal.  Many years ago, I started to gather these standards in outlines, 
notebooks, in the margins of important opinions, etc.  Soon, the collection 
of notes began to take the shape of a comprehensive outline and then grew 
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into a law review article.1  Through the years, the Article continued to evolve 
as the standards evolved, and interest in the profession likewise grew.2 
In this revised Article, you will find an in-depth discussion of the most 
common standards of review seen in Texas civil appeals.  Once again, the 
Article presents a substantial and comprehensive update of standards of 
review for reviewing various trial court rulings, whether they are made 
during pre-trial, trial, or post-trial proceedings.  Finally, the Article describes 
some aspects of appellate practice that put the standards of review in 
context. 
A. Standards of Review Generally 
Standards of review promote efficiency in the judicial system because 
each standard of review determines the likelihood of success in an appeal.3  
The more deferential the standard of review, the less likely the appeal will 
be successful and, theoretically, the less likely a losing party will appeal.  The 
standard of review also “provides a lens through which the parties on appeal 
can focus and frame their arguments” for the reviewing court.4 
Standards of review also distribute power within the judicial branch by 
defining the relationship between trial and appellate courts.5  These 
standards “frame the issues, define the depth of review, assign power among 
judicial actors, and declare the proper materials to review.”6  Standards of 
 
1. The first edition of W. Wendell Hall’s article was published in 1998.  W. Wendell Hall, 
Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351 (1998). 
2. See generally W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1 (2002) 
(providing an update to the 1998 article); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 47 (2006) (amending previous versions of the Article to reflect changes in the law since it was last 
published); W. Wendell Hall, O. Rey Rodriguez, Rosemarie Kanusky, & Mark Emery, Hall’s Standards 
of Review in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 3 (2010) (Although Mr. Hall had retired and asked that his name 
be removed as an author, the other authors insisted “[i]n light of W. Wendell Hall’s exceptional 
contributions to Texas law, and to his firm, colleagues, and community, Mr. Hall’s co-authors have 
insisted that the title of this Article bear his name.  They respectfully refer the reader to the Foreword 
of [that] Article for a summary of Mr. Hall’s enduring contributions.”).  
3. Jared K. Carter, Appellate Practice: Tips for Effectively Defining and Using Standards of Review in 
Appellate Practice, VT. B.J., Spring 2018, at 28, 28. 
4. Id.  
5. See Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377, 378–79 (1984) 
(describing the functions of appellate courts, including the basic functions of “error-correcting and 
rule-making”). 
6. Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 269 
(2005). 
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review are simply the appellate court’s “measuring stick”7 or “the decibel 
level at which the appellate advocate must play to catch the judicial ear.”8  
They are a “powerful organizing principle[,]” and even when “hopelessly 
imprecise, they do provide a language . . . we can use to good advantage in 
giving logical form and focus to our arguments.”9  Therefore, a litigant must 
measure his factual and legal arguments against the appropriate “measuring 
stick” to write an effective and persuasive brief.10  As two leading scholars 
have observed, “[S]tandards of review were never meant to be the end of 
the inquiry but rather a frame and limit on the substantive law.”11 
Standards of review are the cornerstone of an appeal, and these standards 
must be woven into the discussion of the facts and the substantive law in a 
manner that persuades the appellate court that the trial court erred.  The 
standard of review should direct the appellate court to the party’s most 
relevant and important legal arguments.  Typically, lawyers make two 
mistakes in handling appeals.  First, many lawyers are so focused on arguing 
the facts that they fail to discuss the governing standard of review, or they 
fail to consider what that standard allows the reviewing court to do with 
those facts.12  Second, when lawyers do discuss the standard of review, they 
often recite the applicable standard in boilerplate language and with all the 
enthusiasm and conviction of a high school student reciting Dante’s 
Inferno, thus losing an opportunity to use the standards as a roadmap for 
convincing the appellate court that the trial court erred and that the error 
requires reversal.13  As Professors Childress and Davis noted: 
Standards of review, though slippery, cannot be dismissed as sheer politics, 
especially as the court-watcher begins to look at the practical meaning below 
the surface catchphrase.  The ubiquitous standard, either in basic form or as 
defined and refined, is presented as a meaningful guidepost to frame both the 
arguments to the appellate court and that court’s analytical response.  Even 
 
7. See John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J. 
801, 810–11 (1976) (examining the role of the standard of review and the importance of determining 
the applicable standard of review on a case-by-case basis). 
8. Alvin B. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV. 869, 873 (1983). 
9. Barry Sullivan, Standards of Review, in APPELLATE ADVOCACY 59, 59, 62 (Peter J. Carre et al. 
eds., 1981). 
10. See Godbold, supra note 7, at 810 (explaining how the standard of review is a measuring stick 
for the appellate judge). 
11. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FEDERAL 
CIVIL CASES AND REVIEW PROCESS § 1.3, at 21 (1986). 
12. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 59, 62.  
13. Id.  
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when the slogans have no real internal meaning, in many cases it is clear that 
the issue framing or assignment of power behind the words is the turning 
point of the decision.14 
Appellate judges agree that a mechanical recitation of the relevant 
standard of review, without more, is no more helpful than completely 
ignoring the standard altogether.15  While it is important to accurately 
discuss the facts and persuasively argue the substantive law, a lawyer’s failure 
to place meritorious arguments in the context of the applicable standard of 
review gives the appellate court little help.  “If courts apply standards of 
review to give them meaning, litigants would be advised to give the review 
language life through application within an integrated strategy.”16  In other 
words, a formal statement of the standard of review, standing alone, will not 
advance the process of persuading the appellate court.  Under Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(B) and Fifth Circuit Rule 28.3(i), for 
example, the standard of review must be identified and set forth for each 
issue of the argument.17  Those practicing in state appellate courts would 
be wise to follow the federal rule and the Fifth Circuit’s local rule.18 
As one judge observed, “[N]o single concept is more important than the 
standard of review.”19  Consequently, the litigant who ignores the standard 
of review loses credibility with the reviewing court.  Even a credible 
appellate argument can be easily lost if it is not advanced in the context of 
 
14. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.01, at 1-2 (4th ed. 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
15. See generally Sullivan, supra note 9, at 61 (noting many lawyers recognize the need “to say 
something about the standard of review, but think that they need not develop the concept as part of their 
argument”). 
16. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.02, at 1-16 (4th ed. 2010). 
17. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B); 5TH CIR. R. 28.3(i). 
18. Appellate judges invariably advise that advocates address standards of review.  See Leonard 
I. Garth, How to Appeal to an Appellate Judge, LITIG., Fall 1994, at 20, 22 (stating the “[s]tandard of review 
is the element of appellate advocacy that distinguishes the good appellate advocate”); Godbold, supra 
note 7, at 811 (“Early in his presentation counsel should state to the court the standard of review which 
he considers applicable.”); Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other 
Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 431, 437 (1986) (calling counsels’ omission of the standards of review 
in appellate brief writing “The Fifth Sin”); Rubin, supra note 8, at 872 (indicating an author should 
“[s]tart the brief by stating briefly the applicable standard of review”). 
19. Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and Oral Argument in the Fifth 
Circuit, 70 TUL. L. REV. 187, 189 (1995). 
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the governing standard of review.20  If a party does not identify the relevant 
standard and vigorously approach that standard in briefing, the party leaves 
a void that may be filled by his adversary or the reviewing court, and perhaps 
filled incorrectly with the wrong standard.21  Because the reviewing court 
will undoubtedly determine the relevant standard on its own and review the 
appeal accordingly, litigants who do not meaningfully address the standard 
of review risk failing to persuade the reviewing court that the standard, as 
applied to the facts and the law, requires reversal.22  No advocate wants the 
reviewing court to write: “The critical issue in this case is one not discussed 
by the parties: our standard of review.”23 
Identifying the standard of review in most cases is not complicated.24  
Like tying a shoe, it is often easier to demonstrate the proper use of the 
standard of review than it is to explain that use.  For example, the abuse of 
discretion standard is the most common standard of review, but who can 
define the phrase in a simple way that will be useful in every case in which 
it is applied?  No one has met the challenge of describing the standard so 
that it may be applied objectively in every appeal.  While the words used to 
describe standards of review may escape a clear and precise definition, 
“[t]here are no talismanic words that can avoid the process” of applying the 
standard to the record and explaining in a cogent manner why the reviewing 
court should reach a certain result.25 
Justice Felix Frankfurter described standards of review as “undefined 
defining terms.”26  While standards of review often escape precise 
definition, it is incumbent upon appellate litigants to identify the standards 
and apply them in an effective manner to the relevant facts.  Otherwise, a 
litigant who is unfamiliar with “the standard of review for each issue . . . may 
 
20. See James B. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 767 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[C]ounsel’s 
failure to acknowledge the proper standard of review might . . . be considered a concession of lack of 
merit.”). 
21. See United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“The parties’ 
failure to brief and argue properly the appropriate standard may lead the court to choose the wrong 
standard.”). 
22. See Fox v. Comm’r, 718 F.2d 251, 253–54 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting the parties failed to address 
the standard of review, and ultimately affirming the lower court under the abuse of discretion standard). 
23. Id. at 253. 
24. See Nathan L. Hecht, Foreword: Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 1041, 1041 (1993) (“The law prescribing the standard of review applicable to a particular ruling is 
complex but relatively well settled.”). 
25. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). 
26. Id. 
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find himself trying to run for a touchdown when basketball rules are in 
effect.”27  Woe to that lawyer when the final score is tabulated. 
B. Distinguishing the Standard of Review from the Scope of  Review 
Standards of review must be carefully distinguished from the scope of 
review.  The standard of review is the framework by which a reviewing court 
determines whether the trial court erred.28  By comparison, the scope of 
review describes that portion of the appellate record a reviewing court may 
examine to determine whether the trial court erred.29  It asks: “Does the 
appellate court review the entire record or only some portion of the record 
to determine error?”30  The scope of review includes the issues presented 
on appeal and the record relevant to the appellate complaints.  Because the 
appropriate standard of review and scope of review generally determine the 
outcome of an appeal, a litigant must shape the factual and legal arguments 
in a manner that will satisfy the relevant standard as applied to the relevant 
evidence. 
C. Typical Standards of Review in Texas 
There are three major standards of review described in this Article: de 
novo, abuse of discretion, and sufficiency of the evidence.  Of these main 
standards, de novo is the most helpful for the appellate practitioner because 
it permits the court of appeals to take a completely fresh look at the trial 
court’s rulings.31  The availability of de novo review, however, is limited to 
relatively few trial court rulings and needs no in-depth analysis.32 
On the other hand, the second standard—abuse of discretion—is the 
most frequently used; yet its application may be the most onerous from an 
 
27. Godbold, supra note 7, at 811.  
28. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining the purpose of the standard of review). 
29. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.03, at 1-18 to 1-19 (4th ed. 2010). 
30. See Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Tex. 2001) (Baker, J., 
dissenting, joined by Hankinson & O’Neill, JJ.) (noting abuse of discretion was traditionally reviewed 
based on the entire record, but observing that a rule change now expressly allows review based on a 
partial record when factual sufficiency or legal sufficiency is the issue). 
31. See Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156–57 (Tex. 2004) (stating the 
court reviews a summary judgment de novo and takes “as true all evidence favorable to the 
nonmovant” (citing Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Sci. Spectrum, Inc. 
v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997))); Kutner v. Russell, 658 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1983) (en banc) (Onion, J., dissenting) (defining “de novo” and providing the constitutional and 
statutory sources of “trial de novo”). 
32. See infra Part IV(O) (discussing joinder) and Part IV(R) (discussing personal jurisdiction). 
11
Hall and Anderson: Standards of Review in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1110 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1099 
appellate practitioner’s point of view.33  Accordingly, an entire section of 
this Article is devoted to its explication. 
Likewise, this Article focuses extensively on the history and scope of the 
third major standard of review: sufficiency of the evidence.  This standard 
typically applies following either a jury trial or bench trial.34  Specialized 
evidentiary review may apply to certain types of cases, as in family matters 
or administrative agency appeals.35 
II.    ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A. Abuse of Discretion Generally 
Perhaps no standard of review is subject to more misuse than the most 
common standard: abuse of discretion.36  Lawyers often wonder how 
appellate courts can make “abuse of discretion” mean so many different 
things.37  Indeed, one appellate court judge lamented that the abuse of 
discretion standard “means everything and nothing at the same time[.]”38  
One appellate court panel’s view of an abuse of discretion can be another 
panel’s notion of a completely reasonable decision.39  Similar to identifying 
hard-core pornography, knowing when there has been an abuse of 
discretion, for most appellate judges, tracks Justice Stewart’s famous line: “I 
know it when I see it[.]”40  
 
33. See Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173 (1978) 
(“Discretion is a pervasive yet elusive concept . . . .”). 
34. See Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing a jury verdict 
for sufficiency of the evidence); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 
(describing the history of sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal of a jury verdict), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
35. See infra Part III(C)(1) (discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard) and 
Part III(C)(2) (discussing administrative agency appeals). 
36. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 176–180 (recognizing various degrees of discretion). 
37. Id. at 173–74. 
38. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no 
writ). 
39. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939) 
(“Naturally appellate courts will differ on the delicate question of whether trial courts have abused their 
discretion.”). 
40. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the difficulty 
to “define what may be indefinable” as to the kinds of material that fall within the description of “hard-
core pornography”). 
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Appellate courts have understandable difficulty in applying the abuse of 
discretion standard consistently.41  This difficulty is inherent in the standard 
itself.  To suggest that the abuse of discretion standard is a concept “not 
easily defined”42 or “not susceptible to rigid definition”43 is an 
understatement.  “[J]udicial attempts to define the concept almost routinely 
take the form of merely substituting other terms that are equally unrefined, 
variable, subjective, and conclusory.”44  Consequently, it is often easier for 
a reviewing court to state what is not an abuse of discretion than to 
determine what is an abuse of discretion.45  As a result, the amorphous 
concept of abuse of discretion often fails to assist either appellate courts or 
trial courts in deciding cases, and it also makes briefing difficult for appellate 
lawyers.46  Therefore, as one court observed: “An appeal directed toward 
demonstrating an abuse of discretion is one of the tougher appellate 
propositions.”47 
All too often the primary problem with appellate court application of the 
abuse of discretion standard of review to trial court rulings is the tendency 
to assume that the standard is “absolute discretion” rather than “abuse of 
discretion” and the reviewing court never appears to engage in a thorough 
and substantial analysis of the trial court’s ruling for an “abuse.”48  When 
that occurs, it constitutes ineffective or no review.  Too often, it seems, that 
 
41. See, e.g., Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 62–77 (2000) (elaborating on different appellate cases and approaches to 
abuse of discretion). 
42. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934 (quoting Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (per curiam)). 
43. Hodson v. Keiser, 81 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (citing Lindsey 
v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934). 
44. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934 (citing Landry v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 
1970); Johnson v. City of Richardson, 206 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1947, no writ); Cty. Sch. 
Trs. of Callahan Cty. v. Dist. Trs. of Dist. No. 15 (Hart) Common Sch. Dist. of Callahan Cty., 
192 S.W.2d 891, 898 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brazos River Conservation & 
Reclamation Dist. v. Harmon, 178 S.W.2d 281, 292–93 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.); 
Bobbitt v. Gordon, 108 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1937, no writ) (per curiam)). 
45. See id. at 936 (describing a hypothetical example of when a court has not abused its 
discretion). 
46. See Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1965) (reasoning an abuse of discretion 
“must necessarily depend upon the peculiar facts of the case”); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 
(1st Cir. 1954) (attempting to define “abuse of discretion” without making it “sound[ ] worse than it 
really is”). 
47. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 592. 
48. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 184 (“[T]oo much discretion in too many areas is now 
being accorded to trial judges by appellate courts.”).  
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the default ruling on appeal is that there is “no abuse of discretion” or “no 
clear abuse of discretion” and to consistently affirm the trial court’s ruling 
without substantively analyzing the trial court’s decision other than to 
conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred.   
B. Abuse of Discretion in Texas 
The development of the abuse of discretion standard varies between 
jurisdictions and over time.49  In Texas, abuse of discretion is routinely 
defined in the following manner: “The test for abuse of discretion is not 
whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an 
appropriate case for the trial court’s action.”50  Rather, a trial court abuses 
its discretion if its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference 
to [any] guiding [rules and] principles”51 or is “‘so arbitrary and 
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’”52 
By requiring the trial court’s conduct to be arbitrary or unreasonable as a 
condition of reversal, Texas appellate courts acknowledge the discretion trial 
 
49. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 50–51 (2000).  Over fifty years of California case law recites the abuse of 
discretion standard as follows: “In a legal sense discretion is abused whenever in the exercise of its 
discretion the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.”  
Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 453, 456 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (citing Makzoume v. Makzoume, 
123 P.2d 72, 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)).  Early Texas decisions suggested that an “‘abuse of 
discretion . . . implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, 
or moral delinquency.’”  Bobbitt, 108 S.W.2d at 238 (quoting Grayson County v. Harrell, 202 S.W. 160, 
163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1918, writ ref’d)). 
50. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985); Cire v. 
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). 
51. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996) (citing Downer, 
701 S.W.2d at 241); accord Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 766 (Tex. 2006) (Medina, 
J., dissenting, joined by Wainwright & Johnson, JJ.) (“A court abuses its discretion when it renders an 
arbitrary decision, lacking support in the facts and circumstances of the case.” (citing Goode v. 
Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997); Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 
(Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part by In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, 
L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding))).  
52. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Walker v. Packer, 
827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 
83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917).  The abuse of discretion standard 
in Texas has been compared to “the federal standard of ‘clearly erroneous.’”  See Goode, 943 S.W.2d 
at 446 (observing the two standards are “similar, although not identical”).  In Goode, one supreme court 
justice observed in a concurring opinion that it is debatable whether any real difference exists between 
the two standards.  Id. at 454 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).  But see Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 
508, 515 (Tex. 2008) (suggesting the federal clearly erroneous standard is distinct from the Texas abuse 
of discretion standard). 
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courts must have to judge the credibility of witnesses and make decisions 
within broad legal parameters.53  At the same time, it is only by requiring 
trial courts to follow guiding rules and principles that appellate courts can 
impose some measure of control over ad hoc decision making.54  The trial 
court’s action is reasonable, and therefore not an abuse of discretion, only 
when the court exercises its discretion within the correct legal parameters.55  
Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[t]he trial court 
abuses its discretion when its decision lies ‘outside the zone of reasonable 
disagreement.’”56  
“[T]he abuse of discretion standard is typically applied to procedural or 
other trial management” decisions, either when challenged on appeal or by 
original proceeding.57  At its core, “discretion” means choice.58  To find an 
abuse of discretion, the reviewing court “must determine that the facts and 
circumstances presented ‘extinguish any discretion [or choice] in the 
matter.’”59  Therefore, simply because a trial court has exercised its 
discretion to decide a matter differently than a reviewing court under similar 
circumstances does not establish an abuse of discretion.60  In other words, 
the reviewing court “may not substitute its own judgment for the trial 
 
53. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., dissenting, joined by 
Enoch, J.) (“The abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that these functions rest with the 
trial court and not the appellate court.”). 
54. See In re R.R., 26 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding) (“A trial 
court’s wrong decision in applying or analyzing the law, even in an unsettled area of the law, is an abuse 
of discretion.” (citing Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927–28 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding))). 
55. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (“[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the 
law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
56. Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Apolinar v. State, 
155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). 
57. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000). 
58. See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 175 (“The basic idea that discretion conveys is choice.”). 
59. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex. v. Bridewell, 946 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Waco 
1997, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (quoting F.A. Richard & Assoc. v. 
Millard, 856 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)); see In re Nitla 
S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (noting a reviewing court 
may not set aside a trial court’s order unless the record clearly shows that the court could only arrive 
at one decision). 
60. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (“[T]he court of 
appeals may not reverse for abuse of discretion merely because it disagrees with a decision by the trial 
court . . . .”); Jones v. Strayhorn, 321 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. 1959) (“The mere fact or circumstance that 
a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a manner different from what an 
appellate judge would decide if placed in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of 
discretion has occurred.”). 
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court’s judgment.”61  This discretion insulates the trial judge’s reasonable 
choice “from appellate second guessing.”62  Where a party challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a discretionary decision, courts often 
employ a two-pronged analysis: “(1) Did the trial court have sufficient 
information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court 
err in its application of discretion?”63 
There are at least two instances in which a perceived error does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  First, “[a] mere error of judgment is not 
an abuse of discretion.”64  Second, a trial court does not “‘abuse its 
discretion if it reaches the right result’” for the wrong reason.65  These 
exceptions demonstrate that appellate court standards permit a trial judge a 
limited right to be wrong without being reversed. 
One appellate court described four ways in which a trial court commits 
an abuse of discretion:66 (1) a court abuses its discretion if it attempts to 
exercise a power of discretion that it does not legally possess;67 (2) a court 
abuses its discretion if it declines to exercise a power of discretion vested to 
 
61. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Flores v. 
Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)); Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422; 
see Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41 (indicating a lower court’s decision should not be altered absent an abuse 
of discretion). 
62. Brazil v. Khater, 223 S.W.3d 418, 420 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) (citing Bowie, 
79 S.W.3d at 52). 
63. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). 
64. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 841–42 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see Kolfeldt v. 
Thoma, 822 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) 
(suggesting “[a] mere error in judgment” still has some basis in reason and law); Air Prods. & Chems., 
Inc. v. Sanderson, 789 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) 
(per curiam) (noting “a mere error in judgment” becomes abusive when the order is “so unreasonable, 
so arbitrary, or based upon so gross and prejudicial an error of law as to have no basis in reason or in 
law”). 
65. Bruce Terminix Co. v. Carroll, 953 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. 
proceeding) (quoting Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig. 
proceeding)), mand. granted In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); 
Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, writ denied); Luxenberg, 
835 S.W.2d at 142. 
66. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 937–40 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no 
writ); see Minns v. Piotrowski, 904 S.W.2d 161, 168 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ denied) (referring to 
the abuse of discretion analysis applied in Landon), overruled in part on other grounds by Van Es v. Frazier, 
230 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied); Stephens v. Stephens, 877 S.W.2d 801, 805 
(Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied) (applying the Landon abuse of discretion analysis). 
67. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 937. 
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it by law when the circumstances require that the power be exercised;68 (3) a 
court abuses its discretion if it purports to exercise its discretion without 
sufficient information upon which a rational decision may be made, as 
reflected in the appellate record;69 and (4) a court abuses its discretion if it 
exercises its power of discretion by making an erroneous choice as a matter 
of law, in one of the following ways: (i) by making a choice that is “not 
within the range of choices permitted by law”;70 (ii) by arriving at its choice 
in violation of an “applicable legal rule, principle, or criterion”;71 or (iii) by 
making a choice that is “legally unreasonable in the factual-legal context in 
which it [is] made.”72 
The following chart may assist the reader in analyzing the abuse of 
discretion standard of review and its application to a particular challenged 
error. 
 
C. Texas Mandamus Proceedings 
A writ of mandamus is an order from a court, usually to an inferior court, 
commanding the performance of some action.73  To be entitled to a writ of 
 
68. Id. at 938. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 939. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
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mandamus in a Texas civil suit, the relator or party seeking relief must 
establish: (1) that the ruling of the trial court constitutes a clear abuse of 
discretion and (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law.74  The relator has 
the burden of establishing both requirements of mandamus relief.75  
Because the writ of mandamus is discretionary, “its denial, without 
comment on the merits, cannot deprive another appellate court from 
considering the matter in a subsequent appeal.”76 
While writs of mandamus are the most common invocation of original 
jurisdiction in appellate courts,77 mandamus proceedings are not the only 
writs available to appellate courts.78  Of the various forms of extraordinary 
relief, the writ of prohibition is most like the writ of mandamus.79  A writ 
of prohibition “operates like an injunction issued by a superior court to 
control, limit[,] or prevent action in a court of inferior jurisdiction.”80  The 
 
74. In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re CSX 
Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).  See generally In re McAllen Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 467–68 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (describing Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 
504 (Tex. 1843), as the seminal mandamus decision in Texas allowing for mandamus to issue when 
“other modes of redress are inadequate or tedious” or when mandamus is simply the better remedy 
(quoting id. at 506)).  Before the 1950s, “the writ of mandamus issued only to compel the performance 
of a ministerial act or duty.”  Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) 
(citing Wortham v. Walker, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1150 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding); Arberry v. Beavers, 
6 Tex. 457, 463 (1851); Helen A. Cassidy, The Instant Freeze-Dried Guide to Mandamus Procedure in Texas 
Courts, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 510 (1990); Tim Gavin, Comment, The Expanding Use of Mandamus to 
Review Texas District Court Discovery Orders: An Immediate Appeal Is Available, 32 SW. L.J. 1283, 1288 
(1979)).  That rule is still followed in criminal cases, where “[m]andamus relief may be granted if the 
relator shows . . . (1) that the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial and (2) that there is no 
adequate remedy at law.”  Winters v. Presiding Judge of Criminal Dist. Court No. Three of Tarrant 
Cty., 118 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds by TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(c). 
75. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 151. 
76. Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing In re AIU Ins. 
Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). 
77. For a thorough and comprehensive discussion of mandamus proceedings in Texas, see 
Justice Marialyn Barnard, Lorien Whyte, & Emmanuel Garcia, Is My Case Mandamusable?: A Guide to the 
Current State of Texas Mandamus Law, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143 (2014). 
78. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002 (describing numerous writs available to justices of 
the Texas Supreme Court); id. § 22.221 (explaining the writ power of courts of appeals); Ex parte Jones, 
97 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam) (illustrating a court’s authority to consider 
applications for the “writ of habeas corpus, . . . writs of prohibition[,] and other extraordinary 
matters”). 
79. E.g., Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 676 n.4 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (noting a 
writ of mandamus compels an action while a writ of prohibition blocks one). 
80. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding) 
(citing City of Houston v. City of Palestine, 267 S.W. 663, 665 (Tex. 1924)).  In contrast, an appellate 
“writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy” used “to determine disputed questions about the 
18
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two-step formula for granting mandamus relief also applies to the writ of 
prohibition.81 
1. “Clear” Abuse of Discretion 
Because the abuse of discretion standard applies in both appeals and 
mandamus actions, the question arises whether there is any distinction 
between the standard of review on appeal and that required for the issuance 
of mandamus relief.82  Many courts have observed, with regard to whether 
“error” has in fact occurred for purposes of mandamus, that writs of 
mandamus issue generally only for a “clear” abuse of discretion.83  Other 
courts, however, have granted writs of mandamus without any reference as 
to whether the trial court’s abuse of discretion was “clear.”84  On appeal, 
error is usually couched in terms of abuse of discretion—without any 
discussion of whether the abuse needs to be “clear.”85 
 
proper person entitled to hold a public office and exercise its functions.”  State ex rel. Angelini v. 
Hardberger, 932 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (citing State ex. rel. R.C. Jennett v. 
Owens, 63 Tex. 261, 270 (1885) (orig. proceeding)); cf. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 66.001 
(providing for a quo warranto cause of action).  A writ of procedendo is an appellate “court’s order to 
an inferior court to execute judgment.”  See Cavazos v. Hancock, 686 S.W.2d 284, 285 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1985, orig. proceeding) (citing Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. Bounds, 277 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex. 
App.—Waco 1925, no writ) (explaining the remedy of a writ of procedendo). 
81. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 676 n.4 (noting that the “same principles” control the use of writs 
of mandamus and prohibition); see also Ex parte Chi, 256 S.W.3d 702, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 
(applying a two-part test for the writ of prohibition); In re Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding) (recognizing the two-part test for the writ of prohibition). 
82. See Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (noting Texas appellate courts use 
the “abuse of discretion” standard to review many trial court decisions); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 
833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (distinguishing the “abuse of discretion” standard under 
different circumstances). 
83. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) 
(orig. proceeding); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In 
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). 
84. See In re E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 289 S.W.3d 861, 861–62 (Tex. 2009) (orig. 
proceeding) (holding trial court abused its discretion without discussing whether the abuse was clear); 
In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(concluding there was an abuse of discretion without finding clear error).  Of note, the court in Van 
Waters granted mandamus relief in a per curiam opinion, 145 S.W.3d at 206, while the court in Du Pont 
granted mandamus relief without oral argument, 289 S.W.3d at 862.  The court may not have described 
the trial court’s abuse of discretion as “clear,” but the procedural posture and relief granted suggest a 
contrary position. 
85. E.g., Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446 (noting Texas has used the “abuse of discretion” standard in 
reviewing various trial court decisions without any mention of the abuse being “clear”).  Many courts, 
however, will describe the trial court’s discretion as “broad,” which raises many of the same concerns 
as those raised here regarding the necessity and usefulness of any adjective describing a court’s 
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In a mandamus proceeding, it is clear—no pun intended—that the courts 
do impose upon relators a more rigorous standard.86  Perhaps the courts 
simply need to define why a heightened abuse of discretion standard is 
required in mandamus proceedings and define that standard in more 
concrete terms.  Some federal appellate courts hold that a relator is entitled 
to mandamus relief only where there is a strong showing of prejudice, and 
the error “‘so infect[s] the process that it compels the court to consider the 
issue[.]’”87  Under this standard, it is not the trial court’s error that compels 
the reviewing court to grant mandamus relief; rather, the extraordinary 
circumstances of the case compel mandamus relief.88  This statement of an 
abuse of discretion seems to blend into the Texas Supreme Court’s most 
recent test for determining whether an adequate remedy at law precludes 
mandamus relief.89 
2. Adequate Remedy at Law 
Texas courts and commentators alike have struggled to define when an 
appeal is not adequate for purposes of mandamus relief.90  In a 1992 
decision, Walker v. Packer,91 the Texas Supreme Court seemed to narrow the 
inadequacy requirement by rejecting authorities that glossed over this 
 
discretion.  See Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 210 (observing a trial court’s historically broad discretion to 
grant a new trial); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 598 (Tex. 2008) (describing a trial court’s 
discretion to award fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act as broad). 
86. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), 
abrogated in part by Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213; In re Acadia Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 777, 779 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, orig. proceeding). 
87. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FEDERAL 
CIVIL CASES AND REVIEW PROCESS § 4.22, at 294 (1986) (quoting P. Davis, Tips for Obtaining a Civil 
Writ, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1985, at 55, 55). 
88. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137 (reasoning whether there is an adequate remedy at law such 
that mandamus relief is precluded depends upon the particular circumstances of each case); see also In 
re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (discussing how a cost-
benefit analysis of interlocutory review is dependent upon the circumstances of the case rather than 
the type of case). 
89. See, e.g., McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 469 (noting public and private interests inherent in each case 
inform whether appeal is adequate). 
90. See id. at 465, 468 (setting out specific cases where appeal was found to be inadequate for 
mandamus relief); Richard E. Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas Supreme 
Court: One More “Mile Marker Down the Road of No Return,” 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 5–6, 96 n.359 (2007) 
(describing when an appeal is an inadequate remedy in the context of discovery disputes); William E. 
Barker, Comment, The Only Guarantee Is There Are No Guarantees: The Texas Supreme Court’s Inability to 
Establish a Mandamus Standard, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 709 (2007) (discussing when appeal is an 
inadequate remedy entitling parties to mandamus relief). 
91. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). 
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element.92  The court held that appeal was not “inadequate merely because 
it might involve more delay or cost than mandamus[,]” and it outlined 
several specific categories in the discovery context where mandamus relief 
would be appropriate.93 
The standard announced by Walker seemed to work well for two decades 
until a sharply divided court issued two substantively related cases on the 
same day in 2004: In re AIU Insurance Co.94 and In re Prudential Insurance Co. 
of America.95  In Prudential, the court appeared to broaden the inadequacy 
requirement by stating that “[a]n appellate remedy is ‘adequate’ when any 
benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.  When the 
benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether 
the appellate remedy is adequate.”96 
The court observed that “adequate” defies “comprehensive definition; it 
is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations 
that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus 
proceedings to review the actions of lower courts.”97  The court noted that 
mandamus should be reserved for: 
[S]ignificant rulings in exceptional cases [when review] may be essential to 
preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or 
loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law 
that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare 
private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring 
eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.98 
 
92. Id. at 842. 
93. Id. at 842–44. 
94. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). 
95. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).  In both 
cases, the majority consisted of Justices Hecht, Owen, Smith, Wainwright, and Brister, and the dissent 
consisted of Chief Justice Phillips and Justices O’Neill, Jefferson, and Schneider.  A third, unsigned 
opinion that issued on September 3, 2004 also suggests that adequacy of appeal is a flexible concept.  
See In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(holding in a per curiam opinion that mandamus relief is not typically available for a trial court’s 
consolidation order, but nonetheless granting relief from one given the extraordinary circumstances 
present in the case).  See generally Pamela Stanton Baron, Texas Supreme Court Docket Analysis: September 1, 
2010, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 24TH ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE, 
ch. 3, at 8 (2010) (explaining that per curiam opinions require at least six votes). 
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In the wake of this broad language, some commentators expressed a 
concern the courts would be flooded with mandamus proceedings, which 
did not materialize at that time.99 
Four years later, in its 2008 McAllen opinion,100 the supreme court 
instructed that “[w]hether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately 
remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of 
interlocutory review.  As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it 
must be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat 
cases as categories.”101  The court insisted Prudential’s balancing test should 
not “entangle appellate courts in incidental trial court rulings any more than 
Walker’s ad hoc categorical approach.”102  According to the court, its 
balancing analysis “merely recognizes that the adequacy of an appeal 
depends on the facts involved in each case.”103  Similarly, whether the 
legislature has determined that a type of order is subject to interlocutory 
appeal is not dispositive in a case-by-case analysis.104 
In McAllen, a hospital sought mandamus relief when the trial court denied 
its motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ failure to file expert reports 
from a qualified expert as required by statute.105  The failure to dismiss was 
contrary to the legislative findings about a crisis in healthcare that could be 
addressed by requiring expert reports shortly after filing suit.106  With this 
background, the Texas Supreme Court was willing to grant the hospital’s 
mandamus petition despite previously denying similar petitions.107  The 
 
99. See Jerry D. Bullard, Mandamus in a Post-Prudential World, in S. TEX. COLL. OF LAW, CIVIL 
APPEALS FOR TRIAL LAWYERS, tab H, at H-9 (2006) (“[A]lthough the analysis is still continuing, it 
does not appear that Prudential has had a significant effect on mandamus jurisprudence”); Richard E. 
Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas Supreme Court: One More “Mile Marker 
Down the Road of No Return,” 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 143–45 (2007) (predicting a significant impact flowing 
from Prudential); Reagan W. Simpson & Aditi R. Dravid, Mandamus Update: The Aftermath of Prudential: 
Much Ado About Nothing?, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 21ST ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE 
PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 22, at 1 (2007) (explaining the impact of Prudential’s more lenient mandamus 
standards has been mild despite predictions to the contrary). 
100. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). 
101. Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136–37). 
102. Id. at 469. 
103. Id. 
104. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 
2009) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to set aside motion for new trial despite the fact 
the legislature had repealed a law allowing appeal of these orders). 
105. McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 462.  See infra Part IV(H)(4) for more information about this form 
of dismissal. 
106. McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 461, 469. 
107. Id. at 470 (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & O’Neill, J.). 
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court cautioned against automatic mandamus relief in future cases, noting a 
number of factors that might defeat mandamus relief.108 
One year after McAllen, the court revisited another category of cases 
where it had previously held a trial court’s use of discretion was not 
reviewable.109  In In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, 
L.P.,110 a sharply divided court concluded that “trial courts must give more 
explanation than ‘in the interest of justice’ for setting aside a jury 
verdict.”111  On its face, this ruling seems limited to the rare orders granting 
a new trial in the interest of justice.112  However, it appears that the number 
of mandamus proceedings being filed in appellate courts did expand in light 
of Columbia, McAllen, and the supreme court’s willingness to find appeal 
inadequate to categories of cases not previously subject to mandamus 
review.113   
In 2018, the supreme court held that when the trial court’s order would 
“‘skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, and 
compromise the presentation of [the relator’s] defense [or claims] in ways 
unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record[,]’” mandamus is proper.114 
 
108. Id. at 467; see In re Gladewater Healthcare Ctr., 279 S.W.3d 850, 852–53 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2009, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief from an order denying a motion to 
dismiss because, on the facts of the case, appeal would be an adequate remedy). 
109. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213.  But see Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 
700 S.W.2d 916, 916 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding a trial court does not abuse its discretion 
by granting a motion for new trial without explication of its finding when doing so is “in the interest 
of justice”), abrogated in part by Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. 
110. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) (orig. 
proceeding). 
111. Id. at 206.  The dissent seemed to agree with the basic idea that explanations for granting 
new trials in the interest of justice were preferable to no explanations, but the dissent rejected adopting 
such “a rule by judicial fiat on interlocutory review.”  Id. at 215 (O’Neill, J., dissenting, joined by 
Jefferson, C.J., & Medina & Green, JJ.). 
112. Id. at 206. 
113. Kurt H. Kuhn, Mandamus Is Not a Four-Letter Word, in AUSTIN BAR ASS’N, “A WHOLE 
NEW WORLD”: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TEXAS MANDAMUS PRACTICE, sec III, at 9–10 (2008) 
(collecting statistics about the number of mandamus filings in Texas appellate courts, which are not 
publicly available from the Texas Office of Court Administration).  At the very least, we now know 
that orders granting new trials in the interest of justice should provide detailed explanations.  Columbia, 
290 S.W.3d at 206.  It remains to be seen whether orders containing detailed explanations may be 
subject to mandamus relief and, if so, whether such orders will be subject to an abuse of discretion 
standard of review or a sufficiency standard. 
114. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam)). 
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The history of mandamus proceedings in Texas shows that categorizing 
orders for purposes of mandamus relief may make it easier to dispose of 
these cases, but such categorization oversimplifies the role of the appellate 
advocate and ignores the reality that each case is different.115  Regardless of 
the type of order challenged in a mandamus proceeding, appellate advocates 
should explain their rationale for seeking extraordinary relief,116 and 
appellate courts should likewise articulate their rationale for granting it.117  
For example, it is often said that if an order is void, the relator need not 
show the lack of an adequate appellate remedy.118  It is probably more 
accurate in light of recent precedent to say that when an order is void, appeal 
is inadequate because the potential waste of party and judicial resources 
weighs in favor of mandamus relief.119 
D. The Sliding Scale of Abuse of Discretion 
As this Article illustrates, a trial judge’s discretion may be applied to scores 
of situations and in many different ways.  Some trial court decisions are 
inherently discretionary,120 while others involve construction of rules or 
statutes and the consideration of facts that may be hotly contested.121  
Because the concept of discretion or choice defies uniform application to 
all situations, it is not surprising that the appellate courts’ review of 
 
115. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) 
(explaining why categorization must give way to relevant circumstances in each case). 
116. See In re Acadia Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, orig. 
proceeding) (recognizing it is complainant’s burden to establish how the trial court was unreasonable 
or arbitrary in its decision). 
117. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206 (acknowledging that appellate courts should 
explain their rulings). 
118. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(holding it unnecessary for relator to show inadequate remedy on appeal when court’s order was void); 
In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (pointing out that an 
order issued by a judge who refused to recuse himself when he was constitutionally prohibited from 
presiding over the trial entitled relator to mandamus without necessity of showing there was no 
adequate appellate remedy). 
119. See Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(reasoning a visiting judge’s void order could result in unnecessary incarceration for the relator); Buttery 
v. Betts, 422 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding) (holding relators were entitled to 
mandamus relief without resorting to “needless retrial and an appeal”). 
120. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. 
proceeding) (reiterating that matters of true discretion lie solely with the trial court), abrogated in part by 
Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. 
121. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) 
(holding mandamus proper where trial court abused its discretion for failing to follow a statute). 
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discretion is not uniform.  In the final analysis, appellate lawyers should not 
be misled into concluding that appellate judges approach every review of a 
trial judge’s discretion in the same manner or with the same level of interest, 
deference, or analysis. 
Often, reviewing courts simply refer to an “abuse” of discretion.122  
Other times, reviewing courts refer to a “clear” or “manifest” abuse of 
discretion.123  If “abuse of discretion” were a single standard, no advocate 
could ever show a “clear” abuse of discretion.  An “arbitrary, capricious, and 
irrational” decision remains so, no matter how “clear” or “manifest” it may 
be: zero times zero equals zero, just as one hundred times zero equals zero.  
In either situation, the trial court abused its discretion—whether a “clear” 
or “manifest” abuse or just an “abuse.” 
Characterizing the abuse as clear or manifest—or merely as run-of-the-
mill abuse—without more, is not useful or meaningful.  The descriptive 
types of abuse of discretion are perpetuated purely by habit rather than by 
any meaningful distinction.  If there are, in fact, varying degrees of the abuse 
of discretion standard of review, then the courts should spell out any 
intended differences or limitations.124  As Professor Rosenberg once 
observed, “To tame the concept [of abuse of discretion] requires no less 
than to force ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld, and to say so 
in a manner that provides assurance for today’s case and some guidance for 
tomorrow’s.”125 
III.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is typically 
considered to apply following a trial on the merits to the ultimate trier of 
fact, whether that is the jury or the judge.  This standard may also apply to 
pretrial rulings and may have specialized applications, as in family law 
matters.  The standard has a long, rich history in Texas jurisprudence, on 
 
122. E.g., Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (utilizing the traditional abuse 
of discretion standard in an appeal). 
123. See City of Dallas v. Vanesko, 189 S.W.3d 769, 771 (Tex. 2006) (holding the standard of 
review in a zoning case requires a “clear” abuse of discretion before reversing a zoning board’s 
decision); Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. 1984) (observing the 
trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial will not be revised absent a “manifest abuse of discretion”). 
124. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 764 (1982) (wanting 
initially to apply a uniform definition, but concluding that “the differences are not only defensible but 
essential”). 
125. Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 185.  
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both sides of the civil and criminal dockets, which should be considered by 
an appellate advocate crafting a sufficiency challenge. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence in Jury Trials 
In Texas, jury findings have long been the subject of appellate review to 
determine the sufficiency of the evidence in support of those findings.  In 
addition to the “legal sufficiency” standard employed in most jurisdictions, 
Texas is one of only three jurisdictions (in addition to New York and the 
U.S. military courts) that also utilizes the less deferential “factual 
sufficiency” standard, which permits the court to consider the weight of the 
evidence.126 
The standards and scope of legal and factual sufficiency review have not 
remained static, but have slowly evolved.  In particular, commentators 
continue to assess the impact of the Texas Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
in City of Keller v. Wilson,127 which re-evaluated the standard for legal 
sufficiency challenges in civil cases.128  After significant debate, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals recently eliminated the factual sufficiency 
standard of review “in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
 
126. See 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012) (“The [Military] Court of Criminal Appeals may act only with 
respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.  It may affirm only such 
findings . . . it finds correct in law and fact . . . .  In considering the record, it may weigh the evidence, 
judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the 
trial court saw and heard the witnesses.”); People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 673 (N.Y. 1987) (noting 
the lower court’s error in failing to conduct statutorily required factual sufficiency review). 
127. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005). 
128. See generally William V. Dorsaneo, III, Evolving Standards of Evidentiary Review: Revising the Scope 
of Review, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 225, 240–41 (2005) (illustrating differences between inclusive and exclusive 
standards of review); W. Wendell Hall & Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil 
and Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 549–52 (2008) (describing the standards of review in 
Texas as they pertain to the roles of the judge and jury in both civil and criminal trials); W. Wendell 
Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 234–47 (2006) (discussing legal sufficiency 
challenges in light of the Texas Supreme Court decision in City of Keller); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of 
Review in Texas, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 165–66 (2002) (suggesting contradictions in Texas case law with 
regard to the jury’s role in determining sufficiency of the evidence); Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the 
Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing the court’s 
Harmer decision “is an unwelcome attack on the finality of jury verdicts”); David E. Keltner et al., No 
Evidence Review: The Scope and Standard of Legal Sufficiency Review After City of Keller, in STATE BAR OF 
TEX., 22ND ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 16, at 1–2 (2008) 
(discussing how City of Keller defined exclusive and inclusive standards of review); Thomas R. Phillips 
& Martha G. Newton, Evolving Notions of “No Evidence,” in STATE BAR OF TEX., PRACTICE BEFORE 
THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, ch. 12.3, at 2–6 (2007) (interpreting recent Texas Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the no evidence standard of review). 
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support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”129 
1. Legal Insufficiency 
As discussed throughout this Article, at various stages before, during, or 
after a trial, a trial court may be asked to rule on the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence.130  If properly preserved,131 challenges to the legal sufficiency of 
the evidence for a jury’s verdict may also be brought as an issue in the courts 
of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court.132 
a. City of Keller v. Wilson 
In City of Keller, the Texas Supreme Court recognized both of the different 
scopes of review applicable to no evidence cases.133  The court held, 
however, that whether the legal sufficiency scope of review was all of the 
evidence or only the evidence favorable to the jury’s verdict made no real 
difference,134 and the difference between the inclusive and exclusive 
standards was “more semantic than real.”135  Whether a reviewing court 
 
129. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).  See generally Hall & Emery, 
supra note 128, at 580 (noting the court in Watson almost “ended the use of factual sufficiency review 
in the bulk of cases”). 
130. See infra Part IV(Y) (summary judgment); Part V(I) (directed verdict); Part VI(B) (motion 
to disregard); Part VI(C) (JNOV). 
131. In a jury trial, challenges to the legal insufficiency of the evidence are preserved by: “(1) a 
motion for instructed verdict, (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) an objection 
to the submission of the issue to the jury, (4) a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact 
issue[,] or (5) a motion for new trial” specifically raising the complaint.  Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 
510–11 (Tex. 1991) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985)); 
Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. 1987); Aero Energy, 699 S.W.2d 
at 822; accord TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (“The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the 
nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief 
to which he may be entitled . . . .  Provided, that upon motion and reasonable notice the court may 
render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and provided 
further that the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding on a question that 
has no support in the evidence.”). 
132. See Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 44 S.W. 69, 69–70 (1898) (recognizing the 
courts of appeals and the supreme court have jurisdiction to review challenges to the legal sufficiency 
of the evidence). 
133. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. 2005) (acknowledging both 
“exclusive” and “inclusive” standards for review of legal sufficiency have been used). 
134. Id. at 821–22. 
135. See id. at 825–27 (discussing the holding in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 149–51 (2000), and noting the different scopes of review are “more semantic than real” and that 
reviewing courts should review all of the evidence in the record). 
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reviews all of the evidence or only part of the evidence in a legal sufficiency 
review, “there can be no disagreement about where that review should 
end[:]”136 
The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial 
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under 
review.  Whether a reviewing court begins by considering all the evidence or 
only the evidence supporting the verdict, legal-sufficiency review in the proper 
light must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard 
contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.137 
“A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier-of-
fact, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable 
disagreement.”138 
The supreme court did not appear to view City of Keller as a sharp change 
in doctrine, but rather an incremental change that reflected the standards of 
review in practice.139  The court stated: “[T]he traditional rule in Texas has 
never been that appellate courts must reject contrary evidence in every no-
evidence review.”140  The traditional scope of review does not disregard 
contrary evidence if: (1) there is no favorable evidence;141 (2) contrary 
evidence renders supporting evidence incompetent;142 or (3) “the evidence 
establishes conclusively the opposite of [a] vital fact.”143 
i. Types of Evidence that Cannot Be Disregarded 
In City of Keller, the court outlined several kinds of evidence that cannot 
be disregarded when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence:144 
 
136. Id. at 822. 
137. Id. at 827. 
138. Id. at 822 (citing William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and 
“Insufficient Evidence,” 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 517–20 (1991)). 
139. Id. at 827–28; see Phillips & Newton, supra note 128, at 6 (suggesting the “[t]he uproar over 
the . . . City of Keller decision[ ] has been disproportional to the incremental nature of [the] opinion[ ],” 
as City of Keller was “more about clarifying existing law than inventing new law”). 
140. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. 
141. See id. (noting the court must sustain a no evidence point when there is a “complete absence 
of evidence of a vital fact” (quoting Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of 
Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1960))). 
142. See id. (recognizing the court must also sustain a no evidence point when “the court is 
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital 
fact” (quoting Calvert, supra note 141, at 362–63)). 
143. Id. (quoting Calvert, supra note 141, at 362–63). 
144. See id. at 811–12 (describing when courts may not disregard contrary evidence). 
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Contextual evidence.  The court cited the following as examples: defamation 
cases, where the entire publication must be considered;145 contract cases, 
where the entire contract is reviewed;146 and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress cases, where “‘the context and the relationship between 
the parties’” is considered.147  Accordingly, as noted by the court: 
[I]f evidence may be legally sufficient in one context but insufficient in 
another, the context cannot be disregarded even if that means rendering 
judgment contrary to the jury’s verdict.  Either “evidence contrary to the 
verdict” must be defined to exclude material contextual evidence, or it must 
be an exception to the general rule.148 
Competency evidence.  Incompetent evidence has always been “insufficient 
to support a judgment, even if admitted without objection.”149  The court 
in City of Keller stated that “evidence showing it to be incompetent [evidence] 
cannot be disregarded, even if the result is contrary to the verdict.”150  For 
instance, “if an eyewitness’s location renders a clear view of an accident 
‘physically impossible,’ it is no evidence of what occurred,” regardless of the 
witness’s testimony to the contrary.151  This rule also applies “[w]hen expert 
testimony is required[;] lay evidence supporting liability is legally 
insufficient.”152  Additionally, when an expert’s opinion fails to meet the 
reliability standards, a review of the expert’s testimony cannot disregard his 
testimony that demonstrates that his opinion does not meet the reliability 
standards.153  As the court observed, the evidence at issue might be some 
 
145. Id. at 811. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 811 (quoting Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); then 
citing Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610–11 (Tex. 2002); GTE Sw., Inc. v. 
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999)). 
148. Id. at 812. 
149. Id. at 812 (citing Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 
232 n.1 (Tex. 2004)). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. (quoting Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 75 S.W. 4, 6 (1903)). 
152. Id. (citing Bowles v. Bourdon, 219 S.W.2d 779, 782–83 (Tex. 1949)). 
153. See id. at 813 (“[R]eview of an expert’s damage estimates cannot disregard the expert’s 
admission on cross-examination that none can be verified.” (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 
133 S.W.3d 245, 254–57 (Tex. 2004), abrogated in part by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 
268 S.W.3d 1, 18–19 (Tex. 2008))); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714, 
720 (Tex. 1997) (adhering to the notion that courts should examine more than an expert’s bare opinion 
to determine if the evidence is reliable). 
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evidence in isolation, but it is no evidence when contrary evidence 
demonstrates that it is incompetent.154 
Circumstantial evidence.  When inferences must be considered in 
determining a no evidence challenge, the reviewing court must “view each 
piece of circumstantial evidence, not in isolation, but in light of all the 
known circumstances.”155  Again, the court provided examples: (1) one 
fact-finder “might infer from [grocery] cart tracks in spilled macaroni salad 
that it had been on the floor a long time, but” another might conclude that 
it just occurred;156 and (2) when there is an “injury or death[,] . . . [no 
eyewitnesses,] and only meager circumstantial evidence” suggesting an 
explanation, the court “cannot disregard other meager evidence of equally 
likely causes.”157  Therefore, “when the circumstantial evidence of a vital 
fact is meager, [the] reviewing court must . . . [review] all the circumstantial 
evidence . . . and competing inferences[,]” not just the favorable 
evidence.158 
Conclusive evidence.  The court noted Justice Calvert’s observation that, in a 
no evidence review, “Texas courts . . . do not disregard contrary evidence 
that conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.”159  There are many 
forms of conclusive evidence.160  One form of conclusive evidence is found 
when the evidence is undisputed.  As the court explained, a reviewing court 
“cannot ‘disregard undisputed evidence that allows of only one logical 
inference[,]’”161 and “[b]y definition . . . [leaves] reasonable jurors [to] reach 
only one conclusion from it.”162  The court then noted that “undisputed 
contrary evidence [generally] becomes conclusive . . . when it concerns 
physical facts that cannot be denied.”163  The court provided the following 
examples: (1) “no evidence supports an impaired-access claim if it is 
undisputed that access remains along 90 percent of a tract’s frontage”;164 
 
154. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 813 (recognizing evidence may seem to be competent when 
viewed alone, but not when viewed in light of other evidence). 
155. Id. at 813–14 (quoting Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 167 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam)). 
156. Id. at 814 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1998)). 
157. Id. (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); W. 
Tel. Corp. of Tex. v. McCann, 99 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937)). 
158. Id.  
159. Id. at 814 (citing Calvert, supra note 141, at 363–64). 
160. Id.  
161. Id. (quoting St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 519–20 (Tex. 2002) (plurality 
opinion)). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 815. 
164. Id. (citing County of Bexar v. Santikos, 144 S.W.3d 455, 460–61 (Tex. 2004)). 
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(2) “[e]vidence that a buyer believed a product had been repaired is 
conclusively negated by a[ ] . . . letter to the contrary”;165 and (3) “an 
insured’s liability has not been determined by an ‘actual trial’ if the insured 
did not appear, present evidence, or challenge anything presented by his 
opponent.”166  Undisputed conclusive evidence may also be conclusive 
when a party admits that the evidence of a vital fact is true.167 
The second form of conclusive evidence arises when “the evidence is 
disputed.”168  The court observed that “[u]ndisputed evidence and 
conclusive evidence are not the same—undisputed evidence may or may not 
be conclusive, and conclusive evidence may or may not be undisputed.”169  
For example, a mother may testify that she had sex with only one man 
during the relevant time that she became pregnant, even though the 
purported father’s “blood test[ ] conclusively proved he was not the . . . 
father” of the child.170  Because the blood test is conclusive, “there [would 
be] no evidence to support the paternity verdict” against the purported 
father.171  The court concluded that while “reviewing courts [cannot] 
substitut[e] their opinions on credibility for those of the jurors, . . . jurors 
[likewise cannot] substitut[e] their opinions for [the] undisputed truth.”172 
Clear and convincing evidence.  In cases such as “parental termination, 
defamation, and punitive damages[,]” where there is an elevated standard of 
proof, the reviewing court must consider all of the evidence, not just the 
evidence favoring the verdict, in reviewing those judgments.173 
Consciousness evidence.  In cases involving an issue of “what a party knew or 
why it took a” particular action, such as assessing conscious indifference, 
bad faith denial of insurance coverage, employment discrimination, the right 
to governmental immunity, and the running of limitations under the 
 
165. Id. (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 
97–98 (Tex. 2004)). 
166. Id. (citing State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1998)). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 816. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. (citing Murdock v. Murdock, 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991)). 
171. Id. (citing Murdock v. Murdock, 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991)). 
172. Id. at 816–17. 
173. Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted) (first citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); then 
citing Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002); Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 
38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex. 2000); and then citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 
2004)). 
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discovery rule, the reviewing court must consider all of the evidence, not 
just the evidence favoring the verdict, in reviewing those judgments.174 
ii. Types of Evidence that Must Be Disregarded 
In City of Keller, the court also noted three kinds of evidence that must be 
disregarded:175 
Credibility evidence.  Because “[j]urors are the sole judges of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony[,]”176 jurors are free 
“to believe one witness and disbelieve another[,]”177 and “[r]eviewing 
courts [may not] impose their own opinions to the contrary.”178  
Accordingly, “reviewing courts must assume [that] jurors decided all 
[credibility questions] in favor of the verdict if reasonable human beings 
could do so.”179  The court emphasized “[t]he jury’s decisions regarding 
credibility must be reasonable.”180  For example, “[j]urors cannot 
[disregard] undisputed testimony that is . . . free from contradictions and 
inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.”181  Similarly, 
jurors “are not free to believe testimony that is conclusively negated by 
undisputed facts.”182  However, if “reasonable jurors could decide what 
testimony to [disbelieve, the] reviewing court must assume they did so in 
favor of their verdict,” and affirm the jury’s finding.183 
Conflicting evidence.  The court noted that it is within the jury’s province “to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence.”184  Consequently, when “reviewing all 
 
174. Id. at 817–18. 
175. See id. at 818–21 (describing evidence that should always be disregarded). 
176. Id. at 819 (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); 
Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1993); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 
697 (Tex. 1986); Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89, 93 (1849)). 
177. Id. (citing McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697; Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. 
1986); Ford v. Panhandle & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 252 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. 1952); Houston, E. & W.T. 
Ry. Co. v. Runnels, 47 S.W. 971, 972 (Tex. 1898)). 
178. Id. (citing Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120). 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 820 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 599 (Tex. 2002)) 
(reiterating the reasonableness standard for jury decisions regarding credibility). 
181. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tex. 
2002); In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. 2000); WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 
574 (Tex. 1998)). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. 1993); Lyons v. Millers 
Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 1993); Biggers v. Cont’l Bus Sys., Inc., 303 S.W.2d 
359, 365 (Tex. 1957); Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 13 S.W. 665, 667 (Tex. 1890)).  
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the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict[, the court] must assume that 
[the jury] resolved all conflicts” in the evidence consistent with the jury’s 
verdict.185  The court concluded that where “reasonable jurors could 
resolve conflicting evidence either way, [the] reviewing court[ ] must 
presume [that the jury] did so in favor of the [jury verdict], and disregard the 
conflicting evidence in their legal sufficiency review.”186 
Conflicting inferences.  The court held that “[e]ven if [the] evidence is 
undisputed, it is [within] the province of the jury to draw . . . whatever 
inferences they [choose], so long as more than one is possible and the jury” 
is not required to guess.187  Therefore, when the court reviews “all the 
evidence in a light [most] favorable to the [jury’s] verdict[,]” the reviewing 
court “must assume jurors made all inferences in favor of their verdict if 
reasonable minds could [do so], and disregard all other inferences in their 
legal sufficiency review.”188 
iii. The Reasonable Verdict Standard 
Despite the court’s detailed tour of evidence that cannot be disregarded 
and evidence that must be disregarded, the court’s decision in City of Keller is 
not as remarkable for defining the scope of review in legal sufficiency review 
as it is for repeatedly reminding the reviewing courts that regardless of the 
quantity and quality of the evidence presented, the jury’s verdict must be 
reasonable.189  The impact of City of Keller’s reformulation is readily apparent 
in the manner in which legal sufficiency standards are commonly stated in 
opinions.190  Additionally, in its emphasis on the reasonable juror standard, 
 
185. Id. (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Tex. 1999); Caller-Times 
Publ’g Co. v. Triad Commc’ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1992); Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d 
897, 899 (Tex. 1966)).  
186. Id. at 821. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. See generally id. at 807–30 (using the word “reasonable” forty-two times and the phrase 
“reasonable jurors” fifteen times). 
190. For example, in one case the Texas Supreme Court stated the standard of review simply 
as “[w]e review a summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors 
to differ in their conclusions.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (citing id. at 822–23).  City of Keller’s influence is also apparent in the many appellate court 
opinions citing to it.  See Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (applying the reasonable and fair-minded juror standard established in 
City of Keller); Canal Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 238 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied) 
(“When reviewing a finding of fact for legal sufficiency, we may set aside a finding of fact only if the 
evidence at trial would not enable a reasonable and fair minded finder of fact to make the finding under 
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City of Keller appears to bring Texas more closely in line with federal 
standards for legal sufficiency review.191  The test is not so much whether 
there is a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict, but whether the 
reviewing court believes that the evidence at trial would allow reasonable 
and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.192  Under the 
new standard, as the court says, it really does not matter whether one reviews 
the entire record or only that evidence that supports the verdict because the 
reviewing court may set aside the jury’s decision if a majority of the 
reviewing court finds that “reasonable and fair-minded people” could not 
have reached the verdict which is the subject of the appeal.193 
While the Texas Supreme Court has not yet repudiated the traditional 
“scintilla rule” or the “matter of law” rule, City of Keller’s use of the 
reasonable and fair-minded juror standard seems likely over time to erode 
those standards and the frame of reference through which a judge is required 
to consider the record evidence.  This raises the continuing possibility that 
the appellate courts may not as rigorously separate out evidence and may 
 
review.” (citing id. at 827)); Rosenblatt v. Freedom Life Ins. Co. of Am., 240 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“In applying the legal-sufficiency standard, we must credit 
evidence that supports the judgment if reasonable jurors could credit that evidence, and we must 
disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not disregard that evidence.” (citing id. 
at 827)). 
191. See W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 253–55 (2006) 
(comparing the comprehensive standard of review adopted by the Fifth Circuit and the standard of 
review in Texas).  In the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 decision in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 
1969) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997), 
the court adopted the inclusive, whole record approach to review of jury verdicts: 
[T]he Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non-
mover’s case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party 
opposed to the motion.  If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor 
of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, 
granting of the motions [for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict] is proper.  
On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of 
such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment 
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the 
jury.  A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. 
Id. at 374.  The key inquiry in both City of Keller and Shipman was whether fair-minded jurors could 
render a verdict on the evidence presented at trial.  See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and 
Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2000) (noting Shipman does not explain how the analytical 
process of reviewing all of the evidence “‘in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable 
to the party’” works (quoting Shipman, 411 F.2d at 374)). 
192. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (affirming the notion that 
the true inquiry is whether a fair-minded jury could find for a party by utilizing the evidence presented). 
193. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822. 
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simply ask more generally whether a verdict is “reasonable.”  This poses the 
problem that the appellate courts may weigh conflicting evidence and 
inferences on legal sufficiency review.  But, unlike most jurisdictions, Texas 
has a separate standard of review that permits the courts of appeal to engage 
in just such weighing of the evidence. 
2. Factual Insufficiency 
A “[f]actual sufficiency . . . [challenge] concede[s] conflicting evidence on 
an issue” (which made it appropriate for the jury to consider), “yet 
maintain[s] that the evidence against the jury’s finding is so great[,]” or the 
evidence for the jury’s finding is so weak, “as to make the finding 
erroneous.”194  Constitutionally, only the intermediate courts of appeals 
have jurisdiction to review for factual sufficiency.195 
When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence in 
a civil case, “the court of appeals must weigh all of the evidence in the 
record.”196  The court must “keep[ ] in mind that it is the jury’s role, not 
[the court’s], to judge the credibility of the evidence, to assign the weight to 
be given to testimony, and to resolve inconsistencies within or conflicts 
among the witnesses’ testimony.”197  “[T]he court . . . may not pass upon 
the witnesses’ credibility or substitute its judgment for that of the jury [or 
fact finder], even if the evidence would clearly support a different result.”198  
 
194. See Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (explaining the factual sufficiency standard). 
195. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). 
196. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Burnett v. Motyka, 
610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam)); see Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 
445 (Tex. 1989) (emphasizing that in a factual sufficiency review the court of appeals is required to 
consider all evidence in the record, not just evidence contrary to the verdict); Lofton v. Tex. Brine 
Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (holding the courts of appeals “must 
review all of the evidence” in their decision on a review of factual sufficiency (citing Garza v. Alviar, 
395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965))); Burnett, 610 S.W.2d at 736 (remanding the case back to the court of 
appeals for its failure to “consider and weigh all the evidence” in a factual sufficiency review). 
197. Walker v. Ricks, 101 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing 
Reyna v. First Nat’l Bank in Edinburg, 55 S.W.3d 58, 73 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)); 
see Corpus Christi Area Teachers Credit Union v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1991, no writ) (“[I]n considering an ‘insufficient evidence’ point, we must remain cognizant 
of the fact that it is for the jury, as the trier of fact, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to assign 
the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.” 
(quoting Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 719 S.W.2d 245, 249–50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.))). 
198. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor 
Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986)); see Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634–35 (disapproving of decisions by 
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A court of appeals must “detail the evidence . . . and clearly state why the 
jury’s finding is factually insufficient” when reversing a jury verdict,199 but 
it need not do so when affirming a jury verdict.200  However, when a court 
of appeals reviews a factual insufficiency challenge to a punitive damage 
award, the court must “detail the relevant evidence in its opinion, explaining 
why that evidence either supports or does not support the punitive damages 
award[.]”201 
“Factual sufficiency points of error are designated as ‘insufficient 
evidence points’ or ‘great weight and preponderance points,’ depending 
upon whether the complaining party had the burden of proof.”202 
a. Insufficient Evidence 
If a party is attacking the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an 
issue to which the other party had the burden of proof, the attacking party 
must demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to support the adverse 
finding.203  In reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence challenge, the 
 
appellate courts that merely substituted their own judgment for that of the jury without detailing the 
courts’ mental processes in arriving at their opinions).  Confusion has arisen regarding the validity of 
Pool.  The Eighth Court of Appeals has stated that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Pool was 
overruled on other grounds by Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel.  Rusty’s Weigh Scales & Serv., Inc. v. 
N. Tex. Scales, Inc., 314 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.).  However, Crown Life 
overruled the holding of the Sixth Court of Appeals in Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1986), not the 
Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).  Crown Life Ins. 
Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2000).  Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Pool 
is still “good law.”  See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016) 
(stating that court of appeals announced the correct standard and citing Pool). 
199. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635 (requiring the court of appeals to explain its reasons for 
reversing a trial court’s judgment if the reversal is based on factual insufficiency); see also Citizens Nat’l 
Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (“When a court of appeals 
disturbs the judgment of a lower tribunal, merely saying that the court has reviewed all the evidence 
and reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the trier of fact is not enough.  Instead, the court should 
explain, with specificity, why it has substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.”). 
200. See Ellis Cty. State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. 1994) (declining to extend 
the requirement in Pool to cases where the appellate court affirms the trial court’s judgment). 
201. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 
140 (Tex. 2012); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (providing factors that must be 
considered in reviewing the damages award). 
202. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
1988, writ denied). 
203. See Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ 
denied) (indicating that a showing of insufficient evidence is appropriate when the party challenging a 
finding of fact does not have the burden of proof); see also id. at 275–76 (explaining that an insufficient 
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court of appeals must first consider, weigh, and examine all of the evidence 
that supports and that is contrary to the jury’s determination.204  A court 
must sustain an insufficient evidence point when the “evidence adduced to 
support the vital fact, even if it is the only evidence adduced on an issue, is 
factually too weak alone to support it.”205  The court sets aside the 
judgment if the evidence is so weak “as to be clearly wrong and unjust.”206 
b. Great Weight and Preponderance 
If a party is challenging a jury finding regarding an issue upon which that 
party had the burden of proof, the complaining party must demonstrate that 
“the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the 
evidence.”207  In reviewing a challenge that the jury finding is against the 
“great weight and preponderance of the evidence,” the court of appeals 
must first examine the record to determine if there is some evidence to 
support the finding.208  If such is the case, then the court of appeals must 
determine, in light of the entire record, whether “the finding is so contrary 
to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be 
clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or if the great preponderance of the 
evidence supports its non-existence.”209  Whether the great weight 
challenge is to a finding or a nonfinding, “[a] court of appeals may reverse 
and remand a case for new trial [only] if it concludes that the jury’s ‘failure 
 
 
evidence point is the appropriate challenge to a jury finding when the attacking party does not have 
the burden of proof). 
204. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); see Cropper v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 648–49 (Tex. 1988) (detailing the history of the appellate 
courts’ power to review jury verdicts on factual issues); Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 
1988) (promoting the conclusive ability of appellate courts to make factual sufficiency determinations 
so long as the correct test is applied in evidentiary review). 
205. Ritchey v. Crawford, 734 S.W.2d 85, 87 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) 
(citing Calvert, supra note 141, at 366). 
206. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Dyson v. Olin Corp., 
692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1985); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam)). 
207. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Croucher 
v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)). 
208. Id. at 241–42.  
209. Castillo v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 953 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ) 
(citing Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176); see id. at 242 (“The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the 
evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the 
great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” (citing Pool v. 
Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 351, 484 (1998))). 
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to find’ is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”210 
3. The Development of the Legal and Factual Sufficiency Standards 
While City of Keller established the standards for legal sufficiency review in 
Texas, it did not address the Texas constitutional provision that “the 
decision of [the courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of 
fact brought before them on appeal or error.”211  An ongoing question in 
the development of legal and factual sufficiency review in Texas is whether 
these two standards will be applied separately and consistently, or whether 
City of Keller’s “reasonable and fair-minded person” standard will, little by 
little, subsume factual sufficiency in practice, even if not in doctrine. 
a. An Overview of the Constitutional Conflict Between the 
Right to Trial by Jury and the Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction over 
Issues of Fact 
“Texas is still one of the most jury-deferential states in the United 
States[,]”212 and makes broad use of juries.213  The Texas Constitution 
provides that “[t]he right of a jury trial shall remain inviolate” and be 
 
210. Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1989) (citing Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988)). 
211. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). 
212. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 429 n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see William Powers, Jr., 
Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1699 n.3 (1997) (“A hallmark of this 
entire body of law [regarding legal and factual sufficiency], however, is extraordinary deference to 
juries.”). 
213. Texas makes wider uses of jury trials than most jurisdictions.  Texas has always permitted 
a right to a jury trial for cases in equity (which the Seventh Amendment does not require), commitment 
proceedings for the mentally ill, and disbarment for lawyers.  See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“The right 
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . .  Provided, that the Legislature may provide for the temporary 
commitment . . . of mentally ill persons . . . without the necessity of a trial by jury.”); id. art. I, § 15-a 
(noting the legislature may allow for a waiver of a jury trial in some cases involving commitment of 
“persons of unsound mind[,]” but confirming that despite possible waiver, the “person under inquiry 
[can] . . . demand a trial by jury”); id. art. V, § 10 (“In the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the 
plaintiff or defendant shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial by jury . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.077(a) ( “The supreme court may not adopt or 
promulgate any rule abrogating the right of trial by jury of an accused attorney in a disbarment 
action . . . .”).  Texas also permits sentencing by jury in all criminal trials and forbids the trial judge 
from commenting on the weight of the evidence.  See TEX CONST. art. I, § 10 (“In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.05 (forbidding judges from commenting upon the weight of the evidence and 
prohibiting a judge from “mak[ing] any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the 
case”). 
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available in all cases,214 and the Texas Supreme Court has cautioned that 
the “courts must not lightly deprive our people of this right by taking an 
issue away from the jury.”215  There are express directives in the statutes 
and rules regarding the roles of judge and jury, requiring trial judges to 
admonish the jury that they “are the sole judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”216 
Unlike most jurisdictions, courts of appeals in Texas are granted 
jurisdiction over questions of fact.217  The purpose of this power, as the 
Texas Supreme Court held more than 100 years ago, “was not to enlarge 
[the courts of appeals’] power over questions of fact, but to restrict, in 
express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and to confine it to 
questions of law.”218  The Texas Government Code provides that “[a] 
judgment of a court of appeals is conclusive on the facts of the case in all 
civil cases.”219 
In 1951, the Texas Supreme Court established that it might accept 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the factual conclusivity clause, to determine if 
a correct legal standard had been applied by the courts of appeals.220  Since 
then, members of the supreme court in several decisions have expressed 
concern that the court has assumed overly broad power to review fact issues, 
even though it is constitutionally restricted to legal issues. 
In Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,221 the supreme court reaffirmed the courts of 
appeals’ jurisdiction to review cases for factual insufficiency of the 
evidence,222 but also held that the supreme court had the authority to 
review courts of appeals’ opinions to determine if the appellate court applied 
the correct standard of review to the facts.223  In effect, Pool further clarified 
the supreme court’s power to review a court of appeals’ application of the 
 
214. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15-a; id. art. V, §§ 10, 13, 17. 
215. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 56 (Tex. 1997) (citing Young v. Blain, 
245 S.W. 65, 67 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1922)). 
216. TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a. 
217. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). 
218. Choate v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co., 44 S.W. 69, 69 (Tex. 1898). 
219. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.225(a). 
220. See In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661–62 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam) (setting forth the 
circumstances in which the supreme court may accept jurisdiction to review an appellate order 
regarding weight of the evidence). 
221. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986). 
222. See id. at 633 (determining the correct standard of review and remanding to the court of 
appeals for application of the proper standard). 
223. See id. at 634–35 (concluding the supreme court may take jurisdiction over a final judgment 
of the court of appeals on a fact question to determine if the appropriate standard was applied). 
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correct legal standard to the facts, instead of only determining whether the 
correct legal standard was utilized.  Notably, Justice Gonzalez’s concurrence 
expressed a fear that this holding may “be used to allow this court to second 
guess the courts of appeal[s].”224 
In Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,225 the Texas Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the court of appeals’ constitutional obligation to review fact 
questions, reasoning that the constitutional right to a jury trial and the 
appellate courts’ constitutional authority to review fact questions “have 
peacefully co-existed for almost one hundred and fifty years, and are 
thoroughly rooted in our constitution and judicial system.”226  While the 
court recognized the “inescapable fact” that it could not amend the 
Constitution to remove the conflict, it concluded that even if the court was 
so empowered, it was “not prepared to sacrifice either [constitutional 
provision] for the benefit of the other.”227 
In Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. (Lofton I),228 the conflict appeared again, 
when the court was called upon to apply Pool to a court of appeals’ 
opinion.229  In Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. (Lofton II),230 a 5–4 decision, the 
majority “briefly present[ed] a review of why the lower court’s [factual 
sufficiency] analysis [was] incorrect.”231  Justice Gonzalez’s dissent noted 
 
224. Id. at 637 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). 
225. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988). 
226. Id. at 652. 
227. Id. 
228. Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).  In Lofton 
I, the Texas Supreme Court found that the court of appeals failed to apply the proper standard for 
factual sufficiency by failing to “fully consider” all of the evidence and failing to clearly “state in what 
regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.”  Id. at 805 
(citing Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 594–95 (Tex. 1986)).  
On remand, a divided Fourteenth Court of Appeals again held that the evidence was factually 
insufficient to support the proximate cause finding.  Tex. Brine Corp. v. Lofton, 751 S.W.2d 197, 204 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 1988), rev’d, 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989).  However, the Texas 
Supreme Court again reversed, ruling that the court could permit interested witness testimony to 
establish the lack of proximate cause as a matter of law, and that the court of appeals was not permitted 
to “substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact” by holding the evidence factually 
insufficient.  Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton II), 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989). 
229. See Lofton I, 720 S.W.2d at 805 (recognizing the standard established in Pool that “when 
reversing a trial court’s judgment after concluding the supporting evidence is insufficient, the court of 
appeals must detail the relevant evidence introduced at trial and clearly state why the jury’s finding is 
factually insufficient” (citing Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635)). 
230. Lofton II, 777 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1989). 
231. Id. at 386–87. 
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that the fear he expressed in Pool had been realized in Lofton II.232  As the 
court of appeals had twice found the evidence factually insufficient, 
Justice Gonzalez concluded “we have no jurisdiction to review it.”233  He 
added that the court was “now swamped with requests to second guess the 
courts of appeals . . . to make rulings on sufficiency grounds[,]” as “[t]he 
losing party will always allege that the court of appeals erred in reversing a 
jury verdict or[,] if it refuse[d] to reverse on sufficiency grounds, that the 
court of appeals used the wrong standard.”234  In a separate dissent, 
Justice Hecht echoed Justice Gonzalez’s concern, concluding that the Lofton 
II decision was an unconstitutional review by the supreme court of the 
factual sufficiency of the evidence, and an affront to the courts of appeals’ 
constitutional prerogative to judge the factual sufficiency of the evidence in 
a case.  He explained: 
Stymied by the constitution, the Court cannot decree the result it rather 
plainly wants to see in this case.  To accomplish the desired end, the Court 
must keep reversing the judgment of the court of appeals until it reaches a 
result that the Court approves.  Always the ground for reversal is that the 
appeals court either cannot or will not follow the law.  For this Court to hold 
that an appeals court has not conducted its factual insufficiency analysis in a 
lawful manner, simply to coerce that court into changing its conclusion, is to 
usurp the constitutional prerogative of the court of appeals.  That is what I 
believe is happening in this case.235 
Justice Hecht further noted that the court should avoid playing ping-pong 
with the court of appeals when a majority of the court “keep[s] reversing 
the judgment of the court of appeals until it reaches a result that the 
[majority] approves.”236 
 
232. See id. at 387 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“The court of appeals has twice found the evidence 
factually insufficient; we have no jurisdiction to review it.”); cf. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 637 (Gonzalez, J., 
concurring) (noting “the [majority] court is implicitly trying to prevent the court of appeals from second 
guessing the jury[,]” and expressing fear “that this opinion may in turn be used to allow this court to 
second guess the courts of appeal”). 
233. Lofton II, 777 S.W.2d at 387 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). 
234. Id. at 387–88. 
235. Id. at 388 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
236. Id.; see Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 533–34 (discussing the concern expressed by 
Justices Hecht and Gonzalez that the supreme court should not reverse an appeals court simply to get 
the lower court to reach a result with which the supreme court approves). 
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In Aluminum Co. of America v. Alm,237 the supreme court circumvented 
the court of appeals’ conclusion that the jury’s finding of gross negligence 
was supported by factually insufficient evidence.238  In another 5–4 
decision, a deeply divided court reversed and held that defendant Aluminum 
Co. of America (Alcoa) was grossly negligent as a matter of law.239  Ignoring 
the evidence of care introduced by Alcoa,240 the supreme court refused to 
accept the court of appeals’ analysis of the factual sufficiency of the evidence 
and concluded that gross negligence as a matter of law is a legal issue over 
which the supreme court has jurisdiction.241  The dissenters summarized 
the real meaning of the court’s decision: Whenever a majority of the court 
is dissatisfied with a court of appeals’ conclusion on a factual sufficiency 
point, it may impose any result it chooses “merely by holding that a party 
proved the necessary facts conclusively, i.e., as a matter of law.”242 
In Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc.,243 Justice Gonzalez, in a concurring 
opinion, reasoned that the denial of supreme court review was proper 
because “to take jurisdiction of this case again” would have been the 
equivalent of “second-guess[ing] the court of appeals’ review of the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence.”244  He added that to otherwise take jurisdiction 
“would require us to continue to send the case back to the court of appeals 
until they ‘get it right,’ i.e., until the court of appeals reaches a result in 
accord with [the supreme court’s] view of the evidence.”245  Because the 
court of appeals properly reviewed the factual sufficiency challenges, 
Justice Gonzalez observed that the court must avoid the “yo-yo effect when 
a majority of the court keeps reversing the judgment of the court of appeals 
until it reaches a result that the majority approves.”246 
In 1994, the Texas Supreme Court’s movement toward the reasonable 
and fair-minded person standard gained traction in Transportation Insurance 
 
237. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Alm, 785 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1990). 
238. Id. at 140–41 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“[T]his is the first time in the history of American 
jurisprudence that a court has held that a jury could not disbelieve a plaintiff’s case as to gross negligence 
when the issue is disputed, and that a court should determine this issue as a matter of law.”). 
239. Id. at 140. 
240. Id. at 143. 
241. Id. at 141–42. 
242. Id. at 143. 
243. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1993). 
244. Id. at 286 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). 
245. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
246. Id. at 287 (citing Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986) 
(per curiam); Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton II), 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989); Powers & Ratliff, 
supra note 138, at 533). 
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Co. v. Moriel,247 the court’s seminal punitive damages decision.  In Moriel, 
the court took the significant step of permitting the review of the evidence 
supporting the punitive damages award itself, rather than reviewing the 
jury’s gross negligence finding.248  Years later, in a notable use of its power 
to reverse factual sufficiency determinations, the supreme court twice 
reversed the damages awarded in Bunton v. Bentley.249  Justice Baker, 
dissenting in the 2002 decision, argued that the supreme court had 
“overstep[ped] its constitutional appellate review boundaries to conduct 
what effectively results in a factual sufficiency review of the mental anguish 
damages award and issue[d] a wholly advisory opinion to the court of 
appeals about those damages.”250  The court was evaluating the 
“reasonableness” of the mental anguish award as “a proxy for factual 
sufficiency review.”251 
When the supreme court decided City of Keller in 2005, many debated 
whether the court’s embrace of the reasonable and fair-minded person 
standard might once and for all “collapse [the] distinction between factual 
sufficiency review and the high court’s review of whether courts of appeals 
applied the correct factual sufficiency standard.”252  Rather than sending a 
case back to the court of appeals for factual sufficiency review, the 
reasonable and fair-minded person standard might obviate the need to 
reverse and remand to the court of appeals for further consideration of the 
 
247. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 
(Tex. 2012). 
248. Id. at 30. 
249. Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Bentley v. 
Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 607 (Tex. 2002). 
250. Bentley I, 94 S.W.3d at 624 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
251. Id.  
252. Hall & Emery, supra note 128, at 562; see W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 
38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 276 (2006) (posing the question, “[I]s there any difference between reviewing 
the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict under the supreme court’s 
holding in City of Keller[,]” and suggesting that “it may be argued that the two standards of review have 
collapsed into one standard of review—the ‘reasonable and fair-minded’ juror standard articulated in 
City of Keller”).  See generally William V. Dorsaneo, III, Evolving Standards of Evidentiary Review: Revising the 
Scope of Review, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 225, 233–36 (2005) (discussing the effect of City of Keller on “the 
scope of legal sufficiency review for civil cases”); David E. Keltner et al., No Evidence Review: The Scope 
and Standard of Legal Sufficiency Review After City of Keller, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 22ND ANNUAL 
ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 16, at 10–12 (2008) (discussing whether “City 
of Keller’s reasonable juror standard departs from traditional legal sufficiency standards, and allows the 
[Texas] Supreme Court (and other appellate courts) to supplant their own decision for that of the jury 
in a legal sufficiency review”). 
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facts, consistent with the supreme court’s opinion.  Instead, the court could 
simply review the evidence in issue, and if five members of the court agree, 
it may conclude that no reasonable and fair-minded juror could reach a 
certain verdict and render judgment accordingly. 
b. Applications of City of Keller 
Despite more than ten years of case law to help assess City of Keller’s effect, 
the results remain developing and inconclusive, particularly with respect to 
the effect of the “final” test of whether a reasonable juror could make the 
challenged finding.  The supreme court has upheld jury verdicts, but it has 
also shown no reluctance in reversing them even where there were sharp 
differences of opinion in the court of appeals and in the supreme court itself.  
We will examine a few of these cases. 
In a 5–4 decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co.,253 the supreme 
court reversed a jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for The Coca-Cola 
Company (Coke) in an anti-trust case.254  Specifically, plaintiff soft drink 
bottlers sued Coke and several of its distributors for entering into calendar 
marketing agreements (CMAs) with retailers.255  The plaintiffs claimed that 
these CMAs unreasonably restrained trade by monopolizing the market in 
violation of state antitrust laws.256  “The district court rendered judgment 
on the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding damages incurred 
throughout the region and permanently enjoining [Coke], in specified 
counties in . . . four states, [based on] certain conduct that it determined to 
be anticompetitive.”257  The court of appeals found “sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find monopolization” based on testimony presented at trial.258  
With respect to liability issues, the court of appeals rejected Coke’s argument 
that there was no evidence showing a foreclosure of competition in any 
relevant market.  Liability, the court of appeals reasoned, could be based on 
evidence that enforcement of several CMA provisions could be read to 
“restrict trade and impact competition[.]”259  The court of appeals stated, 
“Although any one of the factors set out [in the case] might be insufficient 
 
253. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006). 
254. Id. at 675. 
255. Id. at 675–76. 
256. Id. at 678. 
257. Id. at 674. 
258. See id.at 679 (detailing the testimony upon which the court of appeals based its finding). 
259. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 304 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
2003), rev’d, 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006). 
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to allow the jury to conclude Coke had acted to restrain trade, due to the 
numerous factors presented in evidence, it is not appropriate to take this 
determination out of the hands of the jury.”260  The supreme court reversed 
the court of appeals, with the majority holding that there was no evidence 
that Coke’s practices restrained trade.261 
Justice Brister dissented, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, and 
Justices O’Neill and Medina.  Justice Brister opined that, in holding there 
was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Coke harmed 
competition, the majority had drawn an inference contrary to the finding 
that the jury was entitled to draw.262  He stated that “several of Coke’s 
activities in the Ark-La-Tex market were so anticompetitive that federal 
courts would not require such proof, and we should not either.”263  
Justice Brister asserted, “There is a line between competing and bullying, 
and the jury found that Coke crossed it.  As evidence in the record would 
allow reasonable jurors to reach that conclusion, I would not render 
judgment to the contrary . . . .”264 
In an amicus brief submitted to the supreme court on motion for 
rehearing, a group of seven prominent Texas law professors urged the court 
“to consider seriously the impact that allowing its decision to stand will have 
in the future with respect to how courts, litigants, and the public in general 
regard the legitimacy of jury verdicts rendered in this state.”265  The 
professors argued: 
Our central concern, stated plainly and emphatically, is that it is troubling 
to see the Court reject a verdict in which the jury found it to be (at least) more 
 
260. Id. at 305. 
261. Harmar, 218 S.W.3d at 689–91. 
262. See id. at 699–700 (Brister, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & O’Neill & Medina, JJ.) 
(noting the court cannot ignore what a jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence supporting a 
verdict under a per-se or rule-of-reason analysis). 
263. Id. at 699. 
264. Id. at 693.  Notably, Justice Brister’s dissenting opinion did not cite the court’s opinion in 
City of Keller, which he authored.  Id. at 693–706. 
265. Brief for Texas Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Coca-Cola 
Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006) (No. 03-0737).  In addition, commentators 
outside of Texas noticed Harmar’s anti-jury effect.  See Andrew Cohen, Texas Supreme Court to Juries: Get 
Bent, THE WASH. POST (May 8, 2007, 8:44 AM), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/benchconference/ 
2007/05/three_degrees_of_ separation_an.html (opining “anti-jury rulings” from the supreme court 
in Texas are becoming more common, especially as compared to other states that typically give much 
more respect to jury verdicts); see also Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal 
Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing Harmar is an “unwelcome attack on the 
finality of jury verdicts”). 
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likely than not that Petitioners had violated the antitrust laws when the Court 
does not declare the evidence on which this verdict was based to be legally 
inadmissible.  In the absence of a more searching inquiry, the majority’s 
opinion seems merely to have substituted its judgment for that of the jury.266 
They further contended that the judgment against the bottling companies 
was concerning for two reasons: “(i) the standard for review for legal 
sufficiency has traditionally been—appropriately so—far more respectful of 
the jury’s verdict than is the majority’s opinion; and (ii) even on the 
majority’s reading of the factual evidence adduced, it appears that a 
reasonable jury could have” found for the bottling companies.267  The amici 
further stated, “We believe the majority’s decision in this case portends 
troubling consequences in terms of the legitimacy of verdicts rendered by 
juries in this state.”268  Following the Harmar decision, one article noted 
that the opinion, while not rendering the City of Keller decision incorrect, 
demonstrated that the standards articulated in City of Keller “carry the 
potential for abuse.”269 
Yet in Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,270 the supreme court 
reinstated a judgment on a jury’s verdict after the trial court had granted 
JNOV.271  The case involved “[a] high-speed police chase resulting in a 
traffic accident [that] sparked a personal-injury lawsuit against the fleeing 
driver by the family injured in the crash.”272  In dispute was whether the 
driver’s attempts to elude police forfeited coverage under an intentional-
injury exclusion in his automobile liability insurance policy.273  The court 
held “that the insurer did not establish as a matter of law that its insured 
intentionally caused the family’s injuries[,]” and therefore reversed the 
district court’s JNOV and “render[ed] judgment on the jury’s verdict in 
favor of the injured family.”274 
 
266. Brief for Texas Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Harmar, 
218 S.W.3d 671 (No. 03-0737). 
267. Id. at 10. 
268. Id. at 11. 
269. Phillips & Newton, supra note 128, at 6. 
270. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. 2009). 
271. Id. at 829; cf. Jackson v. Axelrad, 221 S.W.3d 650, 652–53 (Tex. 2007) (upholding jury 
verdict in favor of defense). 
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Justice Brister dissented, challenging the majority’s conclusion that a 
reasonable juror could not find that the driver’s conduct caused intentional 
damage to the family.275  Insisting that “[t]here will never be a more extreme 
case than this[,]” Justice Brister found it difficult to understand how 
reasonable jurors could fail to conclude that the driver could not have 
intended the damage to the family resulting from his conduct.276  
Accordingly, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that the driver could have 
believed the chase would end with the driver “rolling his vehicle” or “hitting 
a fixed object,” or with the police “discontinu[ing] the pursuit” rather than 
risk him injuring someone.277  Justice Brister suggested that the majority 
avoided the policy exclusion by focusing narrowly on what the driver knew 
split seconds before the crash, rather than on what the driver might have 
known about his conduct during the course of the entire chase.278  As 
Justice Brister surmised, a driver “ought to know” that driving a large truck 
at high speeds while chased by police would result in harm to others.279  He 
also pointed to City of Keller for the principle that “if evidence may be legally 
sufficient in one context but insufficient in another, the context cannot be 
disregarded even if that means rendering judgment contrary to the jury’s 
verdict.”280  Essentially, Tanner demonstrates the importance of the factual 
“context” that the court chooses to include in its legal sufficiency review.  
The majority and dissent differed, in effect, on how wide the camera lens of 
the court should be when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. 
The supreme court was also divided in Providence Health Center v. Dowell,281 
where the court reversed a judgment based on a jury verdict and rendered 
judgment based on legally insufficient evidence of proximate causation.282  
Plaintiffs alleged an emergency room physician and nurse acted negligently 
by releasing Lance, a suicidal twenty-one year old, into the care of his family 
 
275. See id. at 834 (Brister, J., dissenting) (“Anyone who drives a huge 4-ton pickup at 100 miles 
an hour through city streets during rush hour ‘ought to know’ that someone is going to get hurt.”). 
276. Id. at 834–35. 
277. Id. at 834–35. 
278. Id. at 835. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 835 n.4 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 812 (Tex. 2005)).  In 
Autozone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam), the court also addressed the “context” 
issue, stating that “[e]ven though the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it 
cannot be considered in isolated bits and pieces divorced from its surroundings; it must be viewed in 
its proper context with other evidence.”  Id. at 592. 
281. Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008). 
282. Id. at 330. 
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because the individual killed himself “thirty-three hours after his 
release[.]”283  The majority reasoned, “[T]he evidence is undisputed that if 
Lance had stayed with his family as instructed, he would not have hanged 
himself when he did.  But there is no evidence that” the hospital, physician, 
and nurse “caused [his] suicide to occur when it did.”284  The majority 
further noted that there was “no evidence that Lance could have been 
hospitalized involuntarily, that he would have consented to hospitalization, 
that a short-term hospitalization would have made his suicide unlikely, that 
he exhibited any unusual conduct following his discharge, or that any of his 
family or friends believed further treatment was required[.]”285  Therefore, 
the majority concluded that “the defendants’ negligence was too attenuated 
from the suicide to have been a substantial factor in bringing it about.”286 
But three dissenting justices asserted that the majority “misapplie[d] the 
law” and “disregard[ed] relevant evidence[.]”287  In particular, the dissent 
objected that the majority required proof that Lance “would have 
voluntarily submitted to hospitalization or could have been involuntarily 
retained[,]” evidence that (in the opinion of the dissent) would have been 
inadmissible as it was speculative.288  The dissent reasoned, “Because Lance 
was never properly advised” regarding post-release care, there was no 
evidence as to “whether he would have consented to treatment[.]”289  
Additionally, the dissent referred to expert testimony indicating that 
hospitalization would have lowered the risk of suicide, which constituted 
“some evidence” that the healthcare provider’s negligence caused the 
suicide.290  Notable in this case are the sharp splits in the court of 
appeals291 and in the supreme court; however, the supreme court rendered 
judgment despite disagreeing over what evidence was “undisputed.”292 
 
283. Id. at 325. 
284. Id. at 330. 
285. Id. at 329–30. 
286. Id. at 330. 
287. Id. at 333 (O’Neill, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & Medina, J.). 
288. Id. at 334. 
289. Id. at 335. 
290. Id. 
291. Compare Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 167 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005) 
(determining that “some evidence” was contained in the record proving proximate cause), rev’d, 
262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008), with id. at 60–61 (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (stating no evidence was present 
that defendants were a substantial cause of death), rev’d, 262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008). 
292. Other supreme court decisions have also turned on the characterization of undisputed 
evidence.  The supreme court’s per curiam decision in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 
754 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), may have indicated another call to ensure that the lower courts credit 
48
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In Minnesota Life Insurance Co. v. Vasquez,293 the supreme court reversed a 
jury’s verdict against an insurance company.294  The issue was whether there 
was “any evidence that Minnesota Life knowingly committed an unfair 
settlement practice.”295  The court of appeals upheld the jury’s finding that 
Minnesota Life failed to pay a “claim after coverage . . . [became] reasonably 
clear.”296  In an opinion by Justice Brister, the supreme court held that the 
court of appeals considered only the evidence in support of the jury’s 
finding.297  In effect, the court of appeals had found some evidence of an 
unfair settlement practice in the fact that Minnesota Life failed to pay a claim 
for six months after it learned of the cause of death even though it had a 
policy of paying within ten days.298  The supreme court, however, 
concluded that the court of appeals failed to follow City of Keller’s 
requirement that a court review all of the evidence, which the supreme court 
found to contain “undisputed” documentary evidence that coverage was not 
reasonably clear.299  This case presents an unusually transparent instance of 
the differences between two courts attempting to apply the same standard 
(City of Keller), but reaching different results.300 
 
undisputed evidence and do not simply look at the evidence in favor of the non-movant on summary 
judgment.  See id. at 756 (stating the First Court of Appeals “failed to apply the proper standard of 
review”).  In Goodyear, while off-duty, a Goodyear employee drove a company tire delivery truck to a 
store at 3:00 a.m. to buy cigarettes.  Id.  While en route, the driver fell asleep at the wheel, crossed the 
centerline and collided with another vehicle, injuring the driver.  Id.  The supreme court reversed and 
rendered judgment for Goodyear, holding that “[t]he court of appeals erred in considering only the 
evidence favorable” to the plaintiff, and “ignoring undisputed evidence in the record” that the driver 
was on a “personal errand” at the time of the accident.  Id. at 757.  In Trammell Crow Central Texas, Ltd. 
v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008), a block of concurring justices found a threat to City of Keller’s 
framework in the court of appeals’ refusal to credit undisputed evidence.  Id. at 19 (Jefferson, C.J., 
concurring, joined by Hecht, Brister, & Johnson, JJJ.). 
293. Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W. 3d 774 (Tex. 2006). 
294. Id. at 776–77. 
295. Id. at 776. 
296. Id. at 776–77. 
297. Id. at 777. 
298. See Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 133 S.W.3d 320, 328–29 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
2004) (sustaining the jury’s finding that the insurance company failed to pay the claim after learning 
the cause of death), rev’d, 192 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006). 
299. Minn. Life, 192 S.W. 3d at 777–78 (holding there was “no evidence that the insurer failed 
to pay the claim after coverage had become reasonably clear”). 
300. Compare Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 133 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
2004) (interpreting City of Keller to mean that the reviewing court should disregard all contrary evidence), 
with Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W. 3d 774, 777 (Tex. 2006) (asserting City of Keller means 
that a reviewing court should look at all of the evidence, including contrary evidence). 
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In Jelinek v. Casas,301 the Texas Supreme Court may have inadvertently 
suggested that courts consider the “credibility” of testimony when reviewing 
for the legal sufficiency of the evidence.302  In this case, decedent Casas, a 
cancer patient, was admitted to the hospital for abdominal pain and placed 
on antibiotics used for the prevention and treatment of intra-abdominal 
infections.303  Two days following her admission, major abdominal surgery 
was performed on Casas.304  She continued the antibiotic regimen for an 
additional five days, but the hospital mistakenly permitted a four-and-a-half 
day lapse of antibiotic treatment.305  The hospital subsequently admitted 
that the antibiotic treatment should have been continued; however, the 
hospital refused to admit that the lapse in treatment was the cause of 
additional abdominal pain to Casas.306  The court noted that Casas’ expert 
admitted there was no direct evidence of an anaerobic infection, leaving the 
jury to consider the circumstantial evidence of infection, such as fever and 
changed heart rate, but also admitted on cross examination that those signs 
“were equally consistent with two other infections cultured from Casas’s 
incision and blood[.]”307   
The Jelinek court held that “when the facts support several possible 
conclusions, only some of which establish that the defendant’s negligence 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, the expert must explain to the fact finder why 
those conclusions are superior based on verifiable medical evidence, not 
simply the expert’s opinion.”308  “Because there [was] no direct evidence of 
the infection and the circumstantial evidence [was] meager,” the court held 
that it “must consider not just favorable but all the circumstantial evidence, 
and competing inferences as well.”309  The court wrote that “[c]ourts 
should not usurp the jury’s role as fact finder, nor should they question the 
jury’s right to believe one witness over another.”310  The court then stated 
that “when reviewing a verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, courts need 
not—indeed, must not—defer to the jury’s findings when those findings are 
 
301. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010). 
302. Id. at 532–38. 
303. Id. at 530. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. at 532. 
307. Id. at 535.   
308. Id. at 536 (citing Lenger v. Physician’s Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. 1970); 
Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965)).  
309. Id. at 538 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 814 (Tex. 2005)). 
310. Id. 
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not supported by credible evidence.”311  Unless the court intended to depart 
from City of Keller’s position that “[j]urors are the sole judges of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony[,]”312 the court 
probably used the term “credible” as short-hand for City of Keller’s additional 
view that “[t]he jury’s decisions regarding credibility must be 
reasonable[,]”313 that is, “creditable.”   
Two subsequent cases indicate that the supreme court does not intend to 
require reviewing courts to make further inquiries into credibility.  In Gunn 
v. McCoy314 and Thota v. Young,315 the court reaffirmed that “jurors are the 
sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their 
testimony.”316  “It is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence, and when reasonable jurors could resolve conflicting evidence 
either way, we presume they did so in accordance with the verdict.”317  Both 
cases involved conflicting expert testimony and the court concluded in both 
cases that that jury could have reasonably believed one expert over the 
other.318  As a result, the legal sufficiency challenge failed.319  Assuming 
that the experts are both “creditable,” meaning their opinion testimony is 
competent and thus admissible, it is left to the jury to determine which 
expert is more “credible.” 
 
311. Id. (emphasis added). 
312. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 
757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1993); McGalliard v. 
Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986); Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89, 93 (1849)). 
313. Id at 820 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 599 (Tex. 2002)); see id. 
at 813–14 (“In claims or defenses supported only by meager circumstantial evidence, the evidence does 
not rise above a scintilla (and thus is legally insufficient) if jurors would have to guess whether a vital 
fact exists.  ‘When the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may 
be inferred.’” (footnote omitted) (first citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 
2004); Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Hammerly Oaks, Inc., 
v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997); W. Tel. Corp. of Tex. v. McCann, 99 S.W.2d 895, 900 
(Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937); Calvert, supra note 141, at 365; then citing Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. 
Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984); and then quoting Tubelite, a Div. of Indal, Inc. v. Risica 
& Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1991))); Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) 
(per curiam) (“The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact 
from meager circumstantial evidence ‘which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more 
probable than another.’” (quoting Hammerly Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 392)). 
314. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018). 
315. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2012). 
316. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819); Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695 
(quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819). 
317. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820).   
318. Id.; Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695–96.   
319. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665–66; Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695–96. 
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The court’s recent decision in Alamo Heights Independent School District v. 
Clark320 provides an interesting analysis of contextual evidence and its 
effect on the inferences that a reasonable juror can draw.  In Clark, the court 
reviewed the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting Clark’s claim that 
she was sexually harassed by another female teacher at the school.321  While 
the majority and the dissent recited the same standard of review and 
identified the same acts allegedly giving rise to the harassment claim, their 
respective analyses demonstrate an apparent lack of consensus as to how 
the contextual evidence should be employed in conducting the review.322 
The majority criticizes the dissent for failing to consider the entire context 
of the alleged harasser’s acts in determining whether the alleged harasser’s 
admittedly vulgar conduct was sexually motivated.323  While acknowledging 
that legal sufficiency reviews require the court to “view the evidence and its 
inferences in the light most favorable to Clark,” the majority further notes 
“we cannot disregard unfavorable evidence and inferences that reasonable 
jurors could not[,]” which “includes evidence showing the context in which 
events occurred, regardless of whether it is favorable to Clark.”324  The 
majority accuses the dissent of failing “to credit evidence a reasonable juror 
could not disregard and by ignoring City of Keller’s admonitions regarding 
contextual evidence” because such evidence “winnows the inferences a 
reasonable juror could credit[.]”325  “Ignoring context is impermissible 
because it perverts the legal inquiry, much the same way isolating words and 
phrases from context contorts the meaning and intent of a statute.”326  
Referencing its prior review of mental anguish claims, the majority explains, 
“[I]n our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably 
reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also 
evidence showing that, in context, it was not.”327  The majority criticizes 
the dissent’s evaluation of the contextual evidence, explaining “[t]hough 
purporting to analyze context, the dissent actually distorts it” and that its 
“focus on raunchy details rather than the full context of Clark’s allegations 
 
320. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018). 
321. Id. at 763–69.   
322. See id. at 793 (“Though citing the legal-sufficiency standard, the dissent contravenes it by 
failing to credit evidence a reasonable juror could not disregard and by ignoring City of Keller’s 
admonitions regarding contextual evidence.”). 
323. Id. at 794–95.   
324. Id. at 792–93 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 811–12, 822). 
325. Id. at 793. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. (quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 812). 
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distorts the legal-sufficiency analysis.”328  “Myopic focus on select details 
of offending behavior ignores the reason for it, and the reason is what 
matters under the TCHRA.”329  Ultimately, while the majority 
acknowledges that “[t]he dissent is at least making a limited effort to 
consider context, but it still fails to consider all the context, and the 
inferences it attempts to draw from incomplete context are illogical.”330   
In its evaluation of the contextual evidence, the majority appears to place 
particular emphasis on the evidence that “Monterrubio enjoyed being crass 
and profane and telling dirty jokes and stories to all the coaches, male and 
female, not just Clark[,]” as “[t]his treatment of co-workers of both genders 
provides crucial context that Monterrubio’s motives were based on factors  
other than gender.”331  Given the context, the majority concludes that no 
reasonable juror could infer, and thus the evidence is legally insufficient to 
establish, that Monterrubio’s actions were sexually motivated.332 
The dissent, for its part, accuses the majority of failing to follow the 
controlling standard of review, explaining:  
To determine whether the record contains some evidence to support the 
plaintiff’s claims, we must consider the record “in the light most favorable” 
to the plaintiff, “indulging every reasonable inference” in her favor, and 
“resolving any doubts against” the defendant. . . .  And although a jury can 
reject her effort to portray true facts in a light that favors her, we must review 
the record exactly in that light.  In short, we must accept these facts as the 
facts of this case.333 
After listing the multitude of incidents brought forth by the plaintiff to 
support her claim, the dissent finds that “the evidence would permit a 
reasonable juror to find that Monterrubio harassed Clark ‘because of’ her 
 
328. Id. at 793–94. 
329. Id. at 775.   
330. Id. at 798. 
331. Id. at 775–76 (emphasis omitted) (citing Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2001); Collins v. TRL, 
Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003)); see id. at 798 (“Monterrubio was rude, crass, and hostile 
towards seemingly everyone at work, male or female.  The dissent misanalyzes the significance of this 
evidence.  How she treats not just Clark but everyone else at work provides important context regarding 
Monterrubio’s motives.”). 
332. Id. at 778. 
333. Id. at 803 n.1 (Boyd, J., dissenting, joined by Lehrmann, J.) (internal citation omitted) (citing 
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)); see id. at 811 (“[T]he [majority] Court 
distorts the applicable standard of review.”). 
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gender because (1) Monterrubio was ‘motivated by sexual desire’ for Clark, 
or (2) Monterrubio’s harassment of Clark focused on Clark’s gender-specific 
anatomy and characteristics.”334  The dissent further notes “[a]lthough the 
evidence certainly would not require a juror to reach that finding, it is at least 
sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to reach it[.]”335 
The court’s apparent divergent views regarding the role of contextual 
evidence in legal sufficiency analysis is readily apparent in the discussion 
regarding one particular incident.  During a meeting between Clark and her 
supervisor, Monterrubio continually entered the office, including one 
interruption in which she “us[ed] her tongue to lick seductively the cupcake 
icing off of a cupcake.”336  The dissent identified the incident as capable of 
being inferred by a reasonable juror as sexually motivated.337  In contrast, 
the majority interpreted the incident as incapable of being reasonably 
inferred as sexual.  “[N]otwithstanding Clark’s subjective view of its 
‘seductive[ness],’ Monterrubio’s licking a cupcake cannot reasonably be 
equated with a genuine sexual proposition.”338  “Considered in isolation or 
in the context of Clark’s other complaints, these comments do not indicate 
sexual attraction to Clark but, consistent with her other behavior, a desire 
to tease Clark and make her feel uncomfortable.”339  Whereas the majority 
holds that the conduct is incapable of being reasonably interpreted as sexual 
due to other possible explanations, the dissent argues “‘it is the province of 
the jury to draw from it whatever inferences they wish, so long as more than 
one is possible and the jury must not simply guess.’”340  Thus, the majority 
cites to the context evidence to find alternative motivations for 
Monterrubio’s behavior and holds that the possible alternative explanations 
preclude the jury from inferring that she was motivated by sexual desire, 
whereas the dissent holds that it is the jury’s prerogative to judge the 
possible explanations and to choose from any explanation it finds credible. 
The two opinions present an interesting demonstration of the respective 
justices’ views of the effect of evidentiary doctrines on a legal sufficiency 
review.  The majority appears to elevate contextual evidence above the 
 
334. Id. at 807. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 777.   
337. Id. at 808–09.   
338. Id. at 777 (second alteration in original).   
339. Id. at 777–78 (citing Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560, 562 (7th Cir. 
2016)).   
340. Id. at 812 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex. 2005)). 
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requirement that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the factfinder’s decision, insisting that all contextual evidence must be 
considered and applying that evidence to limit the range of inferences that 
the factfinder can reasonably derive.  The dissent, in contrast, appears to 
favor considering the entire record of contextual evidence but interpreting 
it, like other evidence, in the light most favorable to the factfinder.  The 
extent to which the majority’s approach becomes a mechanism for 
removing certain decisions from the factfinder remains to be seen. 
The 2006 edition of this Article traced the “[o]rigins of the ‘[r]easonable 
and [f]air-[m]inded [j]uror [s]tandard” embraced by City of Keller,341 and 
raised the question of whether City of Keller’s articulation of that standard 
might exacerbate the longstanding conflict in Texas law between the right 
to trial by jury and the power of the courts of appeals and the supreme court 
to review for the sufficiency of the evidence.342  That version noted that, 
even though only the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over factual 
disputes and the power to review for factual sufficiency, the supreme court 
had arguably blurred the lines between legal and factual sufficiency in 
reversing and rendering judgments for “no evidence” where there may have 
been legally sufficient evidence but the supreme court sought a different 
result.343  It was suggested that City of Keller’s “final test” for legal 
sufficiency—“whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and 
fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review”344—might further 
such blurring of the lines by encouraging the courts to simply review a 
verdict’s reasonableness, rather than employing clear and consistent rules to 
determine legal and factual sufficiency.345 
On this point, the verdict is still out.  Generally, it can be said that City of 
Keller has not unleashed a firestorm of reversals of jury verdicts.  But neither 
has doubt been dispelled about whether the reasonable and fair-minded 
person standard has developed into a predictable and stable standard in 
Texas law.346  The supreme court’s decisions in Harmar, Tanner, Dowell, 
Minnesota Life, Clark, and others have turned on such factors as whether 
 
341. W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 255–60 (2006). 
342. See id. at 266–78 (showing various supreme court opinions that feature strong dissents that 
question the majority’s scope of review). 
343. Id. at 274–76. 
344. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. 
345. W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 274–76 (2006). 
346. See id. at 276–78 (warning practitioners should be wary of the finality of the City of Keller 
standard). 
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particular evidence is disputed, what evidence is “relevant,” or what 
evidentiary “context” was appropriate.347  City of Keller does not appear to 
have sufficiently resolved such underlying questions.  For example, City of 
Keller stated that it was not possible “to define precisely when undisputed 
evidence becomes conclusive.”348  And “[e]vidence is conclusive only if 
reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions,” a determination 
that will depend upon “the facts of each case.”349  Thus, the verdict 
reasonable and fair-minded people could reach involves, like Chinese 
boxes,350 additional reasonableness determinations about specific pieces of 
evidence.  At what point do disagreements between members of the court 
over the disputed nature, the proper context, or relevancy of particular facts 
overtake the jury’s task of reweighing the evidence? 
One question notably left open by City of Keller, and not recently addressed 
by the supreme court, is the status of factual sufficiency review in civil cases.  
While the courts of appeals continue on occasion to reverse for factual 
sufficiency,351 the supreme court has not decided a major case that 
 
347. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 793 (Tex. 2018) (“[C]ontext 
is critical in a legal-sufficiency review . . . .”); Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 
831 (Tex. 2009) (holding the context of the evidence—an insurance contract—allowed for a reasonable 
jury to find for the petitioner); Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. 2008) 
(explaining the majority and dissenting opinions turn on undisputed evidence); Coca-Cola Co. v. 
Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 689–91 (Tex. 2006) (dismissing the claim based on no evidence 
of harm in any relevant market); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. 2006) 
(finding the court of appeals reviewed the evidence in the incorrect context by only looking at the 
favorable evidence). 
348. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 815. 
349. Id. at 816 (citing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 340 (Tex. 1998); 
Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982)). 
350. A “Chinese box” refers to “a set of boxes graduated in size so that each fits into the next 
larger one[.]”  Chinese Boxes, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
Chinese%20boxes [https://perma.cc/VAU4-4LUV].  
351. See Elijah Ragira/VIP Lodging Grp., Inc. v. VIP Lodging Grp., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 747, 759 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (finding jury’s determination of no slander of title against the 
great weight of the evidence); Fluor Enters., Inc. v. Conex Int’l Corp., 273 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex. 
App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied) (determining the evidence was factually insufficient to establish 
that criticisms of contractor’s welds by consultant’s engineer were made maliciously or fraudulently, as 
required for contractor to prevail on business disparagement claim against consultant); Ayala v. 
Valderas, No. 02-07-134-CV, 2008 WL 4661846, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2008, no pet.) 
(mem. op.) (holding evidence in a conversion case was factually insufficient where jury award reflected 
replacement value of property, but legal standard in such cases was fair market value); RePipe, Inc. v. 
Turpin, 275 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (finding some evidence of 
damage rendered evidence legally sufficient, but where evidence clearly showed damages were 
$49,360.86 less than the jury’s award, evidence was factually insufficient); Hawkins v. Walker, 
238 S.W.3d 517, 525–27 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (concluding the evidence was factually 
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addressed the line between legal and factual sufficiency standards since 
2006, and then only in the specialized context of punitive damage 
awards.352  On the other hand, over the past decade, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals has engaged in a series of reversals and adjustments of its factual 
sufficiency standard, and in Brooks v. State353 eliminated that standard 
altogether in favor of relying solely on the Federal Constitution’s minimum 
for legal sufficiency.354  It remains to be seen whether the Texas Supreme 
Court will revitalize factual sufficiency review in the civil context as a way 
to restore the power of juries and to discipline the use of the powerful legal 
 
insufficient to support either the jury’s award of $1 million in damages to the mother for past and 
future loss of society and companionship or the jury’s award of $700,000 in damages to the mother for 
past and future mental anguish damages); Bay, Inc. v. Ramos, 139 S.W.3d 322, 330–31 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (holding evidence was factually insufficient to support jury’s finding 
that the mother bore zero responsibility for an eighteen-month-old child’s injuries caused by 
deployment of an air bag where the mother, despite her knowledge that the backseat was the safest 
place for a young child, placed the child in the front passenger seat). 
352. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. 2006); id. at 319 (O’Neill, 
J., dissenting) (“Our courts of appeals in Texas have long been empowered to suggest a remittitur of 
excessive awards when the evidence is factually insufficient to support them.  The court of appeals 
assiduously exercised that power in this case.  It is, of course, appropriate for this Court to intervene 
if the appeals court allows a constitutionally offensive award to stand.  But when the Court chooses a 
marginal case like this in which to intervene, it risks intruding upon an area that has traditionally been 
the well-patrolled province of our courts of appeals.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Transp. Ins. 
Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012); TEX. R. APP. 
P. 46.3)); see Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 624 (Tex. 2002) (Baker, J., dissenting) 
(indicating that the court oversteps its boundaries when conducting a factual sufficiency review on 
mental anguish). 
353. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
354. See id. at 894 (stating there was “no meaningful distinction” between Texas’s criminal 
factual sufficiency standard and the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), legal sufficiency standard); 
cf. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., dissenting, joined by 
Keller, P.J., & Keasler & Hervey, JJ.) (suggesting a “return to the single standard of review for 
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case as set out by the United States Supreme Court”), overruled 
in part on other grounds by Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 911–12; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1996) (recognizing the Supreme Court sets a minimum standard of review for criminal 
convictions and that states are free to heighten this standard), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks, 
323 S.W.3d at 904, 911–12.  See generally Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316–20 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .  Once a 
defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence 
is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution.  The criterion thus impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to 
the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.” (footnote 
omitted) (internal citation omitted) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972))). 
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sufficiency standard by concluding that certain legal sufficiency challenges 
should be properly brought as factual sufficiency challenges.355  But doing 
so would involve curtailing the court’s own jurisdiction to hear such cases.  
The differences in potential appellate relief are considerable: when deciding 
a case under the legal sufficiency challenge, a court may reverse and render 
judgment, effectively negating a jury’s verdict, whereas a reversal for factual 
sufficiency keeps the issue in the jury’s hands for a new trial. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence in Nonjury Trials 
In any case or issue tried without a jury, a “party may request [that] the 
court” prepare “findings of fact and conclusions of law.”356  The trial 
court’s findings of fact “shall not be recited in a judgment[,]”357 and oral 
comments from the bench will not constitute findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.358  It is, however, permissible for a trial court to list its 
findings in a letter to the respective attorneys, as long as the letter is filed of 
record.359  “The filing of a request for findings of fact, in most 
circumstances, extends the appellate timetable.”360  “The time frame for 
filing the findings envisions that a party will receive the findings before the 
deadline for perfecting appeal[,]” allowing “a potential appellant the 
opportunity to review the findings so as to make an intelligent decision as 
to the likelihood of success on appeal prior to investing in an expensive 
reporter’s record.”361 
Although the rules do not require, or even authorize, a party to request 
findings of facts and conclusions of law in connection with other trial court 
rulings, the careful practitioner will ask the trial court to prepare findings 
 
355. See Hall & Emery, supra note 128, at 597–610 (advocating for a return to factual sufficiency 
review in certain situations). 
356. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. 
357. TEX. R. CIV. P. 299a. 
358. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); G.T. Mgmt., Inc. v. Gonzalez, 
106 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Tate v. Tate, 55 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.4 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2000, no pet.); Sharp v. Hobart Corp., 957 S.W.2d 650, 652 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no 
pet.).  Also, a court’s oral statements may not be prepared as a reporter’s record and filed as findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.  Nagy v. First Nat’l Gun Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114, 115–16 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
359. See Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, 
no writ) (affirming the ability of judges to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in a letter 
filed with the clerk as part of the record). 
360. Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 437 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (citing TEX. 
R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(4)). 
361. Id. at 437–38. 
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and conclusions whenever the trial court acts as a fact finder.362  “When no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court judgment [will] 
be upheld on any legal theory supported by the record.”363  “When the trial 
court acts” as a fact finder, its findings are reviewed under the same legal 
and factual sufficiency standards as those in a jury trial.364 
1. Findings of Fact Filed 
a. With Reporter’s Record 
“Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and 
dignity as a jury’s verdict upon [jury] questions”;365 however, they are not 
conclusive when a complete reporter’s record appears in the appellate 
record.366  The trial court’s fact findings are reviewed for legal and factual 
sufficiency of the evidence,367 which is the same standard applied when 
reviewing evidence supporting jury findings.368  “When the appellate record 
 
362. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 33 (Tex. 1994) (emphasizing findings would 
be helpful with respect to a trial court’s review of punitive damages awards), superceded by statute, TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 
118, 140 (Tex. 2012); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 919 n.9 (Tex. 1991) 
(orig. proceeding) (noting findings would be helpful with respect to sanction orders); Fish v. Tandy 
Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (concluding upon denial 
of special appearance, defendant should request findings of fact pursuant to Rule 296). 
363. In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 686 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (citing Davis 
v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); Seaman v. Seaman, 425 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1968)). 
364. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000). 
365. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991) (citing L.R. French v. 
Diamond Hill-Jarvis Civic League, 724 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.); Reyes-Retana v. PTX Food Corp., 709 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.)); see Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994) (stating findings by a trial court 
have the same standards of review as evidence supporting a jury verdict). 
366. See Nipp v. Broumley, 285 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (“[F]indings 
[of fact] are not conclusive on the appellate court if there is a complete reporter’s record . . . .”); 
Stephenson v. Perlitz, 537 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Findings 
of fact are not conclusive on appeal when . . . a statement of facts appears in the record.” (citing 
Swanson v. Swanson, 228 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. 1950); Rosetta v. Rosetta, 525 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 
App.—Tyler 1975, no writ))).  When a trial court is late in filing its findings of fact, the error is 
considered “harmless absent some showing that the late filing injured” the complaining party.  Ford v. 
Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). 
367. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297. 
368. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (clarifying the same legal 
standards are used to review for factual sufficiency whether it is a trial court’s finding or a jury’s verdict 
at issue); id. (recognizing the same standard is used whether reviewing jury verdicts or trial court 
findings); Nelkin v. Panzer, 833 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d 
w.o.j.) (“Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury’s verdict 
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contains a reporter’s record[,] . . . findings of fact are not conclusive on 
appeal if the contrary is established as a matter of law or if there is no 
evidence to support the findings.”369  Although a trial court’s conclusions 
of law may not be challenged for factual insufficiency, the appellate court 
may review the conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their 
correctness.370 
b. Without Reporter’s Record 
If no reporter’s record is made part of the record on appeal, the reviewing 
court presumes that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the trial 
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the judgment was based 
upon those findings and conclusions.371 
2. Findings of Fact Not Requested and Not Filed 
a. With Reporter’s Record 
“If findings of fact [or] conclusions of law are neither filed nor requested, 
the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary finding[s] of fact to 
support it[,]”372 “provided: (1) the proposition is one raised by the pleadings 
and supported by the evidence; and (2) the trial judge’s decision can be 
sustained on any reasonable theory that is consistent with the evidence and 
 
upon special issues.” (citing City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.))). 
369. Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (citing 
Material P’ships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. 
denied)). 
370. Ashcraft v. Lookadoo, 952 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied) (en 
banc); see Tigner v. City of Angleton, 949 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no 
writ) (“[C]onclusions of law are reviewable when attacked as a matter of law, but not on grounds of 
factual sufficiency.” (citing Buzbee v. Castlewood Civic Club, 737 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), abrogated in part by Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 
894 (Tex. 1991))). 
371. Nelkin, 833 S.W.2d at 268 (stressing “[i]f no statement of facts [or reporter’s record] is 
made a part of the record on appeal” then the court will assume the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the trial court’s judgment). 
372. Schoeffler v. Denton, 813 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no 
writ) (citing Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); In re W.E.R., 
669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam)); accord BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 
83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (“When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of 
law . . . all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied.” (citing 
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1987); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717)). 
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the applicable law, considering only the evidence favorable to the 
decision.”373  To prevail, “‘the appellant may show that the undisputed 
evidence’” negates at least one of the essential elements of the decision, or 
the appellant “‘may show that the appellee’s pleadings omit one or more of 
the essential elements . . . [to the decision] and that the trial was confined to 
the pleadings.’”374 
However, when a reporter’s record is included as part of the record, the 
legal and factual sufficiency of the implied findings may be challenged on 
appeal.375  The applicable “standard of review is the same as that applied” 
in the review of jury findings or “a trial court’s findings of fact.”376  
Therefore, when the implied findings of fact are supported by the evidence, 
“the appellate court must uphold the judgment on any theory of law 
applicable to the case.”377  To determine whether the evidence supports the 
implied factual findings, the appellate court will “‘consider only that 
evidence most favorable to’” the implied factual findings and will disregard 
all opposing or contradictory evidence.378 
b. Without Reporter’s Record 
When there are “no findings of fact or conclusions of law” and no 
reporter’s record included in the record on appeal, the reviewing court 
presumes “that all facts necessary to support the judgment have been 
 
373. Franklin v. Donoho, 774 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ), overruled on 
other grounds by Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000); see Austin Area Teachers Fed. 
Credit Union v. First City Bank-Nw. Hills, N.A., 825 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ 
denied) (applying the two-part test from Franklin). 
374. Brodhead v. Dodgin, 824 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (quoting 
Franklin, 774 S.W.2d at 311). 
375. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992); Roberson v. Robinson, 
768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam); see Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County, 
682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1984) (stating reviewing courts may imply factual findings, which would 
sustain the judgment when “the judgment is supported by evidence in the record”). 
376. Wade v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 961 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1997, no writ) (per curiam) (citing Celanese Chem. Co. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)). 
377. Giangrosso v. Crosley, 840 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no 
writ) (citing In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717; M.R.S. Datascope Inc. v. Exchange Data Corp., Inc., 
745 S.W.2d 542, 544 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), abrogated on other grounds by 
B.J. Software Sys., Inc. v. Osina, 827 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)); 
Point Lookout W., Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam); Allen v. Allen, 
717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717. 
378. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1950) (quoting Austin v. Cochran, 
2 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928)). 
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found.”379  “Only in an exceptional case, i.e. where fundamental error is 
presented, is an appellant entitled to a reversal of the trial court’s 
judgment.”380 
3. Findings of Fact Properly Requested but Not Filed 
a. With Reporter’s Record 
When properly requested, the trial court has a mandatory duty to file 
findings of fact.381  If the trial court fails to do so, harmful error is 
presumed.382  However, this presumption is rebutted “if the record before 
the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered 
no injury[.]”383  The test of whether harm exists “depends on whether the 
circumstances of the particular case would require an appellant to” speculate 
as to why the trial judge ruled against the appellant or whether those reasons 
are obvious.384  “‘In factually complicated situations in which there are two 
or more possible grounds for recovery or defense, an undue burden . . . [is] 
 
379. Trevino & Gonzalez Co. v. R.F. Muller Co., 949 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
1997, no writ) (citing Roberson, 768 S.W.2d at 281; Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 
(Tex. 1965); Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839, 845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ 
denied)); Guthrie, 394 S.W.2d at 495; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 
1945). 
380. Ette v. Arlington Bank of Commerce, 764 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, 
no writ) (citing Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 260 S.W.2d 600, 603–04 (Tex. 1953); White v. 
Corpus Christi Little Misses Kickball Ass’n, 525 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1975, 
no writ)); Trevino, 949 S.W.2d at 41; Carns v. Carns, 776 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1989, no 
writ) (per curiam).  See infra Part VIII(H)(4) for a discussion of fundamental error. 
381. Nev. Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—El 
Paso 2005, no pet.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (providing the procedure for a proper request of the trial 
court to file findings of fact); TEX. R. CIV. P. 297 (providing the court shall file findings of fact within 
twenty days of a proper request). 
382. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989) (noting harmful 
error is presumed when the complaining party made the proper requests); Wagner v. Riske, 178 S.W.2d 
117, 119–20 (Tex. 1944) (interpreting Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296 to mean that a court’s failure 
to comply constitutes reversible error “where the party complaining complied with statutory 
requirements” unless “the record before the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining 
party has suffered no injury” (citing San Antonio Water Works Co v. Maury, 12 S.W.166, 166–67 (Tex. 
1888) (per curiam))). 
383. Wagner, 178 S.W.2d at 120 (citing San Antonio Water Works Co v. Maury, 12 S.W.166, 
166–67 (Tex. 1888) (per curiam)); Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Tex., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 
843, 845 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). 
384. Sheldon Pollack, 765 S.W.2d at 845; see Elizondo v. Gomez, 957 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (restating the test for harm set forth in Fraser v. Goldberg, 
552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), and noting that no harm exists 
where the trial court makes a statement that gives the appellant notice of why he was ruled against). 
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placed upon an appellant.’”385  This burden prevents the appellant from 
making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court.386 
If an appellant is harmed by the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact, 
the appellate court should not reverse the case if the trial court can correct 
the failure to act.387  If the trial court can correct its failure to act, the 
appellate court should abate the appeal, order the trial court to make the 
appropriate findings and certify those findings to the appellate court, and 
“then proceed as if the . . . failure to act had not occurred.”388  If the 
original judge is no longer available to prepare findings and conclusions, a 
successor judge may prepare them.389 
b. Without Reporter’s Record 
When a party fails to properly request the trial court to file findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, or call the court’s attention to the omission after 
 
385. Humphrey v. Camelot Ret. Cmty., 893 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, 
no writ) (quoting Fraser, 552 S.W.2d at 594); see Guzman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445, 446–47 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (holding the appellant was not harmed because the trial 
court’s failure to file findings of fact did not deprive appellant of “the opportunity to properly present 
her case” to the appellate court when only one issue was disputed). 
386. See In re O.L., 834 S.W.2d 415, 418–19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (stating 
a question to consider in determining whether harm exists is whether the appellant was prevented from 
making a proper presentation of the issues in the case); Anzaldua v. Anzaldua, 742 S.W.2d 782, 784 
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) (holding the trial court’s error was harmful because it 
prevented the appellant “from making a proper presentation of the issues in this case on appeal”); see 
also Humphrey, 893 S.W.2d at 61 (noting an appellant should not have to guess why the court ruled 
against him). 
387. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4(a). 
388. Id. 44.4(b); see Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 441–42 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no 
pet.) (stating abatement is appropriate where the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact is remedial, 
but reversing and remanding the case because the trial judge was unable to make the findings); Los 
Fresnos v. Gonzalez, 830 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (abating the 
appeal and ordering the trial court to “enter findings of fact and conclusions of law” where the appellate 
court was “unable to say whether error was committed and whether appellant has been deprived the 
opportunity to effectively assert his case on appeal”); Elec. Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., 
821 S.W.2d 170, 171–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (per curiam) (ordering the 
trial court to enter findings of fact “within 30 days of the date of this opinion” where the trial judge 
still served on the court), overruled on other grounds by In re Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). 
389. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.002(b); Ikard v. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d 644, 651 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ).  Contra FDIC v. Morris, 782 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1989, no writ) (holding the remedy of abatement was not available because the original judge was “no 
longer on the court”). 
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having timely requested them,390 and a reporter’s record is not presented to 
the appellate court for review, the appellate court presumes that “the 
evidence was sufficient and that every fact necessary to support the findings 
and judgment within the scope of the pleadings was prove[n] at trial.”391 
4. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact 
When the trial court’s findings involve questions of law and fact, the 
appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of 
discretion.392  In applying the standard, the reviewing court defers “to the 
trial court’s factual determinations” if supported by the evidence and 
reviews “its legal determinations de novo.”393  This standard permits the 
appellate court to review “de novo that part of the decision involving the 
law and its application while recognizing the trial court’s authority to weigh 
and interpret the evidence.”394  Accordingly, “the trial court abuses its 
discretion [if] it fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts, [if] it 
acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or [if] its ruling is based on factual assertions 
 
 
390. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 297 (“If the court fails to file timely findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the party making the [timely] request shall, within thirty days after filing the original request, file 
with the clerk and serve on all other parties . . . a ‘Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law . . . .’”). 
391. See Saenz v. Saenz, 756 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (citing 
Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); Patrick v. Patrick, 728 S.W.2d 
864, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)) (stating the appellant has the burden of 
presenting a sufficient record to the appellate court to determine whether there was an error requiring 
reversal).  Without a reporter’s record or findings of fact filed, the appellate court will presume that the 
evidence at trial was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.  See id. (holding a trial court’s 
judgment will be upheld in the absence of a record).  Similarly, if only a partial reporter’s record is 
properly before an appellate court, the presumption of sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
judgment will apply.  See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (asserting 
although a judgment on the merits is sought, an appellate court will presume the trial court’s findings 
were supported by facts if the record is insufficient to establish otherwise). 
392. See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d 54, 60–61 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to a finding of unconscionability), rev’d on other 
grounds, 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 1999); Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (stating because unconscionability involves both questions of law 
and fact, the abuse of discretion standard is the applicable standard of review)); see also Remington 
Arms Co. v. Luna, 966 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (applying abuse 
of discretion standard to class certification findings). 
393. Remington Arms, 966 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d at 820); Pony Express, 
921 S.W.2d at 820. 
394. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d at 61 (emphasis omitted) (citing Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d 
at 820). 
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unsupported by the record.”395 
C. Other Evidentiary Standards 
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof which 
will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to 
the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”396  The clear and 
convincing standard “is an intermediate standard, falling between the 
preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable 
doubt standard of criminal proceedings.”397  The Texas Supreme Court 
held in In re J.F.C.:398 
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact 
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.  To 
give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a 
court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume 
that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable 
factfinder could do so.  A corollary to this requirement is that a court should 
disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or 
found to have been incredible.  This does not mean that a court must disregard 
all evidence that does not support the finding.  Disregarding undisputed facts 
that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is 
clear and convincing evidence. 
If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a 
court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or 
 
395. Remington Arms, 966 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 
607 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d), abrogated in part on other grounds by Citizens Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2007)). 
396. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 
(Tex. 1979) (per curiam)); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 
380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (defining “clear and convincing 
evidence” as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm 
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established”). 
397. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). 
398. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002). 
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conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must 
conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.399 
The supreme court emphasized that witness credibility issues, which 
necessarily “depend on appearance and demeanor[,] cannot be weighed by 
the” reviewing court.400  While the court stated that even when witness 
“credibility issues are reflected in the” record on appeal, “the appellate court 
must defer to the jury’s determinations . . . so long as those determinations are not 
themselves unreasonable.”401  The court also observed that it must consider 
undisputed evidence that does not support the jury’s finding.402  
Accordingly, the reviewing court may set aside the jury’s determination if it 
finds either that the jury’s decision is unreasonable or that the undisputed 
evidence does not support the jury’s decision.403 
The clear and convincing evidence standard is limited to  
the following situations: (1) exemplary damages,404 (2) actual  
malice,405 (3) public-figure defamation,406 (4) termination of parental  
 
399. Id. at 266.  The supreme court has since followed its holding from the In re J.F.C. case.  
Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 866 (Tex. 2017); Diamond Shamrock 
Ref. Co., L.P. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005); Qwest Int’l Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 
167 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 
220 n.27 (Tex. 2005); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004). 
400. Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 625. 
401. Id. (emphasis added). 
402. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (distinguishing evidence a reasonable person could 
disbelieve from undisputed facts that do not support the jury’s findings, and stating that disregarding 
this evidence “could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence”). 
403. See Diamond Shamrock, 168 S.W.3d at 170 (applying the elevated standard of review where 
the court determines whether a reasonable person “could . . . form[ ] a firm belief or conviction” that 
a matter is true (quoting id.)); Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 628–29 (holding that where some evidence indicates 
termination with malice and other evidence is contradictory, the evidence as a whole does produce a 
clear conviction); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (describing the elevated standard of review as one where 
a “court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient” when “no reasonable factfinder could 
form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true”). 
404. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b); Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Silva, 
148 S.W.3d 370, 372–73 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 496 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). 
405. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). 
406. Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex. 2000); Huckabee v. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. 2000); see Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Abdel-Hafiz, 
240 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“To prevail at trial, a public figure 
plaintiff must establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, but the Texas Supreme Court 
has declined to adopt the clear-and-convincing standard at the summary judgment stage.” (citing 
Huckabee, 19 S.W.3d at 420–21)). 
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rights,407 and (5) because they are constitutionally protected,408 civil 
involuntary commitments.409 
2. Administrative Agency Rulings 
“Texas has recognized four types of review [for] an administrative 
[agency] decision: (1) pure trial de novo; (2) pure substantial evidence; 
(3) substantial evidence de novo; and (4) . . . ‘de novo fact trial.’”410  The 
de novo fact trial standard “is similar to pure trial de novo review except the 
agency’s decision is admissible at trial.”411  This standard, however, has not 
been applied outside utility rate cases.412 
Generally, judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which addresses 
contested cases.413  The reviewing court may reverse the agency’s decision 
only if it violates one of the six distinct bases for reversal set forth in the 
APA.414  Administrative rulings under the APA are subject to two standards 
 
407. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 261; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 
17, 23 (Tex. 2002); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); see In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 572 
(Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (citing to subsections 161.001(1)–(2) of the Texas Family Code). 
408. Ellis Cty. State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 792 n.5 (Tex. 1994); In re G.M., 
596 S.W.2d at 847. 
409. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a); see Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, 
255 S.W.3d 786, 796 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (emphasizing a clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard applies in civil matters involving extraordinary circumstances such as civil 
involuntary commitments). 
410. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing James R. Eissinger, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Contested 
Cases Under APTRA, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 11 (1990)). 
411. Id. (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 1978); Lone 
Star Gas Co. v. State, 153 S.W.2d 681, 695 (Tex. 1941)). 
412. See id. (discussing the usage of de novo fact trial in rate-making decisions). 
413. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.001–.902; Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 
17 (Tex. 2000).  A contested case means “a proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding, 
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an 
opportunity for adjudicative hearing.”  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(1).  It is not always clear, 
however, which standard applies when an administrative procedure is not a contested case.  See TEX. 
TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31(e) (explaining an appeal from an agency decision that certain property is not 
a “facility, device, or method for the control of . . . pollution[,]” and therefore not entitled to an ad 
valorem property tax exemption, is not considered a contested case under chapter 2001 of the 
Government Code). 
414. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(A)–(F).  The statute provides: 
If the law authorizes review of a decision in a contested case under the substantial evidence 
rule or if the law does not define the scope of judicial review, a court may not substitute its 
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of review: pure trial de novo and pure substantial evidence.415  The standard 
of review to apply depends upon what law is at issue, as the standard should 
be spelled out in the governing statute.416  In limited circumstances, both 
standards of review will be used in reviewing the same agency decision.417 
a. Pure Trial De Novo 
“If the manner of review . . . is by trial de novo,” the agency decision is 
vacated and “the reviewing court shall try each issue of fact and law in the 
manner that applies to other civil suits.”418  The appeal is handled by the 
 
judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence on questions 
committed to agency discretion but: 
(1) may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and 
(2) shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; 
(B) in excess of the agency’s statutory authority; 
(C) made through unlawful procedure; 
(D) affected by other error of law; 
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and 
probative evidence in the record as a whole; or 
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted 
exercise of discretion. 
Id. § 2001.174. 
415. Id. §§ 2001.173–.174; see Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 
1978) (“A complete reading of the [relevant] section [of the APA] reveals that in contested cases there 
are now provided only two types of review[:] pure trial de novo or review confined to the agency 
record.”). 
416. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.172; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.255(b) (stating the 
Workers’ Compensation Act provides for substantial evidence review under the APA); Tex. Emp’t 
Comm’n v. Remington York, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 352, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (noting 
judicial review of administrative agency actions under the Labor Code is de novo); Dickerson-Seely & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 784 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) 
(explaining the proper scope of review “is the one provided by the law pursuant to which the action is 
instituted”), abrogated on other grounds by Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 531 
& n.28 (Tex. 1995) (disapproving the holding in Dickerson-Seely that the Texas Workers’ Compensation 
Act “establish[ed] an impermissible hybrid system of judicial review”). 
417. See Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 530–31 (affirming a hybrid judicial review scheme for decisions 
of Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission in contested cases, which requires de novo review of 
some issues, but substantial evidence review of others). 
418. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal 
Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).  The Third Court of 
Appeals has held that the right to trial de novo must be specifically stated in the statute conferring 
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trial court “as though there had not been an intervening agency action[,]”419 
and in line with this principle, the reviewing court cannot admit the agency’s 
decision into evidence.420  The reviewing court bases its decision on its own 
determination of the issues of law and fact in the case,421 and it may 
consider new evidence not presented before the agency.422  As in other civil 
cases, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.423  Finally, 
a party may request a jury trial on each issue of fact.424 
b. Pure Substantial Evidence 
“‘Pure substantial evidence’ review is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum” from trial de novo.425  “Under this standard, the agency’s 
decision is not automatically vacated.”426  Instead, the reviewing court 
considers only the factual “record made before the [administrative body] . . . 
and determines whether the agency’s findings are reasonably supported by 
substantial evidence.”427  “The agency’s decision carries a presumption 
of . . . validity that may” be set aside only if the appellant can demonstrate 
“that reasonable minds could not have reached the [same] conclusion” as 
the agency.428  One endeavoring to reverse administrative findings, 
 
jurisdiction in the trial court.  Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 125 S.W.3d 23, 40 (Tex. App.—Austin 
2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 138 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. 2004). 
419. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); see Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 575 (noting filing 
a petition for trial de novo vacates the agency’s decision). 
420. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 574.  The fact that 
the decision has been made, however, can be used for the purpose of showing that the reviewing court 
has been properly vested with jurisdiction to act on the matter.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173. 
421. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a) (“[T]he reviewing court shall try each issue of 
fact and law in the manner that applies to other civil suits in this state . . . .”); see also Dickerson-Seely, 
784 S.W.2d at 575 (“Our courts have long held that the power to try a case de novo vests the court 
with full power to determine the facts anew and to decide all matters in issue.”). 
422. See Gilder v. Meno, 926 S.W.2d 357, 365 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (“Under 
a ‘pure trial de novo’ review, the decision of the lower agency or board is automatically vacated upon 
the taking of an appeal, and the reviewing tribunal not only hears new evidence, but also substitutes its 
discretion and judgment for that of the lower body.”). 
423. Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 574–75. 
424. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(b). 
425. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). 
426. Id. (citing Gilder, 926 S.W.2d at 366). 
427. Id. (citing Imperial Am. Res. Fund, Inc. v. R.R. Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. 1977)). 
428. Id. (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)); see City of El Paso v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Tex. 1994) (advising the court’s role in a substantial evidence 
review is to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in its entirety, would lead reasonable minds 
to agree in their conclusions concerning the disputed action).  “Substantial evidence” is a term of art, 
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conclusions, or decisions because of a lack of substantial evidence will face 
a difficult task.429 
“At its core, the substantial evidence rule is a reasonableness test or a 
rational basis test.”430  If the agency decision is not “supported by 
substantial evidence in the record[,]”431 or if the decision is “arbitrary or 
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted 
exercise of discretion[,]” the decision must be reversed.432  The scope of 
review is based upon “the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a 
whole.”433  However, the agency’s decision should be affirmed if: “(1) the 
findings of [the] underlying fact[s] in the order fairly support the [agency’s] 
findings of ultimate fact[s] and conclusions of law, and (2) the evidence 
presented at the hearing reasonably supports the findings of underlying 
fact[s].”434  Resolution of factual inconsistencies and ambiguities is within 
the realm of the agency and the goal of the substantial evidence rule is to 
guard that function.435  Therefore, the reviewing court is only concerned 
with the reasonableness of the agency’s order and “not the correctness of the 
 
which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion” of fact.  Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 923 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Austin 
1996, no writ) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564–65 (1988)). 
429. See Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 
1984) (permitting reversal of agency decisions for “absence of substantial evidence only if such absence 
has prejudiced substantial rights of the litigant”); Fetchin v. Meno, 922 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1995) (requiring the record to show error that warrants reversal), rev’d on other grounds, 916 S.W.2d 
961 (Tex. 1996). 
430. R.R. Comm’n v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tex. 1991) (citing Charter 
Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 453); see Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452−53 (noting the “true test” is 
“whether some reasonable basis exists” for the agency’s action and whether “reasonable minds could 
have reached the conclusion” the agency did); Tex. Health Enters., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 
954 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (summarizing the various articulations of the 
substantial evidence rule); William H. Chamblee, Comment, Administrative Law: Journey Through the 
Administrative Process and Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 155, 179–82 (1984) 
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Charter Med.–Dallas). 
431. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 210–11 (Tex. 1991). 
432. State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 344 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex. 2011) (quoting TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(F)); accord Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage 
Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017) (“The APA provides that cases should be reversed or 
remanded if the administrative decision is ‘in violation of a constitutional . . . provision . . . .’” (quoting 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(F))). 
433. Gulf States, 809 S.W.2d at 211 (citing Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452). 
434. Tex. Water Comm’n v. Customers of Combined Water Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 678, 681 
(Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (citing United Res. Recovery, Inc. v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 
815 S.W.2d 797, 801(Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied)). 
435. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Mini, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). 
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order.”436  In applying this test, the reviewing “‘court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence[.]’”437  The 
review is limited in that it requires “‘only more than a mere scintilla,’ to 
support an agency’s determination.”438  “As such, “the evidence in the 
record actually may preponderate against the decision of the agency and 
nonetheless amount to substantial evidence.”439  Finally, the question of 
whether the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence is 
a question of law, “and a trial of the fact issues by a judge or jury is 
avoided.”440 
“Substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” may at first appear 
to be “two sides of the same coin.”441  If an agency’s decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence, then the order is deemed to be arbitrary 
and capricious.442  However, a decision may be supported by substantial 
evidence yet still be arbitrary and capricious, therefore, justifying reversal.443  
 
436. R.R. Comm’n v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tex. 1991) (citing Tex. 
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1988); Firemen’s & Policemen’s 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984)); see State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
of Tex., 344 S.W.3d 349, 355–56 (Tex. 2011) (“Under substantial evidence review of fact-based 
determinations, ‘[t]he issue for the reviewing court is not whether the agency’s decision was correct, 
but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency’s action.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Mireles v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam))); 
Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984) (“The 
true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis 
exists in the record for the action taken by the agency.” (citing Gerst v Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 354 
(Tex. 1966))). 
437. Pend Oreille, 817 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, 
64th Leg., R.S., ch. 61, § 19(e), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 136, 147, repealed by Administrative Procedure Act, 
73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 1, sec. 2001.174, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 583, 749); accord Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 
at 956 (“[T]he agency itself is the primary fact-finding body, and the question to be determined by the 
trial court is strictly one of law.” (citing Bd. of Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund Trs. of Houston v. Mark, 
242 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1951))). 
438. City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Montgomery Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex. 2000)). 
439. Id. (quoting Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452). 
440. In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W.3d 581, 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) 
(citing Dallas Cty. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Warren, 988 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, 
no pet.); Bank of N. Am. v. State Banking Bd., 492 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex. 1973)); Davis, 34 S.W.3d 
at 566; Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956. 
441. Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 454 (citing Benson v. San Antonio Sav. Ass’n, 
374 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. 1963); City Sav. Ass’n v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Dickinson, 
560 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. 1978)). 
442. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Gulf States Utils. Comm’n, 809 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. 1991); id. 
443. See Lewis v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 550 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1977) (holding an order 
of the Savings and Loan Commission was invalid, despite the fact that “the order may be said to have 
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“An agency’s decision is arbitrary . . . if the agency: (1) fail[s] to consider a 
factor the legislature direct[ed] it to consider; (2) considers an irrelevant 
factor; or (3) weighs only relevant factors that the legislature direct[ed] it to 
consider but still reaches a completely unreasonable result.”444  The 
arbitrary and capricious test is a permutation of the abuse of discretion 
standard by focusing on the process of decision making rather than the 
decision itself.445 
c. Substantial Evidence De Novo 
Substantial evidence de novo review, a hybrid standard, allows the 
reviewing court to hear additional “evidence in existence at the time of the 
administrative hearing[,] regardless of whether it was [actually] introduced at 
the administrative hearing.”446  Under the substantial evidence de novo 
rule, “an appealing party has the right to petition the reviewing court to 
remand the case so that additional evidence may be taken before the 
administrative body.”447  “If the court is satisfied that the additional 
evidence is material and that there were good reasons for the failure to 
present it in the proceeding before the state agency, the court may order that 
the additional evidence be taken before the agency on conditions 
determined by the court.”448  The only instance in which a reviewing court 
 
reasonable factual support under the precepts of the substantial evidence rule”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. 
v. Alamo Express, Inc., 308 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1958) (stressing when the agency totally fails to 
make findings of fact and bases its decision on findings in another case, it can be reversed); Pub. Util. 
Comm’n v. S. Plains Elec. Coop., Inc., 635 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 
(ignoring the question of whether substantial evidence existed because improper standards were used 
by the agency in making its determination); Starr Cty. v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 356 
(Tex. App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (finding a lack of notice justified a reversal of the agency 
decision without any consideration of the substantial evidence question). 
444. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1994) (citing Gerst v 
Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 360 n.8 (Tex. 1966)). 
445. See Starr Indus., 584 S.W.2d at 355 (explaining an arbitrary decision-making process by an 
agency that denies a person due process of the law is an abuse of discretion and cannot stand). 
446. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (emphasis omitted) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Big Spring Firemen’s 
Relief & Ret. Fund v. Firemen’s Pension Comm’r, 808 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no 
writ)). 
447. In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) 
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c)); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c) (“A party 
may apply to the court to present additional evidence.  If the court is satisfied that the additional 
evidence is material and that there were good reasons for the failure to present it in the proceeding 
before the state agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken . . . .”). 
448. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c); Occidental Permian Ltd. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 
47 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). 
72
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4
  
2019] STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS 1171 
may admit new evidence is when the administrative record fails to reflect 
procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred in the administrative 
hearing.449  “‘Substantial evidence de novo’ review resembles ‘pure 
substantial evidence’ review in virtually all other respects.”450  The 
administrative order may be set aside only “if it is arbitrary, capricious, 
unlawful[,] or not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.”451  
Although new evidence is introduced at trial, the review is considered a 
question of law.452 
IV.    PRETRIAL RULINGS 
The bulk of pretrial rulings listed below in alphabetical order by topic are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, either on appeal or by writ of 
mandamus.453  There are, however, a number of deviations from this 
general rule.454  See Part II supra for a more complete discussion of how 
the abuse of discretion standard operates as a standard of review in appeals 
and original proceedings. 
A. Abatement 
A motion or plea in abatement alleges that there is some obstacle to 
prosecuting the case.455  Perhaps the most common plea involves dominant 
jurisdiction, which occurs when “two lawsuits concerning the same 
 
449. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(e) (“[T]he court may receive evidence of 
procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred before the agency that are not reflected in the 
record.”). 
450. Galveston Cent., 979 S.W.2d at 765.  
451. Id. (citing Gilder v. Meno, 926 S.W.2d 357, 371 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) 
(Jones, J., dissenting)). 
452. Id. 
453. For example, the trial court’s order granting or denying discovery is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Schild, 828 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
1992, orig. proceeding). 
454. An example of this deviation from the general rule is that an appellate court reviews a trial 
court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue de novo.  Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 
886 S.W.2d 259, 260–62 (Tex. 1994).  In reviewing a special appearance, an appellate court may review 
the fact findings for both legal and factual sufficiency, although the ultimate question of whether the 
court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law reviewed de novo.  BMC Software 
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); see Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, 
Inc., 308 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant is a question of law, which we review de novo.” (citing id.)). 
455. Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam), abrogated in part on other grounds 
by Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338–39 (Tex. 2006); Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces Cty. Bail Bond 
Bd., 1 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). 
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controversy and parties are pending in courts of coordinate 
jurisdiction[.]”456  A motion to abate may also be used to raise a defect in 
parties.457 
Typically, if the plea is sustained, the action is suspended until the obstacle 
is removed.458  There are cases, however, holding that if a party calls the 
trial court’s attention to the pendency of a prior suit involving the same 
parties and same controversy, the subsequent case “must be 
dismissed[.]”459  The Texas Supreme Court has noted the split in authority 
but has not resolved it.460 
A plea in abatement is generally an incidental ruling appealed from a final 
judgment,461 but rare exceptions exist.462  The appellate court will review 
the trial court’s abatement decision with an abuse of discretion standard.463  
 
456. Flores v. Peschel, 927 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig. 
proceeding); see Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988) (noting when a lawsuit 
“is proper in more than one county,” the court in which the lawsuit was first filed obtains dominant 
jurisdiction), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. 
2016). 
457. Truong v. City of Houston, 99 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no 
pet.). 
458. Speer, 685 S.W.2d at 23; Life Ass’n of Am. v. Goode, 8 S.W. 639, 640 (Tex. 1888). 
459. Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 563 n.2 (Tex. 1991). 
460. See Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (indicating that, 
at the trial court level, some courts have dismissed the second suits while others have merely abated 
them). 
461. See Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“In 
the absence of [direct] interference, the refusal to abate can be adequately reviewed on appeal.” (citing 
Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1991))). 
462. See Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus 
relief when a second court incorrectly denied a plea in abatement); Virani v. Cunningham, No. 14-08-
01166-CV, 2009 WL 2568349, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 20, 2009, pet. denied) 
(mem. op.) (affirming an order denying a plea in abatement that was combined with an appealable 
motion to compel arbitration); Epernay Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Shaar, No. 14-09-00422-CV, 2009 WL 
1796062, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) 
(dismissing an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant’s plea in abatement); In re Ayala, 
No. 13-07-140-CV, 2007 WL 1238572, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi April 27, 2007, orig. 
proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting mandamus relief from an order denying a plea in abatement based 
on dominant jurisdiction). 
463. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1998), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. 2016); see Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 
564, 567 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (declining to grant mandamus relief because the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying relator’s plea in abatement and the relator had an adequate remedy 
by appeal), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., No. 17-1060, 2019 WL 
321152, at *3 (Tex. January 25, 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Dolenz v. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of 
Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1981) (holding the trial court “did not act arbitrarily or 
unreasonably in denying [the] plea in abatement”). 
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Whether the trial court properly sustained or overruled a plea in abatement 
depends upon the evidence offered at the hearing on the plea; a reporter’s 
record is required to attack the trial court’s actions following the hearing.464  
If the plea is sustained without hearing evidence, the appellate court must 
accept “allegations of fact in the petition as true and indulge every 
reasonable inference in support [of them].”465 
B. Arbitration 
The parties to a lawsuit might have previously agreed to arbitrate disputes, 
or the parties may be statutorily required to arbitrate.466  The first step to 
engage this method of alternative dispute resolution is to file a motion to 
compel arbitration.  Once the arbitration is complete, the trial court may 
confirm the award. 
1. Motion to Compel Arbitration 
A motion to compel arbitration should specify whether the arbitration is 
sought under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) or the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) or both.  Texas courts favor arbitration agreements.467 
a. Texas Arbitration Act 
In determining whether to compel an arbitration agreement under the 
TAA, a trial court must consider: “(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement 
exists, and (2) if so, whether the claims asserted fall within the scope of the 
 
464. See Vestal v. Jackson, 598 S.W.2d 724, 725–26 (Tex. App.—Waco 1980, no writ) (refusing 
to hold that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to abate the case in the absence of a reporter’s 
record, then known as a statement of facts). 
465. Jenkins v. State, 570 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ) 
(citing Longoria v. Alamia, 230 S.W.2d 1022, 1022 (Tex. 1950)).  The supreme court subsequently 
disapproved of the Jenkins court’s definition on an unrelated issue.  See Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at 
Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 179 & n.7 (Tex. 1994) (disapproving of the appellate court’s 
inclusion of a patient’s medical records as tangible personal property). 
466. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(d) (illustrating statutory arbitration for certain 
matters affecting firefighters and police officers); In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206, 
206–08 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (illustrating a contractual agreement to arbitrate); 
see also L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1977) (noting common law 
arbitration is an alternative to statutory arbitration); Riha v. Smulcer, 843 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (recognizing common law arbitration). 
467. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); Brazoria 
County v. Knutson, 176 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. 1943). 
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agreement.”468  If the court determines that a valid agreement exists, “the 
burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to raise an affirmative 
defense to enforcing arbitration.”469  “Once the trial court concludes that 
the arbitration agreement encompasses the claims, and that the party 
opposing arbitration has failed to prove its defenses, the trial court has no 
discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings.”470 
Whether arbitration is required is a matter of contract interpretation, and 
the enforceability of an arbitration provision is a question of law for the 
court.471  However, the decision to compel arbitration or not is subject to 
review for an abuse of discretion.472  An appeal may be taken from an order 
“denying an application to compel arbitration[,]” or from an order “granting 
an application to stay arbitration[,]” but relief from an order compelling 
arbitration is generally only available on final appeal.473  In rare 
circumstances, mandamus relief is available for an order compelling 
arbitration.474 
b. Federal Arbitration Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act applies to contracts affecting interstate 
commerce.475  “There is a presumption favoring agreements to arbitrate 
 
468. See Nationwide of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Wigington, 945 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex. App.—Waco 
1997, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 
878 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, writ denied)) (resolving doubts in favor of arbitration). 
469. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re Oakwood 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), abrogated in part 
on other grounds by In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 571–72 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)). 
470. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753–54 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) 
(footnote omitted) (citing In re Oakwood, 987 S.W.2d at 573; Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 
943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). 
471. See In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam) (holding enforceability is a “question of law”); J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227 
(interpreting arbitration agreements under “traditional contract principles”). 
472. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d at 271. 
473. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1)–(2); Materials Evolution Dev. USA, 
Inc. v. Jablonowski, 949 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ); Lipshy Motorcars, 
Inc. v. Sovereign Assocs., 944 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ); Burlington N. R.R. 
Co. v. Akpan, 943 S.W.2d 48, 49–50 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ). 
474. In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 841–43 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re Poly-
Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 345–46 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); see Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 
580, 586 (Tex. 2008) (noting when an appeal is an adequate remedy for an order compelling arbitration, 
mandamus must be denied). 
475. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); In re Nexion Health at 
Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). 
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under the federal act[,]”476 and the court should resolve any doubts in favor 
of arbitration.477  Under the FAA, unless there is “unmistakable evidence 
that the parties intended the contrary, it is the courts . . . that must decide 
‘gateway matters’ such as whether a valid arbitration agreement exists[,]”478 
and whether the agreement is binding on a nonparty.479  Pending a clear 
answer from the United States Supreme Court, under the FAA, the Texas 
Supreme Court holds that state law governs whether a nonparty agreed to 
arbitrate480 and “federal law governs the scope of an arbitration 
[agreement][,]”481 noting that the state courts should try “to keep it as 
consistent as possible with federal law.”482 
“[A] party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish 
that: (1) there is a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) the claims raised fall 
within that agreement’s scope.”483  “An agreement to arbitrate is valid [and 
enforceable] unless grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract, such as fraud or unconscionability.”484  If the movant makes 
this showing, and the opposing party fails to demonstrate an affirmative 
 
476. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mack, 945 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1997, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig. 
proceeding) (per curiam)); accord In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) 
(orig. proceeding) (affirming the presumption in favor of arbitration); Cantella, 924 S.W.2d at 944 
(stating both state and federal law favor arbitration). 
477. In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 737; In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001) 
(orig. proceeding). 
478. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (quoting 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003); PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 
538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003)). 
479. Id. 
480. Id. (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996); First Options 
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9). 
481. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
482. Id. at 131 (citing In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739). 
483. In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 737 (citing In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 
2001) (orig. proceeding); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (orig. 
proceeding) (per curiam), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 571–
72 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)); accord In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex. 
2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (listing the two requirements a party must establish to compel 
arbitration). 
484. Emerald Tex., Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no 
writ) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (addressing the 
“[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of” arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (detailing the protections 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides consumers against 
unwanted arbitration provisions); see also In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2005) (orig. 
proceeding) (per curiam) (explaining “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit,” parties are bound 
to the arbitration agreement). 
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defense to arbitration,485 the trial court is obligated to compel 
arbitration.486 
The trial court’s determination of the validity of an arbitration agreement 
is a legal question reviewed de novo.487  A trial court’s order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration under the federal act is reviewable by appeal 
for an abuse of discretion, while a trial court’s order granting a motion to 
compel arbitration under the federal act is reviewable by mandamus for 
abuse of discretion.488 
2. Motion to Confirm or Vacate an Arbitration Award 
To set aside an arbitration award, the complaining party “must allege a 
statutory or common law ground to vacate the award.”489  An arbitration 
award under the common law may be set aside by a court only if the decision 
is tainted by “fraud, misconduct, or such gross mistake as would imply bad 
faith or failure to exercise an honest judgment.”490  In addition to the 
common law grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, the TAA also 
authorizes a court to vacate an award if: (1) the arbitrators “exceed[ ] their 
powers;” (2) the arbitrators “refuse[ ] to postpone [a] hearing” when a party 
shows “sufficient cause for the postponement;” (3) the arbitrators “refuse[ ] 
to hear evidence material to the controversy” or conduct the hearing in a 
manner that “substantially prejudice[s] the rights of a party;” or (4) “there 
was no [arbitration] agreement . . ., the issue was not adversely determined 
 
485. AdvancePCS, 172 S.W.3d at 607. 
486. Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam). 
487. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re 
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). 
488. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.016 (“In a matter subject to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, a person may take an appeal or writ of error to the court of appeals from the judgment 
or interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court . . . .” (internal citation 
omitted)).  But see In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 370 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(illustrating FAA decisions were formerly not appealable and were subject to mandamus relief). 
489. HISAW & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cornerstone Concrete Sys., Inc., 115 S.W.3d 
16, 18–19 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2003, pet. denied) (per curiam) (citing Anzilotti v. Gene D. Liggin, 
Inc., 899 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)); Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d 
at 266. 
490. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); accord 
Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266 (affirming the test outlined in Nuno “for determining whether or not an 
arbitration award must be vacated”); see Emerald Tex., Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (noting “an agreement to arbitrate is valid unless” legal or equitable 
grounds exist for its revocation “such as fraud or unconscionability” (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 171.001)). 
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in a proceeding” to compel or stay arbitration, “and the party did not 
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.”491  
Under the TAA, an award shall be modified by a court if there was: (1) a 
miscalculation of figures; (2) a mistaken “description of a person, thing, or 
property”; (3) the arbitrators made an award of an issue “not submitted to 
them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the” 
issues submitted; or (4) the award is imperfect in form only.492 
Review of a trial court’s decision as to vacatur or confirmation of an 
arbitration award is de novo.493  Because courts favor arbitration awards to 
resolve disputes,494 the courts “indulge every reasonable presumption” in 
favor of upholding the awards.495  “A mere mistake of fact or law is 
insufficient to set aside an arbitration award[.]”496  An arbitration award is 
to be given the same weight as a trial court’s judgment, and the reviewing 
court “may not substitute [its] judgment for the arbitrator’s merely because 
 
491. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(3)–(4).  Like the common law, 
subsection (a)(1) provides that an award may be vacated if “obtained by corruption, fraud, or other 
undue means[,]” and subsection (a)(2) provides that an award may be vacated if any party’s rights are 
prejudiced because an arbitrator was not impartial, was corrupt, or was guilty of misconduct or willful 
misbehavior. Id. § 171.088(a)(1)–(2); see Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (identifying the grounds on which a court may vacate an 
arbitration award). 
492. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1)–(3); accord Riha v. Smulcer, 
843 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (summarizing when an 
arbitration award may be modified). 
493. See Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(stating review of a trial court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award is de novo); Kreit v. Brewer & 
Pritchard, P.C., 530 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting a 
trial court’s decision to affirm or vacate an arbitration award is reviewed under a de novo standard of 
review); Statewide Remodeling, Inc. v. Williams, 244 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no 
pet.) (noting appellate courts review an arbitration confirmation decision de novo). 
494.    In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Riha, 
843 S.W.2d at 292–94; House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
495. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266; see FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753 (“[C]ourts must 
resolve any doubts about an arbitration agreement’s scope in favor of arbitration.” (citing Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Prudential Sec. Inc. v. 
Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam))); Nuno, 946 S.W.2d at 452 
(emphasizing any doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration). 
496. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Powell 
v. Gulf Coast Carriers, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); see 
Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266 (affirming a “mere” mistake is insufficient, but implying a “gross” mistake 
would likely suffice). 
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[it] would have reached a different” result.497  The scope of review is the 
entire record.498 
C. Class Action Certification 
The purpose of class certification is to provide “‘meaningful recompense 
to groups of injured parties whose injuries would be too small to make it 
cost-effective to prosecute them individually.’”499  Whether or not to certify 
a class action presents the court with several challenging and complicated 
decisions because “[o]n one hand, the class-action device affords an avenue 
for relief to large numbers of people who might not otherwise be able to 
pursue individual claims; on the other hand, the decision to certify a class 
can have staggering economic consequences.”500  To obtain certification of 
a class, the representative party or parties must meet the requirements of 
Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which is patterned after its 
federal counterpart, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.501  As 
a result, the supreme court looks to federal decisions and authorities 
interpreting federal class action requirements.502  Pursuant to Rule 42(a): 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties 
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable [(numerosity)], (2) there are questions of law, or fact common 
to the class [(commonality)], (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
 
497. Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, orig. proceeding [leave 
denied]) (citing City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 293–94); accord City of Baytown, 886 S.W.2d at 518 
(showing deference to the arbitrator’s award); see Nuno, 946 S.W.2d at 452 (“Arbitration awards are 
favored by the courts to dispose of pending disputes; therefore, every reasonable presumption will be 
indulged to uphold the arbitration proceeding.” (citing House Grain, 659 S.W.2d at 905–06)) 
498. See Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 294 (reviewing the record as a whole). 
499. Wood v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 69 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, 
no pet.) (quoting Northrup v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 72 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no 
pet.)); accord Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. 1996) (“Class action suits furnish 
an efficient means for numerous claimants with a common complaint to obtain a remedy ‘[w]here it is 
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework . . . .’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980))); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616–18 (1997) (discussing the underlying goals and requirements to qualify as 
a class action suit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
500. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 701 (Tex. 2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting, 
joined by Enoch & Hankinson, JJ.).  Not surprisingly, a trial court’s ruling certifying or refusing to 
certify a class is subject to interlocutory appeal.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3). 
501. Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000). 
502. See id. (explaining that such authority is persuasive to Texas class action certification). 
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parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [(typicality)], and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class [(adequacy of representation)].503 
In addition to these four requirements, class actions must satisfy one of 
the four subdivisions of Rule 42(b).504 
The supreme court requires the trial court to pursue a rigorous analysis 
before ruling on a motion for class certification “‘to determine whether all 
prerequisites to certification have been met.’”505  The court has “rejected 
the ‘certify now and worry later’ approach to class certification[.]”506  While 
it “may not be an abuse of discretion to certify a class that could later fail,” 
the court stated that a “cautious approach to class certification is 
essential.”507  Accordingly, it is improper for a trial court “‘to certify a class 
without knowing how the claims can and will likely be tried.’”508  The trial 
court’s order must set forth a plan as to how the claims will be tried so that 
the appellate court can meaningfully review the trial court’s compliance with 
Rule 42.509  “The formulation of a trial plan assures that a trial court has 
fulfilled its obligation to rigorously analyze all certification prerequisites and 
‘understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive 
 
503. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a); Schein, 102 S.W.3d at 692; accord Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433 
(summarizing the threshold requirements for a class action lawsuit). 
504. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(b).  Rule 42(b) allows an action to proceed as a class action if, in addition 
to satisfying 42(a) prerequisites, one of the following elements is met: (1) maintaining separate actions 
“would create a risk of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications” of individual class members, or 
prosecuting individual class members would either “be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests;” (2) the opposing party “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect 
to the class as a whole;” or (3) “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” so that the class action is the most 
“fair and efficient” method of adjudication.  Id.; accord Union Pac. Res. Grp., Inc. v. Hankins, 
111 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Tex. 2003) (quoting the requirements found in TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(b)); see Compaq 
Comput. Co. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. 2004) (noting the Rule 42(b)(2) requirements must 
be “rigorously analyze[d]” by the trial court before ruling on class certification). 
505. BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 777 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Bernal, 
22 S.W.3d at 435); see Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389, 392–93 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) 
(noting the trial court’s failure to rigorously analyze class certification requirements). 
506. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 776–77 (quoting Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435). 
507. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435. 
508. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting id.); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 
156 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. 2004) (restating the standard set forth in Bernal). 
509. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 777; N. Am. Mortg. Co. v. O’Hara, 153 S.W.3d 43, 44 (Tex. 2004) 
(per curiam). 
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law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification 
issues.’”510  If it cannot be determined “from the outset that the individual 
issues can be considered in a manageable, time-efficient, yet fair manner, 
then certification is not appropriate.”511 
Whether a party is a proper representative of a class and whether a suit 
should be certified as a class action is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.512  However, the reviewing court does not indulge every 
presumption in favor of the order because “compliance with class action 
requirements must be demonstrated rather than presumed.”513 
D. Consolidation 
The trial court may consolidate cases pursuant to Rule 174.514  The 
express purpose of Rule 174 “is to further convenience and avoid prejudice, 
and thus promote the ends of justice.”515  “The trial court may consolidate 
actions that “relate to substantially the same transaction, occurrence, subject 
matter, or question.”516  The actions must “‘be so related that evidence 
presented will be material, relevant, and admissible in each case.’”517  “[T]he 
trial court must balance the judicial economy and convenience . . . gained by 
consolidation against the risk of an unfair outcome because of prejudice or 
 
510. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 778 (quoting State Farm, 156 S.W.3d at 556). 
511. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 436 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex. 
1996)). 
512. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. 2004); see Nat’l W. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (discussing the deference given to courts 
in class action certifications). 
513. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 671 (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 691 
(Tex. 2002)). 
514. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a) (allowing a court to “order a joint hearing or trial of any or all 
the matters in issue[,] . . . order all the actions consolidated[,] and . . . make such orders . . . as may tend 
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay”); Allison v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981) 
(per curiam) (recognizing a trial court’s broad discretion in determining joinder and consolidation); see 
In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 614–17 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (listing factors for 
consolidated trials in mass tort litigation). 
515. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding). 
516. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, 
no writ) (citing Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1992, writ denied)); Crestway Care Ctr., Inc. v. Berchelmann, 945 S.W.2d 872, 873–74 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (en banc) (quoting Excel Corp. v. Valdez, 
921 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied])). 
517. Crestway Care Ctr., 945 S.W.2d at 874 (quoting Valdez, 921 S.W.2d at 448); Martin, 
942 S.W.2d at 716 (citing Lone Star Ford, 838 S.W.2d at 737). 
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jury confusion.”518  If “‘the facts and circumstances of the case 
unquestionably require . . . separate trial[s] to prevent a manifest injustice, 
and there [are] no fact[s] or circumstance[s] supporting or tending to 
support a contrary conclusion,’ the trial court does not have any discretion 
to order consolidation.”519  The trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
consolidate is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.520 
E. Continuance 
Pursuant to Rule 251, a trial court may grant a continuance on sufficient 
cause “supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation 
of law.”521  Whether the trial court grants or denies a motion for 
continuance is within its sound discretion.522  Therefore, the trial court’s 
ruling is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion.523 
 
518. Crestway Care Ctr., 945 S.W.2d at 874 (quoting Valdez, 921 S.W.2d at 448); Martin, 
942 S.W.2d at 716 (citing Dal-Briar Corp. v. Baskette, 833 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, 
orig. proceeding), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 453–54 (Tex. 2009) 
(orig. proceeding)). 
519. Martin, 942 S.W.2d at 716 (quoting Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683). 
520. In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. 
proceeding); see, e.g., Pilgrim Enters., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 24 S.W.3d 488, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (indicating the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to consolidate an 
action).  Mandamus review may also be available.  See, e.g., In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 
203, 206 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief from a court’s decision 
to consolidate several claims). 
521. TEX. R. CIV. P. 251; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 252 (granting continuance based on want of 
testimony); TEX. R. CIV. P. 254 (granting continuance based on absence of counsel when absence was 
caused by attendance in legislature).  The mere absence of counsel does not entitle the party to a 
continuance.  TEX. R. CIV. P. 253; see Vickery v. Vickery, No. 01-94-01004-CV, 1997 WL 751995, 
at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 4, 1997, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for 
publication) (explaining absence of a party is not itself grounds for continuance and that “[t]he absent 
party must show that he had a reasonable excuse for not being present, and that he was prejudiced by 
his absence” (citing Green v. State, 589 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, no writ); Erback v. 
Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1943, no writ))).  For the continuance to be 
granted for necessity of testimony of the absent party, the movant must show “the testimony is material 
and what is expected to be proved by the testimony.”  Id. (citing Green, 589 S.W.2d at 163; Erback, 
170 S.W.2d at 291–92). 
522. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding). 
523. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); Tri-Steel 
Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. 
denied).  In In re North American Refractories Co., the Ninth Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief 
against a trial judge who refused to grant a motion for continuance filed pursuant to a lawyer’s vacation 
letter filed in compliance with the local rule.  In re N. Am. Refractories Co., 71 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. 
App.—Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding).  Because a local rule allowing attorneys to designate vacation 
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A trial court may grant a continuance if the affidavits of the party seeking 
the continuance show that the party seeking the continuance cannot present 
necessary facts in response to a summary judgment motion.524  The trial 
court should consider the following list of nonexclusive factors in ruling on 
a motion for continuance of a summary judgment hearing to conduct more 
discovery: “the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and 
purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the 
continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.”525 
F. Default Judgment 
The rules governing a no answer and post-answer default judgment differ 
greatly.526  “For a no-answer default judgment, the non-answering party is 
deemed to have admitted all the facts properly pleaded in the petition.”527  
On the other hand, in a post-answer default judgment, “non-appearance at 
trial does not constitute an abandonment of the defendant’s answer and it 
is not an implied confession of any issues joined by the answer.”528 
If a defendant fails to file a timely answer after properly being served, the 
defendant may suffer a default judgment.529  A post-answer default takes 
place when a defendant initially answers, but fails to make an appearance at 
trial.530  “[W]hen a default judgment is attacked by motion for new trial[,]” 
the parties may introduce evidence such as “affidavits, depositions, 
testimony, and exhibits” that demonstrate why the default judgment should 
 
weeks was mandatory, the trial court’s refusal to grant the continuance was an abuse of discretion for 
which there was no adequate remedy at law.  Id. at 393–94.  In practical terms, appellate courts only 
review orders denying continuances, perhaps because it would be impossible to show harm from an 
order granting a continuance. 
524. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161. 
525. Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161 (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 800; Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. 
Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus., 
Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521–22 (Tex. 1995); State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 
1988); Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no 
pet.)). 
526. Rouhana v. Ramirez, 556 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). 
527. Id. at 476–77 (citing Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979)).  
528. Id. at 477 (citing Sedona Pac. Hous. P’ship v. Ventura, 408 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2013, no pet.); Mountain Corp. v. Rose, 737 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, writ 
denied)). 
529. TEX. R. CIV. P. 239; Michael A. Pohl & David Hittner, Judgments by Default in Texas, 37 SW. 
L.J. 421, 422 (1983); see Aguilar v. Alvarado, 39 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied) 
(stating the trial court may not award a default judgment once the defendant files an answer). 
530. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam); Stoner, 
578 S.W.2d at 682. 
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be set aside.531  Different rules apply to set aside a default judgment 
depending on whether the judgment was proper (secured in accordance with 
the statutes and rules for issuance, service, and return of citation) or 
defective (not secured in accordance with the statutes and rules for issuance, 
service, and return of citation). 
1. Proper Default Judgment 
A three-part test for determining whether a court should grant a motion 
for new trial to set aside a proper default judgment was established in the 
leading case of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.532  The purpose of 
Craddock is to “alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results . . . when the 
defaulting party has no other remedy available.”533  It “is based upon 
equitable principles and ‘prevents an injustice to the defendant without 
working an injustice on the plaintiff.’”534  Under this test, a trial court may 
set aside a default judgment and order a new trial in any case in which: 
the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, 
or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake 
or an accident;535 provided the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious 
 
531. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573–74 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (citing Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).  If it is too late to file a 
motion for new trial, other options for challenging a default judgment include a regular appeal, 
restricted appeal (formerly known as a writ of error), and bill of review.  See generally Jordan v. Jordan, 
36 S.W.3d 259, 263–65 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. denied) (delineating alternative legal 
remedies available after a default judgment has been entered). 
532. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939); see 
Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992) (reaffirming the three-part Craddock test).  
But see Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Fin. Leasing Servs., Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 356–57 (Tex. 
App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied) (expanding Craddock’s three-part test to four parts by separating the 
mistake or accident element from the conscious indifference element). 
533. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002) (citing 
Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126). 
534. Id. at 685 (quoting Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126). 
535. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126.  A valid excuse does not have to be a good excuse to satisfy 
this burden.  Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.3d at 576.  A slight excuse will suffice, particularly when 
not resulting in delay or prejudice.  Harmon Truck Lines, Inc. v. Steele, 836 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 1992, writ dism’d); Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); cf. Coastal Banc SSB v. Helle, 48 S.W.3d 796, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2001, pet. denied) (determining not being advised of the hearing date is a sufficient excuse for 
failure to appear).  The standard, however, is not negligence but “‘is one of intentional or conscious 
indifference—that the defendant knew it was sued but did not care.’”  Levine v. Shackelford, Melton 
& McKinley, L.L.P., 248 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 186 
S.W.3d at 575–76); see Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. 1984) (looking to the defendant’s 
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defense[,]536 and is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no 
delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.537 
When the first element is established with proof that the defaulted party 
did not receive notice of a trial setting or other dispositive hearing, due 
process alleviates the burden of proving the second element of the Craddock 
test regarding a meritorious defense.538  It is likely that the third element 
regarding prejudice to plaintiff would not have to be proved in the same 
circumstances for the same due process reasons.539 
The Craddock test applies to both no-answer and post-answer default 
judgments.540  The Craddock test can also apply to summary judgments,541 
unless the “motion for new trial [is] filed after judgment has been granted 
 
knowledge and acts to determine intent); Konkel v. Otwell, 65 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.—Eastland 
2001, no pet.) (distinguishing an intentional action from a mistake).  If there is controverting evidence 
on this issue, the court may judge the witnesses’ credibility and determine the weight to be given to the 
testimony.  Harmon Truck Lines, 836 S.W.2d at 265. 
536. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126; see Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966) (requiring 
the defendant to allege facts constituting a defense to the plaintiff’s claim that is supported by 
evidence); Cragin v. Henderson Cty. Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555–56 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1926, 
holding approved) (determining allegations of meritorious defense are to be taken as true if properly 
supported, but that allegations of excuse for failure to appear may be controverted and determined by 
the trial court).  A meritorious defense is one that if proved would cause a different result upon retrial 
of the case, although not necessarily a totally opposite result.  Holliday v. Holliday, 10 S.W. 690, 692 
(Tex. 1889). 
537. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126; accord Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685 (outlining the three-part 
Craddock test); Angelo v. Champion Rest. Equip. Co., 713 S.W.2d 96, 97–98 (Tex. 1986) (expounding 
upon the delay or injury requirement under the Craddock test). 
538. Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); see Mathis v. Lockwood, 
166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (re-affirming Lopez); Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 
4 S.W.3d 46, 52 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (explaining when a party shows he 
had no notice of the trial setting, he does not have to prove a meritorious defense). 
539. Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 744; Mahand v. Delaney, 60 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 
540. See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex. 1989) (providing that Craddock has 
“general application to all judgments of default”). 
541. Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 979 S.W.2d 795, 798–99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1998, no pet.), overruled in part by Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (“[W]e disapprove of . . . court of 
appeals decisions to the extent that they can be read to hold that all of the Craddock factors must be 
met when a nonmovant is aware of its mistake at or before the summary-judgment hearing and thus 
has an opportunity to apply for relief under our rules.”); Washington v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392, 396 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ), overruled in part by Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686.  But see Rabe v. 
Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (refusing 
to apply Craddock in the summary judgment context); Enernational Corp. v. Exploitation Eng’rs, Inc., 
705 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (ruling that the Craddock 
test is inappropriate in summary judgment cases).   
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on a summary-judgment motion to which the nonmovant failed to timely 
respond when the” nonmovant had the opportunity to do so.542 
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial based on Craddock is 
reviewed on appeal with the abuse of discretion standard.543  “The 
historical trend in default judgment cases is toward the liberal granting of 
new trials.”544  Accordingly, when the guidelines established in Craddock 
have been met, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial.545 
2. Defective Default Judgment 
A motion for new trial following a defective default judgment does not 
have to meet the Craddock requirements and should not be confused with a 
motion for new trial after a proper default judgment.546 Personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant to a suit is “dependent upon citation issued 
and served in a manner provided for by law.”547 “If a default judgment is 
not rendered in compliance with the statutes and rules[,] . . . the default 
judgment may be set aside by a motion to set aside, a motion for new trial, 
an appeal, or” a restricted appeal.548 
In reviewing a default judgment under these remedies, both trial and 
reviewing courts may only consider errors that appear on the face of the 
record.549  “[I]t is imperative . . . that the record affirmatively show a strict 
 
542. Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685–86.  The Texas Supreme Court in Carpenter did not expressly 
hold that Craddock does apply to summary judgments; however, the court stated that “Craddock does not 
apply to a motion for new trial filed after summary judgment is granted on a motion to which the 
nonmovant failed to timely respond when the respondent had notice of the hearing and an opportunity 
to employ the means” provided by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. at 683–84(emphasis added). 
543. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009); Cliff v. Huggins, 
724 S.W.2d 778, 778 (Tex. 1987); Grissom v. Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. 1986). 
544. Norton v. Martinez, 935 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). 
545. Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 926. 
546. See Dan Edge Motors, Inc. v. Scott, 657 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983, no 
writ) (holding that when “the record fails to show a valid issuance and service of citation to the 
defendant, or a voluntary appearance prior to rendition of the default judgment, the judgment must be 
reversed” without the defendant having to “excuse his failure to appear, and set up a meritorious 
defense”). 
547. See Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990) (noting that a default judgment 
against a defendant that was never properly served cannot stand because jurisdiction is dependent on 
proper service). 
548. Bagel v. Mason Rd. Bank, N.A., No. B14-91-00548-CV, 1992 WL 43953, at *1 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 1992, no writ) (not designated for publication); see Jordan v. 
Jordan, 890 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994) (holding that courts may look to the face 
of the record to determine appellate error), rev’d on other grounds, 907 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995). 
549. Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 
685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985). 
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compliance with the provided mode of service” for a default judgment to 
withstand attack.550  Accordingly, this showing must be made from the 
record as it existed before the trial court when the default judgment was 
signed, unless the record is amended pursuant to Rule 118 of the Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure.551 
A defendant against whom a defective default judgment has been taken 
may urge the error for the first time on appeal, unless the nature of the error 
requires that evidence be presented and a finding of fact be made by the trial 
court.552  Absent a need for evidence, on appeal, the default judgment is 
reviewed de novo to determine whether it was rendered in compliance with 
the statutes and rules.553 
G. Discovery Rulings 
“Under Texas law evidence is presumed discoverable.”554  The party 
seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving the exemption from 
discovery.555 
 
550. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); accord Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 
884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994); Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836; Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985); see In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding) (concluding that courts must consider sufficiency of process when 
determining whether to grant a default judgment); Seib v. Bekker, 964 S.W.2d 25, 27–28 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1997, no writ) (“The Supreme Court requires that strict compliance with the rules for service of 
citation affirmatively appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.” 
(citing Primate Constr., 884 S.W.2d at 152)). 
551. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 118 (authorizing a court to allow an amendment of service of process 
as long as it would not prejudice the other party); see also Higginbotham v. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 796 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 1990) (finding a trial court’s order recognizing service as proper was, 
itself, “tantamount to formal amendment of the return of citation”); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Wallace, 944 S.W.2d 72, 73–75 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied) (holding that service of citation 
failed to strictly comply with civil procedure rules and did not support a default judgment). 
552. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1) (stating that a motion for new trial is required to complain 
on appeal about the failure to vacate a default judgment); Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 
750 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, no writ) (asserting that in a motion for new trial, “a 
party need not complain about invalid service . . . because it is not a complaint on which evidence must 
be heard, within the meaning of Rule 324”). 
553. Furst v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 864, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); 
Coronado v. Norman, 111 S.W.3d 838, 841–42 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. denied); see also Bronze 
& Beautiful, 750 S.W.2d at 29 (requiring strict compliance with the rules for a default judgment to be 
upheld). 
554. Oyster Creek Fin. Corp. v. Richwood Invs. II, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1997, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(2)(a) (repealed 1999)); Arkla, Inc. v. Harris, 
846 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing Loftin v, Martin, 776 
S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. 1989); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(4)). 
555. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004). 
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The cornerstone of discovery is to “seek the truth, so that disputes may 
be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.”556  In 
line with this principle, the discovery process serves a number of important 
purposes: (1) it promotes “the administration of justice by allowing the 
parties to obtain the fullest knowledge of issues and facts prior to trial;”557 
(2) it helps prevent trial by ambush;558 (3) it insures that a trial is based upon 
“the parties’ claims and defenses rather than on an advantage obtained by 
one side through a surprise attack;”559 and (4) it provides a mechanism to 
resolve disputes by the facts rather than by the facts a party fails to reveal.560  
In summary, the “modern discovery rules were designed to ‘make a trial less 
a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and 
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.’”561 
Trial courts tend to liberally construe the discovery rules to achieve these 
underlying policy goals.562  In turn, trial courts enjoy discretion in ruling on 
the discovery disputes outlined in this Article, and those rulings are usually 
reviewed on appeal only after final judgment, subject to the usual rules of 
error preservation and harm analysis.563  Nonetheless, the trial court’s 
discovery ruling may so alter the fundamental nature of the litigation that 
review by writ of mandamus is available.564 
 
556. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding); In re Striegler, 
915 S.W.2d 629, 641 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (citing Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 
569, 573 (Tex. 1984)); accord In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 (Tex. 1999) (orig. 
proceeding). 
557. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). 
558. Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1989). 
559. Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1992). 
560. Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding). 
561. Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 347. 
562. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 (requiring rules to be liberally construed); Jordan v. Fourth Court of 
Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (observing the liberal nature of the rules). 
563. See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing a trial court’s discretion 
over discovery rulings and explaining the purposes of the discovery rules applied by the trial court); see 
also Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 667 (Tex. 2009) (holding that a party complaining 
about a discovery ruling on appeal must still show harm to obtain reversal); Garcia v. Allen, 751 S.W.2d 
236, 237 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (ruling that a complaint that interrogatories were 
too broad cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).  See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2 (setting forth 
provisions dealing with the scope of discovery).  
564. Compare Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2005) (“[W]e have held for all other 
forms of discovery [depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for disclosure] 
that absent flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules, due process bars merits-preclusive 
sanctions . . . .” (citations omitted)), and In re Rozells, 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2007, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief where deemed admissions had “merits-preclusive 
effect”), with Sutherland v. Moore, 716 S.W.2d 119, 120–21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, orig. 
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In a mandamus proceeding challenging a trial court’s ruling on discovery, 
the relator or complaining party may obtain mandamus relief if “(1) the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the [relator] has no adequate 
remedy by appeal.”565 The degree to which an abuse of discretion may be 
“clear” or not is discussed in Part II supra.  Likewise, as detailed in Part II, 
the degree to which an appeal is inadequate is highly fact specific.  In general, 
discovery rulings may be the proper subject of mandamus review when: a 
trial court wrongly orders discovery of privileged, confidential, or otherwise 
protected information that will have a material effect on the aggrieved 
party’s rights;566 a trial court “compels the production of patently irrelevant 
or duplicative documents, such that it clearly constitutes harassment or 
imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any 
benefit that may obtain to the requesting party”;567 a trial court’s order 
vitiates or severely compromises the party’s ability to present a viable claim 
or defense at trial so the trial could be a waste of judicial resources;568 the 
trial court’s denial of discovery goes “to the heart of a party’s case”;569 the 
trial court denies discovery “and the missing discovery cannot be made [a] 
part of the appellate record”;570 the trial court denies discovery and “refuses 
 
proceeding) (denying mandamus relief where deemed admissions simplified the trial process and 
relator had an adequate remedy by appeal). 
565. In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 255–56 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In 
re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 
(Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). 
566. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843; accord Living Ctrs. of Tex., 175 S.W.3d at 255–56; In re Ford Motor 
Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). 
567. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843; accord Tex. Water Comm’n v. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d 808, 810 
(Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). 
568. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843 (reiterating the court’s holding that “when a trial court 
imposes discovery sanctions which have the effect of precluding a decision on the merits of a party’s claims—
such as by striking pleadings, dismissing an action, or rendering default judgment—a party’s remedy 
by eventual appeal is inadequate, unless the sanctions are imposed simultaneously with the rendition 
of a final, appealable judgment”); see also In re Family Hospice, Ltd., 62 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (restating that if a trial court invalidates a party’s capability to pursue a 
practicable cause of action or defense, an appellate remedy may be deficient). 
569. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843. 
570. Id.; accord Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 721; Family Hospice, 62 S.W.3d at 316; In re Frank 
A. Smith Sales, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); In re 
Kellogg Brown & Root, 7 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding); 
In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. 
proceeding); see also Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (holding 
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by issuing a protective order for discoverable 
documents). 
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to make [the requested discovery] part of the record”571 or the trial court’s 
order would “skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the 
litigation, and compromise the presentation of [the relator’s] defense [or 
claims] in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record,” mandamus 
is proper.572 
1. Withdrawing Deemed Admissions 
Once an action has officially commenced, a party can serve on any other 
party a written request for admissions pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure.573  If the party given the request does not respond 
before thirty days after the request was served (fifty days if a defendant is 
served before his answer is due),574 the requests are automatically deemed 
admitted with no discretion to find otherwise.575  “A matter admitted . . . is 
conclusively established as to the party making the admission unless the 
court permits the party to withdraw or amend the admission.”576 
Under Rule 215.4, “an evasive or incomplete answer may be treated as a 
failure to answer.”577  The requesting party may challenge the sufficiency 
of the answers or objections, and if the court finds the answer insufficient 
under Rule 198, it may deem the matter admitted or order an amended 
answer to be served.578 
 
571. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44 (“Because the evidence exempted from discovery would 
not appear in the record, the appellate courts would find it impossible to determine whether denying 
the discovery was harmful.” (quoting Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tex. 1984))). 
572. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d. 625, 630 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (first alteration in 
original) (quoting In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 81–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, 
orig. proceeding)). 
573. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.1. 
574. Id. R. 198.2(a). 
575. Id. R. 198.2(c); Beasley v. Burns, 7 S.W.3d 768, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. 
denied); Morgan v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, 
pet. denied); Ruiz v. Nicolas Trevino Forwarding Agency, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1994, no writ). 
576. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3; accord Cont’l Carbon Co. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 184, 190 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied); Beasley, 7 S.W.3d at 769. 
577. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.4(a). 
578. Id.; see State v. Carrillo, 885 S.W.2d 212, 214–16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) 
(affirming trial court’s order to deem answers admitted when respondent failed to make a good faith 
effort to answer and instead ignored documents in its own file that would have provided a sufficient 
basis to admit or deny the admission); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Maness, 775 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ ref’d) (approving the trial court’s decision to deem matters admitted 
when respondent lacked any evidence that it had made a diligent inquiry into the matters covered by 
the requested admissions). 
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When admissions are deemed against a party, the party should file a 
motion to withdraw or amend the admissions as soon as possible.579  Rule 
198.3 permits the trial court to allow a party to withdraw or amend 
admissions if: 
(a) the party shows good cause for the withdrawal or amendment; and (b) the 
court finds that the parties relying upon the responses and deemed admissions 
will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved by permitting the party to amend or withdraw the 
admission.580 
Therefore, the motion should allege: (1) that there is good cause for not 
having responded to the request on time; (2) that allowing withdrawal of the 
admissions will not “unduly” prejudice the party relying on the deemed 
admissions; and (3) that the case can be presented on the merits following 
the withdrawal of the admission.581  “[T]he ‘good cause’ requirement is a 
threshold issue which must be determined before the trial judge can even 
consider the remaining requirements set forth in the rule.”582  Generally, 
undue prejudice depends upon whether withdrawal of the deemed 
admission will delay trial or seriously hamper the opposition’s ability to 
prepare for trial.583  The moving party should also attach affidavits setting 
out detailed facts supporting the elements of the rule and attach the answers 
it would have filed.584 
 
579. See Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ 
denied) (holding that while defense counsel’s response to admission requests were over fifty days late, 
counsel showed good cause and was diligent in filing a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions). 
580. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3; accord Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 770 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Morgan, 1 S.W.3d at 807. 
581. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d at 770; Morgan, 1 S.W.3d at 807; see Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 
442 (Tex. 2005) (noting that withdrawing deemed admissions is proper upon a showing of good cause 
and no undue prejudice). 
582. Boone v. Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n, 790 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, no writ); 
accord Webb v. Ray, 944 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). 
583. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443. 
584. See Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 467 (basing its decision to withdraw deemed admissions on the 
affidavits and additional evidence provided by the defense counsel).  The party seeking to withdraw 
admissions should request a hearing on its motion.  At the hearing, the moving party must present 
evidence and witnesses that are necessary to convince the trial court to permit withdrawal of the 
deemed admissions.  Following the presentation of evidence, the party should obtain a ruling on its 
motion. 
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In Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Halton,585 the court observed that there 
is an analogy between a motion to set aside a default judgment occasioned 
by a failure to file a timely answer, and a motion to set aside admissions of 
fact occasioned by a party’s failure to timely file proper responses.586  Thus, 
a party may establish “good cause” by proving that the party did not act 
intentionally or with conscious disregard in failing to timely file answers to 
the requests.587  Consequently, even a weak excuse will suffice, particularly 
when the opposing party suffers no prejudice as a result of the delay.588  
The decision to allow or deny the withdrawal of deemed admissions lies 
within the discretion of the trial court.589 
2. Amending Admissions 
A party may amend or replace an admission “upon a showing of good 
cause for such withdrawal . . . if the court finds that the parties relying upon 
the responses . . . will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby.”590  The same 
considerations applicable to a motion to withdraw deemed admissions apply 
to a party who seeks to withdraw its original response and substitute it with 
a new response.591  Accordingly, the trial court enjoys discretion in allowing 
the withdrawal or amendment of admissions.592 
 
585. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ 
denied). 
586. See id. at 466 (“[N]ew trials may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on 
motion . . . .” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 320)). 
587. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 452 (Tex. 2005); Tommy Gio, Inc. v. Dunlop, 
348 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45 
S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 
588. See Ramsey v. Criswell, 850 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) 
(admitting that, while slight, a party’s illness can be a sufficient excuse); N. River Ins. Co. v. Greene, 
824 S.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied) (identifying a calendar-diary error as 
a sufficient cause); Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no 
writ) (emphasizing lack of prejudice to the opposing party in finding good cause).  However, while a 
clerical error may constitute good cause, being busy and overworked does not.  Greene, 824 S.W.2d at 
700–01. 
589. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443. 
590. Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 169(2)); accord 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3. 
591. Stelly, 927 S.W.2d at 621–22; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3(a)–(b) (listing the requirements 
for a response amendment). 
592. Stelly, 927 S.W.2d at 622; Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 770 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 772, 775 
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.). 
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3. Supplementing Discovery Responses 
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.5, a party whose response 
to a written discovery request is correct and complete when made is, 
nonetheless, under a duty to make the response accurate by amendment or 
supplement: 
(1) to the extent that the written discovery sought the identification of persons 
with knowledge of relevant facts, trial witnesses, or expert witnesses, and 
(2) to the extent that the written discovery sought other information, unless 
the additional or corrective information has been made known to the other 
parties in writing, on the record at a deposition, or through other discovery 
responses.593 
The party supplementing discovery must serve the supplemental discovery 
response “reasonably promptly” after the necessity arises.594  If the 
supplemental response is given less than thirty days prior to the beginning 
of trial, the court will presume that the response was not made in a 
reasonable, prompt manner.595  Pursuant to Rule 193.6, the sanction for a 
party’s failure to comply with the duty to supplement is the exclusion of the 
evidence affected by the violation596 unless the court finds “good cause for 
the failure” to supplement597 or the untimely “response will not unfairly 
surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.”598 The supreme court 
emphasized that “[t]he salutary purpose of Rule 215(5) is to require 
complete responses to discovery so as to promote responsible assessment 
of settlement and prevent trial by ambush” and that the “rule is mandatory, 
and its sole sanction—exclusion of evidence—is automatic, unless there is 
 
 
593. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(a). Under the former rule, there was generally no affirmative duty to 
amend or supplement a response to discovery if the response was correct and complete when initially 
made.  Id. R. 166b (repealed 1999).  Prior to January 1, 1999, the duty to supplement arose only when 
imposed by court order or by party agreement to prevent the response from becoming misleading, 
which included an expert witness whose testimony would respond to a proper inquiry, or when 
required to document a change in expert testimony on a material issue after having been deposed.  Id.  
Rule 193.5 does not apply to deposition testimony.  See id. R. 193.5 cmt. 5 (noting that the duty to 
supplement deposition testimony is governed by Rule 195.6). 
594. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b). 
595. Id. 
596. Id. R.  193.6(a). 
597. Id. R. 193.6(a)(1); see also Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 
(Tex. 2002) (defining “good cause” in motions for withdrawal and amendment of deemed admissions). 
598. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2). 
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good cause to excuse its imposition.”599 
The party seeking to introduce the evidence has the “burden of 
establishing good cause or the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice,” 
which “must be supported by the record.”600  However, the court may 
decide to grant a continuance or postpone the trial temporarily to allow a 
supplemental response to be made “[e]ven if the party seeking to introduce 
the evidence” fails to meet its burden.601  The useful benefit of Rule 193.6 
is that it requires “complete responses to discovery so as to promote 
responsible assessment of settlement and to prevent trial by ambush.”602 
a. Fact Witnesses 
In general, a party must disclose the identity of any potential party or 
person having knowledge of relevant facts.603  If, after a proper discovery 
request, a fact witness is not disclosed at least thirty days prior to the 
beginning of trial, the witness may be subject to a motion to strike or 
exclude.604  There are two exceptions to this harsh sanction, and the trial 
court’s ruling under either exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion.605 
 
599. Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992). 
600. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(b). 
601. Id. R. 193.6(c) (stating that the court has discretion to temporarily delay the trial even if the 
party seeking to introduce evidence fails to meet the burden set forth in subsection (b) of this rule).  
However, the exclusion does not apply when the original trial date is continued, and “the date set is 
more than thirty days from the date of the original trial date.”  H.B. Zachry Co. v. Gonzalez, 847 
S.W.2d 246, 246 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). 
602. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) 
(quoting Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914) (referring to former Rule 215(5)); accord Etheridge v. Oak Creek 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Castillo v. Am. 
Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); see also Mauzey v. 
Sutliff, 125 S.W.3d 71, 77 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (noting that former Rule 215(5) 
is largely the same as present Rule 193.6).  Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6 (reflecting the subject matter 
of former Rule 215(5) after the 1998 legislative amendments, which became effective on January 1, 
1999), with id. R. 215(5) (West 1998, superseded 1999) (illustrating the addition of unfair surprise or 
prejudice as an exception to evidence exclusion in Rule 193.6), and id. R. 215.5 cmt. (noting that Rule 
215.5 was superseded by Rule 193.6). 
603. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(c), (i). 
604. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 915; Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Ret. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 701 S.W.2d 
243, 246 (Tex. 1985); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b) (requiring that all “amended or supplemental 
response[s] must be made reasonably promptly after the party discovers the necessity for such a 
response” and stating that amendments made less than thirty days before trial are not considered 
reasonably prompt). 
605. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 
35, 43 (Tex. 1998) (indicating that a ruling with no legitimate basis or guiding principle is an abuse of 
discretion). 
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Under the first exception, a party must demonstrate good cause on the 
record to allow testimony of the witness.606  Unfortunately, trying to define 
“good cause” is like trying to define “abuse of discretion.”  It is usually easier 
to define what is not considered “good cause.”607 
Under the second exception, the untimely identified witness may testify 
if the party seeking to introduce the testimony demonstrates that the other 
parties will not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the late response.608  
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, however, does not apply to parties 
named in the suit.609  Thus, named parties may testify as fact witnesses even 
though those parties failed to supplement the discovery response in a timely 
manner.610  A named party to the suit may testify at trial “when [the] identity 
[of the party] is certain and when his or her personal knowledge of relevant 
facts has been communicated to all other parties, through pleadings by name 
and response to other discovery at least thirty . . . days in advance of 
trial.”611 
 
606. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1), (b); see also Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n v. Gillenwater, 
285 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(b)).  Former Rule 215(5) also required 
that the party show good cause for admission of the testimony.  TEX. R. CIV. P. 215(5) (West 1998, 
superseded 1999); Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1992); Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 
440, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).  Before Rule 193.6 superseded 215(5), 
however, it was held that the offering party must show good cause for its failure to properly respond 
to the discovery request.  Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1989). 
607. See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002) (reviewing 
several cases that did not “specifically define ‘good cause’” but instead held that “inadvertent failure to 
supplement responses was insufficient to establish good cause”); Remington Arms Co. v. Canales, 
837 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (stating that inadvertence of counsel is not enough 
to satisfy the good cause exception); Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914 (observing that defining the good 
cause rule is very problematic and that the importance of the witness should not be considered); Sharp 
v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1990) (providing that the fact that a witness’s 
identity is known to the other party does not establish good cause for the failure to supplement); Rainbo 
Baking Co. v. Stafford, 787 S.W.2d 41, 41 (Tex. 1990) (holding that failure to contact a witness until 
the day of trial when the party expected to settle the case was not good cause); Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 
647 (explaining that mere failure to locate the witness until the last minute will not suffice absent 
sufficient efforts to locate the witness); Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989) 
(concluding a claim of “great harm” from the denial of the testimony will not establish good cause); 
Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 395 n.2 (Tex. 1989) (suggesting that lack of surprise 
may be considered as a factor); Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1986) (holding that 
lack of surprise is not enough to establish good cause). 
608. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2), (b). 
609. See id. R. 193.6(a) (stating that named parties are not included as witnesses whose identities 
must be disclosed). 
610. Id. 
611. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Smith, 835 S.W.2d 
at 91); accord Rogers v. Stell, 835 S.W.2d 100, 100–01 (Tex. 1992). 
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b. Expert Witnesses 
Under Rule 192.7, there are two types of expert witnesses: (1) a testifying 
expert,612 and (2) a consulting expert.613  “A party may discover [a list of] 
information regarding a testifying expert or . . . a consulting expert whose 
mental impressions and opinions have been reviewed by a testifying expert,” 
including: the expert’s identity, contact information, testimonial subject 
matter, relevant facts known, relevant mental impressions and opinions, 
bias, and “documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data 
compilations” that were provided, reviewed, or prepared for the testifying 
expert’s testimony.614  However, if a consulting expert’s conclusions have 
not been reviewed by a testifying expert, neither the consulting expert’s 
identity nor his conclusions are discoverable.615 
Pursuant to Rule 195.1, a party may request the disclosure of information 
regarding testifying expert witnesses.616  This request must be done via a 
request for disclosure.617  Upon proper request, a party must “designate” 
experts (i.e., disclose the requested information) by “the later of . . . [thirty] 
days after the request is served, or . . . with regard to all experts testifying 
for a party seeking affirmative relief, [ninety] days before the end of the 
discovery period; . . . with regard to all other experts, [sixty] days before the 
end of the discovery period.”618 
Any amendment or supplement to the response regarding expert 
testimony “must be made reasonably promptly after the party discovers the 
necessity for such a response.”619  If an amended or supplemental response 
 
612. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.7(c) (defining a testifying expert as “an expert who may be called 
to testify as an expert witness at trial”). 
613. See id. R. 192.7(d) (defining a consulting expert as an expert “consulted, retained, or 
specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, but who is not a 
testifying expert”). 
614. Id. R. 192.3(e). 
615. Id. 
616. Id. R. 195.1. 
617. Id. R. 194.1 (indicating how a party may obtain certain information listed in Rule 194.2 
from an opposing party); Id. R. 194.2(f) (identifying the information that can be obtained about a 
testifying expert through disclosure); Id. R. 195.1 (stating expert witness information can be obtained 
by a disclosure request pursuant to Rule 194). 
618. Id. R. 195.2; see also id. R. 191.1 (stating that discovery rules can be modified by party 
agreement or by the court for good cause). 
619. Id. R. 193.5(b); accord id. R. 195.6.  Under former Rule 166b(6)(b), expert witnesses were to 
be disclosed “as soon as is practical.”  Id. R.  166b(6)(b) (repealed 1999).  In Mentis v. Barnard, the Texas 
Supreme Court observed that since Rule 166b(6)(b) did not provide a time period by which a party 
must actually decide to retain its testifying experts, “as soon as practical” meant that the attorney was 
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is made fewer than thirty days before trial, it is presumed to have been made 
without reasonable promptness.620  Failure to designate an expert in a 
timely manner will result in the exclusion of the expert’s testimony unless 
the party seeking to call the expert witness can show good cause for failing 
to timely respond,621 or that the failure to timely respond “will not unfairly 
surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.”622  The trial court’s ruling 
to admit or exclude an improperly identified expert is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.623  Expert witness testimony may be limited or excluded for 
other reasons, as discussed in Part V. 
c. Rebuttal Witnesses 
The fact that a witness will be used only as a rebuttal witness does not 
eliminate the obligation to disclose the witness’s identity pursuant to the 
 
required to communicate the witness designation once it was finally decided that the expert was 
expected to testify.  Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994).  The trial court was to “consider 
good cause for late identification only if [the court found] that the witness was not designated as soon 
as was practical.”  Id. at 15.  The new rule replaces “as soon as is practical” with “reasonably promptly” 
after the necessity for the response is discovered, and it also allows an exception for lack of unfair 
surprise and unfair prejudice to the other parties, in addition to the good cause exception.  TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 193.5(b), 193.6(a).  There is also no longer the mandatory sanction of automatic exclusion if 
the exceptions do not apply.  See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, 
no pet.) (stating that the “new Rule 193.6 is less burdensome than the former rule”). 
620. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b).  One appellate court concluded that supplemental responses 
submitted prior to the onset of the presumption of unreasonableness did not constitute a presumption 
that the response is made “reasonably promptly.”  Snider v. Stanley, 44 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).  In ruling that the plaintiff’s choice to wait almost thirty days before 
designating their expert was not reasonably prompt, the Snider court distinguished the Mentis v. Barnard 
decision, which the appellants relied upon, on the ground that Mentis was decided under the former 
rule.  Id. at 716. 
621. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1).  Factors that alone do not show good cause, but may in 
combination, include: “(1) inadvertence of counsel, (2) lack of surprise, unfairness, or ambush, (3) 
uniqueness of excluded evidence, . . . (4) the fact that a witness has been deposed[,] . . . [and (5)] the 
amount of time which an expert had to prepare a report or form an opinion before trial.”  Rodriguez 
v. Hyundai Motor Co., 944 S.W.2d 757, 765–66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 
995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999); accord Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Hunt Energy Corp., 47 S.W.3d 1, 14 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.). 
622. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2); accord F & H Invs. Inc. v. State, 55 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. 
App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2)). 
623. Fort Borwon Villas Condo Ass’n, Inc. V. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex 2009) 
(per curiam) (“A trial court’s exclusion of an expert who has not been properly designated can be 
overturned only upon a finding of abuse of discretion.”) (quoting Mentis, 870 S.W.2d at 16)); see 
Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d at 736 (finding no abuse of discretion to permit expert testimony regarding 
attorney’s fees where a witness was not identified as an expert in response to discovery, but was 
identified as a fact witness). 
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duty to supplement discovery.624  Thus, for a late disclosure, the party 
offering a rebuttal witness’s testimony must still demonstrate good cause or 
the lack of unfair surprise to the other parties for the late disclosure.625  
Good cause may be established when counsel is unable to reasonably 
anticipate the need for such rebuttal evidence.626  The trial court’s decision 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.627 
4. Quashing Depositions 
A party “may object to the time and place designated for an oral 
deposition by motion for protective order or by motion to quash the notice 
of deposition.”628  There are numerous other grounds for objecting to the 
substance of a proposed deposition, the most common of which may be the 
“apex” objection asserted by a high level corporate official denying 
knowledge of relevant facts.629  Generally, the denial of a motion to quash 
a deposition or the denial of a protective order is not a final, appealable 
 
624. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(a)(1) (obligating the responding party to amend his response “to 
the extent that the written discovery sought the identification of persons with knowledge of relevant 
facts, trial witnesses, or expert witnesses”); see also Valley Indus., Inc. v. Cook, 767 S.W.2d 458, 462 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (stating that rebuttal evidence, which includes rebuttal witness 
testimony, disproves facts introduced into evidence by an opposing party). 
625. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1), (2); see also Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 916–
17 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that Alvarado failed to assert good cause for failing to disclose a rebuttal 
witness). 
626. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(d); see also Gannett Outdoor Co. of Tex. v. Kubeczka, 710 S.W.2d 
79, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (approving the admission of an expert’s 
testimony based on good cause when the need for his testimony as a rebuttal witness could not have 
been anticipated prior to the unexpected false testimony of the opponent’s witness), superseded by rule, 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6, as recognized in Lopez v. La Madeleine of Tex., Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (stating that the Gannett Outdoor holding was decided prior to January 1, 
1999 and, therefore, the “argument that previously undisclosed evidence may be admitted solely for 
impeachment purposes” has been superseded by Rule 193.6). 
627. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914, 916–17 (stating that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing testimony of an undisclosed rebuttal witness). 
628. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.4; see also Vega v. Davila, 31 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2000, no pet.) (noting that an appealing party had attempted to quash a deposition notice on 
the grounds that the time and place for the deposition were unreasonable, but holding that “a 
nonresident may be required to attend a deposition in the county in which he is served with a 
subpoena”). 
629. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127–28 (Tex. 1995) (defining 
“apex” deposition); see also In re Alcatel USA, Inc. 11 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) 
(reaffirming Crown Central and setting forth procedure for challenging an apex deposition request); cf. 
West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1978) (objecting to depositions of former attorneys based 
on the attorney-client privilege). 
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order and must therefore be challenged by writ of mandamus.630  The trial 
court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.631 
H. Dismissal 
A motion to dismiss a case can be based on any number of legal theories.  
The most representative reasons are discussed here. 
1. Dismissal for Defect of Parties 
If a party’s capacity to sue is contested, Rule 93 requires the filing of a 
verified plea whenever the record does not affirmatively show the party’s 
right to file suit in the capacity in which the party is suing.632  The trial 
court’s dismissal based on a defect in parties is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.633   
2. Dismissal for Defect in Pleadings 
The trial court’s decision to dismiss for insufficient pleadings is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.634  In general, however, a trial court 
should not dismiss for defective pleadings unless the pleading party is given 
an opportunity to amend.635  Accordingly, see Part IV(S)(1) on special 
exceptions infra.  If a party pleads facts that affirmatively demonstrate an 
 
630. See Alcatel, 11 S.W.3d at 175 (granting mandamus relief when trial court wrongly denied a 
motion to quash deposition notices); Borden, Inc. v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 1989, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief from a trial court’s denial of a motion to 
quash a deposition).  But see Vega, 31 S.W.3d at 378 (permitting appeal when an order denying a motion 
to quash addressed witnesses who were not parties to the suit); Transceiver Corp. of Am. v. Ring 
Around Prods., Inc., 581 S.W.2d 712, 712–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, no writ) (permitting an appeal 
when an order denying a motion to quash addressed a post-judgment deposition); cf. Pub. Citizen v. 
Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (allowing an appeal of 
an order denying a motion to vacate a protective order). 
631. Alcatel, 11 S.W.3d at 175. 
632. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93; Pledger v. Schoellkopf, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1988). 
633. Dahl v. Hartman, 14 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); 
Miller v. Gann, 822 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).  For more 
information about proper parties, see infra Part IV(O) (discussing proper parties and joinder). 
634. Humphreys v. Meadows, 938 S.W.2d 750, 753–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ 
denied). 
635. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Gallien v. Wash. Mut. 
Home Loans, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 856, 864–65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); see also Sherman v. 
Triton Energy Corp., 124 S.W.3d 272, 279–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (holding that the 
trial court had authority to strike the plaintiffs’ petition and dismiss the case when the plaintiffs failed 
to amend the petition pursuant to the court’s orders sustaining the defendant’s special exceptions).  See 
infra Part IV(S)(1) (addressing special exceptions).  
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absence of jurisdiction, such a defect is incurable and immediate dismissal 
of the case is proper.636 
3. Dismissal for Want of Prosecution 
The trial court has an obligation to control its docket and demand that 
parties diligently prosecute their suits.637  Thus, a trial court has the 
authority to dismiss a case for want of prosecution pursuant to either its 
inherent powers or Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a.638  The trial court’s 
powers to dismiss under Rule 165a(1) (failure to appear at a hearing or trial), 
Rule 165a(2) (failure to meet time standards promulgated by the supreme 
court), and Rule 165a(4) (want of prosecution and trial court’s inherent 
powers) are cumulative and independent.639  If the trial court’s order 
dismissing for want of prosecution does not specify the basis for dismissal, 
then the order must be affirmed if any valid basis is supported by the 
record.640 
When resolving the central issue of “whether the plaintiffs exercised 
reasonable diligence,”641 the court may consider the entire trial history, and 
“[n]o single factor is dispositive.”642  Whether the plaintiff intended to 
abandon the litigation is not the inquiry, “[n]or is the existence of a belated 
 
636. Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989); see also infra 
Part IV(S)(1) (discussing subject-matter jurisdiction). 
637. 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enters., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, 
no pet.); see also State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508–09 (Tex. 1984) (emphasizing the inherent power 
of a trial court “to dismiss cases not prosecuted with due diligence”), superseded by rule, TEX. R. CIV. P.  
3a, as recognized in Seigle v. Hollech, 892 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no 
writ) (recognizing that “Rotello was decided before approval of local rules by the supreme court was 
required”). 
638. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1), (4); Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex. 
2004). 
639. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(4) (explaining that dismissal procedures are “cumulative of the 
rules and laws governing any other procedures available to the parties in such cases,” including the 
court’s inherent powers); Veterans’ Land Bd. v. Williams, 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1976) (“Rule 165a 
is not the exclusive authority by which the trial court derives its authority or discretion to dismiss a 
cause for want of prosecution.” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(4))). 
640. City of Houston v. Thomas, 838 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, 
no writ); accord Fox v. Wardy, 225 S.W.3d 198, 199–200 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied). 
641. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997); accord Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Sys., 
960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); see also Christian v. Christian, 
985 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (discussing various reasons given by the 
plaintiff to determine if reasonable diligence was exercised). 
642. Dueitt v. Arrowhead Lakes Prop. Owners, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex. App.—Waco 
2005, pet. denied); accord Scoville v. Shaffer, 9 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no 
pet.). 
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trial setting or an asserted eagerness to proceed to trial conclusive.”643  
Furthermore, the fact that settlement activity is in progress,644 or that the 
opposing parties have remained passive, does not prevent a case from being 
dismissed based upon want of diligence.645  Similar to a trial court’s 
considerations on whether to grant a motion for continuance, factors 
traditionally examined when deciding on a dismissal for want of prosecution 
include “the length of time the case was on file, the extent of activity in the 
case, whether a trial setting was requested, and the existence of reasonable 
excuses for the delay.”646  Other circumstances may be considered as well, 
“such as periods of activity, intervals of inactivity, reasons for lack of 
attention, and the passage of time.”647 
If the dismissal is pursuant to Rule 165a, as opposed to the trial court’s 
inherent powers, then Rule 165a(3) requires the trial court to reinstate the 
case “upon finding after a hearing that the failure of the party or his attorney 
[to appear] was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but 
was due to an accident or mistake or that the failure has been otherwise 
reasonably explained.”648  The reinstatement provisions in Rule 165a(3) 
only apply to dismissals for failure to appear at trial or a hearing,649 and they 
 
643. Ozuna v. Sw. Bio-Clinical Labs, 766 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ 
denied), overruled in part by Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 633 (overruling 
Ozuna to the extent it “can be read to hold that the Bexar County notice of dismissal apprises parties 
of the court’s intent to dismiss on a ground other than the failure to appear under Rule 165a”); accord 
Scoville, 9 S.W.3d at 204. 
644. See FDIC v. Kendrick, 897 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ) 
(explaining how settlement efforts do not constitute an excuse for failing to diligently prosecute a case). 
645. See Tex. Soc’y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 768 S.W.2d 
858, 861 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no writ) (noting that the attitude of the opposing party “does 
not excuse want of diligence”). 
646. Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ 
denied); Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
1998), rev’d on other grounds, 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999). 
647. Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 902. 
648. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3); accord Stolz v. Honeycutt, 42 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Brown v. Howeth Invs., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Quita, Inc. v. Haney, 810 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 1991, no writ); see also Armentrout v. Murdock, 779 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (stating that after conducting the hearing required by Rule 165a(3), the trial 
court has the discretion not to reinstate the case); cf. Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 408–09 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (describing the trial court’s ability to dismiss for want of 
prosecution and the process of reinstatement). 
649. Clark, 900 S.W.2d at 408–09; Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903; see also Moore v. Armour & Co., 
748 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, no writ) (asserting that the reinstatement provisions 
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share several similarities with the Craddock requisites for granting a new trial 
to set aside a proper default judgment.650  The standard of review applied 
to a dismissal for want of prosecution, or the overruling of a motion to 
reinstate, is an abuse of discretion.651 
4. Dismissal of Health Care Liability Claims for Lack of Expert 
Reports 
In Texas, traditional “medical malpractice” litigation was fundamentally 
altered in 1977 when the Texas legislature enacted the Medical Liability and 
Insurance Improvement Act in response to a perceived crisis in the cost of 
health care.652  Article 4590i of the Revised Civil Statutes provided a notice 
of suit provision and capped recoverable damages in those cases described 
as a “health care liability claim.”653 
 
of Rule 165a(3) do not apply to dismissal under the court’s inherent powers for failure to prosecute 
with due diligence). 
650. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3) (mandating that a court reinstate a case if it finds that the 
party’s failure to appear “was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to an 
accident or mistake or that the failure has been otherwise reasonably explained”), with Craddock v. 
Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939) (instructing judges to set aside a default 
judgment if the defendant’s failure to answer “was not intentional, or the result of conscious 
indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident”). 
651. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997); State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 509 
(Tex. 1984), superseded by rule, TEX. R. CIV. P. 3a, as recognized in Seigle v. Hollech, 892 S.W.2d 201, 202 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).  If the trial court fails to set and conduct a hearing 
on the motion to reinstate, the dismissal order will be reversed on appeal.  See Dueitt v. Arrowhead 
Lakes Prop. Owners, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (“The rule is 
mandatory, and the trial court has no discretion about whether to set a hearing on the motion.”); see 
also Reed v. City of Dallas, 774 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (reversing the 
trial court and ordering it to conduct a hearing).  The dissent in Reed v. City of Dallas, however, argued 
that the court should have reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.  Id. at 385 (Howell, J., 
dissenting).  It is also important to note that “dismissal for want of prosecution does not preclude the 
filing of another suit and[,] therefore[,] a dismissal of the case ‘with prejudice’ is improper.”  Willis v. 
Barron, 604 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Melton v. Ryander, 727 
S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that a “dismissal for want of 
prosecution is not an adjudication on the merits” of the case).  If the trial court dismisses the case with 
prejudice, the appellate court will “reform the judgment to strike the words ‘with prejudice’ from the 
judgment.”  Id. 
652. McGlothlin v. Cullington, 989 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) 
(discussing the history of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act). 
653. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 
§§ 4.01(c), 11.02, 11.04, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2048, 2053, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th 
Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884.  The Act defined “health care provider” as 
“any person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed or 
chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care as a registered nurse, hospital, dentist, podiatrist, 
pharmacist, or nursing home, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope 
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Almost twenty years later, despite the enactment of Article 4590i, the 
Texas legislature still faced what was considered “a medical malpractice 
crisis in this state.”654  To address the continuing and growing concerns, 
thirty years since the enactment of Article 4590i, the legislature responded 
by adding the requirement of an expert report, which required “trial courts 
to dismiss health care lawsuits unless an expert report that met certain 
requirements was filed within the first 180 days of the suit.”655  “The 
obvious intent of this statutory provision was to stop suits that had no merit 
from proceeding through the courts.”656 
In 2003, the legislature expressed concern that “the number of health care 
liability claims” had still not decreased but had actually increased 
“inordinately.”657  Once again attempting to reduce the cost of health care, 
the legislature repealed Article 4590i and enacted Chapter 74 of the Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code.658  In enacting the specific provisions of 
Section 74.351, the legislature made extensive changes to the expert report 
requirement.659 
Under Section 74.351, within 120 days after filing the original petition, a 
plaintiff must serve on all parties or their attorneys the expert reports, 
including a curriculum vitae for each reporting expert.660  The parties, 
however, may arrange to extend the deadline for serving an expert report by 
 
of his employment.”  Id. § 1.03(3).  A “health care liability claim” was “a cause of action against a health 
care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted 
standards of medical care or health care or safety which proximately result[ed] in injury to or death of 
the patient, whether the patient’s claim or cause of action [was based] in tort or contract.”  Id. § 1.03(4). 
654. In re Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., Inc., 141 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) 
(Owen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Hecht & Brister, JJ.). 
655. Id. (citing Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 985, 986 
(former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 13.01), repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., 
ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 74.001)). 
656. Id. 
657. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.11(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884. 
658. Mokkala v. Mead, 178 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).  
See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74 (repealing the Medical Liability and Insurance 
Improvement Act of 1977). 
659. Mokkala, 178 S.W.3d at 75–76; see McGahey v. Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of 
Waco, No. 10-02-00288-CV, 2004 WL 1903300, at *2 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 25, 2004, no pet.) 
(mem. op.) (noting some of the differences in seeking extensions for filing expert reports between 
section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and former Article 4590i). 
660. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a); see also id. § 74.351(r)(6) (defining 
“expert report” and providing the requirements necessary to meet this definition). 
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a written agreement.661  If an expert report is not timely served, the trial 
court, “on the motion of the affected physician or health care provider, shall 
. . . [dismiss] the claim with respect to the physician or health care provider, 
with prejudice” and award to the affected healthcare provider “reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs.”662  If an expert report is served within 120 days 
but “elements of the report are found deficient, the court may grant one 30–
day extension to the claimant in order to cure the deficiency.”663 
The statutory criteria of Section 74.351 have been tested extensively for 
virtually every factual scenario.664  Appellate review has aided this 
experimentation by both interlocutory appeal and mandamus proceeding.  
Section 51.014(a) provides that the trial court’s failure to dismiss under 
Section 74.351 is subject to interlocutory appeal.665  Cases governed by the 
predecessor statute may warrant mandamus relief.666 
Regardless of the procedural vehicle used in obtaining appellate review, 
the threshold decision regarding the statute’s applicability is a question of 
law subject to de novo review.667  A trial court’s decision to dismiss a case 
 
661. Id. § 74.351(a). 
662. Id. § 74.351(b). 
663. Id. § 74.351(c). 
664. Cf. Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. 2008) (Brister, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“a substantial part of the state’s appellate resources are already being expended reviewing preliminary 
expert reports”). 
665. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (providing interlocutory appeal of an 
order that “denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an 
appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351”); Ogletree v. 
Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2007) (“[T]he trial court retains discretion to grant a thirty day 
extension, and the Legislature explicitly stated that such orders are not appealable.”).  “A provider may 
pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss when no expert report has been 
timely served, whether or not the trial court grants an extension of time.”  Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 
681, 685 (Tex. 2009).  But see Emeritus Corp. v. Highsmith, 211 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (“[W]e hold that section 51.014(a)(9) authorizes an interlocutory appeal of 
an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss in whole or in part unless the order also grants a 
claimant an extension of time pursuant to section 74.351(c) to cure the deficiencies in a timely-served 
report.”). 
666. See, e.g., In re Collum & Carney Clinic Ass’n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
2001, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief because the trial court failed to dismiss the claim 
after the defendant complained that the expert report did not meet the statutory requirements). 
667. Wickware v. Sullivan, 70 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.).  A 
“health care liability claim” is defined as: 
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or 
other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or 
professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in 
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under Section 74.351(b), like its decision under the predecessor statute 
(Article 4590i), is reviewed for abuse of discretion.668  The trial court’s 
decision to grant an extension to cure a deficient report is also subject to an 
abuse of discretion review.669  However, when an expert report is not timely 
served, the trial court has no discretion but to dismiss a health care liability 
claim.670  Under this standard, the appellate court defers to a trial court’s 
factual determinations, but reviews de novo questions of law involving 
statutory interpretation and constitutional challenges.671 
5. Dismissal of In Forma Pauperis and Inmate Proceedings 
The Texas Constitution and rules of procedure recognize that “courts 
must be open to all with legitimate disputes, not just [to] those who can 
afford to pay the fees to get in.”672  However, when a party files an  
affidavit of inability to pay under Rule 145673 (in forma pauperis) or  
under Section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,674 
“the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss the suit” if the  
allegation of poverty is false675 or the action is “frivolous or  
 
injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or 
contract. 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13).  The definition of “health care provider” is also 
broader than the predecessor statute.  See id. § 74.001(a)(12)(B) (defining “health care provider” to 
include any “officer, director, shareholder, member, partner, manager, owner, or affiliate of a health 
care provider or physician,” as well as their employees when acting within the scope of their 
employment). 
668. Compare McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. 2003) (stating the standard under 
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code), with Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 
79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (explaining the standard under former Article 4590i), and Am. 
Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001) (noting the standard 
for reviewing Article 4590i). 
669. Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 321. 
670. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 683. 
671. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Joplin, 525 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Center at Houston v. 
Cheatham, 357 S.W.3d 747, 748 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). 
672. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 934 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1996) (orig. 
proceeding) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; TEX. R. CIV. P. 145; TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1). 
673. TEX. R. CIV. P. 145. 
674. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (allowing for dismissal of cases upon 
finding that the allegation of poverty is false or that the action is frivolous or malicious). 
675. McFarland v. Collins, No. 01-96-00376-CV, 1997 WL 69860, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 1997, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 13.001(a)(2)); accord Felix v. Thaler, 923 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1995, no writ). 
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malicious.”676  A trial court’s dismissal of a case under Section 13.001 is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.677  Similar abuse of discretion review 
is extended to the trial court’s dismissal of inmate litigation under Section 
14.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.678 In 2005, Rule 145 
was amended to prohibit the contest of an affidavit that is accompanied by 
an attorney’s IOLTA certificate that confirms the party’s inability to pay.679 
“In determining whether the action is frivolous, the trial court may 
consider whether: (1) the action’s realistic chance of ultimate success is 
slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; or (3) it is clear 
that the party cannot prove a set of facts in support of the claim.”680  Of 
the three factors set forth in Section 13.001 (or the four factors of Section 
14.003), the supreme court has essentially approved as constitutionally 
sound only the factor that questions whether the claim has an arguable basis 
in law or fact.681  Therefore, before dismissing a petition under Section 
13.001(b)(2), the judge must examine the petition to ensure that the claim 
has no basis in law and in fact.682  “A claim that has no legal basis is one 
based upon an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory,’”683 and a claim that has 
 
676. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a)(2).  Dismissal may be made on motion 
or by the trial court sua sponte.  Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.). 
677. Williams v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 176 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, 
pet. denied); Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Bohannan 
v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 942 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied). 
678. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(3) (permitting dismissal upon a 
finding that the inmate made a filing “that the inmate knew was false”); Johnson v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice, 71 S.W.3d 492, 493 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (reviewing a trial court’s 
dismissal under Section 14.003 for abuse of discretion).  Inmate litigation may also be dismissed if the 
inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by statute that the inmate knew was false.  
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(3). 
679. TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(c). 
680. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(b).  In De La Vega v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the 
Fourth Court of Appeals observed that “frivolous” is defined as having no basis in law or fact.  De La 
Vega v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).  Inmate 
litigation may also be frivolous or malicious if the claim is substantially similar to a prior claim filed by 
the inmate arising from the same operative facts.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(4). 
681. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1990)).  
The Texas Supreme Court observed that the United States Supreme Court has approved the same 
factor (the lack of arguable basis in law or fact) as appropriate in the federal context.  Id.  Furthermore, 
the court noted that the Fifth Circuit doubted the validity of the third factor (that the party is unable 
to prove facts in support of the claim) in Section 13.001(b)(3).  Id. 
682. Carson v. Gomez, 841 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. 
proceeding). 
683. Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); accord Thomas v. 
Holder, 836 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, no writ); see also McFarland v. Collins, No. 01-
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no factual basis is one that arises out of “fantastic or delusional 
scenarios.”684   
If the plaintiff desires to appeal without paying for the reporter’s record, 
based on an affidavit of inability to pay, the trial court must find that the 
appeal is not frivolous and that the reporter’s record is not needed to decide 
the issues on appeal.685  In determining whether the appeal is frivolous, the 
trial court may consider “whether the appellant has presented a substantial 
question for appellate review.”686 
I. Disqualification of Counsel 
“A motion to disqualify counsel is the proper procedural vehicle to 
challenge an attorney’s representation whenever an attorney seeks to 
represent an interest adverse to that of a former client.”687  However, 
because disqualification is so severe, courts must be wary of ordering such 
a remedy.688  Disqualification may result in “palpable harm, disrupt trial 
court proceedings, and deprive a party of the right to have counsel of 
choice.”689  In considering a disqualification motion, “the court must 
strictly adhere to an exacting standard” to ensure that disqualification is not 
used as a dilatory trial tactic.690  Further, a motion to disqualify an attorney 
must be timely filed.691 Courts have found that a six-month delay 
 
 
96-00376-CV, 1997 WL 69860, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 1997, writ denied) (not 
designated for publication) (holding that a suit is frivolous if it “allege[s] substantially the same facts 
arising from a common series of events already unsuccessfully litigated”). 
684. Thomas, 836 S.W.2d at 352. 
685. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.003(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1. 
686. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.003(b). 
687. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding).  
“This strict rule is based on a conclusive presumption that confidences and secrets were imparted to 
the attorney during the prior representation.”  Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 
833 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding). 
688. See In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (noting that 
disqualification is a severe measure that can result in immediate harm). 
689. Id. at 422. 
690. Id.; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 319, 320–21 (Tex. 1994) 
(reiterating that “the substantial relationship test” must be met for the movant to establish a basis for 
disqualification); Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 399 (stressing the need to strictly adhere to guidelines when 
considering a motion to disqualify); In re Taylor, 67 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, orig. 
proceeding) (noting that counsel disqualification is an extreme remedy); Walton v. Canon, Short & 
Gaston, 23 S.W.3d 143, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.) (declaring that disqualification is a 
severe remedy). 
691. In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). 
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constituted waiver692 but that a two-month delay did not.693 
To disqualify an attorney, the movant must timely offer to the court a 
preponderance of the facts proving a substantial relationship between the 
present matter and a previous representation.694  The movant must prove 
that (1) during the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship, or some 
other relationship giving rise to an implied fiduciary obligation; (2) factual 
matters were involved that are so related to the facts in the pending 
litigation; (3) that the prior relationship creates a “genuine threat that 
confidences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present 
adversary.”695  To satisfy this burden, the movant must offer “evidence of 
specific similarities capable of being recited in the disqualification order.”696 
The standard of review used in assessing a trial court’s ruling on a motion 
to disqualify is the abuse of discretion standard.697  In addition, the trial 
court’s order granting or denying a motion to disqualify may be reviewed by 
mandamus.698 
J. Disqualification of Judges 
1. Disqualification and Recusal 
Pursuant to Rule 18a, any party may file a motion to recuse the trial judge 
if done at least ten days before the date of the trial or other hearing699 and 
a motion to disqualify “should be filed as soon as practicable after the 
movant knows of the ground stated in the motion.”700  A motion to 
disqualify seeks to prevent a judge from hearing a case based on 
 
692. Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding). 
693. In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). 
694. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350–51 (Tex. 1998); Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 
573, 579 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 
123, 126 (Tex. 1996); Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d at 320–21; Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; see also Vaughan, 
875 S.W.2d at 690 (“A party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely 
manner waives the complaint.”). 
695. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia, 891 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. 1995) 
(orig. proceeding). 
696. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400. 
697. In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Walton v. 
Canon, Short & Gaston, 23 S.W.3d 143, 151 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Ghidoni, 966 S.W.2d 
at 579; Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d at 321; Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400. 
698. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); In re Nitla S.A., 92 S.W.3d 
at 422; Nat’l Med. Enters., 924 S.W.2d at 128; Vaughan, 875 S.W.2d at 691. 
699. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b); see also In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. 2002) 
(demonstrating that in certain situations the ten-day rule may not apply). 
700. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(2). 
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constitutional or statutory reasons.701  A motion to recuse seeks to prevent 
a judge from hearing a case for nonconstitutional or nonstatutory 
reasons.702 
If a trial judge should have been disqualified but was not, any orders or 
judgments rendered by that judge are void and without effect.703  Thus, 
disqualification of a judge based on a constitutional prohibition “can be 
raised at any point in” a proceeding.704  In contrast, the existence of 
grounds for recusal of a judge “does not void or nullify” subsequent 
proceedings before that judge and “can be waived if not raised by proper 
motion.”705 
Upon the filing of a motion to disqualify or recuse, the trial judge must 
either recuse himself or request the administrative judicial region’s presiding 
judge to assign a judge to hear the motion.706  Rule 18a(j) provides that if 
the motion is denied, the order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.707  
However, an order granting a motion to recuse is not reviewable.708 
 
701. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 21.005, 74.053, 74.059(c)(3), 
573.022–.025; TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a). 
702. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b) (delineating when a judge shall recuse himself). 
703. O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 449. 
704. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982) (holding that 
an error regarding disqualification may be raised during the proceeding while an error regarding recusal 
may be waived); Kennedy v. Wortham, 314 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. denied) 
(disqualification of judge “cannot be waived and can be raised at any time”) (citing Buckholts, 
632 S.W.2d at 148); (McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1995, writ denied) (confirming that a party waives an error regarding recusal when he fails to raise the 
issue by a proper motion). 
705. In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998); In re E.R.C., 496 S.W.3d 270, 
276 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied), cert. denied sub nom., Stokes v. Corsbie, 137 S. Ct. 834 
(2017). 
706. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1), (g)(1); Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).  A different procedure applies to tertiary motions.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 30.016 (“[A] ‘tertiary recusal motion’ means a third or subsequent motion for recusal or 
disqualification . . . .”). 
707. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j); Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
1993, writ denied); J-IV Invs. v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1990, no writ); cf. CNA Ins. Co. v. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d 785, 793 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ 
denied) (finding that no abuse of discretion review could be conducted because the trial court failed to 
conduct a hearing on the motion to recuse). 
708. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j); Dist. Judges of Collin Cnty. v. Comm’rs Court of Collin Cnty., 
677 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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2. Objection to Visiting Trial Judge 
When a visiting judge is assigned to a case, the presiding judge is required 
to give notice to each party’s attorney if it is reasonable and practicable, time 
permitting.709  “If a party to a civil case files a timely objection . . . the judge 
shall not hear the case.”710  An objection must be filed “not later than the 
seventh day after the date the party receives actual notice of the assignment 
or before the date the first hearing or trial, including pretrial hearings, 
commences, whichever date occurs earlier,” although the presiding judge 
may extend the time to file an objection on written motion and with good 
cause.711  An objection to this assignment must be the first matter presented 
to the visiting judge for a ruling.712  If a party timely objects to the 
assignment, “the judge shall not hear the case.”713  In addition, a former 
judge or justice who was not a retired judge when she left office “may not 
sit in a case if either party objects to the” assignment.714  The governing 
statute is mandatory and does not give the trial court any discretion to rule 
on the objection.715  The court of appeals will review such a ruling for an 
abuse of discretion and may do so in a mandamus proceeding.716 
K. Docket Management 
A trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on motions 
“properly filed and pending before” the court, “and mandamus may  
issue to compel the” judge to act (although not to take a given  
action).717  The trial court will be afforded a reasonable time in  
which to perform this ministerial duty after the motion is brought to its  
 
709. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(a). 
710. Id. § 74.053(b). 
711. Id. § 74.053(c). 
712. Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 383 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied); Morris 
v. Short, 902 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). 
713. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b); In re B.F.B., 241 S.W.3d 643, 645–46 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam); In re Cuban, 24 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding). 
714. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(d); accord Cuban, 24 S.W.3d at 382; see also Mitchell 
Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440–41 (Tex. 1997) (explaining that, for purposes of 
objecting to visiting judges, “the proper inquiry is whether the judge had vested under the State Judicial 
Retirement system” before leaving office, and not after). 
715. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b); Mitchell Energy Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 441. 
716. Mitchell Energy Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 441. 
717. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. 
proceeding). 
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attention.718  What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the facts and 
circumstances in a particular case.719  However, the supreme court has 
admonished the trial courts that while “[t]rial courts are generally granted 
considerable discretion when it comes to managing their dockets.  Such 
discretion . . . is not absolute.  It has long been the case that ‘a delay of an 
unreasonable duration . . ., if not sufficiently explained, will raise a 
conclusive presumption of abandonment of the plaintiff’s suit.’”720 
Generally, however, a trial court is given wide discretion in managing  
its docket721 to achieve “economy of time and effort for itself, for  
counsel, and for litigants.”722  Under Rule 166, a trial court has the 
discretion to summon the parties and their counsel to a pretrial conference 
so that a discovery schedule may be set and other important matters may be 
resolved.723  Although a trial court is given wide “latitude in  
managing discovery and preparing a case for trial,” that latitude is not 
unlimited, particularly in the mass tort context.724  A trial court’s order 
relating to the management of its docket is reviewed for a clear abuse  
of discretion.725 
 
718. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. 
proceeding); see also Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ 
denied) (stating that a trial court cannot consider a motion unless the motion has been brought to the 
court’s attention). 
719. In re Salazar, 134 S.W.3d 357, 358 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding). 
720. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 552, 534 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Callahan v. Staples, 161 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1942)). 
721. Polaris Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) 
(per curiam); Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); Stockton v. Cotton Bledsoe Tighe & 
Dawson, P.C., No. 09-03-00586-CV, 2005 WL 66570, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 13, 2005, no 
pet.) (mem. op.); In re Carter, 958 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, orig. proceeding); 
Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Horton, 797 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1990, no writ); see also Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979) 
(recognizing the inherent power of a trial court “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the 
administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity”). 
722. Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 
723. Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 69 
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). 
724. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 658–59 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) 
(determining that the setting of a trial in a mass tort case without requiring certain discovery responses 
was an abuse of discretion); In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex. 2001) (orig. 
proceeding) (holding that a blanket abatement of discovery in a mass tort case is an abuse of discretion). 
725. Clanton, 639 S.W.2d at 931; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38; Horton, 797 S.W.2d at 680. 
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L. Forum Non Conveniens 
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “[t]he doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, which originated in the common law and is now codified 
in Texas, ‘comes into play when there are sufficient contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state to confer personal jurisdiction upon the trial 
court, but the case itself has no significant connection to the forum.’”726 
The trial court has discretionary power to decline jurisdiction if the 
convenience of the parties and “justice would be better served” in another 
forum that could have maintained the suit.727  Upon a party’s written 
motion to stay or dismiss, the trial court may refuse to impose its jurisdiction 
over the case even though venue is proper in the instant forum.728  When 
a party seeks to stay or dismiss a claim, the court will consider the following 
factors: 
(1) an alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be tried;  
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy; 
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work 
a substantial injustice to the moving party; 
(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or 
otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to 
the plaintiff’s claim; 
(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of 
the state predominate in favor of the claim or action being brought in an 
alternate forum, which shall include consideration of the extent to which an 
injury or death resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state; and 
 
726. In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tex. 2015) (orig 
proceeding) (quoting In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)). 
727. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1991, writ 
dism’d w.o.j.); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 695–96 (Tex. 1990) (explaining 
the process courts must go through before declining jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(i), as recognized in Jones 
v. Raytheon Aircraft Servs., Inc., 120 S.W.3d 40, 44 & n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) 
(recognizing that the supreme court’s finding in Dow Chemical that the forum non conveniens doctrined 
is not applicable to wrongful death cases was overturned by the legislature in 2003). 
728. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b); see also Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 675–
76 (discussing the doctrine’s common-law roots). 
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(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or 
proliferation of litigation.729 
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision about whether to 
dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds for an abuse of 
discretion.730  An order denying a motion to dismiss based on forum non 
conveniens may be reviewed in a mandamus proceeding.731  If a trial court 
“grants a motion to stay or dismiss an action under the doctrine forum non 
conveniens,” it must issue “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” 
although the effect of such findings and conclusions is questionable.732  
Finally, the trial court does not have the discretion to stay or dismiss the 
case if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas.733 
M. Gag Orders 
When a trial court issues a gag order prohibiting discussion of a case 
outside of the courtroom (prior restraint), the order is reviewed for its 
constitutionality.734  To withstand this review standard, the court must 
 
729. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b)(1)–(6).  See generally In re Gen. Elec. Co., 
271 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2008) (discussing how Section 71.051(b) has been amended and no longer places 
the burden of proof on a particular party in regard to the factors enumerated in the statute).  Prior to 
2003, the statutory language provided that a case “‘may’ be stayed or dismissed under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.”  Id. at 686 (citing Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 424, § 1, 1997 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 1680, amended by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 3.04, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 
847, 854). 
730. Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 569; Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 676. 
731. Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 679. 
732. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(f).  The supreme court’s recognition of a 
trial court’s discretion to stay or dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds predates this statutory 
requirement.  Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 676–77.  It would be theoretically possible to review the trial 
court’s facts for sufficiency of the evidence while reviewing its legal conclusions de novo.  Compare 
Lonza AG v. Blum, 70 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (arguing that the 
“proper standard of review of a plea to the jurisdiction . . . is abuse of discretion”), with BMC Software 
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (stating that a trial court’s order denying a 
special appearance should be reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency in its findings of fact and 
reviewed de novo in its findings of law). 
733. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e); Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 569; In re Ford 
Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 
560, 568–71 (Tex. 1999). 
734. Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 620–21 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); see also 
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that some aspects 
of free speech under the Texas Constitution are broader than the federal counterpart).  But see 
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 559 (Tex. 
1998) (“We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a 
different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.”). 
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make written findings supported by the evidence.735  The order must be 
supported by specific findings based on evidence establishing (1) that “an 
imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial process will” result, depriving 
the “litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and” (2) that the order 
“represents the least restrictive means” available to prevent the harm.736  
This two-part constitutional test is a question of law reviewed de novo.737  
Gag orders may be challenged by mandamus.738 
N. Injunctive Relief 
Injunctions are a form of equitable relief that may also be authorized by 
statute.739 “The purpose of a TRO [(temporary restraining order)] is to 
preserve the status quo, which . . . [is] ‘the last, actual, peaceable, non-
contested status [that] preceded the pending controversy.’”740  The purpose 
of a temporary injunction “is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s 
subject matter pending a trial on the merits.”741  “The purpose of a 
permanent injunction is to grant the injunctive relief to which the applicant 
[or movant] is entitled as part of the final judgment after a trial on the 
merits.”742  Injunctions are extraordinary remedies, not relief owed to any 
party.743 
 
735. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10.  The Texas Supreme Court has applied the Davenport test to 
prior restraints on expression.  Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). 
736. Grigsby, 904 S.W.2d at 620; Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 9. 
737. Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74, 79–80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no 
writ); Siebert v. AFL-CIO Union Pines Houston Tr., No. 04-95-00575-CV, 1995 WL 702533, at *1–2 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 30, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication); see also Harris Cnty. 
Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009) (requiring de novo review of 
constitutional issues). 
738. Markel, 938 S.W.2d at 79–80. 
739. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011(c); see, e.g., In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313, 
317 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (discussing a provision for injunctive relief provided by the Texas 
Election Code). 
740. In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Janis Films, Inc. 
v. City of Fort Worth, 358 S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex. 1962)). 
741. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); see also Newton, 146 S.W.3d at 
651 n.12 (“The issuance of a temporary restraining order, like the issuance of a temporary injunction, 
is to maintain the status quo between the parties.”); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) 
(explaining that a court may grant a temporary writ of injunction to preserve the status quo of a pending 
trial). 
742. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129, 147 (Tex. App.—Tyler 
2008, pet. denied) (quoting NMTC Corp. v. Conarroe, 99 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 
2003, no pet.)). 
743. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Nolte Irrigation Co. v. Willis, 180 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.). 
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While an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary 
injunction is allowed,744 no statutory provision permits an appeal from the 
grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.745  Mandamus relief from 
a temporary restraining order may nonetheless be available under unusual 
circumstances.746 
To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the movant must show: “(1) a 
cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief 
sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the 
interim.”747  An irreparable injury exists if the party injured cannot 
sufficiently be compensated in damages or the amount of damages is 
immeasurable by pecuniary standards.748  A temporary injunction is subject 
to equitable principles such as laches or the clean hands doctrine.749  
 
744. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). 
745. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 899 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. 1995) (holding that whether an order 
is a non-appealable temporary restraining order or an appealable temporary injunction depends on the 
order’s characteristics and function, not its title). 
746. See In re Office of the Att’y Gen., 257 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) 
(addressing a temporary restraining order that did not state a basis and was extended without setting a 
trial date); Newton, 146 S.W.3d at 652–53 (involving a temporary restraining order affecting a party’s 
rights to participate in an election that would be over before the order expired); In re Tex. Natural Res. 
Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (holding that “mandamus is 
available to remedy a temporary restraining order that violates Rule 680’s time limitations”).  These 
cases involve highly unusual circumstances.  Most courts are likely to find an adequate remedy by 
appeal should the temporary restraining order be converted to a temporary injunction.  See In re 
Benkiser, No. 01-08-00451-CV, 2008 WL 2388044, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 9, 2008, 
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that, although an appeal was set after the election in question 
and kept relators from participating in the election, relators failed to establish a lack of remedy by 
appeal); see also In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (“This Court may 
review a temporary injunction from a petition for writ of mandamus when an expedited appeal would 
be inadequate . . . .”). 
747. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; see also Bob E. Shannon et al., Temporary Restraining Orders and 
Temporary Injunctions in Texas—A Ten Year Survey, 1975–1985, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 689, 700–21 (1986) 
(setting forth the factors for issuing injunctive relief).  Statutory bases of injunctive relief may or may 
not dispense with these common-law requirements.  Compare David Jasen West & Pydia, Inc. v. State, 
212 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (holding that the injunction authorized by the 
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act supersedes the common law elements), with 
Town of Palm Valley v. Johnson, 87 S.W.3d 110, 110–11 (Tex. 2001) (construing Section 65.011(1) of 
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code as requiring proof of irreparable harm, despite language 
suggesting the contrary). 
748. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. 
749. See In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (noting that “a request 
for injunctive relief” calls upon a court’s equity jurisdiction); see also In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 551 
(Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by O’Neill & Johnson, JJ.) 
(recognizing that the clean hands doctrine can prevent a party from obtaining a temporary injunction); 
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Whether a party is entitled to invoke an equitable defense “is a 
determination left to the [sound] discretion of the trial court.”750 
In an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction,751 the merits of 
the movant’s case are not presented for the appellate court’s review;752 
therefore, a “trial court may not grant a temporary injunction” that would 
accomplish the objective of the lawsuit.753  Appellate review is strictly 
limited to evaluating whether there has been an abuse of discretion.754  
Where the facts definitively indicate that a party is in violation of the law, 
the court is under a duty to enjoin the violation, thereby eliminating the need 
for the court to exercise its discretion.755 
All orders that grant a temporary injunction are required to include a date 
setting the case for trial on the merits.756  Failure to include an order setting 
the matter for a trial on the merits mandates dissolution of the 
injunction.757  Furthermore, the trial court must detail the specific reasons 
it relied upon in ruling on whether a temporary injunction should be granted 
or denied.758  The trial court is not required to explain why it believes an 
applicant has shown probable entitlement to final relief; however, the trial 
court must divulge the reasons why injury will occur if the temporary 
injunction is not granted.759  If the order fails to meet these requirements, 
 
Keene v. Reed, 340 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. App.—Waco 1960, writ ref’d) (acknowledging that the 
equitable principle of laches can keep a party from obtaining a temporary injunction). 
750. Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 551 (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by O’Neill & Johnson, JJ.). 
751. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). 
752. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. 1978). 
753. Tex. Foundries, Inc. v. Int’l Moulders & Foundry Workers’ Union, 248 S.W.2d 460, 464 
(Tex. 1952); accord Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 552 (Wainwright, J., dissenting). 
754. In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Butnaru v. Ford 
Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). 
755. Priest v. Tex. Animal Health Comm’n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no 
writ); City of Houston v. Mem’l Bend Util. Co., 331 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston 1960, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
756. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 
2000); see also EOG Res., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) 
(explaining that the trial court’s order did not set the case for trial and thus violated Rule 683). 
757. Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337; InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 
640, 641 (Tex. 1986); EOG Res., 75 S.W.3d at 52; Ebony Lake Healthcare Ctr. v. Tex. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 62 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). 
758. Big D Props., Inc. v. Foster, 2 S.W.3d 21, 22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) 
(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 683); Arrechea v. Plantowsky, 705 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Univ. Interscholastic League v. Torres, 616 S.W.2d 355, 357–58 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, no writ). 
759. State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971); Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. 
v. City of Austin, 710 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no writ); accord Transp. Co. of Tex. 
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it is rendered fatally defective and void, requiring reversal regardless of 
whether the issue was raised by issue or point of error.760 
In an appeal from a permanent injunction, the standard of review is also 
an abuse of discretion.761  A litigant is entitled to a jury trial in an injunction 
action, but only the ultimate factual issues are submitted for their 
determination.762  The jury is not entitled to “determine the expediency, 
necessity or propriety of equitable relief.”763  Thus, the trial court’s order 
granting or denying a permanent injunction based upon the ultimate facts is 
reviewed the same as an order regarding a temporary injunction.764 
O. Joinder 
Joinder and intervention are distinct.765  While intervention is automatic 
unless challenged,766 “permissive joinder relates to ‘proper parties to an 
action who may be joined or omitted at the pleader’s election’” under 
various rules of pleading and procedure.767  “A court’s decision on joinder 
should be based on practical considerations with a view to what is fair and 
orderly.”768  A trial court has discretion in such matters, and its decisions 
“will not be disturbed on appeal” absent an abuse of discretion.769  A 
joinder decision may also be reviewed by writ of mandamus.770 
 
v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 552–53 (Tex. 1953); Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston 
v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d as modified, 901 S.W.2d 926 
(Tex. 1995); Beckham v. Beckham 672 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); 
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 (requiring every order that grants an injunction or restraining order to “set 
forth the reasons for its issuance”). 
760. Arrechea, 705 S.W.2d at 189; Torres, 616 S.W.2d at 358. 
761. Jim Rutherford Inv., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass’n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Tri-State Pipe & Equip., Inc. v. S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
8 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); SRS Prods. Co., Inc. v. LG Eng’g Co., 
994 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Priest v. Tex. Animal Health 
Comm’n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ). 
762. Priest, 780 S.W.2d at 876. 
763. Id.; see also Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (acknowledging that a jury in equity should not determine issues related 
to the “expediency, necessity, or propriety of [the] relief”). 
764. Priest, 780 S.W.2d at 875–76. 
765. In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). 
766. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990). 
767. TEX. R. CIV. P. 37–40, 51(a), 97(f); see also Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d at 155 (describing 
permissive joinder and noting that the joinder standard is distinct from the intervention standard). 
768. In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, 
orig. proceeding). 
769. Allison v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981). 
770. Arthur Andersen, 121 S.W.3d at 483. 
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When more than one plaintiff joins a case, each plaintiff must establish 
proper venue independently from all other plaintiffs.771  If a plaintiff cannot 
independently demonstrate “proper venue” under a mandatory or 
permissive venue statute, the case must be transferred to a county of proper 
venue or dismissed unless the plaintiff can establish the four joinder 
requirements of Section 15.003(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code.772  In determining proper venue, “[p]roperly pleaded venue facts are 
taken as true unless specifically denied,” in which case prima facie proof of 
the denied facts must be made, including “affidavits and duly proved 
attachments.”773 
A trial court’s determination under Section 15.003(a) is an appealable 
interlocutory order.774  A trial court’s decision regarding transfer of venue 
now subject to interlocutory appeal under the exception set forth in Section 
15.003(a) and (b).775  The standard of review applicable to the trial court’s 
order based on Section 15.003(a) is, by statute, de novo.776 
P. Judicial Notice 
Pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a trial court upon 
its own motion may, or upon the motion of a party shall, take judicial notice 
of the constitutions, public statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, court 
decisions, and common law of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of 
 
771. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a). 
772. Surgitek v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. 1999); O’Quinn v. Hall, 77 S.W.3d 438, 448–
49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). The four-prong joinder requirements are: 
(1) joinder of that plaintiff or intervention in the suit by that plaintiff is proper under the Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) maintaining venue as to that plaintiff in the county of suit does not 
unfairly prejudice another party to the suit; (3) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s 
claim tried in the county in which the suit is pending; and (4) the county in which the suit is 
pending is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff and all persons against whom the suit is 
brought. 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a)(1)–(4). 
773. O’Quinn, 77 S.W.3d at 448–49. 
774. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory appeal when 
a trial court determines that: “(1) a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue; or (2) 
a plaintiff that did not independently establish proper venue did or did not establish the items 
prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)–(4)”). 
775. Id. § 15.003(a), (b); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2013, pet. dism’d). 
776. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(1); Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603.  An 
appeal is accelerated and stays trial of the case.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(2), 
(d). 
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the United States.777  A party who wants judicial notice to be taken of a 
given matter must provide the court with enough information to allow it to 
properly consider the request, and must provide all parties such notice as 
the court deems necessary for them to counter the request.778  Whether 
these requirements have been met is left largely to the trial court’s 
discretion.779  As one court has noted, “the sufficiency of a motion to take 
judicial notice is a question best answered by the trial court.”780  However, 
“once the law has been invoked by proper motion, the trial court has no 
discretion—it must acknowledge that law.”781 
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 201, a trial judge may also take 
judicial notice of a fact if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: 
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or 
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”782  In addition, facts that are notorious 
and indisputable,783 or “well known and easily ascertainable,”784 may be 
judicially noticed.  However, simply because a trial judge has personal 
knowledge of a fact does not permit the judge to take judicial notice of it.785  
The test on review is whether the fact to be judicially noticed is “verifiably 
certain.”786 
 
777. TEX. R. EVID. 202. 
778. Id.; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gunderson, Inc., 235 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. withdrawn); see also In re Gonzales, No. 07-06-00324-CV, 2006 WL 
2588696, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 6, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining that while 
the movant is entitled to a hearing, the trial court is entitled to a reasonable time to rule on the motion). 
779. See Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) (noting that the failure 
to plead a statute or regulation does not preclude the trial court from judicially noticing it). 
780. Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211, 211 (Tex. 1985).  The appellate courts may also take 
judicial notice of their own records.  Victory v. State, 158 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. 1942); Birdo v. 
Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied). 
781. Keller, 699 S.W.2d at 212; see also Eppenauer v. Eppenauer, 831 S.W.2d 30, 31 n.1 (Tex. 
App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (indicating that a court must take judicial notice of any fact whenever 
the court is given the proper information). 
782. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b); see also In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Rule 201(b)). 
783. Harper v. Killion, 348 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1961). 
784. Barber v. Intercoast Jobbers & Brokers, 417 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1967) (naming well-
known geographical facts as an example of things that are commonly judicially noticed); see also City of 
Houston v. Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289, 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (reiterating 
that if a fact is “notorious, well-known, or easily ascertainable,” then judicial notice may be taken of 
that fact). 
785. Eagle Trucking Co. v. Tex. Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1981). 
786. Id.; Levit v. Adams, 841 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). 
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Q. Jury Demand 
The Texas Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he right to jury trial is 
one of our most precious rights, holding ‘a sacred place in English and 
American history.’”787  While a party has a constitutional right to trial by 
jury,788 the right is not absolute.789  If a party desires a jury trial, Texas Rule 
of Civil Procedure 216 requires the party (1) to file with the court clerk a 
written request within a “reasonable time before the date set for trial . . . but 
not less than thirty days in advance”790 and (2) to pay the jury fee.791  As 
long as the party requests a jury trial at least thirty days before trial, it “is 
presumed to have been made a reasonable time before trial.”792 
The trial court has no discretion to refuse a jury trial if the fee is paid  
and request is made on or before the appearance date.793  If the trial court 
denies a jury trial, it will be considered harmful error if the case involves 
questions of material fact.794  In determining whether a late request for a 
jury trial should be granted or denied, the supreme court has  
reminded the courts that a trial court should grant “the right to jury trial if 
it can be done without interfering with the court’s docket, delaying the  
trial, or injuring the opposing party.”795  The trial court’s decision will be  
 
 
787. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (quoting 
White v. White, 196 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. 1917)). 
788. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 
1996). 
789. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004) 
(orig. proceeding) (holding that the constitutional right to trial by jury may be waived via contract so 
long as the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences). 
790. TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(a); see also Glazer’s Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc., 
95 S.W.3d 286, 305–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (noting that a litigant perfects 
a jury trial request when the litigant demands a jury trial and pays the necessary fee). 
791. TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(b); Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (Tex. 1985). 
792. Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 371 (Tex. 1991); cf. In re T.H., 131 S.W.3d 598, 601–
02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (upholding the denial of request for jury trial made after 
trial had already begun). 
793. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 216, 220); Squires 
v. Squires, 673 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).  But see Prudential, 
148 S.W.3d at 140–41 (directing the trial court to quash a jury demand and set the case on the nonjury 
docket when the parties had contractually waived their right to jury trial). 
794. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 98.  “A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the 
record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”  
Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991). 
795. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); see also 
Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (noting that courts abuse their 
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion.796 
R. Personal Jurisdiction 
“[P]ersonal jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to bind a particular 
person or party.”797  “[F]or a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant, due process requires [that the defendant] have 
purposefully established such minimum contacts with the forum state that 
it could reasonably anticipate being sued in the courts” of Texas.798  The 
nonresident’s contacts with Texas “may give rise to either general or specific 
jurisdiction.”799  If the defendant has “continuous and systematic contacts 
with the forum,” general jurisdiction is established.800  Furthermore, when 
the defendant’s alleged liability relates to or arises from activity that occurred 
within the state, specific jurisdiction is established.801 
A special appearance is used to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over 
the person or property based on the claim that neither is amenable to 
process in this state.802  To make this challenge a success, one must first be 
 
discretion if they deny a properly made request for a jury trial if the opposition has not shown that 
such granting would cause it injury, interfere with the docket, or infringe on court procedure).  In 
General Motors Corporation v. Gayle, the court observed that a “failure to make [a timely jury fee payment] 
does not forfeit the right to have a trial by jury when such failure does not operate to the prejudice of 
the opposite party.”  Gayle, 951 S.W.2d at 476 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Plummer, 9 S.W. 
672, 673 (Tex. 1888)); see also In re D.R., 177 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, 
pet. denied) (upholding denial of jury request when trial court record revealed opposing side had been 
preparing their case and submitting evidence based on the understanding there would not be a jury). 
796. See In re Fallis, No. 04-08-00781-CV, 2009 WL 262119, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Feb. 4, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (illustrating error raised in a petition for writ of mandamus); 
Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (illustrating error raised in an 
appeal from a final judgment); In re V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d 183, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2001, no pet.) (discussing that a trial court’s denial of a jury trial “is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard”). 
797. CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). 
798. Commonwealth Gen. Corp. v. York, 177 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. 2005); see PHC-Minden, 
L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007) (“Personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants is constitutional when: (1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum 
state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 325 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). 
799. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d at 925. 
800. Id. 
801. Id.; see also Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007) 
(requiring substantial connection between defendant’s contacts with the forum and the operative facts 
of the litigation). 
802. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a; GFTA Trendanalysen B.G.A. Herrdum GMBH & Co. v. Varme, 
991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1999).  For a history of this procedural vehicle in Texas, see Kelly v. Gen. 
Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). 
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a nonresident of Texas because it is presumed that Texas courts 
automatically have jurisdiction over Texas residents.803  “The plaintiff bears 
the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident 
. . . within the provisions of the long-arm statute.”804  To prevail on a 
special appearance, the nonresident defendant has the burden to negate all 
forms of personal jurisdiction claimed by the plaintiff.805 
A trial court considering a special appearance should address arguments 
concerning the forum’s jurisdiction over the defendant and should not hear 
any arguments regarding defects in service.806  “[D]efective jurisdictional 
allegations in the petition, defective service of process, and defects in the 
citation must be challenged by a motion to quash, not a special 
appearance.”807  A special appearance motion that appropriately challenges 
personal jurisdiction is not converted into a general appearance merely 
because it also challenges the method of service.808 
If a defendant’s special appearance is rejected, the defendant should ask 
the court to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the 
reporter’s record from the hearing on appeal.809  The reporter’s record is 
necessary only if the trial court considered evidence at the hearing— 
that is, more than a hearing conducted on paper, or with affidavits or 
exhibits filed with the clerk—using exhibits and testimony presented in 
open court beyond that which is already on file with the clerk.810  All of the 
evidence before the trial court on the question of personal or in rem 
jurisdiction is considered by the appellate court in determining the propriety  
 
 
803. See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 201, 203 (Tex. 1985) (observing 
that Rule 120a permits only a nonresident defendant to challenge jurisdiction of the court over one’s 
person or property). 
804. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002); see also Kelly, 
301 S.W.3d at 658 n.4 (“While the pleadings are essential to frame the jurisdictional dispute, they are 
not dispositive.”). 
805. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793; CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. 
proceeding). 
806. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]), 
writ ref’d n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985). 
807. Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 203. 
808. See GFTA v. Varme, 991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1999) (noting that a defendant does not 
waive a jurisdictional challenge when contesting the method of service in a special appearance). 
809. Pessina v. Rosson, 77 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied); Daimler-
Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); 
Fish v. Tandy Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied). 
810. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 781–82 (Tex. 2005). 
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of the trial court’s ruling.811 
A trial court’s order granting or denying a special appearance is an 
appealable interlocutory order.812  “Whether a court can exercise 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is a question of law.”813  
Generally, a trial court must resolve disputed questions of fact before 
resolving the jurisdiction issue.814  If the trial judge enters findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the factual determinations are subject to legal and 
factual sufficiency standards of review.815  The trial judge’s legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo.816  While an appellant may not challenge 
conclusions of law for their factual sufficiency, the appellate court may 
review the lower court’s legal conclusions based on the facts to review their 
correctness.817  If the reviewing court finds an erroneous conclusion of law, 
but the trial court’s judgment was proper, the erroneous legal conclusion 
will not warrant reversal.818 
If a trial court fails to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
its order on special appearance, and the record on appeal does not include 
the reporter’s record or clerk’s record, all facts which are necessary to 
uphold the judgment, as well as those facts supported by the evidence, are 
 
811. Texana Cmty. MHMR Ctr. v. Silvas, 62 S.W.3d 317, 323 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, 
no pet.); Silva v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 28 S.W.3d 122, 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied); 
Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892. 
812. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7).  The interlocutory appeal “stays the 
commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal.”  Id. § 51.014(b); accord In 
re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d. 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see Raymond Overseas Holding, 
Ltd. v. Curry, 955 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding) (stating that the 
recent amendments to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provide for an interlocutory appeal from 
an order granting or denying a special appearance).  The availability of this interlocutory appeal 
eliminates the need to seek mandamus relief on review of an order denying a special appearance.  See 
CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (expressing that circumstances 
worthy of mandamus relief are not found when a special appearance is denied in an ordinary case, but 
allowing mandamus to be used upon denial of special appearance in mass tort case due to 
“extraordinary circumstances”). 
813. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010) (citing Moki Mac 
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.2007); see also Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. 
v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 805–06 (Tex. 2002) (reviewing legal conclusions relating to the grant or 
denial of a special appearance de novo); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 
(Tex. 2002) (“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law.”). 
814. Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at 806; BMC Software 83 S.W.3d at 794. 
815. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794 (rejecting the abuse of discretion standard that had 
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implied.819  When the record includes both the reporter’s record and the 
clerk’s record, the implied findings are inconclusive, and thus they may be 
challenged for their factual and legal sufficiency.820  Finally, if findings of 
fact are not issued, the reviewing court should assume that the trial court 
found all factual disputes favorable to its order.821  If the special appearance 
is based upon undisputed or established facts, the appellate court conducts 
a de novo review of the trial court’s order.822 
S. Pleadings 
Technically, “pleadings” are petitions and answers.823  As a practical 
matter, practitioners often use the term “pleadings” to include all manner of 
motions filed in the trial court.824  For purposes of this subsection, the term 
is broadly construed because the concepts discussed may apply to motions 
and other pleas for affirmative relief in addition to answers and petitions. 
1. Special Exceptions 
A petition is sufficient if it gives “fair and adequate notice of the facts 
upon which the pleader bases his claim.”825  Special exceptions are “used 
to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading.”826  If a pleading fails to give fair 
 
819. Id. at 795. 
820. Id. 
821. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002); see BMC 
Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (noting that simply more than a scintilla of evidence will defeat the evidence 
challenge). 
822. Ahadi v. Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied), 
overruled on other grounds by Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791–92 (Tex. 
2005) (“[W]e disapprove of those opinions holding that . . . specific jurisdiction is necessarily 
established by allegations or evidence that a nonresident committed a tort in a telephone call from a 
Texas number . . . .”); Conner v. Conticarriers & Terminak, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). 
823. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 (defining pleadings); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 13, 21, 21b 
(distinguishing motions from pleadings); Crain v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass’n, 781 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism’d) (holding that a motion is not the functional equivalent 
of a pleading and does not carry the same legal significance). 
824. See Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) 
(“[W]e hold that motions are in the nature of pleadings . . . .”). 
825. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Roark 
v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 354 
(Tex. 1995) (quoting Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810). 
826. Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998). 
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notice,827 the defendant should specially except to the petition pursuant to 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91.828  If no special exceptions are filed, the 
pleadings will be construed liberally in the pleading party’s favor.829  The 
purpose of special exceptions is to “point out intelligibly and with 
particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other 
insufficiency in the allegations”830 or otherwise require the adverse party to 
clarify his pleadings “when they are not clear or sufficiently specific.”831  
Special exceptions apply to petitions and answers,832 but may be used in 
motion practice as well.833 
Generally, if a trial court sustains a party’s special exceptions, the other 
party must be afforded the opportunity to make amendments to the 
pleadings before the case is dismissed.834  If the defect in the pleading is 
not cured after amendment, the trial court may then dismiss the case.835  In 
reviewing the trial court’s order of dismissal upon special exceptions, the 
appellate court is required to accept as true all the factual allegations set forth 
 
827. See City of Houston v. Howard, 786 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
1990, writ denied) (defining the test of “fair notice” as whether a reasonably competent opposing 
attorney is able to understand the character of the controversy and what testimony probably will be 
relevant). 
828. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91.  The State is not precluded from challenging pleadings in a plea to the 
jurisdiction or motion for summary judgment.  State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. 2009). 
829. Horizon, 34 S.W.3d at 897; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 495 
(Tex. 1988). 
830. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91; see also State ex rel. White v. Bradley, 956 S.W.2d 725, 744 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1997) (affirming the broad discretion of the court when ruling on special exceptions), rev’d 
on other grounds, 990 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1999). 
831. Villarreal v. Martinez, 834 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see 
also Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (noting that if 
the pleading party refuses to amend or if the amended pleading fails to state a cause of action, summary 
judgment may be granted); San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Landair Travels, 31 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (stating that the court must allow an opportunity to amend, but 
that failure to amend a pleading or to state a cause of action may result in the dismissal of a case). 
832. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 91 (acknowledging that the primary purpose of the special 
exception is to point out with particularity an omission, obscurity, or insufficiency of a pleading), with 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 (explaining that pleadings shall be by petition and answer and consist of a statement 
in plain and concise language). 
833. See Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (emphasizing that when summary judgment is attacked on specificity 
grounds, a special exception is required). 
834. Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998). 
835. Id. 
126
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4
  
2019] STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS 1225 
in the pleadings.836  The trial court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.837 
If the pleading deficiency is so severe that it cannot be remedied by an 
amendment, there is no need to specially except and summary judgment 
should be granted.838  The distinction is “between inadequately pleading a 
cause of action [(special exception)] and utterly failing to plead a viable cause 
of action [(summary judgment)].”839  The cautious practitioner should 
always specially except to the pleading deficiency first, and if the plaintiff 
fails to correct the deficiency after being given an opportunity to replead, 
then move for summary judgment.840 
2. Interpleader 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43,841 providing for interpleader actions, 
extends and liberalizes the equitable remedy of bill of interpleader.842  
Under Rule 43, a stakeholder subject to multiple claims to a fund or property 
may join all claimants in a lawsuit and deposit the property or fund into the 
 
836. Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 492, 507 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); 
Villarreal, 834 S.W.2d at 452; Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d 270, 277–78 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Armendariz v. Bill Sears Supermarket No. 1, 562 S.W.2d 529, 530 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
837. LaRue v. GeneScreen, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, pet. 
denied); Holt v. Reprod. Servs., Inc., 946 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, writ 
denied); see also City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 783 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1992, writ denied) (noting that the trial court’s discretion extends to “hearing, construing, and 
sustaining special exceptions”). 
838. Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658; see also Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 
543 n.1 (Tex. 1971) (recognizing that when the petition fails to state a cause of action, summary 
judgment is given not based on any proof or evidence but merely on the petition’s deficiencies). 
839. Chambers v. Huggins, 709 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no 
writ). 
840. See Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
1989, no writ) (basing a summary judgment ruling on the plaintiff’s failure to plead a cause of action 
after having received an opportunity to be heard); see also Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (stating that a special exception is appropriate when the plaintiff 
needs to clarify a cause of action). 
841. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 43 (“Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as 
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed 
to double or multiple liability.”). 
842. Downing v. Laws, 419 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also 
Sav. & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Emps. v. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no 
writ) (discussing early and current interpleader practice). 
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court’s registry.843  The stakeholder need not be completely disinterested in 
the suit;844 instead, the stakeholder must be subject “to double or multiple 
liability” due to conflicting claims, thereby justifying a reasonable doubt, 
either in law or fact, as to who is rightfully entitled to funds or property.845 
“The purpose of the interpleader procedure is to relieve an innocent 
stakeholder of the vexation and expense of multiple litigation and the risk 
of multiple liability.”846  Interpleader relief will be granted if: “(1) [the party] 
is either subject to, or has reasonable grounds to anticipate, rival claims to 
the same fund[s or property]; (2) [the party] has not unreasonably delayed 
filing [an] action for interpleader; and (3) [the party] has unconditionally 
tendered the fund[s or property] into the registry of the court.”847  Every 
reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of allowing the stakeholder to 
interplead.848  The granting of interpleader is considered a final, appealable 
judgment, which is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.849 
3. Intervention 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows a party to automatically intervene 
in an existing cause of action, “subject to being stricken out by the court for 
sufficient cause on the motion of any party.”850  The plea in intervention 
should be filed before the judgment is rendered.851  A party may not 
 
843. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A., 984 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); see also United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 
1964) (identifying when a party who files an interpleader action may receive attorney’s fees). 
844. Downing, 419 S.W.2d at 219–20. 
845. Davis v. E. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 354 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.1962) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. 
P. 43); Emp’rs’ Cas. Co. v. Rockwall Cnty., 35 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex.1931). 
846. Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Dev. Corp., 686 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850 
(Tex. 2018) (“An interpleader suit is thus authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43 when such a 
stakeholder is ‘exposed to double or multiple liability.’” (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 43; Taliaferro v. Tex. 
Commerce Bank, 660 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ))); Tri-State Pipe & 
Equip. Inc. v. S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 8 S.W.3d 394, 401–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) 
(stating that interpleader provides protection for a stakeholder who would otherwise have “to act as 
judge and jury at its own peril when faced with conflicting claims”). 
847. Fort Worth Transp., 547 S.W.3d at 850; Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; Daniels v. Pecan Valley 
Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 385 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). 
848. Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; Dallas Bank, 686 S.W.2d at 230. 
849. Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; K & S Interests, Inc. v. Tex. Am. Bank/Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887, 
889 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Taliaferro, 660 S.W.2d at 155. 
850. TEX. R. CIV. P. 60. 
851. First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding); Comal Cty. 
Rural High Sch. Dist. No. 705 v. Nelson, 314 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1958); Highlands Ins. Co. v. 
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intervene post-judgment unless and until (1) the trial court sets aside the 
judgment, (2) the trial court carefully considers any prejudice the 
prospective intervenor might suffer if intervention is denied, (3) the trial 
court considers any prejudice the existing parties will suffer as a 
consequence of untimely intervention, and (4) the trial court considers any 
other circumstance that may militate for or against intervention.852  
Under Rule 60, persons or entities have the right to intervene if they 
“could have brought the same action” themselves, or if they would have 
been “able to defeat recovery, or some part thereof,” had the action been 
brought against them.853  The interest asserted can be legal or equitable.854  
Significantly, an intervenor does not have the burden of seeking permission 
from the court to intervene; rather, the party opposing the intervention 
bears the burden of challenging the plea in intervention with a motion to 
strike.855  Absent a party’s motion to strike, the trial court is not authorized 
to strike the intervention.856 
If a motion to strike is filed, the trial court should give the intervenor an 
opportunity to explain and prove the intervenor’s interest in the suit before 
ruling on the motion to strike.857  In response to the motion, the trial court 
“may choose to: (a) try the intervention claim; (b) sever the intervention; 
(c) order a separate trial on the intervention issues; or (d) strike the 
intervention for good cause.”858 
 
Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 794 S.W.2d 600, 602–04 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (explaining 
that Comal County is still viable under the modern rules of procedure). 
852. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 788, 791 (Tex. 2015). 
853. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990); see 
also King v. Olds, 12 S.W. 65, 65–66 (Tex. 1888) (quoting JOHN N. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND 
REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 430 (2d ed. 1883)) (explaining when a person has a right 
to intervene). 
854. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657; Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 
1982), superseded by statute, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004, as recognized in In re N.L.G., 238 S.W.3d 
828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (recognizing that the Texas legislature established a 
“new, more relaxed substantial past contact test for establishing intervenor standing in a [suit affecting 
the parent-child relationship]”). 
855. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. 
856. Id. 
857. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 866 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1993, no writ); Barrows v. Ezer, 624 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). 
858. Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).  The 
trial court should rule on a motion to strike an intervention before considering other matters, such as 
severance.  In re Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). 
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The trial court’s order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.859  The trial 
court abuses its discretion in striking the plea if: “(1) the intervenor meets 
the above test[;] (2) the intervention will not complicate the case by an 
excessive multiplication of the issues[;] and (3) the intervention is almost 
essential to effectively protect the intervenor’s interest.”860  While the trial 
court’s ruling on intervention is typically considered on appeal from a final 
judgment, interlocutory review may be made by petition for writ of 
mandamus.861 
4. Frivolous Pleadings 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13,862 in combination with the Texas Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code,863 instructs the trial court to impose 
appropriate sanctions available under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 
215(2)(b) if “a pleading, motion or other paper is [signed], ‘groundless and 
brought in bad faith[,] or . . . for the purpose of harassment.’”864  Generally, 
courts presume that pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith.865  
 
859. In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). 
860. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657; see also Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. v. Hughes, 
810 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (noting that “interventions are 
favored to avoid a multiplicity of suits”). 
861. See, e.g., In re Helena Chem. Co., 286 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, 
orig. proceeding) (noting mandamus review may be appropriate in “exceptional” cases where “time 
and money” would be “utterly wasted”). 
862. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.  Rule 13 is similar to its federal counterpart.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
(discussing the procedure for sanctions applicable to the signing of pleadings and motions). 
863. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001–.013, 10.001–.006 (providing for the 
assessment of attorney’s fees, costs, and damages for certain frivolous lawsuits and defenses).  The 
essential elements of a claim under Chapter 9 that a pleading is frivolous are that the pleading is 
(1) groundless and brought in bad faith; (2) groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment; or 
(3) groundless and brought for an improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay.  Id. at §§ 9.011, .012.  
In summary, to prevail on a claim under Chapter 9, a party must plead and prove two elements: (1) that 
the pleading has no basis in law or fact and (2) that it was brought in bad faith, or for harassment, or for 
an improper purpose, such as delay.  Hawxhurst v. Austin’s Boat Tours, 550 S.W.3d 220, 230 (Tex. 
App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).  
864. Keith v. Solls, 256 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 13).  “‘Groundless’ means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”  Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13).  “Bad 
faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but means the conscious doing of a wrong for 
dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.”  Id.  “Harass is used in a variety of legal contexts to 
describe words, gestures, and actions that tend to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.”  
Id. at 916–17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elkins v. Scotts-Brown (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). 
865. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 
856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993). 
130
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4
  
2019] STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS 1229 
The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming this 
presumption of good faith.866  A trial court must consider the facts available 
to the litigant, the circumstances existing at the time the document is filed, 
and whether the legal assertions within the document are “warranted by 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of [current] 
law.”867  The court may also consider the amount of time available to 
prepare the pleading (e.g., only a few days before the statute of limitations 
expires), and “examine the signer’s credibility taking into consideration all 
[of] the facts and circumstances available to him at the time of the filing.”868  
The courts have observed that Rule 13 should only be used “in those 
egregious situations where the worst of the bar” uses the judicial system for 
“ill motive without regard to reason and the guiding principles of the 
law.”869  Rule 13 should not be used as “a weapon . . . to punish those with 
whose intellect or philosophic viewpoint the trial court finds fault.”870 
A court may only impose sanctions for good cause,871 “the particulars of 
which must be [included] in the sanction order.”872  The purposes of the 
particularity requirement have been described as to:  
 
866. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 731. 
867. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13); accord TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 10.001(2); In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. 
proceeding). 
868. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d at 889; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.012(b) (listing 
factors that the court must consider).  Rule 13 imposes a duty on the trial court to point out with 
particularity the act or omission on which the sanctions are based. Tarrant Cnty. v. Chancey, 942 
S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ); Zarsky v. Zurich Mgmt., Inc., 829 S.W.2d 
398, 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); see also Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Baty, 946 
S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s 
spontaneous sanction order failed to meet Rule 13 requirements). 
869. See Chancey, 942 S.W.2d at 154–55 (quoting Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exploration 
Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 951 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)). 
870. Id. at 155 (quoting Dyson, 861 S.W.2d at 951). 
871. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (“No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good 
cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.”); Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 730 
(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13).  In addition to monetary sanctions or dismissal of the frivolous pleading 
or motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 
Section 10.004, the trial court may report the offending attorney to the grievance committee if the 
attorney “consistently engage[s] in activity that results in sanctions under Section 9.012.”  TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.013. 
872. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.005; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; see also Murphy v. 
Friendswood Dev. Co., 965 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (reversing 
a sanction order that merely incorporated by reference a motion for sanctions); Schexnider v. Scott & 
White Mem’l Hosp., 953 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ) (failing to determine the 
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(1) ensure that the trial court is held accountable and adheres to the standard 
of the rule; (2) require the trial court to reflect carefully on its order before 
imposing sanctions; (3) inform the offending party of the particular conduct 
warranting sanction, for the purpose of deterring similar conduct in the future; 
and (4) enable the appellate court to review the order in light of the particular 
findings made by the trial court.873 
A trial court’s order under Rule 13 or the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.874 
5. Vexatious Litigation for Repeat Pleadings 
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was amended to include 
Chapter 11 in an attempt to deter non-meritorious or frivolous litigation.875  
The Code now provides that within ninety days after the date the defendant 
files an original answer or a special appearance, the defendant may file a 
motion asking the trial court for an order: “(1) determining that the plaintiff 
is a vexatious litigant; and (2) requiring the plaintiff to furnish security.”876  
After the defendant files this motion, the litigation is stayed until the trial 
 
facts supporting sanctions in the trial court’s bare order).  There is a split among the courts of appeals 
whether a sanctioned party’s failure to object to the lack of particularity of the trial court’s order waives 
that complaint.  See Birnbaum v. Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C., 120 S.W.3d 470, 475–76 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (refusing to address the validity of trial court’s sanctions because the 
issue was not preserved); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 666–67 (Tex. App.—Austin 
1997, no writ) (acknowledging the split and requiring an objection to the lack of particularity to properly 
preserve a complaint for appellate review).  Unlike Rule 13, Rule 215 does not require a trial court to 
state any reasons for good cause.  See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215 (imposing a standard that does not require 
the trial court to specify reasons creating good cause); Kahn v. Garcia, 816 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding) (noting the distinction between Rule 13 and Rule 
215). 
873. Houtex Ready Mix Concrete & Materials v. Eagle Constr. & Envtl. Servs., L.P., 226 S.W.3d 
514, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see Saulnier v. Haase , No. 02-16-00139-CV, 
2017 WL 1428725, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. dism’d) (reaffirming Houtex Ready 
Mix). 
874. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001) 
(“Sanctions are generally reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”); Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 730 
(reviewing the district court’s imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard); Koslow’s 
v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990) (commenting that an appellate court will only set aside the 
imposition of sanctions upon the “showing of a clear abuse of discretion”). 
875. See Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104 (addressing vexatious litigants in 
trial courts, not appellate courts); 1901 NW 28th St. Tr. v. Lillian Wilson, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (“Chapter 11 of the civil practice and remedies code contains the 
legislature’s plan for confronting vexatious litigants—pro se individuals who abuse the legal system by 
pursuing numerous frivolous lawsuits.” (citing Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104). 
876. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051. 
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court determines the merits of the motion.877  The Code sets forth the 
criteria for determining whether a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.878 
If the trial court finds that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, the trial 
court must “order the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the 
moving defendant” in such an amount to compensate the defendant’s 
reasonable expenses in connection with the litigation, including court costs 
and attorney’s fees.879  If the plaintiff fails to provide the security before 
the set time frame ends, the court shall dismiss the litigation.880  After notice 
and a hearing, the trial court may also “enter an order prohibiting [the 
plaintiff] from filing . . . new litigation . . . if the court finds[:]” (1) the 
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant; and (2) the local administrative court judge 
has not given the plaintiff permission to file the litigation.881  If the plaintiff 
violates the order, the plaintiff “is subject to contempt of court.”882  The 
abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a trial court’s order ruling 
that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.883 
T. Sanctions 
1. Inherent Power to Sanction 
Trial courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith 
abuse of the judicial process, even when that conduct may not be covered 
by rule or statute.884  The inherent powers of a trial court are those that 
“aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in 
the preservation of its independence and integrity.”885  The inherent power 
 
877. Id. § 11.052(b). 
878. Id. § 11.054. 
879. Id. § 11.055. 
880. Id. § 11.056. 
881. Id. § 11.101(a). 
882. Id. § 11.101(b). 
883. 1901 NW 28th St. Tr. v. Lillian Wilson, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2017, no pet.); Harris v. Rose, 204 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).  
884. See In re Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that 
contempt power “is an essential element of judicial independence and authority”); In re Bennett, 
960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing a court’s “inherent power to impose 
sanctions”); Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) 
(holding the trial court has “inherent and statutory power to discipline errant counsel for improper trial 
conduct in the exercise of its contempt powers”). 
885. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99 
(Tex. 1979)); Westview Drive Invs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.3d 583, 613 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 40); Union Carbide Corp. v. 
Martin, 349 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398–
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exists only “to the extent necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad 
faith abuse of the judicial process, such as any significant interference with 
the traditional core functions of Texas courts.”886  The trial court must 
make findings of fact that the abuse significantly interfered with the core 
functions of the judiciary,887 such as “hearing evidence, deciding issues of 
fact raised by the pleadings, deciding questions of law, rendering final 
judgment, and enforcing [that] judgment.”888  “[T]he trial court should 
attempt to determine if the offensive conduct is attributable to the attorney, 
the party, or both.”889  “‘[L]esser sanctions must first be tested to determine 
whether they are adequate’ before a sanction that [precludes a judgment] on 
the merits of a case [can] be justified.”890 
“Case[-]determinative sanctions may be imposed . . . only in exceptional 
cases when they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser 
sanctions would promote compliance with the rules.”891  The record must 




99); accord Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988); In re K.A.R., 
171 S.W.3d 705, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting). 
886. Westview Drive, 522 S.W.3d at 613 (quoting White v. Zhou Pei, 452 S.W.3d 527, 546 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); Union Carbide, 349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Greiner v. 
Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied); Lawrence v. Kohl, 853 S.W.2d 
697, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)); Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d 506, 
510 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see also In re Martin, No. 05-06-00072-CV, 2006 WL 
234411, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining that a trial 
court may use its inherent sanction power to remedy any “significant interference with the legitimate 
exercise of the traditional core functions of the court”). 
887. See Union Carbide, 349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Island Entm’t Inc. v. Castaneda, 882 S.W.2d 2, 
5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)); Ezeoke v. Tracy, 349 S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Howell v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 143 S.W.3d 416, 
447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (illustrating specific findings); McWhorter v. Sheller, 993 
S.W.2d 781, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (noting that findings did not 
address interference with core functions); Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 510 (requiring some evidence showing 
the complained-of conduct obstructed the court’s legitimate exercise of power). 
888. Westview Drive, 522 S.W.3d at 613 (citing White, 452 S.W.3d at 546); Union Carbide, 
349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Dallas Cnty. Constable Precinct 5 v. KingVision Pay-Per-View, Ltd., 
219 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)); Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 510; see also Trevino v. 
Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 958 (Tex. 1998) (delineating the core functions of the judiciary). 
889. Williams v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 999 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no 
pet.). 
890. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 
841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992)). 
891. GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). 
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imposing case-determinative or death-penalty sanctions.892 
The court of appeals reviews a trial court’s use of its inherent sanction 
power for abuse of discretion, which necessitates review of the entire 
record.893  Sanctions imposed pursuant to the court’s inherent power must 
be just and appropriate.894  A trial court abuses its discretion if the sanctions 
imposed are not just.895  In determining whether sanctions are just, 
appellate courts apply a two-prong test.896  First, a direct nexus must exist 
“among the offensive conduct, the offender, and the sanction imposed.”897  
Accordingly, the “sanction must be directed against the abuse and toward 
remedying the prejudice caused [to] the innocent party,” and “should be 
visited upon the offender.”898  Second, the sanction must not be 
excessive.899  Due to the amorphous nature of this inherent power and its 
potency, the courts of appeals have admonished trial courts to use it 
sparingly and to be mindful of the sanctioned party’s due process rights.900 
Whether a trial court’s sanction is reviewable by mandamus or by appeal 
is not clear in every case.  If a sanctioned party has an adequate remedy at 
law, then mandamus is not available,901 unless the judgment or order is void 
 
892. See Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839–40 (noting that a trial court should consider, and utilize when 
effective, the imposition of lesser sanctions). 
893. Ezeoke v. Tracy, 349 S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); 
Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 512; see also In re K.A.R., 171 S.W.3d 705, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (noting the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the 
imposition of sanctions at the trial level); In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 809 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (recounting the abuse of discretion standard of review of sanctions 
imposed by the trial court). 
894. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 916–17 & n.4 (Tex. 1991) 
(orig. proceeding). 
895. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 731; Williams v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 999 S.W.2d 836, 843 
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no pet.).  
896. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; Williams, 999 S.W.2d at 843. 
897. Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003). 
898. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. 
899. Id. 
900. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (reminding that “[t]he 
power to sanction is of course limited by the due process clause”); Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d 
506, 510–11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (reiterating the due process limitations on a 
court’s power to sanction); see also In re K.A.R., 171 S.W.3d 705, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (recognizing the need to use the inherent sanction power 
sparingly). 
901. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding); TransAmerican, 
811 S.W.2d at 919. 
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when issued.902  In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,903 the Texas 
Supreme Court held that when sanctions “have the effect of adjudicating a 
dispute, whether by striking pleadings, dismissing an action[,] or rendering 
a default judgment, but . . . do not result in rendition of an appealable 
judgment, then the eventual remedy by appeal is inadequate.”904  A death-
penalty or case-determinative sanction precludes the merits of the case from 
being presented and is clearly reviewable by mandamus.905  In addition, a 
monetary sanction may be reviewed by mandamus if it “raises the real 
possibility that a party’s willingness or ability to continue the litigation will 
be significantly impaired.”906  There is a split among the courts of appeals 
on the issue of whether the striking of a party’s witnesses may be reviewed 
 
902. See, e.g., In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) 
(presuming no adequate appellate relief at law when an order is void). 
903. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (orig. 
proceeding). 
904. Id. at 919; see also Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (reiterating that 
“[c]ase determinative sanctions may be imposed in the first instance only in exceptional cases when 
they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance 
with the rules” (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig. 
proceeding))). 
905. See Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 729 (reviewing death-penalty sanctions in an original mandamus 
proceeding); TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 920 (holding that a discovery sanction, which precludes a 
decision on the merits, is reviewable by mandamus).  Death-penalty sanctions are also limited by 
constitutional due process.  Id. at 917; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 
(“No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any 
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.”).  Consequently, courts have 
strictly applied the requirements to impose sanctions, especially death-penalty sanctions.  See Hamill v. 
Level, 917 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1996) (stating that courts may not use death-penalty sanctions unless 
the sanctioned party’s conduct justifies the presumption of a meritless claim). 
906. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).  In Braden, the 
court found the large monetary sanction, which had to be paid before an appeal would be allowed, was 
reviewable by mandamus.  Id. at 929–30.  But cf. Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 
801, 802 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (ruling that a sanction of $200 in attorney’s fees was not 
reviewable by mandamus); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1986) (orig. 
proceeding) (declaring that a sanction of $1,050 was not reviewable by mandamus).  If the court’s 
imposition of monetary sanctions jeopardizes a party’s ability to continue the litigation, appeal is a 
sufficient remedy only if the court defers payment of the sanction until the court renders final judgment 
and the party has an opportunity to appeal the judgment.  Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.  To preserve the 
issue, the sanctioned party must complain that the monetary sanction prevents the party’s access to the 
court.  Id.  If the sanctioned party complains, the trial court must either defer payment of the sanction 
until the final judgment is rendered or make express written findings explaining why the sanction does 
not preclude the complaining litigant’s access to the court.  Id. 
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by mandamus.907  The availability of mandamus, with regard to the striking 
of a party’s witnesses, generally depends on whether the sanction is case-
determinative.908 
2. Power to Sanction for Discovery Abuse 
A party may obtain discovery relevant to the subject matter, which is to 
be “liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge 
of the facts and issues prior to trial.”909  A trial court may impose sanctions 
“to assure compliance with discovery and deter those who might be tempted 
to abuse discovery in the absence of a deterrent.”910  A trial court’s ruling 
on a motion for sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.911 
 
907. Compare In re Thornton-Johnson, 65 S.W.3d 137,139–40 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. 
proceeding) (order striking expert witness in medical malpractice claim against doctors presented an 
obstacle but did not warrant mandamus), Pope v. Davidson, 849 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (concluding that striking a witness’s testimony in part 
may be presented to and reviewed by a court on appeal and, therefore, does not warrant mandamus), 
and Humana Hosp. Corp. v. Casseb, 809 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, orig. 
proceeding) (ruling that striking an expert witness may be reviewed on appeal by a bill of exceptions), 
with J.G. v. Murray 915 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding) 
(mandamus relief appropriate where trial court erroneously struck defendant’s expert witness), In re 
Kings Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 773, 785–86 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 2009, orig. 
proceeding) (mandamus relief was appropriate where trial court struck defendant’s sole expert witness), 
Buyers Prods. Co. v. Clark, 847 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, orig. proceeding) 
(determining it was inappropriate for the trial court to strike the defendant’s witnesses because of the 
attorney’s violations and conditionally issuing a writ of mandamus), Mother Frances Hosp. v. Coats, 
796 S.W.2d 566, 571–72 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding) (finding that an appeal is not an 
adequate remedy and mandamus is appropriate when an order striking witnesses amounts to an 
emasculation of a party’s defense), and Williams v. Crier, 734 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, 
orig. proceeding) (holding that the facts of the instant case justified mandamus because the trial court’s 
order striking three witnesses “was a clear abuse of discretion”). 
908. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 325–26 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (stating that as long as exclusion of testimony impairs only the party’s 
presentation of its case and does not prohibit a trial on the merits, the striking of testimony is within 
the court’s discretion and is not a case-determinative sanction).  Until a bright-line rule is created, which 
probably will not occur, Justice Peeples’s analysis of the issue remains correct: “The law does not 
permit pre-trial mandamus review of witness-exclusion rulings, except in extreme cases of complete 
emasculation” of a party’s case.  Casseb, 809 S.W.2d at 548 (Peeples, J., concurring). 
909. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (quoting 
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)); Chapa v. Garcia, 
848 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Axelson, 798 S.W.2d at 553); see also  State 
v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1991) (“[D]iscovery is . . . the linchpin of the search for truth.”). 
910. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004). 
911. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 
838; Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986). 
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Rule 215.3, which authorizes trial courts to impose appropriate sanctions 
upon persons who abuse the discovery process, provides that orders 
imposing such sanctions “shall be subject to review on appeal from the final 
judgment.”912  Because the legislature has not created an interlocutory 
appeal regarding discovery sanctions, such sanctions are not appealable until 
a final judgment is signed.913  Nonetheless, a sanctioned party may pursue 
a writ of mandamus if that party has no adequate remedy by appeal.914 
Rule 215 permits a wide range of sanctions for a variety of purposes:915 
“to secure compliance with discovery rules; . . . to deter other litigants from 
similar misconduct; . . . to punish violators;”916 “to insure a fair trial[;] to 
compensate a party for past prejudice[;] . . . and to deter certain bad faith 
conduct.”917  The sanctions, however, must be “just.”918  A two-pronged 
analysis has been developed to determine whether a trial court’s sanctions 
are just.919 
The first prong of this analysis requires that “a direct relationship . . . exist 
between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed.”920  Accordingly, 
the sanction imposed against the offending party “must be directed against 
the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the innocent 
 
912. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.3. 
913. In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Tex. 2006) (“A sanction[] order is appealable when the 
judgment is signed.”); see also Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) 
(“[D]iscovery sanctions are not appealable until the district court renders a final judgment.” (quoting 
Bodnow Corp., 721 S.W.2d at 840)). 
914. See TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 920 (Tex. 1991) (orig. 
proceeding) (holding discovery sanctions that result in preventing a judgment on the merits and that 
are not immediately appealable may be reviewed by mandamus because an ordinary appeal would be 
inadequate). 
915. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b) (identifying the various sanctions a trial court has at its disposal 
to correct discovery violations for a pending action). 
916. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also 
Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (discussing the legitimate purposes of 
sanctions). 
917. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 807 n.4 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). 
918. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b); Spohn, 104 S.W.3d at 882; Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 
850 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding); Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 849; TransAmerican, 811 
S.W.2d at 917. 
919. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); see also Spohn, 
104 S.W.3d at 882 (Tex. 2003) (using the two-part test established in TransAmerican for determining 
whether a trial court abused its discretion when imposing sanctions). 
920. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. 
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party.”921  In other words, the sanctions must be specifically tailored to the 
abuse found.922 
The second prong of this analysis requires that the sanction not be 
excessive—the sanction must fit the offensive conduct.923  The sanction 
should not be more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate 
purpose.924  Moreover, as a general rule, a trial court should always impose 
lesser sanctions before imposing a death-penalty sanction.925  The Texas 
Supreme Court has emphasized “that case-determinative sanctions may only 
be imposed in ‘exceptional cases’ where they are ‘clearly justified’ and it is 
‘fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the 
rules.’”926  Trial courts, however, are not required to “test the effectiveness 
of lesser sanctions by actually implementing and ordering each and every 
sanction.”927  Instead, trial courts “must analyze the available sanctions and 
offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction 
imposed.”928 
 
921. Id. at 917; accord Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied); In re Adkins, 70 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2002, orig. proceeding); In re Polaris Indus., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, 
orig. proceeding). 
922. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; Paradigm, 161 S.W.3d at 537; see also Vela v. Wagner & 
Brown, Ltd., 203 S.W.3d 37, 61 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (finding a direct relationship 
between the abuse and misconduct documented by the trial court and the sanctions imposed). 
923. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917 (“The punishment should fit the crime.”); Polaris, 
65 S.W.3d at 751; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 326–27 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding the trial court’s discovery sanction was not a death-penalty 
sanction and, even if it were, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the sanction was 
justified and not excessive); Adkins, 70 S.W.3d at 391 (reversing a death-penalty sanction because it 
was excessive and therefore unjust). 
924. See Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583 (“[T]he court must make certain that less severe sanctions 
would not have been sufficient to promote compliance.”); TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917 (“[C]ourts 
must consider the availability of less stringent sanctions and whether such lesser sanctions would fully 
promote compliance.”); Adkins, 70 S.W.3d at 390 (stating the record must “reflect that the court 
considered the availability of lesser sanctions”). 
925. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (holding 
that lesser sanctions will suffice if they “promote compliance, deterrence, and discourage further 
abuse”); see also Hamill v. Level, 917 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1996) (disapproving of the death-penalty 
sanction imposed by the trial court because lesser sanctions were available to serve the immediate 
purpose); Polaris, 65 S.W.3d at 751 (noting a trial court should “first test the effectiveness of lesser 
sanctions before entering death penalty sanctions”). 
926. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2004) (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys. 
Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)); see also Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 
104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (requiring courts to first consider less preclusive sanctions). 
927. Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 842. 
928. Id. 
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In determining whether the sanction imposed is just, the trial court should 
consider the entire record, not merely the trial court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, in reviewing the sanction order.929  Therefore, the trial 
court is not restricted to considering only the specific violation committed 
but is entitled to consider other conduct occurring during discovery.930 
In appropriate cases, the Texas Supreme Court has encouraged trial 
judges to prepare written findings that set forth the trial court’s reasons for 
imposing severe sanctions.931  However, written findings are not required 
because they are often unnecessary and constitute an undue burden on the 
trial court.932  However, the appellate courts are required to review the 
entire record and to defer to the trial court’s written findings.933   
U. Sealing Court Records 
Rule 76a provides very specific guidelines for a trial court to follow in 
determining whether to seal court records.934  The trial court must strictly 
 
929. Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583 (citing Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852; Downer v. Aquamarine 
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985); accord Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). 
930. Hernandez v. Mid-Loop, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no 
pet.); Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2004, pet. denied).  In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, Justice Gonzalez identified fourteen 
factors commonly used to analyze sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 920–21 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) 
(Gonzalez, J., concurring).  Two Texas courts of appeals have adopted the approach used by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to determine whether the conduct by the sanctioned 
party warranted the particular sanction imposed.  Pelt v. Johnson, 818 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1991, orig. proceeding) (implementing the six-factor test of Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868–70 (3d Cir. 1984)); Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 517–18 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, no writ) (utilizing the six-factor test of Poulis).  But see Lisa Ann Mokry, Note, Discovery 
Sanctions Must Be “Just,” Consistent with Due Process, and Are Subject to Mandamus Review: TransAmerican 
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991), 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 617, 640 (1992) 
(criticizing TransAmerican for failing “to provide guiding rules and principles for the trial courts to 
follow”). 
931. IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997); Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 
850; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 919 n.9.  The supreme court noted three benefits to making findings: 
first, such findings are useful in appellate review in that they demonstrate whether the trial judge 
followed a reasoned analysis pursuant to the TransAmerican and Braden standards; second, such findings 
help assure the parties involved that the decision resulted from thoughtful judicial deliberation; and 
third, written findings increase the likelihood that the sanctions will deter future sanctionable conduct.  
Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852. 
932. IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 442. 
933. Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583. 
934. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).  The rule allows court records to be sealed only if there is “(a) a 
specific, serious[,] and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: (1) [the] presumption of openness; 
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adhere to these guidelines because court records “are presumed to be open 
to the general public.”935  Any order on a motion to seal or unseal public 
records must be supported by specific findings of fact that state the 
requirements of Rule 76a(1) have been met.936  Any order relating to the 
sealing or unsealing of court records is subject to immediate appellate 
review.937  The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to orders 
regarding motions to seal records.938 
V. Service of Process 
A complaint regarding a curable defect in the service of process does not 
defeat amenability to the court’s process; thus, it should not be brought via 
a special appearance.939  Rather, a motion to quash is the appropriate 
procedural device to raise such an objection.940  The remedy for defective 
service in Texas state courts is additional time to answer the suit, not 
dismissal.941  The trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash service of process 
 
 
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general public health or safety; [and] (b) 
no less restrictive means . . . [that] will adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.”  
Id. 
935. Id.; Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 23–24 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also Gen. 
Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. 1998) (mandating that the standards set forth in Rule 
76a be strictly followed). 
936. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(6). 
937. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(8); see also Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 829 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. 
1992) (“Any party aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, finding, or failure to find made pursuant to 
Rule 76a, including the decision whether the document is a ‘court record,’ as that term is defined by 
the rule, may seek review by interlocutory appeal.” (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 
157, 158 (Tex. 1992))); Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 195 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (quoting Rule 76a(8)). 
938. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d at 526; BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Houston Chron. Publ’g Co., 
263 S.W.3d 31, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Clear Channel, 195 S.W.3d at 134. 
939. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 202–03 (Tex. 
1985). 
940. See Wheat v. Toone, 700 S.W.2d 915, 915 (Tex. 1985) (expounding that “defective 
jurisdictional allegations in the petition, defective service of process, and defects in the citation must 
be challenged by a motion to quash, not a special appearance” (quoting Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 203)); 
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Kreipe, 29 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 
denied) (affirming a motion to quash is the proper vehicle to address defective service). 
941. See Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 202 (stating “a non-resident defendant, like any other 
defendant, may move to quash [a] citation for defects in the process, but his only relief is additional 
time to answer rather than dismissal of the cause”); Alcala v. Williams, 908 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1995, no writ) (construing a motion to abate as a motion to quash).  Although Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) provide for dismissal of a suit for failure to serve process 
or for insufficient service of process, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain analogous 
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is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.942 
W. Severance 
Severance of a claim under Rule 41943 is proper if: “(1) the controversy 
involves more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one that 
could be asserted independently in a separate lawsuit; and (3) the severed 
actions are not so interwoven with the other claims that they involve the 
same facts and issues.”944  The purpose of granting a severance is to ensure 
justice, deter prejudice, and add convenience.945  A severance is required in 
cases where the facts and circumstances clearly require a separate trial to 
prevent injustice, where the facts and circumstances do not support a 
contrary determination, and where no prejudice will be experienced.946  
Under these circumstances, the failure to order separate trials violates a plain 
legal duty and is considered an abuse of discretion.947  Rule 41 gives the 
trial court “broad” discretion to grant a severance, which will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.948 
X. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to decide a case; it is 
 
 
provisions.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4)–(5) (permitting a party to move for dismissal on grounds 
of insufficient process or insufficient service of process), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a (recognizing no 
grounds for dismissal for improper service other than lack of jurisdiction). 
942. Alcala, 908 S.W.2d at 56. 
943. TEX. R. CIV. P. 41 (addressing misjoinder and non-joinder of parties); see also In re B.L.D., 
113 S.W.3d 340, 345 n.3 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that a party seeking to sever under Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41 “may seek separate trials as an alternative form of relief” under Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 174). 
944. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); 
accord Coal. of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 798 S.W.2d 560, 564 
(Tex. 1990). 
945. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990).  
946. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding); In re Progressive 
Cty Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) 
(quoting Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683); In re Burgett, 23 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, 
orig. proceeding). 
947. Burgett, 23 S.W.3d at 126 n.1. 
948. TEX. R. CIV. P. 41; Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658; Morgan v. Compugraphic 
Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1984); Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 
(Tex. 1982); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (noting a “trial court has wide discretion to order or not 
order separate trials when judicial convenience is served and prejudice avoided”). 
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never presumed and cannot be waived.949  Without subject-matter 
jurisdiction, a judgment is void rather than voidable.950 
A trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is typically challenged by a plea 
to the jurisdiction, although other procedural vehicles may be used as 
well.951  Challenging subject-matter jurisdiction is a dilatory plea “to defeat 
a cause of action without regard to whether the claims . . . have [any] 
merit.”952 
Unless the plaintiff’s petition affirmatively demonstrates an absence of 
jurisdiction, the trial court construes the petition liberally in favor of 
jurisdiction.953  Absent incurable defects in jurisdiction, the trial court 
should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.954  If the pleadings 
affirmatively negates jurisdiction, the jurisdictional plea may be granted 
without permitting the plaintiff to amend.955  If a trial court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, it has no choice but to dismiss the case956 because 
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the trial court by either 
consent or waiver.957 
In Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,958 the court held: 
 
949. Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Tex. 2010); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control 
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). 
950. Engelman Irrigation Dist. V. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2017); Mapco, 
Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding). 
951. City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009); Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 
635, 638 (Tex. 2004); see also Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (naming 
a motion for summary judgment as another procedural vehicle for challenging lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction). 
952. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. 
953. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Ass’n 
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. 
954. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. 
955. Id. 
956. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 
852 S.W.2d at 446; see also Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., Inc., 
915 S.W.2d 61, 66 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (“A judge may not sit or act in a 
case unless it is within the jurisdiction of his court.” (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.121(a) 
(West 1988))). 
957. See City of Desoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. 2009) (“The failure of a 
jurisdictional requirement deprives the court of the power to act (other than to determine that it has 
no jurisdiction), and ever to have acted, as a matter of law.” (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at 
Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex. 2004))). 
958. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); see also City of 
Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621–22 (Tex. 2009) (reaffirming Miranda). 
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When the consideration of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction requires 
the examination of evidence, the trial court exercises its discretion in deciding 
whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary 
hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this 
determination must be made as soon as practicable.959 
Where the jurisdictional challenge involves the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim “and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court 
reviews the relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists.”960  If the 
evidence raises a question of fact regarding jurisdiction, “the trial court 
cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction,” and the fact-finder will resolve the 
fact issue.961  If, however, the evidence is undisputed or does not raise a 
fact issue on the question of jurisdiction, then “the trial court rules on the 
plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.”962 
Decisions involving the government may be reviewed by interlocutory 
appeal to determine whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction.963  
A trial court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “is fundamental error and 
must be noted and reviewed by the appellate court at any time it 
appears.”964  The reviewing court “construe[s] the pleadings in favor of the 
plaintiff and look[s] to the pleader’s intent.”965  Whether a petition alleges 
facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction is treated as 
a question of law and is reviewed de novo.966  Similarly, whether 
 
959. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. 
960. Id. 
961. Id. at 227–28. 
962. Id. at 228. 
963. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an interlocutory 
appeal of an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit”); Harris Cty. 
v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that “when a trial court denies the governmental 
entity’s claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for 
summary judgment, or otherwise . . . an interlocutory appeal may be brought”).  “If a plaintiff has been 
provided a reasonable opportunity to amend after a governmental entity files its plea to the 
jurisdiction,” any subsequent dismissal is with prejudice.  Id. at 639. 
964. Fincher v. City of Texarkana, 598 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1980, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.); accord Tullos v. Eaton Corp., 695 S.W.2d 568, 568 (Tex. 1985); Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Int’l 
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local Union No. 782, 352 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. 1961); see 
also Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998) (indicating that lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction can be raised sua sponte by the appellate court). 
965. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (quoting 
Huston v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
966. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.  
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uncontroverted evidence of jurisdictional facts demonstrates subject-matter 
jurisdiction is also a question of law.967 
Occasionally, “disputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that also implicate 
the merits of the case may require resolution by the finder of fact.”968  
“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading 
requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the 
plea that implicates the merits of the case, [the reviewing court accepts] as 
true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,” indulges every logical 
inference, and resolves any doubts in favor of the nonmovant.969  Only 
matters presented to the trial court will be reviewed upon appeal from the 
order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.970 
1. Standing 
“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to [maintaining] suit.”971  It is 
also an essential “component of subject matter jurisdiction.”972  “In Texas, 
the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real 
controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”973 A 
party has standing “when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it 
is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal 
authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the 
controversy.”974  “To have standing a party must have suffered a threatened 
 
967. Id. 
968. Id. at 227. 
969. See id. at 228 (noting that this standard mirrors the summary judgment standard). 
970. Huston, 663 S.W.2d at 129 (citing Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496 S.W.2d 146, 148 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), aff’d, 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974)). 
971. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010)); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 
146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 
444 (Tex. 1993); Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984)). 
972. Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 646; accord M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 
704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000); see also Austin 
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005) (“Without standing, a court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”); Munters Corp. v. Locher, 936 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (observing that the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction 
makes the judgment void). 
973. Heckman, 369 S.W3d at 154 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d. 299, 304, 
307 (Tex. 2008)). 
974. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 848–49 (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. 
Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996)); see also Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cty. 
Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that both standing and capacity are required 
for a party to bring a lawsuit). 
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or actual injury.”975  An opinion issued in a lawsuit where there is no 
standing (or where there is no case or controversy)976 is an advisory 
opinion, which Texas courts are prohibited from issuing.977 
Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court.978  Except 
for issues involving mootness, subsequent events do not deprive the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.979 
To establish standing, a person “must demonstrate a personal stake in the 
controversy.”980  A court determines if an individual has standing by 
analyzing whether there is “(1) ‘a real controversy between the parties,’ that 
(2) ‘will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.’”981  For 
example, whether an association has standing to sue on behalf of its 
members is determined by reviewing whether “its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right,” whether “the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and whether 
“the claim asserted [or] the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.”982 
The de novo standard of review applicable to subject-matter jurisdiction 
applies to standing as well, and, “[a]s a component of subject matter 
jurisdiction,”983 the “issue of standing may be raised for the first time on 
 
975. Allstate Indemn. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex. 2006). 
976. See Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. 2004) (stating that a justiciable 
controversy must be before the court to warrant adjudication).  “A judicial decision reached without a 
case or controversy is an advisory opinion, which is barred by the separation of powers provision of 
the Texas Constitution.”  Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1). 
977. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. 
Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).  The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the 
separation of powers article to mean that courts are prohibited “from issuing advisory opinions because 
such is the function of the executive rather than the judicial department.”  Id.; see also TEX. CONST. 
art. II, § 1 (describing Texas’s separation of powers). 
978. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 n.9. 
979. See id. (explaining the court’s power to retain subject-matter jurisdiction). 
980. Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 795 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ); accord Austin 
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 
1984); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004) 
(“Standing consists of some interest peculiar to persons individually and not as members of the general 
public.” (quoting Hunt, 664 S.W.2d at 324)). 
981. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal 
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996)); accord Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 
504, 517–18 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. 
982. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)); accord Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 518. 
983. Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 646; accord Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445–46. 
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appeal.”984  When reviewing a trial court’s order regarding standing,985 
“Texas appellate courts ‘construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and 
look to the pleader’s intent.’”986  When standing is raised for the first time 
on appeal, Texas appellate courts “construe the petition in favor of the 
party, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence 
supports standing.”987 
2. Mootness 
Like standing, mootness is a component of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.988  The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in 
which an actual controversy exists.989  A case becomes moot if a 
controversy no longer exists or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome.990 
If a case becomes moot, the parties lose standing to maintain their 
claims.991  There are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of 
mootness: (1) if the issue is “[capable] of repetition yet evading review”; and 
(2) if the collateral consequences doctrine is applicable.992  Because the 
issue of mootness implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate 
courts review the trial court’s dismissal based on mootness with the de novo 
standard of review.993 
 
984. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 849; accord Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 517 n.15; see also McAllen 
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tex. 2001) (stating that standing, as an element of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived). 
985. The typical challenge to standing is made in the trial court by a motion to dismiss, but it 
may take other forms as well.  See Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) 
(challenging with a motion to dismiss); In re A.M.S., 277 S.W.3d 92, 95 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
2009, orig. proceeding) (utilizing a motion for new trial).  While standing may be further challenged by 
appeal, in certain situations, standing may be raised in an original proceeding.  See In re K.K.C., 292 
S.W.3d 788, 790 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief in a suit 
affecting the parent-child relationship when the petitioner lacked standing to file suit). 
986. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (quoting Huston v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
987. Id.  
988. See Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 51–52 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (stating once 
a case becomes moot, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction). 
989. Camarena v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988). 
990. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). 
991. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). 
992. Gen. Land Office of the State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 
1990). 
993. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016); Heckman v. 
Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149–50 (Tex. 2012); City of Shoreacres v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. 
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3. Ripeness 
Ripeness “is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter 
jurisdiction.”994  “While standing focuses on the issue of who may bring an 
action, ripeness focuses on when that action may be brought.”995  As a 
component of subject-matter jurisdiction, ripeness “cannot be waived and 
may be raised for the first time on appeal.”996 
Ripeness concerns whether, at the time a lawsuit is brought, “the facts 
have developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to 
occur, rather than being contingent or remote.”997  To establish that a claim 
is ripe based on an injury that is likely to occur, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the injury is imminent, direct, and immediate, and not 
merely remote, conjectural, or hypothetical.998  “Ripeness, like standing, is 
a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, . . . and like 
standing, emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to 
be presented.”999 
If the pleadings are insufficient, the trial court should afford an 
opportunity to replead if the defects are potentially curable, but it may 
dismiss “if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of 
jurisdiction.”1000  Ripeness may be raised through various procedural 
vehicles, such as a motion to dismiss or plea to the jurisdiction.1001 
Ripeness is subject to de novo review.1002  The appellate court will  
accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and “indulge every 
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the [plaintiff’s]  
 
Quality, 166 S.W.3d 825, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); Pantera Energy Co. v. R.R. Comm’n 
of Tex., 150 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). 
994. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 
1998). 
995. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) (citing Patterson, 
971 S.W.2d at 442; Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 
626–27 (Tex.1996)). 
996. Id. 
997. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442. 
998. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 852. 
999. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 
(Tex. 1998)). 
1000. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004). 
1001. See Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851 (using a motion to dismiss to raise ripeness); Combs v. 
Entm’t Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (reviewing a plea to the 
jurisdiction via interlocutory appeal). 
1002. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928–29. 
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favor.”1003  Of course, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s 
legal conclusions.1004 
Y. Summary Judgment 
The underlying purpose of Texas’s summary judgment rules is a narrow 
one—the elimination of “patently unmeritorious claims and untenable 
defenses.”1005  There are two separate methods of moving for summary 
judgment in Texas, each with different standards of review on appeal.1006  
Texas law generally considers “summary judgment to be a harsh remedy 
requiring strict construction.”1007 
1. Traditional Summary Judgment: Rule 166a(c) 
Pursuant to Rule 166a(c), a summary judgment is proper only when a 
movant establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant 
is therefore “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1008  A defendant may 
be entitled to summary judgment if the defendant disproves “at least one of 
the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action”1009 or establishes 
all the elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law.1010 
In a summary judgment proceeding, the burden of proof is on the movant 
who, unless the movant has leave of court, has twenty-one days prior to the 
date set for hearing to file and serve the summary judgment motion and 
 
1003. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Garrett Place, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 
140, 143 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.). 
1004. See Salazar v. Morales, 900 S.W.2d 929, 932 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) 
(asserting that an appellate court accepts as true a trial court’s factual determinations, but it is not 
required to accept the trial court’s blanket legal conclusions). 
1005. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc. 555 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Gulbenkian v. Penn, 
252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1952)) (underlying purpose of Rule 166a is to eliminate patently 
unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) 
(quoting City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)); accord 
Gulbenkian, 252 S.W.2d at 931; Breceda v. Whi, 187 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, 
no pet.); Valores Corporativos v. McLane Co., 945 S.W.2d 160, 169 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, 
writ denied). 
1006. See generally David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 54 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (examining summary-judgment practice in Texas and federal courts). 
1007. Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ 
denied). 
1008. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; accord Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 
336, 344 (Tex. 2005); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). 
1009. Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). 
1010. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. 1997). 
149
Hall and Anderson: Standards of Review in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1248 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1099 
supporting affidavits.1011  Once the movant has established the right to a 
summary judgment, the burden of proof “shifts to the nonmovant to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.”1012  The 
party opposing the motion must file and serve his response and opposing 
affidavits no later than seven days before the hearing, unless the court grants 
an extension.1013 
The trial court may grant the parties a hearing, but it should be 
nonevidentiary.1014  To determine whether a disputed issue of material fact 
precludes summary judgment, the court construes all competent evidence 
in favor of the nonmovant as true, indulging every reasonable inference and 
resolving any doubts in favor of the nonmovant.1015 
A trial court’s summary judgment is reviewed by an appellate court de 
novo.1016  An appellate court “examine[s] the entire record in the light most 
 
1011. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Roskey v. Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 
(Tex. 1982). 
1012. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 
1995)); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).  A summary 
judgment cannot be granted simply because the nonmovant fails to respond when the movant’s 
summary-judgment evidence is not legally sufficient.  Id.  The motion for new trial standards in Craddock 
v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939), do not apply after summary judgment is granted 
because the nonmovant failed to timely respond to the motion when (1) the nonmovant had notice of 
the hearing and (2) an opportunity to move to extend time to alter the deadlines in Rule 166a.  
Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002).   
[A] motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response should be granted when the 
nonmovant establishes good cause by showing that the failure to timely respond (1) was not 
intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake, and (2) 
that allowing the late response will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seeking 
summary judgment. 
Id. at 688.  A trial court’s order on a motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
1013. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). 
1014. See In re Am. Media Consol., 121 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. 
proceeding) (“Parties are not entitled to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.” (citing 
TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS § 7.01 (3d ed. 2002))); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 
166a(c)–(d) (stating that oral testimony is not permitted and that summary judgment shall be rendered 
based on documents filed with the court at the time of the hearing or filed after the hearing with leave 
of the court). 
1015. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 
644 (Tex. 1995)); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). 
1016. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) 
(citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012)); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 
164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 
2004). 
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favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and 
resolving any doubts against the motion.”1017  Because a reviewing court 
views all evidence in favor of the nonmovant, the usual presumption that 
the judgment is correct does not apply to a summary judgment.1018 
On appeal, evidence that favors the movant will not be “considered 
unless it is uncontradicted.”1019  Summary judgment, however, may be 
based on the uncontroverted evidence of an interested witness or expert 
witness “if the evidence is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free 
from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily 
controverted.”1020 
When appealing from summary judgment, the grounds of review are also 
limited.1021  The movant’s “motion for summary judgment must itself 
expressly present the grounds upon which it is made, and must stand or fall 
on these grounds alone.”1022  “Issues not expressly presented to the trial 
court by written motion” for summary judgment or response to the motion 
cannot be considered by an appellate court as grounds for reversal.1023  The 
appellate court “can consider the record only as it existed at the time 
 
1017. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). 
1018. See Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005) (stating all 
evidence favorable to the nonmovant is reviewed in the interest of judicial economy); IHS Cedars 
Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004) (affirming that the 
court reviews all evidence favorable to the nonmovant when reaching its conclusion); see also Carter v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (declaring 
the standard of review and presumptions in an appeal from summary judgment favor reversal of the 
judgment). 
1019. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 
(Tex. 1965). 
1020. Republic Nat’l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986) (citing TEX. 
R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). 
1021. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Kirby Rest. Equip. & Chem. Supply Co., 170 S.W.3d 144, 146 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). 
1022. Sci. Spectrum Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997), superseded by rule, TEX. 
R. CIV. P. 166a(i), as recognized in Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (asserting that the prohibition against summary judgment by default 
is inapplicable to motions filed under Rule 166a(i)); accord Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 
73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002) (noting a traditional summary judgment cannot be granted on grounds 
not presented in the motion); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (requiring the movant’s motion to 
explicitly state the specific grounds for the summary judgment). 
1023. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d 919, 921 
(Tex. 2005); Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at 204 (denying summary judgment to movant’s claim because issues 
were not included in original motion before the trial court); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 
858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 674–
75 (Tex. 1979). 
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summary judgment was entered.”1024  Moreover, an appellate court may 
not raise grounds for reversing a summary judgment sua sponte.1025  The 
appellate court should review “all grounds presented to the trial court and 
preserved on appeal in the interest of judicial economy.”1026 
When the motion for summary judgment is based on several different 
grounds1027 and the order granting the motion is silent as to the reason for 
granting the motion, the appellant must show “that each independent 
ground alleged is insufficient to support the summary judgment 
granted.”1028  The summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the 
theories are meritorious.1029  If the reviewing court determines that 
summary judgment was improperly granted, the reviewing court will reverse 
the judgment and remand the cause for a trial on the merits.1030  However, 
if a motion for summary judgment is filed by both parties, and one is granted 
by the trial court and one is denied, the reviewing court should determine 
all presented questions and render the judgment that should have been 
rendered by the trial court.1031 
A summary judgment order is not necessarily interlocutory because the 
order grants more relief than the movant requested (for example, by 
granting summary judgment on claims that were not addressed in the 
 
1024. McGee v. Deere & Co., No. 03-04-00222-CV, 2005 WL 670505, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Mar. 24, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
1025. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990); see also Jacobs v. 
Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2001) (stating the appellate court erred in reversing a summary 
judgment on a claim that the movant never pled in the trial court). 
1026. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). 
1027. The reviewing court should “affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories 
presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious.”  Joe v. Two Thirty 
Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004). 
1028. Skiles v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005), rev’d on 
other grounds, 221 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2007); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 
380 (Tex. 1993) (noting “[w]hen reviewing a summary judgment granted on general grounds, [an 
appellate] [c]ourt considers whether any theories asserted by the summary judgment movant will 
support the summary judgment” (emphasis omitted)). 
1029. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 
162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocates of Tex., 
136 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). 
1030. Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1988); accord Lubbock Cty. v. Trammel’s 
Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. 2002). 
1031. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d at 648; accord SAS Inst., 
Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 529 
(Tex. 2002). 
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summary judgment motion).1032  “[A]n order that expressly disposes of the 
entire case is not interlocutory merely because the record fails to show an 
adequate motion or other legal basis for the disposition.”1033  Thus, despite 
perceived inadequacies in the record, language in the record expressing 
finality may help the appellate court in determining whether the order 
should be considered final; “[l]anguage that the plaintiff take nothing by his 
claims in the case, or that the case is dismissed, shows finality if there are no 
other claims by other parties.”1034  The correct resolution under these 
circumstances, therefore, is to treat the summary judgment as final and 
appealable.1035  Any claimed error regarding the adequacy of the motion 
may result in a reversal on appeal and remand to the trial court, but it should 
not result in dismissal of the appeal for lack of a final judgment.1036 
2. No Evidence Summary Judgment: Rule 166a(i) 
Since 1997, litigants may seek another basis for summary judgment.1037  
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), a litigant may file a motion for 
summary judgment seeking dismissal of all or part of a lawsuit if there is no 
evidence to support at least one of the elements of the adverse party’s claim 
or defense.1038  However, it is inappropriate to file a Rule 166a(i) motion 
until there has been adequate time for discovery.1039 
Moreover, a Rule 166a(i) motion must specifically set forth the elements 
of the adverse party’s claim or defense for which there is no evidence.1040  
 
1032. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001); see also Sultan v. Mathew, 
178 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. 2005) (requiring that a judgment dispose of each issue and party before 
becoming final and appealable); cf. In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) 
(noting that during the appeal of a default judgment, appellate review is only proper upon a final 
judgment expressly disposing of the case).  See generally William J. Boyce, Finality Plus, in UNIV. TEX. 
12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON STATE AND FEDERAL APPEALS (June 2002) (discussing the finality 
of summary judgments); William J. Boyce, Is Lehmann the Final Word on Summary Judgment Finality?, 
XIV APP. ADVOC. 4 (2001) (analyzing the finality of summary judgments after Lehmann). 
1033. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206. 
1034. Id. at 205. 
1035. See Ritzell v. Espeche, 87 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the trial court’s 
summary judgment order was unmistakably clear that all claims were adjudicated, thus making the 
summary judgment final). 
1036. See id. (holding that the summary judgment was final because “the trial court was 
unequivocally clear that [all] claims were adjudicated, and therefore the summary judgment was” 
appealable). 
1037. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). 
1038. Id.; W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). 
1039. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). 
1040. Id. 
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The motion cannot be conclusory or generally allege that there is no 
evidence to support the claims.1041  With the filing of the motion, the 
burden shifts to the nonmovant, who must present “more than a scintilla of 
probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”1042  Under the 
Rule, if the nonmovant fails to provide enough evidence, the trial court must 
grant the motion.1043 
“A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed 
verdict,” and the same legal sufficiency or no-evidence standard is 
applied.1044  No evidence summary judgments are reviewed under the same 
legal sufficiency standard as directed verdicts.1045  Accordingly, the trial 
court should grant a summary judgment, sustaining a no-evidence point, 
when: 
(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is 
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence 
offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no 
more than a mere scintilla,1046 or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes 
the opposite of the vital fact.1047 
 
1041. Keszler v. Mem’l Med. Ctr. of E. Tex., 105 S.W.3d 122, 127–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2003, no pet.). 
1042. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). 
1043. Wyndham Int’l, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, 
no pet.); see also Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70–71 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) 
(requiring courts to grant summary judgment unless respondent “raise[s] a genuine issue of material 
fact”).  But see Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic, 22 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. 
denied) (articulating that “the better approach is to review no-evidence motions for summary 
judgments in the same manner any other Rule 166a summary judgment is reviewed,” by indulging in 
“every reasonable inference and resolv[ing] all doubts in favor of the nonmovant” rather than 
disregarding all contrary evidence when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-movant). 
1044. Wyndham, 186 S.W.3d at 686; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 
(Tex. 2003); Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d 904, 911 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Maguire Oil 
Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350, 357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Rocha v. Faltys, 
69 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Kelly v. Demoss Owners Ass’n, 71 S.W.3d 
419, 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.). 
1045. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing Chapman, 
118 S.W.3d at 750). 
1046. More than a scintilla of evidence is found when the evidence would allow “reasonable 
and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.”  Forbes, 124 S.W.3d at 172; Burroughs Wellcome 
Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995). 
1047. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (quoting Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751). 
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Again, appellate review is de novo.  When reviewing a no-evidence 
summary judgment on appeal, the appellate court will “review the evidence 
presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence 
favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary 
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”1048 
Z. Venue 
“Venue, as defined by the common law, is the proper place for a lawsuit 
to proceed.”1049  Each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff suit must independently 
establish proper venue.1050  Complaints about improper venue must be 
raised in the trial court with a motion to transfer venue pursuant to Rule 86 
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.1051 
Generally, a venue ruling is not a final judgment nor an order subject to 
appeal.1052  Mandatory venue statutes are enforceable by petition for writ 
of mandamus1053 and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1054  On appeal, 
a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to transfer venue is 
reviewed by the appellate court de novo.1055  On appeal, an appellate court 
 
1048. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006); Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 
248. 
1049. Ramsay v. Tex. Trading Co., 254 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. 
denied). 
1050. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a); Shell Oil Co. v. Baran, 258 S.W.3d 
719, 721 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. abated).  A party may file an interlocutory appeal of a trial 
court’s determination that “a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.”  TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b). 
1051. TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1); see also Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 383–84 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (explaining that venue is not jurisdictional and a party waives any 
objection to improper venue if its objection is not made by a timely filed written motion). 
1052. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(b); In re Signorelli 
Co., 446 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding).  There are 
exceptions.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE. ANN. § 15.003(a), (b)(1). 
1053. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642; In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174, 176 
(Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 
(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)); In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2007) (orig. 
proceeding) (per curiam); see also In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262–63 (Tex. 2008) (orig. 
proceeding) (enforcing a venue ruling on mandamus that was not followed by the transferee court). 
1054. Signorelli, 446 S.W.3d at 473 (citing In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114, 
117 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)). 
1055. Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d. 259, 260 (Tex. 1994); Union Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. dism’d); Killeen v. Lighthouse 
Elec. Contractors, L.P., 248 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied); Highland 
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cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s 
venue choice.1056  “If there is probative evidence to support the trial court’s 
determination, even if the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary 
. . . the appellate court should defer to the trial court.”1057 
On appeal of a venue order, the reviewing court must consider the entire 
record and the trial itself to determine whether the trial court improperly 
transferred a case to another county under Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure 861058 and 87,1059 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code Section 15.064(b).1060  Appellate review of the venue determination, 
thus, differs greatly from the scope of the decision made by the trial judges, 
who must rule solely on the basis of certain documents without the benefit 
of live testimony and the entire record.1061  As a consequence, the trial 
court may properly overrule a motion to transfer venue and later determine, 
based on additional evidence (or during trial), that venue lies in another 
county.1062  This scope of review—the entire record puts—the appellate 
courts in the position of considering matters that the trial court had no 
opportunity to assess before making its decision.1063  Nevertheless, the 
 
Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 212 S.W.3d 522, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, 
pet. denied). 
1056. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757–58 (Tex. 1993). 
1057. Id. 
1058. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86 (pertaining to motions to transfer venue). 
1059. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87 (regarding determination of motions to transfer venue). 
1060. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (stating that appellate courts 
consider the entire record, which includes a trial on the merits, in determining whether venue was 
proper); see also Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261–62 (addressing the appellate court’s consideration of the 
entire record during review of a transfer of venue (citing Dan R. Price, New Texas Venue Statute: 
Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 855, 878–79 (1984))).  See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 255, 257–259 
(setting forth provisions regarding change of venue based on allegations of prejudice). 
1061. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(b) (requiring the court to base its decision on the pleadings, 
party stipulations, affidavits, and attachments filed by the parties); Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58 (noting 
the difference between the trial court’s venue transfer hearing, which must take prima facie evidence 
as true, and the appellate court’s review, which must reverse if any evidence destroys the prima facie 
proof); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carter, 778 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ 
denied) (discussing a trial court’s limited sources when determining venue under Rule 87(3)(b)); Tex. 
City Ref., Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ 
denied) (stating that while the scope of appellate review encompasses the entire record, the trial court 
must look only to certain documents and may not hear live testimony), abrogated in part by Ruiz, 
868 S.W.2d at 758 (abrogating the preponderance of the evidence standard of review adopted by Texas 
City Refining). 
1062. Tex. City Ref., 767 S.W.2d at 185. 
1063. Bristol v. Placid Oil Co., 74 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (mem. 
op.); Kansas City S. Ry., 778 S.W.2d at 915; Tex. City Ref., 767 S.W.2d at 185. 
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appellate courts continue to review the trial court’s determination by 
considering the entire record.1064 
If venue was improper, the case must be reversed, even if the county of 
transfer would have been proper if originally chosen by the plaintiff.1065  
Reversal is required whether a motion to transfer is erroneously granted or 
denied.1066 
V.    TRIAL RULINGS 
Rulings that relate to the general conduct of a trial are within the broad 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion.1067  A trial court even has the authority to express itself 
in exercising its discretion.1068  A trial court may intervene to maintain 
control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, to prevent a waste of time, 
and may make remarks that are “critical or disapproving of, or even hostile 
to, counsel, the parties, or their cases.”1069  A trial court may permit jurors 
to submit occasional questions to the witnesses in conjunction with 
appropriate procedural safeguards.1070  In summary, a trial court has 
inherent power to control the disposition of cases “with economy of time 
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for the litigants.”1071  The more 
common trial rulings are discussed here. 
 
1064. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); see Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58 
(rejecting a preponderance of the evidence review and noting the confusion in interpreting, applying, 
and harmonizing Rule 87 with Section 15.064(b)). 
1065. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261; Ruiz, 868 
S.W.2d at 758. 
1066. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 
198 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex. 1998); Wichita 
Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1996). 
1067. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 2001); Schroeder v. Brandon, 
172 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. 1943); see also Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (declaring the trial court is responsible for the management of his or her 
docket); Kreymer v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) 
(emphasizing the trial court has broad discretion concerning the extent of cross-examination allowed). 
1068. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 240–41. 
1069. Id. at 240 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)); accord Great Glob. 
Assurance Co. v. Keltex Props., Inc., 904 S.W.2d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ). 
1070. Hudson v. Markum, 948 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied). 
1071. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 
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A. Invoking the Rule 
Texas Rule of Evidence 614 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267 
govern sequestration of witnesses in civil litigation.1072  The purpose of 
sequestration, or “invoking the rule,” is to minimize “witnesses[] tailoring 
their testimony in response to that of other witnesses and [to] prevent[] 
collusion among witnesses testifying for the same side.”1073  However, 
invoking the rule does not prevent a witness from talking about the case 
before trial, especially when the witness’s speech is directed toward persons 
not involved in the pertinent case.1074  Either the parties or the court, on 
its own motion, may sequester witnesses.1075  The rule is not discretionary; 
a court must exclude witnesses upon request of the parties.1076  The rule 
provides that at the request of any party, the witnesses in the case shall be 
removed from the courtroom to a place where they cannot hear the 
testimony of any other witness in the case.1077  Certain witnesses are 
exempt from sequestration, including: 
(1) a party who is a natural person or his or her spouse; (2) an officer or 
employee of a party that is not a natural person and who is designated as its 
representative by its attorney; [and] (3) a person whose presence is shown by 
a party to be essential to the presentation of the [case].1078 
Although an expert witness is generally found to be exempt under the 
essential presence exception, experts are not automatically exempt.1079  
Instead, Rules 614 and 267 give the trial court “broad discretion to 
determine whether a witness is essential.”1080  A party has the burden of 
showing why the presence of its witness is essential to the presentation of 
its case.1081  A trial court’s refusal to grant a party’s request for a witness to 
remain during trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1082 
 
1072. Drilex Sys., Inc. v. Flores, 1 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 1999); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28 
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). 
1073. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116. 
1074. Kennedy v. Eden, 837 S.W.2d 98, 98 (Tex. 1992). 
1075. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116 & n.2. 
1076. Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ dism’d). 
1077. Id. 
1078. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116–17; In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2002, no pet.). 
1079. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116–17. 
1080. Id. at 118–19. 
1081. Id. at 117. 
1082. Id. at 117–18. 
158
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4
  
2019] STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS 1257 
The exemptions can be limited, however, by other legislation.  In In re M-I 
L.L.C.,1083 the court construed the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act as 
granting the trial court discretion to exclude a party’s corporate 
representative from portions of a temporary injunction hearing involving 
alleged trade secret information about which he was potentially 
unaware.1084   
When a party or the court invokes the rule, the parties should request that 
the trial court “exempt any prospective witnesses whose presence is essential 
to the presentation of the [case].”1085  The party seeking the exemption 
from the rule has the burden to establish that the witness’s presence is 
necessary.1086  If the witness is exempt, then the witness is not placed under 
the rule and “need not be sworn or admonished.”1087  When “the [r]ule is 
invoked, all nonexempt witnesses must be placed under the [r]ule and 
excluded from the courtroom.”1088  Generally, “witnesses under the [r]ule 
. . . may not discuss the case with anyone other than the attorneys in the 
case.”1089 
The rule is violated “when a nonexempt prospective witness remains in 
the courtroom during the testimony of another witness, or when a 
nonexempt prospective witness learns about [another witness’s] trial 
testimony through discussions with persons other than the attorneys in the 
case or by reading reports or comments about the testimony.”1090  When 
the rule is violated, a party may file a motion to exclude the witness, and the 
trial court, considering all of the circumstances,1091 may “allow the 
testimony of the potential witness, exclude the testimony, or hold the 
 
1083. In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016). 
1084. Id. at 579 (construing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.006). 




1089. Id.  
1090. Id. 
1091. The supreme court noted that some of the “circumstances” may include: “whether the 
party calling the witness was at fault in causing or permitting the violation, whether the witness’s 
testimony is cumulative, and whether the witness is a fact witness.”  Id. at 117 n.3; accord Upton v. State, 
894 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, pet. ref’d); Garza v. Cole, 753 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Holstein v. Grier, 262 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1953, no writ). 
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violator in contempt.”1092  The trial court’s decision is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.1093 
B. Motion in Limine 
A motion in limine does not preserve any issue for appellate review.1094  
To preserve error on appeal for the wrongful exclusion of evidence, the 
record must reflect that the party opposing the motion in limine actually 
attempted to introduce the excluded evidence during the trial and obtained 
a ruling from the court that the evidence would not be admitted.1095  If a 
party complains of the wrongful admission of evidence, the record must 
reflect that the party seeking to exclude the evidence made a proper 
objection when the evidence was actually offered during the trial on the 
merits.1096  In either event, the standard of review is based on the rule of 
evidence invoked.1097 
C. Empanelling a Jury 
1. Jury Shuffle 
Under Rule 223 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party has the 
right to demand a jury shuffle as long as it is timely requested.1098  The 
demand must be made before voir dire, and only one shuffle may be 
granted.1099  “Before voir dire” means prior to jury-questionnaire responses 
 
1092. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 117 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 267(e)); Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); accord 
In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). 
1093. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 117–18; K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d at 28. 
1094. Zinda v. McCann St., Ltd., 178 S.W.3d 883, 894 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. 
denied). 
1095. Id.; Richards v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 35 S.W.3d 243, 252 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). 
1096. Richards, 35 S.W.3d at 252; Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Johnson v. Garza, 884 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ 
denied); Wilkins v. Royal Indem. Co., 592 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, no writ). 
1097. See infra Section V(F) (discussing admission of evidence). 
1098. TEX. R. CIV. P. 223; Carr v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, 
pet. denied); Whiteside v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. granted, 
judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Martinez v. City of Austin, 852 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ 
denied). 
1099. TEX. R. CIV. P. 223; Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 133; Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 618; Martinez, 852 
S.W.2d at 73. 
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being examined by any of the parties.1100  Rule 223 procedures for a jury 
shuffle are mandatory and failure to comply with them is error.1101 
Whether that error results in reversal depends on the court. In deciding 
whether to grant a new trial for failing to conduct a requested jury shuffle, 
one court of appeals used a traditional harmless error analysis.1102  Under 
this analysis, the court requires appellants to show that “violation of Rule 
223 probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”1103  
Otherwise, a violation of the rule will generally not be an “infringement 
upon the fundamental right to [a] trial by jury” and any error will be 
harmless.1104 
Another court of appeals adopted the “relaxed” harmless error standard 
used in the jury selection context.1105  Under this analysis, a complaining 
party must show that a “trial was materially unfair, without having to show 
more.”1106  Furthermore, the appellate court must examine the entire 
record.1107  Under this standard, a party does not have to show specific 
harm or prejudice arising from the inappropriate shuffle; however, it does 
require “some showing that the randomness of the jury has suffered.”1108  
Such a showing will result in the granting of a new trial.1109  The “relaxed” 
standard has been subject to sharp criticism.1110 
 
1100. Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 133–34. 
1101. Id.; Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 619. 
1102. Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 620. 
1103. Id. 
1104. Id. 
1105. Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 135. 
1106. Id. 
1107. Id. 
1108. Id. at 136. 
1109. Id. 
1110. See Jackson v. Williams Bros. Constr. Co., 364 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (Sharp, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “existing case law imposes a 
harmless-error analysis on a sitting Texas trial judge’s conscious refusal to abide by a very clearly-
worded rule” and criticizing that analysis.  “Obviously the appellate court cannot compare the 
composition of the non-shuffled panel with the shuffled panel when the trial court did not do its job.  
Instead, harm is analyzed under this so-called ‘relaxed’ standard by which a burden is placed on the 
party demanding the shuffle to somehow prove a lack of randomness in the jury panel.  This begs the 
question of just how bad does the panel have to be before it crosses over into hypothetical 
‘unrandomness.’  Engaging in such esoteric arguments is a valid reason for laypersons to make fun of 
our jury system.  The worst part of this ‘relaxed’ harm analysis, however, is that, absent an egregious 
‘unrandom’ initial jury panel, the trial court’s response to the shuffle demand is essentially 
discretionary.”). 
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In BNSF Railway Co. v. Wipff,1111 the court of appeals presumed harm 
from the trial court’s refusal to shuffle the jury, but did so because BNSF 
specifically argued to the trial court that two objectionable jurors were seated 
that it would have otherwise struck.1112  The court of appeals presumed 
harm because “we cannot know for certain that [the objectionable jurors’] 
inclusion did not affect the verdict.”1113  The court of appeals further 
explained that it would have found the error harmful even under the 
“relaxed” standard of review, based on the following factors that rendered 
the case “hotly contested” and, thus, materially unfair: “(1) the number of 
special issues, (2) the count of the verdict, (3) the absence of summary-
judgment motions or motions for instructed verdict, (4) the pleadings and 
the jury findings, (5) whether the record shows how the parties used their 
strikes, and (6) whether there were any double strikes.”1114  “Viewing all 
these factors in light of the entire record, BNSF has shown that the trial was 
materially unfair based on the erroneous denial of a jury shuffle arguably 
resulting in the seating of two objectionable jurors.”1115 
2. Voir Dire and Challenges for Cause 
The Texas Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts to provide a 
litigant with broad latitude during voir dire examination to enable the litigant 
“to discover any bias or prejudice by the potential jurors so that peremptory 
challenges may be intelligently exercised.”1116  Although voir dire 
examination is left chiefly to the sound discretion of the trial court,1117 the 
trial court “abuses its discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper 
question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to challenge for 
cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges.”1118  “[T]o 
 
1111. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Wipff, 408 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). 
1112. Id. at 668. 
1113. Id. (quoting Cortez ex rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87, 
91 (Tex. 2005)). 
1114. Id. at 669 (citing Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 136). 
1115. Id. 
1116. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Babcock v. 
Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989)); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 
362, 375 (Tex. 2000); Haryanto v. Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, 
writ denied). Bias and prejudice are statutory grounds for disqualification.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 62.105(4). 
1117. Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 92. 
1118. Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 228 (defining “challenge for cause”); 
Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d at 750 (noting that inquiry into juror bias and prejudice is proper to determine 
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preserve a complaint that a trial court improperly restricted voir dire, a party 
must timely alert the trial court as to the specific manner in which it intends 
to pursue the inquiry.”1119  To obtain a reversal, the complaining party must 
show the trial court abused its discretion and the error was reasonably 
calculated to cause, and “probably [did] cause[], the rendition of an improper 
judgment.”1120 
Whether bias and prejudice exist is ordinarily a fact question.1121  
However, if the “evidence shows that a prospective juror has a state of mind 
in favor of or against a litigant [or type of suit] so that the juror is not able 
to act impartially and without prejudice, the juror is disqualified as a matter 
of law.”1122  “[T]he relevant inquiry is not where jurors start but where they 
are likely to end.”1123  If the evidence is not conclusive as a matter of law, 
the reviewing court must examine the evidence “in the light most favorable 
to the trial court’s ruling.”1124  Once bias or prejudice is established, it is a 
legal disqualification and reversible error automatically results if the court 
overrules a motion to strike.1125  To preserve error “when a challenge for 
cause is denied, a party must use a peremptory challenge against the 
veniremember involved, exhaust [all of the party’s] remaining challenges, 
and notify the trial court that a specific objectionable veniremember will 
remain on the jury” panel in light of the court’s denial of a challenge for 




whether potential jurors are statutorily disqualified); Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 92 (“[T]rial judges must not 
be too hasty in cutting off examination that may yet prove fruitful.”). 
1119. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d at 758. 
1120. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; accord Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709. 
1121. See Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. 1998) (stating that “[i]f prejudice is not 
established as a matter of law, the trial court makes a factual determination as to whether the venire 
member should be disqualified”); Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1963) (suggesting 
that a juror’s bias or prejudice may be a factual determination left to the trial court’s discretion). 
1122. Kiefer v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 
pet. denied); see also Hafi v. Baker, 164 S.W.3d 383, 385 (Tex. 2005) (labeling a bias “disqualifying if ‘it 
appears that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act 
with impartiality’” (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963))).  Bias is an 
indication toward one side or another, and prejudice means prejudgment and includes bias.  Id. 
1123. Hafi, 164 S.W.3d at 385 (quoting Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 93). 
1124. Kiefer, 10 S.W.3d at 39. 
1125. See Compton, 364 S.W.2d at 182 (“It is only where there are grounds for disqualification 
other than those provided for in the statute that the discretionary powers of the trial judge may be 
exercised.”). 
1126. Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 90–91. 
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for an abuse of discretion.1127 
It is improper for counsel to question veniremembers about their 
potential verdict in light of certain evidence.1128  Questions to prospective 
jurors should address their biases and prejudices, not their opinions about 
evidence.1129  Questions to prospective jurors cannot isolate one relevant 
piece of evidence.1130  “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow questions that seek to determine the weight to be given (or 
not to be given) a particular fact or set of relevant facts.”1131  Trial courts 
have discretion to decide whether an inquiry of potential jurors explores 
external biases, unfair prejudices, or possible verdicts based on 
evidence.1132 
3. Alignment of Parties and Allocation of Peremptory Strikes 
Questions regarding alignment and antagonism of the parties often arise 
in multiple-party litigation.1133  Under Rule 233, the trial judge is required 
to assess whether antagonism exists among the parties on the same side of 
the case before assigning the number of peremptory challenges by the 
parties.1134  Upon motion of any of the litigants, the court must allot the 
number of peremptory challenges in such a way as to ensure that “no litigant 
or side is given [an] unfair advantage.”1135  A trial court’s decision to grant 
a motion to realign a party as a plaintiff is permitted “only where the burden 
of proof on the whole case rests on the defendant, or where the defendant 
makes the required admissions before trial.”1136 
 
1127. Id. at 93; State v. Dick, 69 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); Kiefer, 
10 S.W.3d at 39. 
1128. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. 2006) (stating that the 
court in Cortez “adopted the general rule that it is improper to ask prospective jurors what their verdict 
would be if certain facts were proved”). 
1129. Id. at 751–52. 
1130. See id. at 752 (asserting that asking whether a “juror can be fair after isolating a relevant 
fact” is just as confusing “as an inquiry that previews all the facts”). 
1131. Id. at 753. 
1132. Id. at 754–55. 
1133. Amis v. Ashworth, 802 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding [leave 
denied]) (Ramey, C.J., dissenting). 
1134. TEX. R. CIV. P. 233; Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1974); Amis, 802 
S.W.2d at 385 (Ramey, C.J., dissenting).  Under the Rule, “side” is defined as “one or more litigants 
who have common interests on the matters with which the jury is concerned.”  TEX. R. CIV. P. 233. 
1135. TEX. R. CIV. P. 233. 
1136. Amis, 802 S.W.2d at 384. 
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On mandamus review, the appellate court reviews the record as it existed 
at the time the motion was heard to determine whether the court abused its 
discretion.1137  Conversely, appellate review requires the appellate court to 
consider the entire record to determine if the court abused its discretion, 
and if so, whether the abuse constitutes reversible error.1138  To preserve 
error in the allocation of jury strikes, the party must lodge the objection after 
voir dire but before exercising the strikes.1139  The party must clearly state 
whether it is objecting to the allocation of the peremptory strikes or to the 
alignment of the parties.1140 
Whether antagonism exists between parties, per se, is a question of 
law.1141  “[I]n determining whether antagonism exists, the trial court must 
consider the pleadings, information disclosed by pretrial discovery, 
information and representations made during voir dire of the jury panel, and 
any other information brought to the attention of the trial court before the” 
parties exercise their strikes.1142  “The existence of antagonism must be 
finally determined after voir dire and prior to the exercise of the strikes of 
the parties.”1143  The existence of antagonism is not a discretionary matter; 
“it is a question of law [determined from the above factors as to] whether 
any of the litigants . . . on the same side of the docket are antagonistic” 
regarding an issue that the jury will be asked to answer.1144  “The nature 
and degree of the antagonism, and its effect on the number of peremptory 
jury strikes allocated to each litigant or side, [however,] are matters left to 
the discretion of the trial court.”1145 
 
1137. Id. at 384 n.7. 
1138. Id. at 382–83. 
1139. Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 77 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); see also In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1980) 
(illustrating that error is not preserved when a party fails to lodge objections to the allocation of strikes 
at the proper time). 
1140. See Pojar v. Cifre, 199 S.W.3d 317, 327–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) 
(holding that error was preserved only on the issue of alignment of sides and not on the allocation of 
strikes because defendant only argued for realignment of sides at trial). 
1141. Garcia v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 704 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1986); Patterson Dental 
Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979). 
1142. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737; accord Patterson Dental Co., 592 S.W.2d at 919. 
1143. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737. 
1144. Patterson Dental Co., 592 S.W.2d at 919; accord Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d 
648, 652 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
1145. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt, 718 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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Thus, if the trial court based its finding “upon a reasonable assessment of 
the situation,” as it existed at the time when the challenges were made, no 
abuse of discretion occurred.1146  On the other hand, if the trial court has 
disregarded “the posture of the parties[,] or has misconstrued or 
overlooked” a crucial factor, the trial court’s “decision should be reversed 
as an abuse of discretion.”1147 
4. Batson/Edmonson Challenges 
In Batson v. Kentucky,1148 the Supreme Court of the United States held the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution1149 prohibits 
parties from using peremptory strikes to exclude members of a jury panel 
solely on the basis of race.1150  This proscription applies to both criminal 
and civil trials.1151  The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
three-step process in resolving a Batson objection to a peremptory 
challenge.1152  First, “the opponent of the . . . challenge must establish a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination.”1153  Second, the burden shifts to 
the party exercising the strike to present a race-neutral explanation.1154  
“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the” reason offered, the 
explanation “will be deemed race-neutral.”1155  Third, the trial court must 
then determine whether the challenging party “has proven purposeful racial 
discrimination.”1156  “[T]he issue of whether the race-neutral explanation 
should be believed is [] a question of fact for the trial court.”1157  The 
 
1146. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 S.W.2d at 661; see also Pojar v. Cifre, 199 S.W.3d 317, 329–30 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a trial court’s allocation of peremptory 
challenges is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
1147. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 S.W.2d at 661. 
1148. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
1149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
1150. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
1151. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991); see also Goode v. 
Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1997) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has extended 
Batson to civil trials); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) (holding that use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the equal protection rights of the 
excluded juror). 
1152. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445; see Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 514–15 (Tex. 2008) 
(noting that a Batson challenge involves a three-step process). 




1157. Id. at 446.  Unless the explanation offered is too incredible to be believed, the reviewing 
court cannot reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.  Id. 
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standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding a Batson/Edmonson 
challenge is abuse of discretion.1158  To preserve a Batson/Edmonson issue 
for appellate review, the complaining party must object to the allegedly 
offensive peremptory strikes before swearing in the jury.1159  The exclusion 
of even one potential juror on the basis of race invalidates the entire jury 
selection process and requires a new trial.1160 
D. Opening Statements 
Rule 265(a) does not allow counsel to describe to the jury the evidence 
that counsel plans to offer, “nor to read or display the documents and 
photographs he proposes to offer.”1161  Additionally, the trial court has 
broad discretion to limit opening statements, subject only to review for 
abuse of discretion.1162 
E. Trial Amendments of Pleadings 
When a request to amend pleadings is made within seven days of trial or 
thereafter,1163 the request must be granted “unless (1) the opposing party 
presents evidence of surprise or prejudice, or (2) the amendment asserts a 
new cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face.”1164  If 
 
1158. See id. (asserting the Texas Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s Batson ruling for abuse 
of discretion); accord Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. 2008).  However, “[t]he Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals has . . . adopted the clearly erroneous standard of review for Batson issues.”  
Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446 (citing Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 720–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).  
The federal system also “employs a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.”  Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 515. 
1159. Jones v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ 
denied). 
1160. Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 521. 
1161. Guerrero v. Smith, 864 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); 
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 265(a) (allowing counsel to only “state to the jury briefly the nature of his claim 
or defense and what said party expects to prove, and the relief sought”). 
1162. Guerrero, 864 S.W.2d at 800; Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
1163. TEX. R. CIV. P. 63, 66.  The “date of trial” means the day the case is scheduled for trial, 
not the day the case actually begins trial.  Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., 
Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); AmSav Group, Inc. v. Am. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Brazoria Cty., 796 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ 
denied).  The rule also applies to summary judgment proceedings because a summary judgment hearing 
is a trial.  Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988). 
1164. State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994).  “The burden of showing 
surprise or prejudice rests on the party resisting the amendment.”  Id.; accord Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. 
Tex. Sand & Gravel Co., 844 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1992); Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 
787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990).  “Surprise may be shown as a matter of law if the pleading asserts a 
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the amendment is procedural in nature (i.e., merely conforming the 
pleadings to the evidence at trial), the trial court must grant the 
amendment.1165  However, if the amendment is substantive in nature (i.e., 
changing the basis of a party’s causes of action), the trial court has discretion 
to grant or deny the amendment.1166 
The standard of review for granting a trial amendment is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion.1167  To establish an abuse of discretion in 
allowing the amendment, the complaining party must (1) present evidence 
of surprise or prejudice;1168 and (2) request a continuance.1169  Mere 
allegations of surprise or prejudice are not sufficient to establish an abuse of 
discretion.1170 
F. Admission of Evidence 
The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s 
discretion.1171  To obtain reversal of a judgment based on error in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must show that the trial 
court’s ruling was in error and that the error was calculated to cause and 
probably did cause “the rendition of an improper judgment.”1172  
Reversible error does not usually occur in connection with rulings on 
 
new and independent cause of action or defense.”  Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). 
1165. Chapin & Chapin, 844 S.W.2d at 665.  “The rule of trial by consent is limited to those 
exceptional cases where the parties clearly tried an unpleaded issue[;] . . . [therefore, t]he rule should be 
cautiously applied and [is] not [appropriate] in doubtful situations.”  Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 
783, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ). 
1166. Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); 
Libhart, 949 S.W.2d at 797; Taiwan Shrimp Farm, 915 S.W.2d at 70. 
1167. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658; Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939; Williams v. Williams, 
19 S.W.3d 544, 546 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). 
1168. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 940. 
1169. Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, writ denied); James v. Tex. Dep’t 
of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ). 
1170. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 941; see also Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353, 377 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (finding no error where the court allowed an amended 
pleading post-verdict when opposing party presented no evidence of either surprise or prejudice). 
1171. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 
159 S.W.3d 897, 918 (Tex. 2004) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 
66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001); see also LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693, 698 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (discussing the balancing factors related to the admission or 
exclusion of evidence). 
1172. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; accord Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 918 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).  See 
infra Section VIII(H)(3) (discussing reversible error). 
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questions of evidence unless the appellant can demonstrate that the whole 
case turns on the particular evidence that was admitted or excluded.1173  
Furthermore, error from the improper admission of evidence is usually 
deemed harmless if (1) the objecting party “opens the door” by “introducing 
the same evidence or evidence of a similar character,”1174 (2) the objecting 
party “opens the door” by subsequently permitting the same or similar 
evidence to be introduced without objection,1175 or (3) the evidence is 
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence.1176 
1. Expert Testimony 
“Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged [conduct] is of such a 
nature [that it is not] within the experience of [a] layman.”1177  When a party 
objects to an expert’s proposed testimony regarding a matter of science, or 
any other technical or specialized knowledge, whether novel or 
conventional, the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of 
demonstrating its admissibility.1178  Accordingly, the proponent must 
establish that the expert’s testimony is based on a reliable foundation.1179  
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides a two-part test to determine the 
admissibility of an expert’s testimony.1180  First, the expert must be 
 
1173. Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220. 
1174. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., Co., 966 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex. 1998) (quoting 
McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984)). 
1175. Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. 1984). 
1176. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 919; City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 
773, 791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied). 
1177. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Roark v. 
Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982)). 
1178. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 410 (Tex. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).  In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., the 
supreme court held that the Robinson factors apply to all expert testimony offered under Texas Rule of 
Evidence 702.  Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998).  To preserve 
error on a complaint that expert testimony is not reliable and, therefore, “no evidence, a party must 
object to the evidence before trial or when the evidence is offered.”  Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Gonzalez outlined the steps he thought necessary to preserve a Daubert/Robinson 
challenge for appellate review.  Id. at 412–15 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). 
1179. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 
1180. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); see also TEX. R. EVID. 702 
(“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”). 
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qualified.1181  Second, the expert’s opinion must be relevant to the issues 
in the case and based upon a reliable foundation.1182 
Qualified.  Under Rule 104(a),1183 whether an expert is qualified is a 
preliminary question for the trial court to decide, and the party offering the 
expert’s testimony has the burden of establishing the witness is qualified 
under Rule 702.1184  In determining whether an expert is qualified, the trial 
court must make certain that the purported expert truly has the expertise 
concerning the subject matter about which the expert is offering an 
opinion.1185  The supreme court has noted that the trial court is not to 
decide whether an expert’s conclusion is correct, but instead, should only 
determine whether the analysis used to reach the conclusion is reliable.1186 
Relevant.  The relevance requirement, which includes the relevancy 
analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402,1187 “is met if the 
expert testimony is ‘sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid 
the jury in resolving a factual dispute.’”1188  If the evidence has no 
relationship to any issue in the case, the evidence does not satisfy Rule 702 
and is, therefore, inadmissible.1189  “Opinion testimony that is conclusory 
or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the 
existence of a material fact ‘more probable or less probable,’”1190 and such 
testimony is incompetent evidence that cannot support a judgment.1191  
Similarly, an expert who offers only personal credentials and subjective 
opinions has offered essentially uncorroborated evidence, which does not 
 
1181. TEX. R. EVID. 702; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 
2006). 
1182. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800.  “The exacting standards for expert testimony set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court” and by the Texas Supreme Court “are well-known to Texas 
litigators.”  Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 259 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted), abrogated 
on other grounds by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
1183. TEX. R. EVID. 104(a). 
1184. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. 1998). 
1185. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499; Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 719. 
1186. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728. 
1187. TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402. 
1188. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002) (quoting E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995)). 
1189. See TEX. R. EVID. 702 (requiring that the expert’s knowledge “help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). 
1190. Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004) 
(quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401). 
1191. Id. at 232. 
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assist the jury.1192  As the court in Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez1193 
pointed out, “Rule 702, by its terms, only provides for the admission of 
expert testimony that actually assists the finder of fact.”1194  Justice 
Gonzalez poignantly observed in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Robinson1195 that a reviewing court is not obligated to accept as some 
evidence the testimony of an expert who states “that the world is flat, that 
the moon is made of green cheese, or that the Earth is the center of the 
solar system.”1196  Such evidence carries absolutely no weight and is the 
equivalent of no evidence.1197 
Reliable.  “The reliability requirement focuses on the principles, research, 
and methodology underlying an expert’s conclusions.”1198  Expert 
testimony is not reliable if it “is not grounded ‘in the methods and 
procedures of science’” and is the equivalent of “no more than ‘subjective 
belief or unsupported speculation.’”1199  If an expert’s scientific evidence 
is not reliable, then it is “legally” not evidence.1200  To determine reliability, 
the supreme court observed: 
Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods, 
analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion.  The court should 
ensure that the opinion comports with applicable professional standards 
outside the courtroom and that it “will have a reliable basis in the knowledge 
and experience of [the] discipline.”1201 
In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the following six 
nonexclusive factors for admissibility of scientific evidence, of which four 
were first stated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell 
 
 
1192. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. 2006); Coastal Transp. 
Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997). 
1193. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. 2006). 
1194. Id. at 801. 
1195. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995). 
1196. Id. at 558. 
1197. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712. 
1198. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004), abrogated on other grounds 
by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
1199. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
590 (1993)). 
1200. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. 2006). 
1201. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 725–26 (Tex. 1998) (quoting 
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc:1202 
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; 
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation 
of the expert . . . ; 
(3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 
(4) the technique’s potential rate of error; 
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as 
valid by the relevant scientific community; and 
(6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or 
technique.1203 
In Cooper Tire, the Texas Supreme Court emphasized that the six factors 
are not exclusive and “that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.”1204  
The supreme court recognized in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,1205 
“that the Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony”;1206 however, 
in those cases “there still must be some basis for the opinion offered to 
[demonstrate] reliability.”1207  The courts have emphasized that it is 
ultimately up to the trial court, in exercising its duty as evidentiary 
gatekeeper, to assess the reliability of particular expert testimony.1208 
The Texas Supreme Court has developed several principles for 
determining reliability.  The trial court is required to ensure that purported 
experts do in fact have expertise regarding the subject matter of their offered 
opinion when deciding whether an expert is qualified.1209  Under the 
reliability requirement, the expert testimony “is unreliable if it is not 
 
1202. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995).  See 
generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–97 (1993) (addressing factors to be considered). 
1203. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557; accord Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801; Helena Chem. Co. v. 
Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex. 
1999); see also Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 720 (reviewing the factors that a trial judge may consider when 
determining admissibility of scientific evidence). 
1204. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801. 
1205. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998). 
1206. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499; accord Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 
39–40 (Tex. 2007). 
1207. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499. 
1208. Id. at 499; Coastal Tankships, Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 611 (Tex. App.— 
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). 
1209. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800. 
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grounded ‘in the methods and procedures of science’ and amounts to no 
more than a ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’”1210  
Additionally, if the analytical gap between the data the expert relies upon 
and the opinion offered is too great, the expert testimony is unreliable.1211  
The reviewing court is “not required . . . to ignore fatal gaps in an expert’s 
analysis or assertions that are simply incorrect.”1212  Thus, “if an expert 
relies upon unreliable foundational data,” any opinion based on that data is 
unreliable.1213  “When an expert’s opinion is predicated on a particular set 
of facts, those facts need not be undisputed. An expert’s opinion is only 
unreliable if it is contrary to actual, undisputed facts.”1214  Similarly, if the 
underlying data is sound, but the expert’s methodology is flawed, the 
opinion is also unreliable.1215  In applying the reliability standard, the trial 
court does not “determine whether the expert’s conclusions are correct; 
rather,” the trial court’s role is to determine “whether the analysis used to 
reach those conclusions is reliable.”1216  The court stated in General Motors 
Corp. v. Iracheta:1217 
We [previously] noted . . . that, although expert opinion testimony often 
provides valuable evidence in a case, “it is the basis of the witness’s opinion, 
and not the witness’s qualifications or his bare opinions alone, that can settle 
an issue as a matter of law; a claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit 
[an assertion made not proved] of a credentialed witness.”  Opinion testimony 
that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not 
tend to make the existence of a material fact “more probable or less probable.”  
This [c]ourt has labeled such testimony as “incompetent evidence,” and has 
 
1210. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 
1995)); accord Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002); see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 
at 40–41 (determining the expert’s testimony “amounted to . . . more than a recitation of his credentials 
and a subjective opinion” and, thus, was properly admitted). 
1211. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 40; Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800; Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 
133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy 
Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008); Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d at 629. 
1212. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800–01 (quoting Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 
159 S.W.3d 897, 912 (Tex. 2004)). 
1213. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499. 
1214. Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State, 487 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted) (first citing 
Hous. Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch, 443 S.W.3d 820, 833 (Tex. 2014); then 
citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). 
1215. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499. 
1216. Kerr-McGee Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 254; Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 
S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998). 
1217. General Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2005). 
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often held that such conclusory testimony cannot support a judgment.  
Furthermore, this [c]ourt has held that such conclusory statements cannot 
support a judgment even when no objection was made to the [testimony].1218 
While the Robinson factors cannot always be used to determine an expert’s 
reliability, “there must be some basis for the opinion offered to show its 
reliability.”1219  The court emphasized, however, that all expert testimony 
must meet both the relevance and reliability requirements.1220 
“A flaw in the expert’s reasoning from the data may render reliance on a 
study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn therefrom dubious.  
Under that circumstance, the expert’s scientific testimony is unreliable and, 
legally, no evidence.”1221  When reviewing the sufficiency of the scientific 
evidence supporting a jury finding, unreliable scientific evidence is the legal 
equivalent of no evidence at all.1222  Thus, “[i]f the foundational data 
underlying [the scientific] opinion testimony are unreliable,” or the expert 
used a flawed methodology or flawed reasoning, the scientific evidence—
even if admitted without objection—is legally “no evidence.”1223 
In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court determined “that the trial court is 
the evidentiary gatekeeper” to determine whether the expert and his 
proffered testimony meet these two tests.1224  Even though the trial court 
functions as an “evidentiary gatekeeper” by screening for irrelevant and 
unreliable expert evidence, it ultimately has broad discretion in determining 
the admissibility of the evidence.1225  The trial court’s determination that 
 
1218. Id. at 470–71 (citations omitted) (quoting Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum 
Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004)); see also Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801 (explaining “the trial 
court is not required ‘to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert’” (quoting Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727)). 
1219. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801 (quoting Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726). 
1220. Id. 
1221. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997)). 
1222. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712. 
1223. Id.; see also Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d at 471 (concluding that the expert testimony was unreliable 
and did not “rise to the level of competent evidence”). 
1224. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); accord 
Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 
997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex. 1999); Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998). 
1225. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002); Helena Chem. Co., 
47 S.W.3d at 499; Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998); see also 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558–59 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
the expert’s scientific testimony because that evidence “was not based upon a reliable foundation,” the 
expert used methodology that “follow[ed] no scientific principles,” the expert’s opinion had not been 
subjected to peer review, and the expert conducted his research “for the purpose of litigation”). 
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these requirements have been met is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.1226  Both the admissibility and sufficiency of unreliable scientific 
evidence may be challenged for the first time on appeal.1227  
The trial court’s determination of whether an expert witness is necessary 
to establish a negligence claim is reviewed de novo.1228  
2. Demonstrative Evidence 
Visual, real, or demonstrative evidence is admissible where it tends to 
resolve some issue at trial and is relevant, so long as its probative value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.1229  In line with these principles, a trial court 
should admit evidence of an out-of-court experiment only when there is a 
substantial similarity between the conditions existing at the time of the 
occurrence giving rise to the litigation and the conditions created by the 
experiment.1230  However, the conditions do not have to be identical; the 
experiment may be admitted if the trial court, in exercising its discretion, 
finds the difference in condition to be minor.1231  A trial court may permit 
a demonstration of the plaintiff’s injury as long as it focuses on “the extent 
and nature of the injury” and is not designed to inflame the minds of the 
jury.1232  The admission of such demonstrative evidence is within the trial 
court’s discretion and is subject to an abuse of discretion review.1233  
“[E]xcept in rare circumstances . . . when the admissibility of a video is at 
issue, the proper exercise of discretion requires the trial court to actually 
view video evidence before ruling on its admissibility.”1234   
 
1226. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800; Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304–05 (Tex. 2006); 
Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. 2002); Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 718–
19; Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1996). 
1227. Compare Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409 (reviewing the trial court’s order excluding scientific 
evidence), with Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711 (considering a “no evidence” point of error). 
1228. See, e.g., FFE Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. 2004). 
1229. TEX. R. EVID. 403; In re C.J.F., 134 S.W.3d 343, 356 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. 
denied); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 389 (Tex. 1998) (plurality opinion) (observing 
that admission of videotapes of sled tests was harmful error because the conditions present at the time 
of the accident were not shown to be similar to those during the test). 
1230. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. 1997); accord Horn v. Hefner, 
115 S.W.3d 255, 256 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). 
1231. Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. 1964). 
1232. Parkway Hosp., Inc. v. Lee, 946 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, 
writ denied). 
1233. Id. 
1234. Diamond Offshore Servs. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Tex. 2018) (reversing and 
remanding for new trial where trial court excluded defendant’s video of personal injury plaintiff 
engaged in various activities). 
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G. Motion for Mistrial 
An order granting a motion for mistrial is an interlocutory order and is 
typically not appealable.1235  The remedy for review of an order granting a 
mistrial is by mandamus.1236  An order denying a motion for mistrial is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1237 
H. Bifurcation 
Under Rule 174(b), a trial court may order a separate trial on any issue in 
the interest “of convenience or to avoid prejudice” to a party.1238  A trial 
court’s order of bifurcation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1239 
If a defendant timely files a motion for bifurcated trial as to punitive 
damages, a trial court must separate the determination of the amount of 
punitive damages from the remaining issues.1240  “Under this approach, the 
jury first hears evidence relevant to liability for actual damages, the amount 
of actual damages, and liability for punitive damages (e.g., gross negligence), 
and then returns findings on [those] issues.”1241  If the jury finds in favor 
of the plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages liability, the same jury is 
presented with evidence relevant to punitive damages, such as evidence of 
 
1235. See Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984) (noting an 
interlocutory order granting a motion for new trial is not reviewable on appeal); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. 
v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (reiterating that a grant of a motion 
for new trial is not appealable directly or after final judgment from further proceedings in the trial).  
But see Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that there 
are “two instances when a Texas appellate court has overturned the trial court’s grant of a new trial: 
when the trial court’s order was wholly void, and where the trial court specified in the written order 
that the sole ground for granting the motion was that the jury’s answers to special issues were 
irreconcilably conflicting”). 
1236. Galvan v. Downey, 933 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ 
denied). 
1237. Schlafly v. Schlafly, 33 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 
denied); Sowards v. Yanes, 955 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 
996 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1999). 
1238. TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b); Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tex. 
2004). 
1239. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 556. 
1240. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009; Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 
430 (Tex. 2000); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994); see also Hyman Farm Servs., 
Inc. v. Earth Oil & Gas Co., 920 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, no writ) (noting that 
bifurcation is used to prevent the jury from considering a defendant’s net worth when determining 
liability). 
1241. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 30. 
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the defendant’s net worth.1242  The jury then determines the amount of 
damages to award after considering all of the evidence presented at both 
phases of the trial.1243  Significantly, a “verdict may be rendered awarding 
exemplary damages only if the jury was unanimous in finding liability for 
and the amount of exemplary damages.”1244 
I. Motion for Directed or Instructed Verdict 
1. Jury Trial 
A directed verdict is a procedural device that authorizes a court to 
“direct” or “instruct” the jury to render a verdict because there is nothing 
to decide.1245  A defendant may make a motion for directed verdict after a 
plaintiff rests.1246  After the defendant rests or both sides close, either party 
may make a motion for directed verdict.1247  A court may also grant a 
motion for directed verdict on its own initiative.1248  The directed verdict 
is like a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, except that it is brought 
during trial.1249  A court may direct a verdict “if no evidence of probative 
 
1242. See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (noting that 
“forty-three states now allow evidence of net worth to be discovered and admitted for the limited 
purpose of assessing punitive damages”), rev’d on other grounds, 827 S.W.2d 833, 841−42 (Tex. 1992).  In 
holding a defendant’s net worth was relevant to the issue of punitive damages and, thus, discoverable, 
the Lunsford court noted “two of the purposes of punitive damages: punishing the wrongdoer and 
deterring the same or similar future conduct.”  Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 
152 S.W.3d 172, 184 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). 
1243. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 30. 
1244. TEX. R. CIV. P. 292(b); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(d) 
(requiring exemplary damages to be based on a unanimous jury finding for both liability and the amount 
of damages). 
1245. TEX. R. CIV. P. 268. 
1246. See Wedgeworth v. Kirskey, 985 S.W.2d 115, 116−17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. 
denied) (asserting the proper time to grant a motion for directed verdict is after the plaintiff has had 
an opportunity to present his case). 
1247. See Cecil Pond Constr. Co. v. Ed Bell Invs., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Tyler 
1993, no writ) (holding a motion for directed verdict was premature because both parties had not yet 
rested).  Note that if a court overrules a directed verdict during trial (jury or non-jury), the movant can 
either test the ruling on appeal or introduce more evidence.  However, if more evidence is introduced, 
the motion must be re-urged at the close of all evidence to avoid waiver.  1986 Dodge 150 Pickup VIN 
# 1B7FD14T1GS006316 v. State, 129 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.); Wenk 
v. City Nat’l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1981, no writ). 
1248. See Encina P’ship v. Corenergy, L.L.C., 50 S.W.3d 66, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
2001, pet. denied) (asserting that when a jury does not come back with a verdict, but there is not yet 
an order for mistrial, the court may reconsider and grant a previous motion for instructed verdict). 
1249. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003). 
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force raises a fact issue” on a material element of the plaintiff’s claim.1250  
A court may also direct a verdict “if the evidence conclusively establishes a 
defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action.”1251 
Whether as a “no evidence” point or “matter of law” point, the court of 
appeals reviews a trial court’s directed verdict under a legal sufficiency 
standard.1252  If the directed verdict is denied, the court of appeals is 
“limited to the specific grounds stated in the motion.”1253  But, in reviewing 
a trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, the reviewing court may consider 
any reason the directed verdict should have been granted, even if not stated 
in the court’s order or the party’s motion.1254 
2. Non-Jury Trial 
A motion for directed verdict may also be made in a non-jury trial,  
though there is technically no jury to “direct.”1255  In a non-jury trial, a 
directed verdict is sought by a motion for judgment.1256  As in a jury trial, 




1250. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs. Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000). 
1251. Id. 
1252. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (applying the same legal 
sufficiency standard to directed verdicts as well as summary judgments, judgments notwithstanding the 
verdict, and appellate no-evidence review).  See generally supra Part III (discussing the legal sufficiency 
standard of review). 
1253. Cooper v. Lyon Fin. Servs. Inc., 65 S.W.3d 197, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2001, no pet.).  But see Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 425–26 (Tex. 
2015) (“Despite FPL Farming’s reliance on the wrong burden in its motion for directed verdict, we 
will consider its contentions because ‘[i]t is our practice to liberally construe the points of error in order 
to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.’ Thus, liberally construing 
FPL Farming’s contentions, FPL Farming would have been entitled to a directed verdict if it 
conclusively established, as a matter of law, that it did not authorize or consent to EPS’s alleged entry.” 
(citations omitted) (first quoting Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982); then citing O’Neil 
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976); and then citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 
46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam))). 
1254. See Reyna v. First Nat’l Bank, 55 S.W.3d 58, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) 
(explaining that a reviewing court may affirm the lower court’s directed verdict, even if it was on 
erroneous grounds, as long as there is other support for the motion). 
1255. See Carrasco v. Tex. Transp. Inst., 908 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) 
(identifying the different standards of review for a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial and a bench 
trial). 
1256. McKinley Iron Works, Inc. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 917 S.W.2d 468, 469−70 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ). 
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sufficiency standard.1257   
J. Charge of the Court 
Due to its ever-developing nature, confusion remains regarding the 
standard of review applicable to complaints about the court’s charge to the 
jury.1258  The confusion is due to the existence of different standards for 
different aspects of charge practice, which courts sometimes simplistically 
fail to limit to their proper procedural context.1259 
 
1257. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 823 (concluding that the standard of review should be 
uniform for directed verdicts “without or against a jury verdict” as well as other motions).  See generally 
supra Part III (discussing the legal sufficiency standard of review). 
1258. See First Valley Bank v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that “in some 
cases a request can serve as an objection sufficient to preserve error in a jury charge”); see also State 
Dep’t of Pub. Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Tex. 1992) (“The rules governing charge 
procedures are difficult enough; the caselaw applying them has made compliance a labyrinth daunting 
to the most experienced trial lawyer.”).  In Payne, the court severely criticized the traps involved in 
preserving error at the charge stage of the trial.  Id.  The court stated: 
The procedure for preparing and objecting to the jury charge has lost its philosophical moorings.  
There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and 
that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and 
obtained a ruling.  The more specific requirements of the rules should be applied, while they 
remain, to serve rather than defeat this principle. 
Id.; see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014) (“Our procedural rules are technical, 
but not trivial.  We construe such rules liberally so that the right to appeal is not lost unnecessarily.  But 
when an objection fails to explain the nature of the error, we cannot make assumptions.  Preservation 
of error reflects important prudential considerations recognizing that the judicial process benefits 
greatly when trial courts have the opportunity to first consider and rule on error.  Affording courts this 
opportunity conserves judicial resources and promotes fairness by ensuring that a party does not 
neglect a complaint at trial and raise it for the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted) (first citing 
Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. 2008); then citing 
In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003))); id. (noting that party’s status as pro se did not warrant 
leniency on preserving error). 
1259. See Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that the appellate 
court “review[s] a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a particular instruction under an abuse of 
discretion standard”); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990) (noting 
that “[t]he standard for review of the charge is abuse of discretion, [which] occurs only when the trial 
court acts without reference to any guiding principle”).  However, “when a trial court submits a single 
broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability,” one of which is an invalid 
theory, and the reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on the invalid 
theory, the error is harmful and a new trial must be granted.  Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 
378, 388 (Tex. 2000); see also Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tex. 
2009) (reiterating the holding in Casteel that an appellate court must presume harmful error when it 
cannot determine whether the jury verdict was based on an invalid theory); Romero v. KPH Consol., 
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 226, 230 (Tex. 2005) (affirming Casteel and Harris County v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 
(Tex. 2002), and explaining that the “reversible error rule of Casteel and Harris County neither encourages 
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1. Time for Objecting and Requesting Instructions 
In King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez,1260 the court reviewed a trial 
court’s decision to deny a requested instruction because the request was not 
tendered by the trial court’s deadline.1261  The trial court refused the 
requested instruction on the morning the charge was to be read to the jury, 
based on its setting of a deadline for making all objections and tendering all 
requests by the close of the formal charge conference the prior 
afternoon.1262  The court held Rule 272 affords trial courts the discretion 
to set a deadline for charge objections that precedes the reading of the 
charge to the jury as long as a reasonable amount of time is afforded for 
counsel to examine and object to the charge.1263  The court further stated: 
Accordingly, while the rule strictly prohibits objections after the charge is read, 
it affords trial courts latitude in addressing objections made before.  And it is 
not surprising that many trial courts would prefer to avoid the confusion and 
scheduling difficulties that would arise if objections were allowed up to the 
moment the court plans to charge the jury.1264   
 
nor requires parties to submit separate questions for every possible issue or combination of issues; the 
rule does both encourage and require parties not to submit issues that have no basis in law and fact in 
such a way that the error cannot be corrected without retrial”); cf. City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 
29 S.W.3d 62, 69 n.1 (Tex. 2000) (noting that the court has not decided whether the rationale in Casteel 
should be extended to cases in which there allegedly was no evidence to support one or more theories 
included within a broad-form submission); see also Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
572 S.W.2d 273, 277–78 (Tex. 1978) (addressing a broad-form negligence question with several 
potential factual bases for finding negligence, some pled and some not).  In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Co., the court affirmed the court of appeal’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment, 
presuming harm from the incorrect submission, and addressed actions that a trial court might take to 
eliminate such error.  Id.  The court suggested that the charge should list “the relevant acts or 
omissions” raised by the evidence and warned to do otherwise would allow the jury to return a verdict 
supported by no evidence.  Id.  The question is whether the failure to take this step or the failure to 
eliminate theories not supported by the evidence creates a Casteel/Harris County problem.  The Fort 
Worth Court of Appeals rejected a Casteel/Harris County complaint in Columbia Medical Center of 
Las Colinas v. Bush ex. rel. Bush, holding that there was nothing affirmatively misleading in the charge, 
which “did not instruct the jury to consider or not to consider any specific act or negligence.”  
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas v. Bush ex. rel. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2003, pet. denied).  The supreme court denied review in Bush.  The issue remains unresolved.  While 
Scott is still good law, if appellate courts required trial courts to load the charge with granulated factual 
allegations in limiting instructions, broad form might never be “feasible.” 
1260. King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez, 443 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. 2014). 
1261. Id. at 842–47. 
1262. Id. at 847. 
1263. Id. 
1264. Id. at 843–44. 
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It is worth noting that the court cautioned against trial courts rejecting, out 
of hand, objections or requested instructions and questions solely because 
they were made after a court-imposed deadline.   
An objection that may seem obvious to an appellate court perusing a cold 
record may occur to battle-weary trial counsel only when the fog of war has 
lifted after a long day in the courtroom, or simply after a decent night’s sleep.  
Trial courts should therefore make every effort to entertain on the merits a 
charge objection brought in good faith after conclusion of the formal charge 
conference but before the charge is read to the jury.1265 
2. Questions 
Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, a trial court must submit broad-
form questions to the jury.1266  The broad-form submission requirement 
was “intended to simplify jury charges for the benefit of the jury, the parties, 
and the trial court.”1267  The supreme court has stated that “[w]hen 
properly utilized, broad-form submission can simplify charge conferences 
and provide more comprehensible questions for the jury.”1268  Rule 278 
provides that “[t]he court shall submit the questions . . . in the form 
provided by Rule 277, which are raised by the written pleadings and the 
evidence.”1269  The supreme court has interpreted Rule 278 as providing 
“a substantive, nondiscretionary directive to trial courts requiring them to 
submit requested questions to the jury if the pleadings and any evidence 
support them.”1270  Thus, as “long as matters are timely raised and properly 
 
1265. Id. at 847. 
1266. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); see also TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 277 (“In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form 
[submissions].”); Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. 1992) (reiterating that Rule 277 
requires broad-form submission “whenever feasible”); Crawford v. Deets, 828 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Tex. 
App.⎯Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (“Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, a court must submit 
such broad-form questions.”). 
1267. Romero v. KPH Consol., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 230 (Tex. 2005). 
1268. Harris Cty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2002); see also Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 230 
(following the holding in Smith and recognizing that broad-form submission can simplify charges and 
allow questions to be more comprehensible).  However, broad-form submission is not always 
practicable and “cannot be used to broaden the harmless error rule to deny a party the correct charge 
to which it would otherwise be entitled.”  Id. 
1269. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; see also Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (explaining that questions should 
be submitted to the jury in broad form as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277 “whenever 
feasible”; however, “broad-form submission cannot be used to put before the jury issues that have no 
basis in the law or the evidence”). 
1270. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992). 
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requested as part of a trial court’s charge,” a judgment must be reversed 
“when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or 
a vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence.”1271 
The submission of controlling issues in the case—in terms of theories of 
recovery or defenses—appears to be a question of law and is reviewable de 
novo.1272  Likewise, other objections, such as those which claim that the 
issue in question was “not supported by the pleadings”1273 or that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to support submission,1274 should be 
reviewed de novo because each complaint raises a question of law.1275 
Whether a trial court should have submitted a theory by questions or 
instructions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion test, recognizing, 
however, that there is a presumption in favor of broad-form submission of 
questions.1276  “To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is 
reversible, the reviewing court must consider the pleadings of the parties, 
the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety.”1277  In 
addition, the reversible error analysis applies to complaints about errors in 
the charge.1278  However, when the complaint alleges that an element of a 
theory has been omitted in the questions or instructions—either because 
 
1271. Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992). 
1272. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Street, 379 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. 1964) (declining to review a 
controlling issue because the parties had not objected to submission of the issue to the jury and, 
therefore, waived any objection to its form). 
1273. McLennan Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Sims, 376 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Waco 1964, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
1274. Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 243; Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1985); Garza 
v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. 1965).  However, “stock no-evidence” objections and general 
objections that do not address the issue of broad-form submission are not sufficient to preserve error.  
Tefsa v. Stewart, 135 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). 
1275. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 525 (Tex. 2002) (plurality opinion) 
(holding whether a submitted definition misstates the law is a legal question and affirming that the 
court of appeals properly applied the de novo standard of review). 
1276. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); Niemeyer v. Tana 
Oil & Gas Corp., 39 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); McReynolds v. First Office 
Mgmt., 948 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (explaining 
that the court shall submit those instructions and definitions necessary for the jury’s deliberations in 
broad-form questions, whenever feasible). 
1277. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 
1986); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1994) (noting that the 
holding in Island Recreational would not be extended to the instant case where “the trial court 
affirmatively charged the jury on the wrong standard of causation,” nor would the court consider 
overruling it). 
1278. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 786–87 (Tex. 2001) (citing TEX. R. 
APP. P. 61.1); Island Recreational, 710 S.W.2d at 555. 
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the court believed that it was established as a matter of law or because an 
element of the theory of recovery was omitted—the appropriate standard 
of review should be de novo.1279 
3. Instructions and Definitions 
A litigant has the right to have the jury properly instructed on the issues 
“authorized and supported by the law governing the case.”1280  The trial 
court should generally “explain to the jury any legal or technical terms” 
contained in instructions and definitions.1281  The decision of whether to 
submit a particular instruction or definition is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion,1282 with the essential inquiry being whether the instruction or 
definition aids the jury in answering the questions.1283  Accordingly, a court 
is given wide latitude to determine the sufficiency of explanatory 
instructions and definitions.1284  “[A] court has considerably more 
discretion in submitting instructions and definitions than it has in submitting 
[jury questions].”1285 
 
1279. See State Dep’t of Pub. Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 240–41 (Tex. 1992) 
(emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to submit an element of his theory of recovery over the defendant’s 
objection); see also Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 846 n.4 (Tex. 2005) (applying Payne 
and concluding that error was preserved because counsel “made a clear, timely objection and obtained 
a ruling”); McKinley v. Stripling, 763 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. 1989) (ruling that the plaintiff’s refusal to 
submit the proximate cause issue in an informed consent action, after the defendant properly objected 
to the omission, waived the issue and the plaintiff could not recover). 
1280. Harris Cty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. 
Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2000)). 
1281. K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (requiring courts to “submit such instructions 
and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002) (affirming that courts “must submit ‘such instructions and 
definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict’” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 277)); 
Niemeyer, 39 S.W.3d at 387 (stating a trial judge “has wide discretion in submitting jury questions, as 
well as instructions, and definitions”); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Garcia, 758 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (reiterating that Rule 277 requires courts to submit any 
instructions and definitions that the jury may need to render a proper verdict). 
1282. Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006); State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 
951 S.W.2d 444, 451–52 (Tex. 1997); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. 1986). 
1283. Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 842–43 (Tex. 2005); McReynolds v. First 
Office Mgmt., 948 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ). 
1284. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1995); Mobil Chem. Co. v. 
Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); Perez v. Weingarten Realty Inv’rs, 881 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied); M.N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 
631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). 
1285. Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ 
denied); cf. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1999) (“[S]ubmission of a 
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When instructions or definitions are actually given, the question on 
review is whether the instruction or definition is “proper.”1286  An 
instruction is proper if it assists the jury, is supported by the pleadings or 
evidence, and accurately states the law.1287  Examples of “improper” 
instructions include those that misstate the law or mislead the jury,1288 
those that “comment on the weight of the evidence,”1289 or those that 
“‘nudge’ or ‘tilt’ the jury.”1290  The test of sufficiency for a definition is its 
“reasonable clarity in performing [its] function.”1291  Both instructions and 
definitions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.1292  
However, whether the terms are properly defined or the instruction properly 
 
single question relating to multiple theories may be necessary to avoid the risk that the jury will become 
confused and answer questions inconsistently.”).  The aim of the jury charge is to present “the issues 
for decision logically, simply, clearly, fairly, correctly, and completely.”  Id.  “Toward that end, the trial 
judge [has] broad discretion so long as the [jury] charge is legally correct.”  Id.  Generally, plaintiffs are 
entitled to obtain findings in support of alternative recovery theories, even if those theories speak to a 
single injury.  Id. at 668.  In those cases, the trial judge should structure the charge so as to “allow the 
plaintiff to elect a basis of recovery, and [allow] the defendant to assert defenses that may not be 
available” under all theories.  Id.  The Rodriguez court further stated, “Our holding today does not 
hamper the trial court from submitting a charge on multiple theories.”  Id.  Interestingly, the court in 
Rodriguez did not cite or discuss Rule 278, which provides that judgment will not be reversed because 
of the failure to submit alternate wordings of the same question.  TEX. R. CIV. P. 278. 
1286. TEX. R. CIV. P. 277; Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 791; M.N. Dannenbaum, 840 S.W.2d 
at 631; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
1287. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002); Tex. Workers’ Comp. 
Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Tex. 2000); El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp., 
77 S.W.3d 374, 388 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.). 
1288. Jackson v. Fontaine’s Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1973); Steak & Ale of Tex., 
Inc. v. Borneman, 62 S.W.3d 898, 904–05 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); McReynolds, 
948 S.W.2d at 344; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 721–22 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1997, no writ). 
1289. Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ 
denied).  A “comment on the weight of the evidence” may be demonstrated when the instruction 
“assumes the truth of a material controverted fact, or exaggerates, minimizes, or withdraws some 
pertinent evidence from the jury’s consideration.”  Id. at 241–42; accord H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. 
Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1998). 
1290. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. 2003). 
1291. Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ 
denied). 
1292. Torres, 928 S.W.2d at 242; see also Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 
(Tex. 1995) (recognizing that an incidental comment on the evidence is permissible “when it is properly 
a part of an instruction or definition”); Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (defining an improper explanatory 
instruction as one that misstates the law as applied to the facts). 
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worded should be a question of law reviewable de novo.1293  A de novo 
standard of review should also be used when the complaint is that an 
explanatory instruction or definition misstates the law1294 or directly 
comments on the weight of the evidence.1295 If the definition or instruction 
was improper, the reviewing court must then determine whether the error 
was harmless.1296 
When a party complains about the court’s refusal “to submit a requested 
instruction or definition,” the question on review is “whether the request 
was reasonably necessary to enable the jury to render a proper verdict.”1297  
When “the refusal is based on a determination that the request is 
unnecessary, the abuse of discretion standard” of review should apply.1298  
In contrast, when the refusal is based upon a determination that the 
instruction or definition was not raised by the pleadings,1299 was not 
supported by at least “some evidence,”1300 was not tendered in substantially 
correct form, or was not an element of a ground of recovery or defense in 
 
1293. See M.N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (asserting that an instruction is improper if it misstates the law); Villareal 
v. Reza, 236 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ) (finding an instruction that fails 
to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof issue is erroneous). 
1294. See Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (holding that a definition given by the trial court was legally 
correct, aided the understanding of the jury, and was not demonstrably a source of harmful error); 
Wakefield v. Bevly, 704 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (refusing to rule 
before the trial occurs on what instructions a trial court may properly submit to the jury in a case on 
remand); Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (declining 
to find error in the trial court’s submission of broadly worded issues to the jury). 
1295. City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. 1972); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of 
Fla. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 434–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ). 
1296. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001); see also Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (holding 
the court’s discretion is not abused unless an instruction caused an improper judgment to be rendered); 
M.N. Dannenbaum, 840 S.W.2d at 631 (restating that an error must have caused the rendering of an 
improper verdict to constitute reversible error). 
1297. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, 
writ dism’d by agr.); accord Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 790; Johnson v. Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d 
441, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Steinberger v. Archer Cty., 
621 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (describing 
what type of instructions and definitions are required). 
1298. Moran, 946 S.W.2d at 405. 
1299. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999) (holding 
the trial court did not err in excluding a negligence instruction from the jury charge because it was not 
alleged in the pleadings), rev’d on other grounds, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002). 
1300. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243–44 (Tex. 1992); accord Ornelas v. Moore Serv. Bus 
Lines, 410 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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broad-form submission,1301 the complaint presents a legal question 
reviewable de novo.1302  Except (perhaps) for a refusal to submit 
instructions concerning otherwise nonsubmitted elements of a party’s cause 
of action or defense, which implicates the constitutional right of trial by jury, 
the harmless error rule applies when determining whether the improper 
refusal to submit a requested instruction or definition requires reversal.1303 
In determining whether an alleged error in the submission of instructions 
or definitions is reversible, “the reviewing court must consider the pleadings 
of the parties, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its 
entirety.”1304  The error will constitute reversible error only if, when viewed 
in light of the totality of these circumstances, the error amounted to such a 
denial of the complaining party’s rights “as was reasonably calculated and 
probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.”1305 
 
1301. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 168–69 (Tex. 2002); Placencio v. Allied 
Indus. Int’l, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1987); M.L. Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d); see also Ornelas, 410 S.W.2d at 923 (holding that 
appellant’s requested jury instructions were too vague or erroneously worded to constitute proper 
instructions). 
1302. See Wolff, 999 S.W.2d at 586 (stating that the appropriate test for reviewing a trial court’s 
legal conclusions, such as “the substance of a submitted definition[, is] de novo”). 
1303. Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 61.1(a), 
44.1(a)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2003); Vingcard A.S. v. Merrimac 
Hosp. Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); St. James Transp. 
Co. v. Porter, 840 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); cf. Williams, 
85 S.W.3d at 170 (referring to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 61.1(a) and an earlier erroneous 
admonition by the trial court to the jury). 
1304. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 
1986); accord Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, 
writ dism’d by agr.). 
1305. Island Recreational Dev. Corp., 710 S.W.2d at 555; accord TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; Bed, Bath & 
Beyond v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. 2006); Moran, 946 S.W.2d at 406; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. 
Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Tex. 1998) (plurality opinion) (stating that an “erroneous instruction . . . 
infect[s] the entire charge”).  In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., the supreme court held 
that the submission of the charge was reversible error “[b]ecause the charge failed to instruct the jury 
on the proper measure of . . . damages.”  Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 
812, 817 (Tex. 1997).  The court, however, did not engage in a reversible error analysis.  Id.  Conversely, 
in State v. Williams, the supreme court did employ a reversible error analysis to an improper instruction 
and concluded that the error was not harmful.  State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. 1996); 
see also Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 723 (finding that although the trial court had abused its discretion in 
allowing an instruction, it did not cause an improper verdict). 
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K. Closing Statements 
As with opening statements, the trial court has discretion to limit and 
control closing remarks to the jury.1306  To obtain reversal of a judgment 
on the basis of improper jury argument, an appellant must prove the 
existence of: 
(1) an error (2) that was not invited or provoked, (3) that was preserved by the 
proper trial predicate, such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion 
for mistrial, and (4) [that] was not curable by an instruction, a prompt 
withdrawal of the statement, or a reprimand by the [trial court].1307 
Additionally, if the argument is incurable,1308 the appellant must also 
“prove . . . that the argument by its nature, degree, and extent constitute[s] 
reversibl[e] . . . error.”1309 
Improper jury arguments rarely result in reversible error.1310  Some 
notable examples of improper jury arguments include appealing to racial or 
ethnic prejudice,1311 accusing a defendant corporation of being a killer of 
 
1306. See Dang v. State, 202 S.W.3d 278, 281 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no 
pet.) (noting that Texas courts have yet to answer which harm analysis should be applied when 
reviewing whether a trial court abused its discretion regarding the time length of a closing argument). 
1307. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 
269 (discussing rules for jury arguments). 
1308. See Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. 1954) (“The true test 
[for incurability] is the degree of prejudice [that flows] from the argument—whether the argument, 
considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to cause such prejudice to the opposing 
litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or an instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the 
probability that it resulted in an improper verdict.”); see also Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d 900, 906–
07 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, writ withdrawn) (applying Haywood to determine that the word 
“corrupt” did not affect the outcome of the case). 
1309. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839; accord Shampine, 948 S.W.2d at 906; Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Carter, 
848 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).  Only in the rare instance of 
incurable jury argument is error preserved without an objection.  See Rodriguez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 
944 S.W.2d 757, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997) (stressing the requirement that error must be 
preserved on most claims of improper argument), rev’d on other grounds, 995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999). 
1310. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839 (illustrating that improper jury arguments rarely result in 
reversible error); Shampine, 948 S.W.2d at 907 (applying Reese to decide that use of the word “corrupt” 
was not incurably improper); Isern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, writ 
denied) (stressing that jury arguments causing incurable harm are rare and therefore reversible error is 
rare); Boone v. Panola Cty., 880 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ) (indicating that 
improper jury arguments rarely result in reversible error because most errors can be cured by instructing 
the jury to disregard it). 
1311. See Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Peñalver, 256 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2008) (comparing 
trial counsel to Nazis was incurable jury argument); Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 
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families,1312 referring to a party as “cattle,”1313 and a “party’s personal 
expression of gratitude to the jury.”1314  In these instances, the appellant 
must prove that the argument, by its “nature, degree[,] and extent 
constituted reversibly harmful error”1315 (proper inquiries include: the 
length of the argument, whether the argument was repeated or abandoned, 
and whether cumulative error existed),1316 and that “the probability that 
the [improper] argument caused harm exceeds the probability that the 
verdict was based upon proper proceedings and evidence.”1317  Finally, the 
reviewing court must evaluate the improper jury argument in light of the 
entire case, “[f]rom voir dire . . . [to] closing argument[s].”1318 
L. Jury Deliberations 
The scheduling of jury deliberations, sequestration of jurors, breaks, and 
the like are all reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1319  Responses to jury 
notes are reviewed in the same manner as regular charge practices.1320  
While repeating testimony to the jury and the extent of the repetition is 
discretionary, testimony must be reread if the requirements of Texas Rule 
of Civil Procedure 287 are met.1321  In the absence of disagreement 
 
859, 866–67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (holding “incurable reversible error” 
occurred when counsel appealed to ethnic unity in his closing argument to the jury). 
1312. Carter, 848 S.W.2d at 854 (finding reversible error present in attorney’s statement which 
suggested that Ford Motor Company knowingly manufactured cars that killed people and valued 
greater profits over human life). 
1313. See Sw. Greyhound Lines v. Dickson, 236 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. 1951) (holding the trial 
court’s “curative” instruction for the jury to disregard plaintiff’s counsel’s inflammatory and abusive 
statement that the defendant was lacking in “common decency” and acted as “cattle” was still 
prejudicial to the defendant’s rights and thus, constituted reversible error). 
1314. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. 2005) (“A party’s personal 
expression of gratitude [in Spanish] to the [all-Hispanic] jury at the close of a case is [manifest] error 
that cannot be repaired and therefore need not be objected to.”). 
1315. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839. 
1316. Id. at 840. 
1317. Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d 900, 907 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. withdrawn); 
accord Isern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, writ denied); Boone v. 
Panola Cnty., 880 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ). 
1318. Luna v. N. Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. 1984); Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 
840; Jones v. Republic Waste Servs. of Tex., Ltd., 236 S.W.3d 390, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Boone, 880 S.W.2d at 198; La. & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Capps, 766 S.W.2d 291, 294 
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied). 
1319. TEX. R. CIV. P. 282. 
1320. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 286 (expressing the similarity of jury notes to regular charge practices). 
1321. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 287 (requiring disagreement among jurors as to witness statements 
before testimony can be read back to them). 
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between jurors, however, the court is not obligated to have testimony read 
back.1322  Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding what 
portion of testimony is relevant to the point in dispute.1323 
A trial court has discretion to issue a supplemental charge to the jury 
(“verdict urging” or “dynamite” charge) or return a jury for further 
deliberations in an attempt to encourage them to reach a verdict.1324  
Typically, to test a supplemental charge for coerciveness, the supplemental 
charge must be “broken down into its several particulars and analyzed for 
[its] possible coercive [effect].”1325  A potentially coercive charge will not 
constitute reversible error unless the charge as a whole retains its coercive 
nature when all the “circumstances surrounding its rendition and effect are 
[analyzed].”1326  Additionally, the length of time a court allows for jury 
deliberations is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial court.1327  
Although the trial court has considerable latitude, if the complaining party 
can show substantial evidence on appeal “that it was altogether improbable 
that the jury would reach a verdict,” then the error is reversible.1328 
M. Conflicting Jury Findings 
In reviewing the legal question of whether jury findings irreconcilably 
conflict, the appellate court applies a de novo standard of review.1329  
Because this is purely a legal question, the trial court’s granting of a new trial 
on the express basis of irreconcilably conflicting jury findings can be 
 
 
1322. See Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 225–26 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. 
denied) (stressing that the jury is only entitled to hear the testimony in dispute). 
1323. Id. at 225; Wirtz v. Orr, 575 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dism’d); 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 423 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ 
dism’d w.o.j.). 
1324. See Lochinvar Corp. v. Meyers, 930 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no writ) 
(stating that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 286, the trial court may also issue a supplemental 
charge to correct an error in the original charge); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 286 (permitting courts to issue 
written instructions to juries during deliberations).  Violations of Rule 286 are reversed only if the error 
is prejudicial.  Lochinvar Corp., 930 S.W.2d at 187. 
1325. Stevens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. 1978); accord Minn. Mining & 
Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603, 632 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 953 
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1997). 
1326. Stevens, 563 S.W.2d at 229, 232. 
1327. Nishika, 885 S.W.2d at 632; Shaw v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 791 S.W.2d 204, 205–
06 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). 
1328. Shaw, 791 S.W.2d at 206. 
1329. See FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 89–90 (Tex. 2004) (stating that 
issues of law are decided de novo). 
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challenged by mandamus.1330 
“In reviewing the jury findings for conflict, the threshold [inquiry] is 
whether the findings [implicate] the same material fact.”1331  If the conflict 
can be reasonably reconciled, the reviewing “court may not strike 
[conflicting] jury answers.”1332  The reviewing “court must ‘reconcile 
apparent conflicts in the jury’s findings’ if reasonably possible [considering] 
the pleadings and evidence, the manner of submission, and the other 
findings considered as a whole.”1333  When “the issues submitted ‘[may 
have] more than one reasonable construction,’” the reviewing court will 
generally adopt the construction that “avoids a conflict in the answers.”1334 
Appellate review is “limited to the question of conflict, and . . . review of 
the jury findings is limited to a consideration of the factors before the 
jury.”1335  Similarly, when no conflict exists, the appellate court cannot use 
the jury’s answer to one question to challenge the insufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the jury’s answer to another question.1336 
VI.    POST-TRIAL RULINGS 
A. Post-Verdict & Post-Judgment Pleading Amendments 
When a request to amend pleadings is made after trial, the request must 
be granted, “unless (1) the opposing party presents evidence of surprise or 
prejudice; or (2) the amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense, 
and thus[,] is prejudicial on its face.”1337  If the amendment is procedural 
in nature (i.e., merely conforming “the pleadings to the evidence at trial”), 
 
 
1330. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Craik, 346 S.W.2d 830, 831–32 (Tex. 1961). 
1331. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 508 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Bender 
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1980)). 
1332. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260; see also Lee v. Huntsville Livestock Servs., 934 S.W.2d 158, 160 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. denied) (asserting that jury answers must result in 
different judgments before one will be stricken). 
1333. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260. 
1334. Id. 
1335. Id. 
1336. See Huber v. Ryan, 627 S.W.2d 145, 145–46 (Tex. 1981) (holding that a jury’s findings of 
injury and zero damages for past pain and suffering could be reconciled). 
1337. State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994); accord TEX. R. CIV. P. 
63, 66.  “The burden of showing surprise or prejudice rests on the party resisting the amendment.”  
Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658.  “Surprise may be shown as a matter of law if the pleading asserts a new 
and independent cause of action or defense.”  Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). 
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the trial court must grant the amendment.1338   
A trial amendment is prejudicial on its face if “(1) the amendment asserts 
a new substantive matter that reshapes the nature of the trial itself; (2) the 
new matter is of such a nature that the opposing party could not have 
anticipated it in light of the development of the case up to the time the 
amendment was requested; and (3) the opposing party’s presentation of its 
case would be detrimentally affected by the amendment.”1339 Accordingly, 
if the amendment is substantive in nature (i.e., changing the basis of a party’s 
causes of action), the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the 
amendment.1340  While “the trend is to give the trial court[s] wide latitude 
in allowing amendments,” post-verdict or post-judgment trial amendments 
may not be permitted.1341  The trial court’s decision will be reviewed on 
appeal for an abuse of discretion.1342 
B. Motion to Disregard Jury Findings 
A trial court may disregard a jury’s answer to a question in the charge only 
when the answer has no support in evidence, or the question is 
immaterial.1343  “A [jury] question is immaterial when it should not have 
been submitted, it calls for a finding beyond the province of the jury (e.g., 
such as a question of law), or when it was properly submitted but has been 
 
1338. Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. Tex. Sand & Gravel Co., 844 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1992); 
Stephenson v. Le Boeuf, 16 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).  
“The rule of trial by consent is limited to those exceptional cases where the parties clearly tried an 
unpleaded issue[;] . . . [therefore, t]he rule should be cautiously applied and [is] not [appropriate] in 
doubtful situations.”  Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ). 
1339. Zarate v. Rodriguez, 542 S.W.3d 26, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. 
denied) (citing Tanglewood Homes Ass’n v. Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).  
1340. Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); 
Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Libhart, 949 S.W.2d 
at 797; Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., 915 S.W.2d 61, 70 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). 
1341. Boarder to Boarder Trucking, Inc. v. Mondi, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see also Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2004, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s grant of motion for leave to amend petition the same day it 
rendered judgment). 
1342. See Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658 (exercising the right to review the trial court’s decision 
for an abuse of discretion). 
1343. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 
1994); River Oaks Place Council of Co-Owners v. Daly, 172 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 2005, no pet.). 
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rendered immaterial by other findings.”1344  If the issue is immaterial, has 
no support in the evidence, or if the evidence establishes a contrary finding, 
then the court may disregard an answer and substitute its own finding.1345 
A court reviews the denial of a motion to disregard jury findings as a legal 
sufficiency challenge.1346  Therefore, the court views the “evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict,” “credit[ing] favorable evidence if 
reasonable jurors could, and disregard[ing] contrary evidence unless 
reasonable jurors could not.”1347  The court sustains such a challenge only 
when no more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury’s finding.1348  
“More than a scintilla of evidence exists when . . . reasonable and fair-
minded people [could] differ in their conclusions.”1349  The court must 
“view the evidence in a light that tends to support the jury’s finding and 
disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary” unless doing so would 
be unreasonable.1350  Where some evidence supports the disregarded 
finding, the reviewing court “must reverse and render [a] judgment on the 
verdict unless the appellee [asserts] cross-points [or issues] . . . [showing] 
grounds for a new trial.”1351 
C. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) 
A trial court may disregard a jury verdict and render a JNOV if no 
evidence supports the jury finding on an issue necessary to liability or if a 
directed verdict would have been proper.1352  Unlike the motion to 
disregard jury findings (discussed above in Part VI(B)), a motion for JNOV 
 
1344. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. 1999). 
1345. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 820 (Tex. 2005); Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis, 
951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967); see also TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 301 (“[T]he court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding or a question 
that has no support in the evidence.”).  A jury finding is immaterial if the question “should not have 
been submitted” to the jury or if the question, although “properly submitted[, was] rendered immaterial 
by other findings.”  Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157. 
1346. Willard Law Firm, L.P. v. Sewell, 464 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2015, no pet.); Excel Corp. v. McDonald, 223 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. 
denied). 
1347. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 822, 827. 
1348. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). 
1349. Id. (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). 
1350. McDonald, 224 S.W.3d at 508. 
1351. Basin Operating Co. v. Valley Steel Prods., 620 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
1352. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. 2003); Fort Bend Cty. 
Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991); see also supra Section VI(I) (explaining 
standards for directed verdict). 
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asks the trial court to disregard all of the jury’s findings and render judgment 
contrary to them.1353 
A court of appeals reviews an appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s 
grant or denial of a motion for JNOV under the legal sufficiency 
standard.1354  Generally, where the court of appeals finds error, it will 
reverse and render the judgment.1355  But in some instances, such as where 
the law on which the case was tried has changed between the time of trial 
and appeal, the court of appeals will remand for a new trial.1356  An appellee 
that received negative jury findings but had its motion for JNOV granted by 
the trial court should argue that the trial court did not err in granting a 
motion for JNOV, and also raise independent issues, if any, that may be 
grounds for granting a new trial.1357 
D. Motion to Admit Additional Evidence 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 270 allows, but does not require, the court 
to permit additional evidence.1358  Rule 270 states that “[w]hen it clearly 
appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may 
permit additional evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury 
case no evidence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict 
 
1353. Cf. Teston v. Miller, 349 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (referencing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301, but stating “[t]his is not a case involving a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but one to disregard the findings”). 
1354. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (stating that the standard 
of review for JNOV is legal sufficiency); Mikob Props., Inc, v. Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 594 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (stating that the standard of review for JNOV is legal sufficiency); see 
also Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2009) (asserting that the test for 
legal sufficiency must involve the determination of whether the evidence would enable a reasonable 
person to reach the verdict under review).  See generally supra Section III(A)(1) (discussing legal 
sufficiency standard of review). 
1355. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. 2003). 
1356. Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. 1966), abrogated on other grounds by Parker v. 
Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978). 
1357. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(c) (“[T]he appellee may bring forward by cross-point contained in 
his brief filed in the Court of Appeals any ground which would have vitiated the verdict or would have 
prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been rendered by the trial court in harmony with the 
verdict . . . .”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(b)(2) (“[T]he appellate court must remand a case to the trial 
court to take evidence if: (A) the appellate court has sustained a point raised by the appellant; and 
(B) the appellee has raised a cross-point that requires the taking of additional evidence.”); N.N. v. Inst. 
for Rehab., 234 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (noting that appellee 
defends the JNOV as correct and asserts two cross-points, but only if appellant’s issue is sustained in 
the court of appeals). 
1358. Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 223 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). 
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of the jury.”1359  After having rested a case, the party’s right to reopen the 
case and introduce additional evidence is a matter within “the sound 
discretion of the trial court.”1360  In a bench trial, the trial court may permit 
the introduction of additional evidence even after judgment has been 
entered if it does so within the court’s plenary power.1361  In both jury and 
nonjury trials, the trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence on an 
uncontested or noncontroversial matter.1362 
Factors the trial court considers in determining whether to allow 
additional evidence include whether the party seeking to introduce the 
evidence showed due diligence in obtaining that evidence, whether the 
evidence is decisive, whether the trial court’s reception of the evidence 
would cause undue delay, and whether allowing the additional evidence 
would cause an injustice.1363  In making this determination, “[t]he trial court 
should exercise its discretion liberally ‘in the interest of permitting both sides 
to fully develop the case in the interest of justice.’”1364 
The trial court’s decision to permit additional evidence will be disturbed 
on appeal only when it abuses its discretion.1365  The trial court 
automatically abuses its discretion if it reopens, post-verdict, the evidence 
 
1359. TEX. R. CIV. P. 270; accord Chapman v. Abbot, 251 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). 
1360. Binford v. Snyder, 189 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex. 1945); accord Lopez v. Lopez, 55 S.W.3d 
194, 201 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). 
1361. See McCarthy v. George, 623 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing plaintiffs to reopen the evidence 
thirty-three days after trial even though plaintiffs did not argue that failure to submit evidence at trial 
was not due to a lack of diligence; under the facts of the case, “development of this case was clearly in 
the interest of justice”); Priddy v. Tabor, 189 S.W. 111, 116 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1916, writ ref’d) 
(concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by hearing additional testimony after entering 
judgment in bench trial when additional testimony was heard during same term as original judgment); 
see also Harrison v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 702, 704–05 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1953, no writ) (holding trial 
court did not err by allowing appellees to introduce evidence at hearing on opposing party’s motion to 
reform judgment). 
1362. TEX. R. CIV. P. 270. 
1363. Rollins v. Tex. Coll., 515 S.W.3d 364, 371 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, pet. denied) (citing 
Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied)); Hernandez v. 
Lautensack, 201 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). 
1364. Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 779 (quoting Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. 
Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 366–67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)). 
1365. Rollins, 515 S.W.3d at 371 (citing Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d at 827); Lopez, 55 S.W.3d at 
201; Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1980, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
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on a contested matter in a jury case, because to do so contravenes Rule 
270.1366 
E. Motion for New Trial 
1. Motion for New Trial Generally 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 provides that: 
New trials may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on 
motion or on the court’s own motion on such terms as the court shall direct.  
New trials may be granted when the damages are manifestly too small or too 
large.  When it appears to the court that a new trial should be granted on a 
point or points that affect only a part of the matters in controversy and that 
such part is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties, the court may 
grant a new trial as to that part only, provided that a separate trial on 
unliquidated damages alone shall not be ordered if liability issues are 
contested.  Each motion for new trial shall be in writing and signed by the 
party or his attorney.1367 
The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewable by appeal.1368  “The 
standard of review depends on the [nature of the] complaint preserved by 
the motion for new trial.”1369  Generally, a trial court’s denial of a motion 
for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.1370  For example, “the 
denial of a motion for new trial that does not contain one of the complaints 
enumerated in Rule 324(b) [see infra], is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion.”1371  A trial court’s order on a motion for new trial based upon 
 
1366. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 270 (allowing additional noncontroversial testimony only before the 
jury verdict is rendered). 
1367. TEX. R. CIV. P. 320. 
1368. See In re Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88, 101–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no 
pet.) (affirming, on appeal, the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial); In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d 
73, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (enforcing the trial court’s discretion in denying a 
motion for new trial); Prestige Ford Co. v. Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (finding, on appeal, that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for new 
trial); Delgado v. Hernandez, 951 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) (affirming 
the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial and stating the standard of review on appeal). 
1369. Delgado, 951 S.W.2d at 98; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 324 (presenting prerequisites for motion 
for new trial). 
1370. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006). 
1371. Champion Int’l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 762 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. 1988) 
(orig. proceeding); Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d at 102; M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d at 80; Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d 
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jury misconduct is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1372  
However, sufficiency of the evidence challenges are governed by the legal 
and factual sufficiency standards of review.1373 
“Except in very limited circumstances, an order granting a motion for 
new trial rendered within the period of the trial court’s plenary power is not 
reviewable on appeal.”1374  The longstanding rule was that the granting of 
a new trial may only be subject to appellate review if: (1) the trial court’s 
plenary power had expired prior to the grant;1375 or (2) the order was based 
on the sole ground of “irreconcilably conflicting” jury answers.1376  But a 
2009 decision of the Texas Supreme Court indicates both that mandamus 
review is available to review grants of new trials and that lower courts need 
to recognize the limits of that power.1377  The supreme court emphasized 
that “Texas trial courts have historically been afforded broad discretion in 
granting new trials[,] [b]ut that discretion is not limitless.”1378  While the 
trial court has significant discretion to grant a new trial, it is required to 
specify the reasons it is ordering a new trial, and the “reasons should be 
clearly identified and reasonably specific.”1379  “Broad statements such as 
‘in the interest of justice’ are not sufficiently specific.”1380  Each point relied 
upon in a motion for new trial “shall briefly refer to that part of the ruling 
of the court, charge given to the jury, or charge refused, admission or 
rejection of evidence, or other proceedings which are designated to be 
complained of, in such a way that the objection can be clearly identified and 
 
at 77; Delgado, 951 S.W.2d at 98; Washington v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1995, no writ). 
1372. Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).  To 
obtain a new trial based upon jury misconduct, the movant “must show that (1) misconduct occurred; 
(2) it was material; and (3) based on the record as a whole, the misconduct resulted in harm” to the 
movant.  Id. 
1373. See supra Part III (explaining sufficiency of the evidence). 
1374. Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005); accord Cummins 
v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 235–36 (Tex. 1984).  
1375. Wilkins, 160 S.W.3d at 563. 
1376. Id.; accord Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. 
proceeding), overruled in part by In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. 
2009) (orig. proceeding); see also Rogers v. Clinton, 794 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. 1990) (finding mandamus 
to be the proper remedy because judge granted order for a new trial after the party withdrew the motion 
for new trial). 
1377. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210. 
1378. Id. 
1379. Id. at 215. 
1380. Id. 
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understood by the court.”1381  “Generality in motions for new trial must 
be avoided because objections phrased in general terms shall not be 
considered by the court.”1382  It is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion when 
a trial court fails to give its reasons for disregarding a jury verdict.1383  
In In re United Scaffolding, Inc.,1384 the Texas Supreme Court noted that an 
order granting a motion for a new trial will not be held to be an abuse of 
discretion if “its stated reason for granting a new trial (1) is a reason for 
which a new trial is legally appropriate . . . ; and (2) is specific enough to 
indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but 
rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case at hand.”1385  The court added that it may be an 
abuse of discretion “if the given reason, specific or not, is not one for which 
a new trial is legally valid.”1386  Thus, “[t]he good cause for which [Rule 
320] allows trial courts to grant new trials does not mean just any cause.”1387  
Further, mandamus would issue if the trial court’s “articulated reasons 
plainly state that the trial court merely substituted its own judgment for the 
jury’s, or that the trial court simply disliked one party’s lawyer, or that the 
reason is based on invidious discrimination.”1388  Additionally, mandamus 
may be granted “if the order, though rubber-stamped with a valid new-trial 
rationale, provides little or no insight into the trial judge’s reasoning.”1389  
The Texas Supreme Court observed that “the mere recitation of a legal 
standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and 
preponderance of the evidence,” is not sufficient, and that the new trial 
order “must indicate that the trial judge considered the specific facts and 
circumstances of the case” and “explain how the evidence (or lack of 
evidence) undermines the jury’s findings.”1390  The court finally noted that 
that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion if its . . . order provides no more 
 
 
1381. Id. at 210 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 321). 
1382. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 322). 
1383. Id. at 213. 
1384. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).  
1385. Id. at 688–89 
1386. Id. at 689 (citing Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210 n.3). 
1387. Id. (quoting Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210 n.3). 
1388. Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210; then citing In re 
BMW, 8 S.W.3d 326, 328 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing of a petition for mandamus)). 
1389. Id.  
1390. Id. 
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than a pro forma template rather than the trial judge’s analysis.”1391 
The Court of Criminal Appeals also observed that a trial court’s discretion 
to grant a new trial in the interest of justice is not “unbounded or 
unfettered.”1392  The court specified that: 
A trial judge does not have authority to grant a new trial unless the first 
proceeding was not in accordance with the law.  He cannot grant a new trial 
on mere sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or simply because he personally 
believes that the defendant is innocent or “received a raw deal . . . .”  
[Additionally,] [a]lthough not all of the grounds for which a trial court may 
grant a motion for new trial need be listed in [a] statute or rule, the trial court 
does not have discretion to grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that 
he is entitled to one under the law.  To grant a new trial for a non-legal or 
legally invalid reason is an abuse of discretion.1393 
As a general rule, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant 
a motion for new trial if the defendant: “(1) articulated a valid legal claim in 
[the] motion for new trial; (2) produced evidence or pointed to evidence in 
the trial record that substantiated [the asserted] legal claim; and (3) showed 
prejudice to [the defendant’s] substantial rights under the [rules of appellate 
procedure].”1394  “The defendant need not establish reversible error as a 
matter of law before the trial court may exercise its discretion in granting a 
motion for new trial.”1395  “On the other hand, trial courts do not have the 
discretion to grant a new trial unless the defendant demonstrates that [the] 
first trial was seriously flawed and that the flaws adversely affected [the 
defendant’s] substantial rights to a fair trial.”1396 
Practitioners should carefully note that a motion for new trial is required 
to preserve several issues on appeal.1397  Rule 324(b) requires that the 
following issues be raised by a motion for new trial: 
 
1391. Id. 
1392. State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 906–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
1393. Id. at 907. 
1394. Id. at 909; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) (stating that when the appellate record indicates 
constitutional error in a criminal case, “the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or 
punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute 
to the conviction or punishment”). 
1395. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909. 
1396. Id. 
1397. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(a) (providing that “a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to a 
complaint on appeal in either a jury or a nonjury case, except as provided in subdivision (b)”). 
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(1) A complaint on which evidence must be heard such as one of jury 
misconduct or newly discovered evidence or failure to set aside a judgment 
by default; 
(2) A complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury 
finding; 
(3) A complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence; 
(4) A complaint of inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages found by the 
jury; or 
(5) Incurable jury argument if not otherwise ruled on by the trial court.1398 
“An appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider [these] issues” unless 
a motion for new trial has been “filed with the trial court to preserve [the] 
issue[s].”1399  The reason for requiring that these matters first be brought 
to the attention of the trial court is to allow it the opportunity to correct any 
errors that were not considered prior to the motion.1400 
2. Motion for New Trial Based on Jury Misconduct 
When the evidence on the question of alleged jury misconduct is 
conflicting, the appellate court will generally defer to the trial court’s 
findings of fact and review under an abuse of discretion standard.1401 If 
there is conflicting evidence on the issue of misconduct, the trial court's 
finding must be upheld on appeal.1402 
To obtain a new trial based upon jury misconduct, a party must show: 
(1) that misconduct occurred; (2) that the misconduct was material; and 
 
1398. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1)–(5). 
1399. Moore v. Kitsmiller, 201 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. denied); accord 
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hecht, 225 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. granted, 
judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (concluding that since a motion for new trial was not filed, appellant failed to 
preserve its factual sufficiency issue on appeal). 
1400. Stillman v. Hirsch, 99 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. 1936); accord In re Marriage of Wilburn, 
18 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied); Mushinski v. Mushinski, 621 S.W.2d 669, 
670–71 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, no writ).  The motion for new trial may be overruled by signed order 
or otherwise by operation of law if not ruled upon “within seventy-five days after the judgment [is] 
signed.”  Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1991). 
1401. See Pharo v. Chambers Cty., 922 S.W.2d 945, 948–49 (Tex. 1996) (deferring to the trial 
court’s determination of whether jury misconduct occurred). 
1402. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tex. 2000); Losier v. Ravi, 
362 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). 
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(3) that, based upon the whole record, it probably resulted in harm.1403  In 
considering a motion for new trial premised on jury misconduct, a court will 
review a “juror’s affidavit alleging [that] ‘outside influences’ were brought to 
bear upon the jury.”1404  In addition, “[a] court may, of course, admit 
competent evidence of juror misconduct from any other source.”1405  To 
obtain a hearing in the absence of a juror’s affidavit, a party must explain 
why affidavits cannot be obtained and provide specific examples of material 
jury misconduct.1406 
There is no probable injury when the jury probably would have rendered 
the same verdict even if the misconduct had not occurred.1407  
“Determining the existence of probable injury is a question of law.”1408 
3. Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence 
To obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,1409 a 
movant must show: 
[F]irst, that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second, 
that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; 
third, that it is not cumulative; fourth, that it is so material that it would 
probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted.1410 
 
1403. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(a); accord Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 372; Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 
S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. 1985). 
1404. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 369 (quoting at Weaver v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 739 S.W.2d 23, 
24 (Tex. 1987)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b) (limiting juror’s ability to testify about deliberations to 
cases where outside influences were improperly used); TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (barring juror’s testimony 
regarding deliberations except when outside influence was used). 
1405. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 369 (citing Mayo v. State, 708 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1986); Fillinger v. Fuller, 746 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, no writ)). 
1406. See Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 163 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1942) (noting that it is 
reversible error to decline testimony on the motion of material jury misconduct if the lack of affidavits 
is supported by reasonable explanation and excuse); Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623, 636 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (requiring “a reasonable explanation and excuse as 
to why affidavits cannot be secured” and specific allegations of jury misconduct). 
1407. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 419.  
1408. Pharo, 922 S.W.2d at 950 (citing State v. Wair, 351 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. 1961) (per 
curiam)); Losier, 362 S.W.3d at 647 (citing id.). 
1409. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1). 
1410. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983) (citing New Amsterdam Cas. 
Co. v. Jordan, 359 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1962); Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Moser, 152 S.W.2d 390, 395 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1941, no writ); In re Y., 516 S.W.2d 199, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.)), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720–21 (Tex. 2003); 
accord Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010) (listing the factors set out in 
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Furthermore, the newly discovered evidence must be admissible, 
competent evidence.1411  Because this information is generally outside of 
the court’s knowledge, each of the above elements should be supported by 
an affidavit of the party.1412 
Whether a motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence will be granted or denied lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion.1413  “When a trial court refuses to grant a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence,” the appellate court will accept every reasonable 
inference in favor of affirming the trial court’s decision.1414  In reviewing 
the trial court’s decision to refuse a new trial, appellate courts recognize the 
well-established principle that motions for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence are disfavored, and therefore should be reviewed with 
careful scrutiny.1415 
F. Motion to Modify, Reform, or Correct the Judgment 
In addition to motions for new trial, a trial court, during its period of 
plenary power, may modify, correct, or reform a judgment.1416  The court 
reviews the denial of a motion to modify a judgment for abuse of 
 
Jackson); Armendariz v. Redcats USA, L.P., 390 S.W.3d 463, 471 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) 
(reaffirming the Jackson factors); In re A.G.C., 279 S.W.3d 441, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2009, no pet.) (citing to Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809). 
1411. Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 193 S.W.3d 605, 615 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
2006, pet. denied); Nguyen v. Minh Food Co., 744 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ 
denied). 
1412. See Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834, 844 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2008, no pet.) (recognizing each of the four elements “must be established by an affidavit of the party” 
(citing In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477, 512 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994, no appeal))), abrogated on other grounds by 
Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. 2016); In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d at 512 
(noting the moving party must show the four factors in an affidavit to win a new trial). 
1413. Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 813); Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809; Armendariz, 390 S.W.3d 
at 471; Fantasy Ranch, 193 S.W.3d at 615. 
1414. In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); accord  
Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 621 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied) (“Every 
reasonable presumption will be made on review in favor of orders of the trial court refusing new trials.” 
(citing Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809)). 
1415. See State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 452 (Tex. 1997) (affirming the court 
of appeals’ decision that denied remand for trial based on newly discovered evidence); Kirkpatrick v. 
Mem’l Hosp. of Garland, 862 S.W.2d 762, 775 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (holding motions 
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored unless the new evidence would cause 
a different result); Nguyen, 744 S.W.2d at 622 (noting appellate courts should review with careful 
scrutiny a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence). 
1416. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d)–(e). 
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discretion.1417  “An appellate court [also] has the power to correct and 
reform a trial court judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has 
the necessary data and information to do so.”1418 
Rule 329b provides that motions for new trial and motions to modify, 
correct, or reform a judgment are overruled by operation of law after certain 
periods of time.1419  “When a motion for new trial is overruled by operation 
of law,” the court of appeals reviews “whether the trial court abused its 
discretion [by] allowing the motion to be overruled.”1420 
G. Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc or Clarification Orders 
After the trial court’s plenary power over its own judgment terminates 
and the judgment becomes final, the trial court still retains the authority to 
correct clerical errors made in entering the judgment through a judgment 
nunc pro tunc or through a clarification order.1421  A judgment nunc pro tunc is 
appropriate only to correct a clerical error; that is, it cannot be used to 
correct a judicial error.1422  “A clerical error is one which does not result 
from judicial reasoning or determination.”1423  “A judicial error is [the type 
 
1417. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (holding when 
confronted with the issuance of a turnover order, the court of appeals should review under an abuse 
of discretion, rather than a no evidence, standard); Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 250 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (noting denial of a motion to modify a final judgment is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion); Wagner v. Edlund, 229 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (concluding 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the modification of judgment). 
1418. Jackson v. State, 288 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) 
(citing Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); TEX. R. 
APP. P. 43.2(b)); accord Williams v. State, 911 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ) 
(affirming an appellate court has the power to modify a judgment “to make the record speak the truth” 
(quoting Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d))). 
1419. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b. 
1420. Limestone Constr., Inc. v. Summit Commercial Indus. Props., Inc., 143 S.W.3d 538, 542 
(Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. 
1992)). 
1421. TEX. R. CIV. P. 316; TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f); see Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 
(Tex. 1986) (“After the trial court loses its jurisdiction over a judgment, it can correct only clerical 
errors in the judgment by judgment nunc pro tunc.” (emphasis added)); Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 
450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970) (recognizing the well-settled law that clerical errors, but not judicial 
errors in the rendition of judgment, may be corrected after the trial court loses jurisdiction). 
1422. See Barton v. Gillespie, 178 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no 
pet.) (“Even if the trial court incorrectly renders judgment, the trial court cannot alter a written 
judgment that precisely reflects the incorrect rendition.” (citing Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232)).  
1423. Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Petroleum Equip. 
Fin. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 622 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.)). 
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of] error which occurs in the rendering as opposed to the entering of a 
judgment.”1424   
A clerical error is a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment in the 
record and the judgment that was actually rendered.  A clerical error does not 
result from judicial reasoning, evidence[,] or determination.  Conversely, a 
judicial error arises from a mistake of law or fact that requires judicial 
reasoning to correct.1425 
Whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of law that 
is reviewable de novo and not binding on the appellate court.1426 
“[F]or a judgment nunc pro tunc to be properly granted, the evidence must 
be clear and convincing that a clerical error was made.”1427  “Evidence may 
be in the form of oral testimony of witnesses, written documents, previous 
judgments, the court’s docket[,] or the [trial] judge’s personal 
recollection.”1428  To the extent the trial judge relied upon his personal 
recollection of the facts at the time the original judgment was entered and 
then entered the judgment nunc pro tunc, a court may presume that his 
personal recollection supports the finding of clerical error.1429  “[W]hether 
the [trial] court pronounced judgment orally and the terms of [any] 
 
1424. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231 (citing Comet, 450 S.W.2d at 58; Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 
289, 292–93 (Tex. 1953), overruled in part by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Tex. 1955); 
Petroleum Equip., 622 S.W.2d at 154; Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 
1982) (per curiam)); see In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. 
proceeding) (holding the trial court judge “rendered judgment when she signed the order” and “[t]hus, 
the error in the order was a judicial error”); Crocker v. Synpol, Inc., 732 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1987, no writ) (defining judicial error). 
1425. Barton, 178 S.W.3d at 126 (internal citations omitted) (citing Andrews, 702 S.W.2d at 585; 
Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)). 
1426. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232; see Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968) (orig. 
proceeding) (noting the trial court’s findings or conclusions “as to the nature of the errors” are not 
binding on the Texas Supreme Court). 
1427. Barton, 178 S.W.3d at 127 (emphasis added) (citing Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. 
Owners, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); In re Broussard, 
112 S.W.3d 827, 833–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)); accord Riner, 
976 S.W.2d at 683 (reiterating the clear and convincing standard).  But see Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3d 
732, 736 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (per curiam) (applying traditional legal and factual 
sufficiency standards). 
1428. Riner, 976 S.W.2d at 683 (citing Pruet v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 702, 705 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ.)). 
1429. Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ); see Pruet, 
715 S.W.2d at 705 (stating a presumption arises that a judge’s personal recollection will support the 
finding of clerical errors if he corrects the judgment nunc pro tunc). 
203
Hall and Anderson: Standards of Review in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1302 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1099 
pronouncement are questions of fact” that are reviewed for legal and factual 
sufficiency.1430 
H. Remittitur 
The remittitur process arises out of the trial court’s discretion to grant 
new trials.1431  Professors Powers and Ratliff correctly observe that when 
a trial court believes that a jury’s award of damages is excessive, the trial 
court can use its autonomy to persuade a “plaintiff to make what amounts 
to a settlement offer.”1432  In such a situation, the trial court typically denies 
the defendant’s motion for new trial on the condition that the plaintiff remit 
a specified amount of damages so that the trial judge may sign a lesser 
judgment.1433  The plaintiff has two choices: to remit the suggested amount 
unconditionally or to have a new trial.1434  Because the trial court “has no 
authority to change a jury award[,]” the trial court judge “cannot compel a 
remittitur, but can ‘suggest’ it.”1435  Because a trial court cannot grant a new 
trial for any reason or no reason, its power to use remittitur as a settlement 
tool is limited somewhat. 
In suggesting a remittitur or in reviewing a trial court’s order of remittitur, 
the proper standard of review is factual sufficiency,1436 not abuse of 
discretion.1437  Because remittitur involves the question of factual 
sufficiency, the Texas Supreme Court may not order a remittitur, but the 
 
1430. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232 (citing Wood v. Paulus, 524 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Thomas M. Reavley & David L. Orr, Trial Court’s Power to Amend 
Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 203 (1973)). 
1431. Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 564.  
1432. Id. 
1433. Id. 
1434. Id.; see Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (holding if the plaintiff 
rejects the court’s “suggestion,” the trial court may grant a new trial). 
1435. Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 564. 
1436. See Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 620 (Tex. 2002) (Baker, J., dissenting) 
(stating the standard of review in Texas for excessive damages is factual sufficiency of the evidence). 
1437. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30–31 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 
118, 140 (Tex. 2012) (explaining the factual sufficiency standard should be used for the review of 
punitive damage awards); Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 777–78 (Tex. 
1989) (per curiam) (using a factual sufficiency standard for attorney’s fees); Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641 
(applying a factual sufficiency standard to actual damages); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 
1986) (per curiam) (emphasizing factual sufficiency as the only acceptable standard to review remittitur 
of actual damages); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 46.2 (allowing appellate review of remittitur requests); TEX. 
R. CIV. P. 315 (providing for remittitur generally); TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2) (discussing factual 
insufficiency to support jury findings). 
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courts of appeals may.1438  Although the supreme court lacks jurisdiction 
to review or order a remittitur because it is a factual sufficiency issue,1439 
the court does have jurisdiction to determine whether the court of appeals 
applied the proper standard in reviewing the remittitur issue.1440  Where 
the Texas Supreme Court has found error, the court has either remanded to 
the court of appeals for a suggestion of remittitur, or reversed and remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial when there was evidence to support some 
damages but no evidence to support the amount awarded by the jury.1441   
I. Actual Damages 
1. Unliquidated Damages 
“In determining [actual] damages, the jury has [the] discretion to award 
damages within the range of evidence presented at trial.”1442  “But the 
verdict must fall within the range of the evidence presented, and a jury may 
not ‘pull figures out of a hat’ in assessing damages.”1443 
This general rule becomes more problematic when “awarding damages 
for amorphous, discretionary injuries[,] such as mental anguish [and] pain 
and suffering”—such damages are inherently difficult because the injury 
constitutes “a subjective, unliquidated, nonpecuniary loss.”1444  It “is 
 
1438. See TEX. R. APP. P. 46.3 (“The court of appeals may suggest a remittitur.”); Tony Gullo 
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310 (Tex. 2006) (discussing how the Texas Rules of Appellate 
Procedure allow courts of appeals to provide remittitur orders). 
1439. See Bentley I, 94 S.W.3d at 620 (explaining since the determination of whether a remittitur 
is excessive is factual, it is final in the court of appeals, and the supreme court does not have jurisdiction 
to review the findings); cf. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 
960 S.W.2d 41, 51 (Tex. 1998) (overruling a motion for voluntary remittitur for failure to present a 
question of law).  See supra Part III(A)(2) (addressing the factual insufficiency of the evidence standard 
of review). 
1440. See Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 623 (recognizing the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court 
because “determining the proper remittitur standard is a question of law” (citing Flanigan v. Carswell, 
324 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1959), overruled in part by Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641)). 
1441. Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 670 (Tex. 2007). 
1442. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. 2002) (citing Price Pfister, Inc. v. 
Moore & Kimmey, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 341, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)). 
1443. 338 Indus., LLC v. Point Com, LLC, 530 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, 
pet. denied) (quoting CCC Grp., Inc. v. S. Cent. Cement, Ltd., 450 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). 
1444. Sanchez v. Balderrama, 546 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (citing 
Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Wagnon, 979 S.W.2d 343, 354 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. denied); Duron 
v. Merritt, 846 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ)); see Roberts v. Williamson, 
111 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. 2003) (referring to the difficulty involved in determining the value of 
intangible damages). 
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necessarily an arbitrary process[,]” not subject to objective analysis or 
mathematical calculation.1445  Because there are no objective guidelines to 
assess the money equivalent of such injuries, the jury is given a great deal of 
discretion in awarding an amount of damages it determines appropriate.1446  
While the jury has broad discretion, there must be evidence to justify the 
amount awarded, as the jury “cannot simply pick a number and put it in the 
blank.”1447  The Eighth Court of Appeals observed that once there is some 
amount of mental anguish or pain and suffering established by the evidence, 
the “award of damages is virtually unreviewable.”1448  However, a jury’s 
discretion to compensate for mental anguish is limited to that which “causes 
[a] ‘substantial disruption in [the plaintiff’s] daily routine[,]’ or ‘a high degree 
of mental pain and distress.’”1449  Furthermore, the court added that while 
the damages are clearly reviewable under a sufficiency of the evidence 
review, there are tremendous difficulties “inherent in an appellate court’s 
review of discretionary damages.”1450  Nevertheless, a challenge to a 
damages award for these types of unliquidated and intangible injuries is 
reviewed as any other challenge based upon the sufficiency of the evidence 
 
1445. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nabhan, 808 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ 
dism’d). 
1446. See Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. 1997) 
(recognizing the broad discretion of the jury in determining damages for pain and suffering); see also 
Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Zrubeck, 850 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ 
denied) (holding an award of discretionary damages such as mental anguish “will be shunted to the 
discretionary domain of the jury” (citing Kneip v. UnitedBank–Victoria, 774 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 566)); Marshall v. Superior 
Heat Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (concluding damage 
awards for future physical impairment are “particularly within the province of the jury”). 
1447. Turner v. Duggin, 532 S.W.3d 473, 484–85 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) 
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d 514, 552 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. 
denied)). 
1448. Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (citing 
Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no writ), overruled in part by Saenz v. Fid. 
& Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. 1996)); accord Martin v. Tex. Dental Plans, Inc., 
948 S.W.2d 799, 805–06 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (“We must note the subjective 
nature of a mental anguish question and the wide discretion given to juries in determining such 
questions.” (citing Arias, 831 S.W.2d at 85)). 
1449. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614 (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 
1995)); accord Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 797 (Tex. 2006) (“Mental anguish awards 
will pass a legal sufficiency review if evidence is presented describing ‘the nature, duration, and severity 
of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs’ daily routine.’” (citing 
Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 444)). 
1450. Arias, 831 S.W.2d at 85 n.2. 
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(legal and factual)1451 or based upon the factual sufficiency of the evidence 
where the excessiveness of the damages is challenged.1452 
2. Zero Damages 
“In reviewing an argument that the jury’s failure to make a finding of 
damages [or an award of zero damages] is ‘against the great weight and 
preponderance’ of the evidence,” the appellate court “must consider and 
weigh all of the evidence, keeping in mind that the jurors are the sole judges 
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, 
and may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.”1453   
Texas courts “have uniformly recognized a distinction between cases in 
which the plaintiff has presented uncontroverted ‘objective’ evidence of an 
injury caused by a defendant’s negligence, and cases in which the plaintiff’s 
injuries are more ‘subjective’ in nature.”1454  For example, when “‘the 
plaintiff has objective symptoms of injury . . . and there is [evidence] . . . 
which the defendant could offer to refute such fact[s], [the] plaintiff’s 
evidence cannot be disregarded by the jury when the defendant fails to 
 
1451. See Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 52–53 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) 
(determining an award for mental anguish was supported by legally sufficient evidence); Larson v. 
Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (concluding the evidence must be factually 
insufficient to support the damages verdict before the court will order remittitur).  Two authors have 
noted that when intangible damages are at issue, appellate courts find it difficult to refer to specific 
testimony that demonstrates inadequacy or excessiveness as required by Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 
715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).  Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 567.  “Nevertheless, common sense 
suggests that courts should have some authority to review excessive or inadequate damage awards.  It 
would be unwise to permit a jury to make any award it thinks fit without limit, even though it is dealing 
with damages that resist exact calculation or quantification.”  Id. 
1452. Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 53; Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. 
1998); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 847–48 (Tex. 1990); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 
624 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). 
1453. Rumzek v. Lucchesi, 543 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (citing 
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 
802, 819 (Tex. 2005); McGuffin v. Terrell, 732 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no 
writ); Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Tex. 2000)). 
1454. Id. (citing In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 483 S.W.3d 249, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 2016, orig. proceeding); Hammett v. Zimmerman, 804 S.W.2d 663, 665–66 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 1991, no writ); Thompson v. Stolar, 458 S.W.3d 46, 62 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.); Lanier 
v. E. Founds., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 445, 456 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Horton v. Denny’s Inc., 
128 S.W.3d 256, 259–62 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied); Hyler v. Boytor, 823 S.W.2d 425, 427–28 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 
801, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ); Davis v. Davison, 905 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1995, no writ)). 
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refute it.’”1455  Accordingly, “[w]hen there is uncontroverted, objective 
evidence of an injury and the causation of the injury[,] . . . appellate courts 
are more likely to overturn jury findings of [zero] damages for past pain and 
mental anguish.”1456 
Alternatively, if the plaintiff’s complaints are subjective in nature and, 
therefore, incapable of direct proof, the jury may award zero damages.  As the 
Fort Worth Court of Appeals has recognized, where the evidence of pain is 
conflicting, scant, or more subjective than objective, appellate courts are 
generally more reluctant to determine a jury finding of [zero] damages is 
contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.1457   
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals has provided examples of cases in which 
courts have held that a plaintiff suffered an “objective” injury, which would 
mandate an award of damages; these examples include fractures, organic brain 
syndrome and nerve damage, severe electrical burns, cuts, and “lacerations, 
tendinitis, and torn muscles requiring surgery.”  In contrast, courts have 
generally held that soft tissue injuries are more subjective than objective in 
nature, and that in such cases, a jury has the discretion to enter a zero damages 
award.1458 
Accordingly, a challenge to an award of zero damages should be reviewed 
as any other challenge based upon the sufficiency of the evidence; therefore, 
the award of zero damages should be reversed if it is “so contrary to the 
great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be manifestly 
unjust.”1459 
 
1455. Id. (first quoting Hammett, 804 S.W.2d at 666; then citing Lopez v. Salazar, 878 S.W.2d 
662, 663 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); Russell v. Hankerson, 771 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Lowery v. Berry, 269 S.W.2d 795, 796–97 (Tex. 1954)). 
1456. Id. at 332–33 (first alteration in original) (quoting In re State Farm, 483 S.W.3d at 263; then 
citing Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 805). 
1457. Id. at 333 (citations omitted) (first citing Stolar, 458 S.W.3d at 62; Monroe v. Grider, 
884 S.W.2d 811, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); then citing In re State Farm, 483 S.W.3d 
at 264; McGuffin, 732 S.W.2d at 427; Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 805). 
1458. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Hammett, 804 S.W.2d at 665–66; 
then citing Sanchez v. King, 932 S.W.2d 177, 180–83 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ); Gutierrez 
v. Martinez, No. 01-07-00363-CV, 2008 WL 5392023, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); Lamb v. Franklin, 976 S.W.2d 339, 341–42 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no 
pet.); Crow v. Burnett, 951 S.W.2d 894, 898–99 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied); Davison, 
905 S.W.2d at 793; Hyler, 823 S.W.2d at 427–28). 
1459. Marshall v. Superior Heat Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
1992, no writ); accord Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (detailing 
a “proper factual-sufficiency review”).   
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J. Punitive Damages 
The primary purpose of awarding punitive damages is not to compensate 
individuals, but to punish a wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent to future 
wrongdoers.1460  Punitive damages are levied against a defendant “to 
punish the defendant for outrageous, malicious, or otherwise morally 
culpable conduct.”1461  The legal justification for punitive damages is 
similar to the justification for criminal punishment.  “[L]ike criminal 
punishment, punitive damages require appropriate substantive and 
procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of unjust punishment.1462  
Although punitive damages are [imposed to serve] the public purpose[s] of 
punishment and deterrence, the proceeds become a private windfall.”1463  
However, “criminal fines are paid to a governmental entity and [are] used 
for [the] public[’s] benefit.”1464  Thus, the duty of reviewing courts in civil 
cases, “like the duty of criminal courts, is to ensure that defendants who 
deserve to be punished in fact receive an appropriate level of punishment, 
while . . . preventing [the imposition of] . . . excessive or otherwise 
erroneous” punishment.1465 
Punitive damages are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency of the 
evidence and for excessiveness.1466 
 
1460. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 49 (Tex. 1998); Transp. Ins. 
Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16–17 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012). 
1461. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16 (citing S. Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600–
601 (1880); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(3)); accord Bradley, 52 Tex. at 599–01 (noting 
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the offender); Celanese Ltd. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 
75 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (restating the purpose of punitive 
damages); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (defining exemplary damages as “any 
damages awarded as a penalty or by way of punishment but not for compensatory purposes”). 
1462. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16–17; accord Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex. 
2004) (per curiam) (noting exemplary damages should be “reasonably proportionate” to the “actual 
harm suffered”); Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 620 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. 
denied) (detailing the procedure for assessing exemplary damages). 
1463. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17 (footnote omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 104, 104(a)(2) (2012); 
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 591 (4th Cir. 1990)); accord Hall v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co., 
82 S.W.3d 5, 22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001) (explaining proceeds from these damages are a 
windfall, not a right), rev’d on other grounds, 168 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2005). 
1464. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17. 
1465. Id. 
1466. See Myers v. Walker, 61 S.W.3d 722, 731–32 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied) 
(holding that the award must be carefully reviewed “to ensure that the award is supported by the 
evidence”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (discussing legal insufficiency raised in a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict); TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (4) (stating to complain of factual sufficiency 
or excessiveness issues on appeal, these points must be raised in a motion for new trial).  The United 
209
Hall and Anderson: Standards of Review in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1308 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1099 
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the punitive damages 
award, appellees [are] required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the harm they suffered resulted from fraud, malice, or gross negligence.  In 
reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency under the clear and convincing 
standard, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder 
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.  
We must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and 
judgment.  We must also disregard all evidence a reasonable factfinder could 
have disbelieved, but we must consider undisputed evidence even if it does 
not support the finding.1467 
In a factual sufficiency review, the court of appeals must determine 
“whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm 
conviction or belief that the allegations in the petition were proven.”1468   
When reviewing an award of punitive damages, the reviewing court must 
consider a number of factors to determine the reasonableness of the 
award.1469 
[T]he United States Supreme Court requires courts reviewing exemplary 
damages to consider three factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm 
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the 
 
States Supreme Court has held that the standard of review of punitive damages is de novo review.  
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001).  It is doubtful, however, 
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case will have an impact on Texas courts’ 
review of punitive damages awards. 
1467. Bright v. Addison, 171 S.W.3d 588, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (citations 
omitted) (first citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a)(1)–(3); then citing Sw. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 623–25, 627 (Tex. 2004); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., Inc., 
142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)). 
1468. Bright v. Addison, 171 S.W.3d 588, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (citing 
Citizens Nat’l Bank, 142 S.W.3d at 483). 
1469. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 31 (requiring courts to “detail the relevant evidence in . . . 
opinion[s], explaining why that evidence either supports or does not support the punitive damages 
award in light of the Kraus factors”); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.013 (ordering 
any court reviewing exemplary damages to state the “reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding[,]” 
and to address the evidence or lack thereof “with specificity . . . as it relates to the liability for or amount 
of exemplary damages”); Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981) (“Factors to 
consider in determining whether an award of exemplary damages is reasonable include (1) the nature 
of the wrong, (2) the character of the conduct involved, (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, 
(4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and (5) the extent to which [the] conduct 
offends a public sense of justice and propriety.” (citing First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach, 
493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134, 
139 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.))). 
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difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”1470 
The standard of review of the constitutionality of punitive damages award 
is de novo.1471  The three factors help ensure a reasonable relationship 
between punitive damages and actual damages.1472  Accordingly, one court 
has noted, “actual damages are used to indicate the reasonableness of 
[punitive] damages under the rule that [punitive] damages must be rationally 
related to actual damages.”1473  There is no exact formula to measure 
punitive damages by actual damages.1474  Rather, this ratio is merely one 
tool to assist the courts in determining whether a punitive damage award is 
the product of a jury’s passion rather than reason.1475  In addition to the 
ratio of punitive to actual damages, the appellate court also considers: 
“(1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved; 
(3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and 
sensibilities of the parties concerned; (5) the extent to which such conduct 
 
1470. Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)); accord Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia 
Healthcare Co., Inc., 520 S.W.3d 848, 873–74 (Tex. 2017) (quoting the factors set out in Campbell); see 
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 308–09 (Tex. 2006) (elaborating on the Texas 
law formulation of the test outlined in Campbell). 
1471. Horizon, 520 S.W.3d at 874; Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54. 
1472. Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54. 
1473. Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1987); see Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 
at 28–29 (detailing the procedural safeguards Texas courts use in assessing punitive damage awards). 
1474. See Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54 (stating mathematical formulas and particular ratios are but 
one consideration and must be examined in light of the other factors); Tatum v. Preston Carter Co., 
702 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1986) (noting no set rule exists to measure punitive damages by actual 
damages); see also Foley v. Parlier, 68 S.W.3d 870, 881 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (declaring 
courts “must make [the] determination [of punitive damages] on a case-by-case basis” (citing Kraus, 
616 S.W.2d at 910)); InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 909 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1987, no writ) (discussing the “reasonable relationship” test for punitive damages).  But cf. 
Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 308–09 (stating an award that is four times the amount of compensatory damages 
might be constitutionally impermissible).  The ratio of actual damages to punitive damages has been 
substantially reduced by the Texas Tort Reform Act.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 41.008(b) (providing, in most cases, that exemplary damages may not exceed the greater of $200,000 
or “two times the amount of economic damages; plus . . . an amount equal to any noneconomic 
damages found by the jury[,]” not exceeding $750,000). 
1475. See Tatum, 702 S.W.2d at 188 (recognizing the reasonable proportion rule will help to 
determine whether the jury’s award was reasonable); Risser, 739 S.W.2d at 909 (examining the factors 
to consider when determining whether an award was reasonable). 
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offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and (6) the net worth of the 
defendant.”1476 
K. Attorney’s Fees 
1. Fees Based on Contract or Statutes Generally 
Texas follows the American Rule for the award of attorney’s fees, which 
permits the award of such fees if permitted by statute or contract.1477  For 
instance, attorney’s fees may not be recovered in tort cases without 
authorization from a statute or contract between the parties.1478  Statutes 
authorizing attorney’s fees may involve issues of reasonableness and 
necessity (suitable for a jury’s factual determination), as well as equity and 
justice (suitable for a judge’s discretion).1479  As a result, the appeal of 
attorney’s fees may combine the corresponding standards of review.1480 
In reviewing the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees (which 
may include a legal assistant’s time under certain conditions)1481 the 
reviewing court should consider: 
 
1476. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011(a)(1)–(6); see Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 
879 S.W.2d 10, 28 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), 
as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012) (discussing many factors 
have been set forth for evaluation); Tatum, 702 S.W.2d at 188 (listing several factors to consider); Kraus, 
616 S.W.2d at 910 (emphasizing what should be considered when determining reasonableness of 
punitive damages).  In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the West Virginia Supreme Court 
concluded that decisions post-Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), “fall into three 
categories: (1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and (3) really stupid defendants who 
could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions but who actually caused minimal harm.”  TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887–88 (W. Va. 1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
1477. 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378, 382 (Tex. 2011); 
accord TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (permitting the recovery of “reasonable attorney’s 
fees”). 
1478. Knebel v. Capital Nat’l Bank in Austin, 518 S.W.2d 795, 803–04 (Tex. 1974); see Brosseau 
v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381, 398 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“Generally, attorney’s fees 
are not recoverable in tort actions unless provided by statute.” (citing Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 
47, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied))). 
1479. Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 231 (Tex. 2010). 
1480. Id.; see Midland W. Bldg. L.L.C. v. First Serv. Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc., 
300 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (stating jury’s award of zero attorney’s fees was improper 
because of evidence of party’s attorney’s fees and value thereof).  
1481. See Gill Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Supply Co., 759 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ 
denied) (discussing the evidence required to award legal assistant’s fees); accord Kimberly-Clark Corp. 
v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:05-CV-2097-B ECF, 2008 WL 1958998, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 
2008) (“Under Texas law, compensation for a paralegal or legal assistant’s work may be included in the 
award for attorneys’ fees if the paralegal or legal assistant performed work that has traditionally been 
done by any attorney.” (citing Gill, 759 S.W.2d at 702)). 
212
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4
  
2019] STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS 1311 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty 
of collection before the legal services have been rendered.1482 
“To determine whether an attorney’s fee award is excessive, the reviewing 
court may draw upon the common knowledge of the justice[s] of the court 
and their experiences as lawyers and judges.”1483  “A trial court may not 
grant . . . an unconditional award of appellate attorney’s fees”; rather, 
 
1482. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (citing 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. *1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. *2, 
subtit. *G, app. *A (Tex. State Bar R. art. *X, § *9); Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 
880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960–961 (Tex. 
1996)); Aquila Sw. Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Expl., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 240–41 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (citing Arthur, 945 S.W.2d at 818); accord Headington Oil Co., L.P. v. White, 
287 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (restating the factors set out in 
Arthur); Acad. Corp. v. Interior Buildout & Turnkey Constr., Inc. 21 S.W.3d 732, 741–42 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (noting the eight factors are not strict “elements of proof[,]” but 
“guidelines” to consider).  The preceding cases use the language found in Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.04 in arriving at their respective holdings; however, in the federal system, 
a bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Texas has held that Rule 1.04(f) has been preempted by 
11 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).  See In re Smith, 397 B.R. 810, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining 11 U.S.C. 
§ 504 “imposes a prohibition against fee-splitting or the sharing of compensation in virtually all 
circumstances arising in a bankruptcy case”). 
1483. Aquila Sw. Pipeline, 48 S.W.3d at 241 (citing City of Fort Worth v. Groves, 746 S.W.2d 
907, 918 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ)); accord Phillips v. Phillips, 296 S.W.3d 656, 673 (Tex. 
App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (reaffirming the proposition that judges may rely on their common 
knowledge as lawyers in reviewing attorney’s fees); see O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237, 
248–49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (discussing a situation in which the judge properly 
used personal experience and knowledge of attorneys to determine whether the fees were excessive). 
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such an award must be conditioned upon the appellant’s unsuccessful 
appeal.1484 
When multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the party 
asserting those causes must segregate the hours into those (1) for which fees 
may be recovered; (2) for which fees cannot be recovered; and (3) for which 
party they may be recovered.1485  In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,1486 
the Texas Supreme Court explained an exception to the duty to segregate: 
A recognized exception to this duty to segregate arises when the attorney’s 
fees rendered are in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction 
and are so interrelated that their “prosecution or defense entails proof or 
denial of essentially the same facts.”  Therefore, when the causes of action 
involved in the suit are dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances 
and thus are “inter[t]wined to the point of being inseparable,” the party suing 
for attorney’s fees may recover the entire amount covering all claims.1487 
 
1484. Pickett v. Keene, 47 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. dism’d) (citing 
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 24 S.W.3d 386, 400 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied); 
Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied)); accord Cameron, 
24 S.W.3d at 400–01 (“An unconditional award of appellate attorneys’ fees is improper.” (citing 
Humble Nat’l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ 
denied))).  
1485. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006) (“[F]ee 
claimants have always been required to segregate fees between claims for which they are recoverable 
and claims for which they are not.” (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 
1997); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991); Matthews v. Candlewood 
Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); Int’l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 
496 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. 1973))); Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 73 (expressing a party must show that the 
claim allows recovery of attorney’s fees and that allowable fees have been segregated); Sterling, 
822 S.W.2d at 10–11 (“When a plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees in cases where there are 
multiple defendants, and one or more of those defendants have made settlements, the plaintiff must 
segregate the fees owed by the remaining defendants from those owed by the settling defendants so 
that the remaining defendants are not charged fees for which they are not responsible.” (citing Wood 
v. Component Constr. Corp., 722 S.W.2d 439, 444–45 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ), overruled 
in part by Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11; Verette v. Travelers Indem. Co., 645 S.W.2d 562, 568 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.), overruled in part by Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11; Stone v. Lawyers Title 
Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55, 63–64 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977))). 
1486. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991). 
1487. Id. at 11–12 (citation omitted) (first quoting Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & 
Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied); then quoting Gill Sav. Ass’n 
v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), aff’d in part, modified 
in part, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)). 
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In Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa,1488 the Texas Supreme Court stated 
that this exception “has since threatened to swallow the [general] rule [of 
segregation]”1489 and proceeded to hold that: 
To the extent Sterling suggested that a common set of underlying facts 
necessarily made all claims arising therefrom “inseparable” and all legal fees 
recoverable, it went too far.1490   
. . . . 
. . . [Rather,] [i]ntertwined facts do not make tort fees recoverable; it is only 
when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable 
claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.  We 
modify Sterling to that extent.1491   
“Thus, the general duty to segregate fees applies, unless a party meets its 
burden of establishing that the same discrete legal services were rendered 
with respect to both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.”1492 
2. Fees Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act 
Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, the trial court may 
award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.1493  
“First, the court must determine the reasonable hours spent by counsel in 
the case and a reasonable hourly rate for such work[,]”1494 and second “the 
court then multiplies the number of such hours by the applicable rate, the 
product of which is the base fee or lodestar.”1495  The court then has the 
option to modify the base lodestar up or down or to apply a multiplier, “if 
 
1488. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006). 
1489. Id. at 311. 
1490. Id. at 313. 
1491. Id. at 313–14; accord CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“When discrete legal services advance both recoverable claims and 
unrecoverable claims, attorneys are not required to segregate fees to recover the total amount covering 
all claims.” (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313)); Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Dev., Ltd. v. City of San 
Antonio, 269 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (reaffirming the principle stated in 
Chapa), pet. abated, 303 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. 2010). 
1492. Gallagher Headquarters, 269 S.W.3d at 641 (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 314; Hong Kong 
Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)). 
1493. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.259(a). 
1494. El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012) (citing Dillard Dep’t Stores, 
Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 412 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied)).  
1495. Id. (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323–24 (5th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam)).  
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relevant factors indicate an adjustment is necessary to reach a reasonable fee 
in the case.”1496  The relevant non-exclusive factors include: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty 
of collection before the legal services have been rendered.1497 
The Texas class action rule “further provides that any adjustment to the 
base lodestar ‘must be in the range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar 
figure.’”1498  The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.1499 
L. Guardian Ad Litem Attorney’s Fees 
Rule 173 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires a trial court to 
appoint a guardian ad litem when a minor is represented by a guardian or 
next of friend who appears to have an interest adverse to that of the 
minor.1500  When an attorney is appointed a guardian ad litem pursuant to 
Rule 173, the attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee to be taxed as costs 
 
1496. Id. (citing Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d at 412). 
1497. Id. at 761 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. *1.04, reprinted in TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. *2, subtit. *G, app. *A (Tex. State Bar R. art. *X, § *9; Arthur Andersen & Co. 
v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)). 
1498. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i)(1)). 
1499. Id.  
1500. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.2(a)(1); Land Rover U.K., Ltd. v. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d 604, 606–07 
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Brownsville-Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. 
1995). 
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pursuant to Rules 131 and 141.1501  As a general rule, ad litem fees are 
assessed against the losing party.1502  Generally, the same factors for 
determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees are used to determine the 
reasonableness of a guardian ad litem fee.1503  The Texas Supreme Court 
has held “[a] reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours spent 
performing necessary services within the guardian ad litem’s role yields a 
reasonable fee.”1504  However, “[w]hile necessary services within the 
proper, limited scope of the Rule 173 guardian ad litem’s role are 
compensable, including those legal services necessarily performed by a 
lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem, compensation cannot be awarded for 
legal or other services outside that role, even if they are performed.”1505  
Additionally, an “ad litem may not recover fees . . . after resolution of the 
conflict for which [the ad litem has been] . . . appointed[.]”1506  In applying 
these considerations, the award of guardian ad litem attorney fees is a matter 
“within the sound discretion of the trial court.”1507  The trial court’s 
reasons for an award, however, must be substantiated by the record, or the 
trial court may be found to have abused its discretion.1508  “When an ad 
 
1501. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.6(c); Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 606–07; see Roberts v. Williamson, 
111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003) (explaining how a fee may be taxed as costs under Rules 131 and 141). 
1502. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124 (asserting there must be good cause on the record for 
splitting the guardian ad litem fees among the parties); Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 812 S.W.2d 
366, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ) (assessing whether good cause exists for imposing guardian 
ad litem fees against the prevailing party). 
1503. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 607; Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 794 
(Tex. 1987). 
1504. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999) 
(per curiam)). 
1505. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. 2012) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 173(4); 
id. at 607). 
1506. Brownsville-Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex. 1995); see 
Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 607 (stating “a guardian ad litem is required to participate in the case only to 
the extent necessary to protect the minor’s interest” and “[i]f a guardian ad litem performs work beyond 
the scope of this role, such work is non-compensable” (citing Gamez, 894 S.W.2d at 756–57)). 
1507. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d at 756 (citing Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794); accord Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 
at 578 (“The amount a guardian ad litem is awarded as compensation is within the trial court’s 
discretion and an award will not be set aside except for abuse of that discretion.” (citing Hinojosa, 
210 S.W.3d at 607)); Jocson v. Crabb, 196 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no 
pet.) (“Rule 173 authorizes the trial court to award an ad litem a reasonable fee for his services, and the 
determination of the amount of compensation awarded to an ad litem lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.” (citing Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794)); see Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794 (“The discretion of 
the trial court in setting an ad litem fee is not unbridled.”). 
1508. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003).  
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litem’s fee is unreasonable or excessive, [the appellate court] may fix the 
proper amount of the fee.”1509 
M. Court Costs 
Under Rule 131,1510 the successful party in a suit is entitled to recover 
from an adversary all costs incurred in the suit, except where otherwise 
provided.1511  “Whether a party is the ‘successful’ party and entitled to costs 
is determined by the court, and the taxing or tabulation of costs is 
determined by the clerk.”1512  Taxing costs against a successful party 
generally contravenes Rule 131.1513  “A successful party is ‘one who obtains 
a judgment of a competent court vindicating a claim of right, civil in 
nature.’”1514  The purpose of Rule 131 “is to ensure that the prevailing 
party is freed of the burden of court costs and that the losing party pays 
those costs.”1515  Pursuant to Rule 141, the trial court may assess the costs, 
other than as provided by law or the rules, for good cause stated on the 
record.1516  Even when the trial court states good cause on the record, the 
 
1509. Hirczy v. Hirczy, 838 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) 
(citing Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 264 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)); see Celanese Chem. 
Co. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (setting aside the 
ad litem fees on appeal because the amount awarded was excessive). 
1510. TEX. R. CIV. P. 131. 
1511. Id.; Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 376 
(Tex. 2001); Martinez v. Pierce, 759 S.W.2d 114, 114 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).  But see Bethune, 
53 S.W.3d at 381 (Baker, J., dissenting, joined by Hankinson & O’Neill, JJ.) (suggesting the majority 
implicitly overruled Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1985)).  The Texas Civil Practice 
and Remedies Code specifies items recoverable as costs.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 31.007(b). 
1512. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Hayes, 507 S.W.3d 263, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2016, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (citing Wood v. Wood, 320 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. 1959); 
Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). 
1513. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 376; Martinez, 759 S.W.2d at 114; Sparks v. Booth, 232 S.W.3d 853, 
872 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); see Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 515 (Tex. 
App.—Eastland 2008, pet. denied) (“Trial courts are generally required to tax costs against the 
unsuccessful party.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 31)). 
1514. Crow v. Burnett, 951 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied) (quoting 
Lovato v. Ranger Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see 
Williamson v. Roberts, 52 S.W.3d 354, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001) (concluding a party does not 
have to prevail on every claim to be considered successful), aff’d, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003). 
1515. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 378. 
1516. TEX. R. CIV. P. 141; Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; see Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 376 (recognizing 
the two requirements of Rule 141 to be (1) good cause that is (2) reflected on the record); Sparks, 
232 S.W.3d at 872 (recognizing good cause may be stated in a written order or judgment, as well as in 
an oral hearing). 
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supreme court has admonished the appellate courts to “scrutinize the record 
to determine whether it supports the trial [court’s] decision” to assess part 
or all of the costs against the prevailing party.1517  “‘Good cause’ is a very 
elusive concept . . . determined on a case-by-case basis.”1518  The supreme 
court has observed that “good cause” usually means “that the prevailing 
party unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings, unreasonably increased 
costs, or otherwise did something that should be penalized.”1519  However, 
potential harm caused to a losing party, or an inability to pay court costs, 
does not constitute good cause as a matter of law.1520  The trial court’s 
general notion of fairness, without more, does not constitute good 
cause.1521  When the trial court assesses costs in a manner other than under 
the general rule and fails to state good cause on the record, the courts 
generally hold that the trial court abused its discretion.1522  The trial court’s 
determination of good cause and its assessment of court costs are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.1523 
 
1517. Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985); accord Williamson, 
52 S.W.3d at 356 (“Good cause is an elusive concept, and appellate courts must scrutinize the record 
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging fees to a successful party for good 
cause.” (citing Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601)); see Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515 (“To determine if the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion, we have been instructed to scrutinize the record to determine if 
it supports the trial court’s decision to tax some or all costs against the prevailing party.”). 
1518. Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Morrow v. Terrell, 50 S.W. 734, 736 (Tex. App.—1899, 
writ ref’d)) (holding the unnecessary lengthening of trial is sufficient as good cause to assess costs 
against a successful defendant); accord Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872 (reaffirming the elusiveness of “good 
cause”); Williamson, 52 S.W.3d at 356 (restating the proposition set out in Rogers and Sparks); see Gleason 
v. Lawson, 850 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (noting Rules 131 and 141 
should not be used to penalize a party for refusal to enter into settlement negotiations when a party 
has not been ordered or encouraged to do so). 
1519. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 377 (citing Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601; Operation Rescue–Nat’l v. 
Planned Parenthood of Hous. and Se. Tex., Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60, 86–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 
657, 658 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); State v. Castle Hills Forest, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 370, 
373 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied)). 
1520. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515; Price Constr., Inc. v. Castillo, 147 S.W.3d 431, 442 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied). 
1521. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515.  
1522. See Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872 (“A trial court’s failure to state on the record a finding of 
good cause to vary from [R]ule 131 constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (citing Marion v. Davis, 
106 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied))); Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 
App.—Texarkana 1996, no writ) (declaring appeals courts generally find it an abuse of discretion for 
trial courts to assess costs inconsistent with the general rule without stating good cause on the record). 
1523. See Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (stating that a judge’s determination of costs should not be 
disturbed on appeal unless abuse of discretion is shown on the record); Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872 
(indicating the standard of review for a trial court’s assessment of costs is an abuse of discretion). 
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N. Exercise of Plenary Power 
A trial court has both the plenary power and the jurisdiction to 
“reconsider, not only its judgment but also its interlocutory orders until 
thirty days after the date a final judgment is signed or, if a motion for new 
trial or its equivalent is filed, until thirty days after the motion is overruled 
by signed, written order or operation of law,” whichever occurs first.1524  
Additionally, a timely filed post-judgment motion that requests a substantive 
change in the existing judgment constitutes a motion to modify under 
Rule 329b(g),1525 thereby extending the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and 
the appellate timetable.1526  During this period, plenary power is “‘[f]ull, 
entire, complete, absolute, perfect, [and] unqualified.’”1527  Once a trial 
court loses plenary power over its judgment, the judgment becomes final 
and any attempt to exercise further jurisdiction over the judgment (except 
to correct clerical errors) will be set aside as void.1528  “A void judgment . . . 
 
1524. Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig. 
proceeding) (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam); Bollard v. Berchelmann, 921 S.W.2d 861, 863–64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig. 
proceeding); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (establishing trial courts’ plenary power 
to grant a new trial or change its judgment until thirty days after a motion for new trial is overruled by 
written, signed order, or operation of law); In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 
167 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“Because the default judgment was interlocutory, 
the trial court retained jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and order a new trial.” (citing Carrillo, 
848 S.W.2d at 84)); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2000) 
(stating a trial court possesses jurisdiction and plenary power to change its ruling for thirty days after a 
final judgment is signed); Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d at 84 (discussing how Rule 329b(d) allows a trial court 
thirty days to vacate, modify, correct, or reform its judgment). 
1525. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(g). 
1526. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 562–63 (Tex. 2005) (noting a 
motion for new trial extended the appellate timetable for reviewing the original judgment, but that such 
motion did not interfere with court’s power to make subsequent judgments); Lane Bank Equip. Co., 
10 S.W.3d at 313–14 (holding a post-judgment motion for sanctions seeking to add an award of 
attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous litigation extends the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction). 
1527. Pope, 927 S.W.2d at 658 (quoting Mesa Agro v. R.C. Dove & Sons, 584 S.W.2d 506, 508 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); accord Callaway v. Martin, No. 02-16-00181-CV, 2017 WL 
2290160, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (emphasizing the 
unqualified nature of the trial court’s plenary power); Zarate v. Sun Operating Ltd., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 
617, 619–20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (outlining the scope of the trial court’s 
plenary power). 
1528. See Graham Nat’l Bank v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 747 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 1987) (orig. 
proceeding) (holding a court order void after the order was issued beyond expiration of the court’s 
plenary power); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 730 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam) 
(concluding the trial court had no jurisdiction or plenary power to consider a motion to unseal after 
judgment became final); Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1938, 
no writ) (“A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts 
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‘is good nowhere and bad everywhere.’”1529  Whether a trial court properly 
exercised its plenary power is a question of law reviewed de novo by the 
reviewing court.1530 
O. Supersedeas Bond 
Generally, if a party loses at the trial court, a writ of supersedeas will stay 
execution of the judgment pending appeal1531 and guarantee the appellee 
the benefits of the judgment if affirmed.1532  To obtain a writ of 
supersedeas, a party generally files with the clerk a “good and sufficient” 
supersedeas bond or deposit.1533  Importantly, the amount of actual 
damages that must be superseded may be reduced under the Texas Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code1534 and implies that punitive damages no 
 
performed under it are also nullities.  Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no 
force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody.  ‘It is good nowhere and bad everywhere,’ 
and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity.  It is not susceptible of ratification or 
confirmation, and its invalidity may not be waived.” (quoting 25 TEX. JUR. § 254 (1935))). 
1529. Munters Corp. v. Locher, 936 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, 
writ denied) (quoting Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1967, no writ)). 
1530. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999) (stating 
legal conclusions should be reviewed de novo), rev’d on other grounds, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002); see also 
Lane Bank Equip. Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313–14 (discussing how to determine if the exercise of plenary 
power was proper). 
1531. See Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Expl. Co., 74 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (“[A] judgment debtor may supersede the judgment by filing a 
supersedeas bond.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1)). 
1532. See Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) 
(recognizing the intent of such bond is to fulfill judgment for appellee if trial court ruling is affirmed); 
Cooper v. Bowser, 583 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1979, no writ) (per curiam) (holding 
supersedeas bond amount must be adequate to secure appellee’s collection of “judgment against 
appellant and his sureties” if the trial court judgment is affirmed). 
1533. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(2).  A few judgments are stayed without the requirement of 
posting a supersedeas bond or deposit.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001(b) (listing as 
some of those exempt: the Veterans’ Administration, and the Federal National Mortgage Association); 
id. § 6.002(a) (exempting incorporated cities and towns).  Exempt entities supersede the judgment by 
filing a notice of appeal.  See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 481–82 (Tex. 1964) 
(providing exemption from paying bond after notice of appeal was filed by Texas Liquor Control 
Board); Weber v. Walker, 591 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, orig. proceeding) (explaining 
when an exemption exists, “judgment is superseded as a matter of law upon the filing of notice of 
appeal” (citing City of West University Place v. Martin, 123 S.W.2d 638, 638 (Tex. 1939))). 
1534. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(1)–(2) (requiring the amount 
secured not to exceed one-half of the judgment debtor’s worth or $25 million, whichever is less); id. 
§ 52.006(c) (allowing a trial court to reduce the security amount if the debtor would otherwise suffer 
economic harm). 
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longer must be suspended.1535  In cases where the judgment is for 
something other than money, property, or foreclosure, the decision of 
whether and under what circumstances to permit supersedeas lies within the 
discretion of the trial court.1536 
The numerous rules for posting an appropriate supersedeas bond depend 
upon the type of judgment and are beyond the scope of this Article.1537  
The right to supersedeas is absolute and enforceable by mandamus, even 
though the trial court may retain discretion in fixing the amount of the 
bond.1538 
 
1535. See id. § 52.006(a)(1)–(3) (mandating a secured amount in the sum of compensatory 
damages, interest, and costs awarded, but making no mention of punitive damages). 
1536. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3) (ordering the trial judge determine whether and what 
security must be posted by the judgment debtor when the judgment is not for money or property); 
Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 
(holding the trial court had discretion “to set alternate security in the present case”).  Texas Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24.2 sets forth the applicable rules for the following: superseding a judgment 
involving money, land, or property; other judgments; conservatorship or custody; and for the state, 
municipality, a state agency, or a subdivision of the state in its governmental capacity.  TEX. R. APP. 
P. 24.2(a)(1)–(5).  To the extent Chapter 52 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code conflicts 
with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chapter 52 controls.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 52.005(a).  Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3), an appellant may supersede 
execution on a judgment for other than money, the recovery of property, or foreclosure, by filing a 
bond in the amount fixed by the trial court that will secure the judgment creditor for any loss or damage 
occasioned by the appeal.  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3).  However, the trial court has discretion to refuse 
to permit the judgment to be suspended upon filing by the judgment creditor of security to be “ordered 
by the trial court in an amount and type that will secure the judgment debtor against any loss or damage 
caused by the relief granted[.]”  Id.  The “rule was intended to permit a trial court to deny supersedeas 
of an injunction, conditioned upon the setting of a bond sufficient to protect the appealing party’s 
interests.”  Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex. 1986) 
(orig. proceeding) (citing Hill v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 695 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1985) (orig. 
proceeding) (per curiam)).  The trial court’s decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  
See id. at 87 (“The sole issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to allow [an electric company] to supersede the injunctive portion of its judgment.” (citing Johnson v. 
Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part by In re 
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. 
proceeding))); see also LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke, 229 S.W.3d 469, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating the amount of security set by the trial court is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard). 
1537. See generally 5 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 
§ 30:21 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing rules for posting supersedeas bonds). 
1538. See Man-Gas Transmission Co. v. Osborne Oil Co., 693 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1985, no writ) (per curiam) (asserting a “trial judge’s discretion extends only to the amount 
of the supersedeas bond and not to whether the bond should be granted”); see also Solar Soccer Club 
v. Prince of Peace Lutheran Church of Carrollton, 234 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. 
denied) (“A trial judge is given broad discretion in determining the amount and type of security 
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Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.2 governs the suspension of 
interlocutory orders pending review by the appellate courts.1539  Under this 
rule, the trial court may suspend an interlocutory order pending an appeal if 
the appellant files a supersedeas bond or makes a deposit pursuant to Texas 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1540  Denial of supersedeas may be 
reviewed by an appellate court for abuse of discretion.1541  Similarly, an 
appellate court may issue any necessary temporary orders to ensure that the 
rights of the parties are protected, pending disposition of the appeal, and 
may require such security as it deems appropriate.1542  However, “if the 
appellant’s rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas[,]” then the 
appellate court may not suspend the trial court’s order.1543 
If the trial court improperly sets the amount of the bond, the clerk 
improperly approves it, or if it is believed that an initially sufficient  
bond has become insufficient, the remedy is by motion in the court of 
appeals once appellate jurisdiction has attached.1544  If a party believes  
that the trial court’s order setting the amount of the bond is excessive,  
the party may have the trial court’s order reviewed by motion in the court 
of appeals.1545  If the appellate court finds that the bond is insufficient  
upon review of the bond, the court “may” require an additional  
 
required.” (citing Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof’l Corp., 80 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 2002, no pet.))). 
1539. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.2. 
1540. Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2 (explaining the amount of security needed for various types 
of judgments). 
1541. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.2. 
1542. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3. 
1543. Id. 
1544. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(1)–(5) (listing reasons an appellate court may review securities 
after a proper motion has been made); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein, 911 S.W.2d 153, 
155 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ) (concluding the appellate court is the appropriate court 
to determine the sufficiency of appellant’s bond on motion by appellee); Culbertson v. Brodsky, 
775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (determining the trial court 
ordered an excessive amount of bond); Bank of E. Tex. v. Jones, 758 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding upon motion by appellant, the appellate court had 
jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the bond). 
1545. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(1) (stating an appellate court may review the amount of a bond, 
but “must not modify the amount” if the “judgment is for money”).  The district clerk’s determination 
of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the tendered supersedeas bond is reversed only upon a showing 
of an abuse of discretion.  See Universal Transp. & Distrib. Co. v. Cantu, 75 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1934, orig. proceeding) (declaring in the absence of an abuse of discretion, 
mandamus will be refused). 
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bond;1546 likewise, upon a finding that the bond is excessive, the court 
“may” reduce the amount of the original bond.1547 
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.3(a) gives the trial court continuing 
jurisdiction, even beyond the expiration of its plenary power and perfection 
of the appeal, to monitor and modify the security.1548  Any changes ordered 
by the trial court, however, must be made known to the court of 
appeals.1549  The review of the security, as well as any changes to the 
security, also remain with the appellate court.1550  Thus, in carrying out the 
review, “the appellate court may issue any temporary orders necessary” or 
remand the matter to the trial court for evidentiary determinations.1551 
P. Turnover Orders 
“The Texas turnover statute provides judgment creditors with a 
procedural device to assist them in satisfying their judgment  
 
1546. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(d) (“The appellate court may require that the amount of a bond, 
deposit, or other security be increased or decreased, and that another bond, deposit, or security be 
provided and approved by the trial court clerk.”). 
1547. See id. (stating an appellate court has authority to decrease a security amount); McDill 
Columbus Corp. v. Univ. Woods Apartments, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, 
no pet.) (adhering to the supreme court’s reasoning that under some circumstances it is appropriate to 
reduce the bond to protect both parties). 
1548. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a) (authorizing continuing jurisdiction of a trial court to decide 
sufficiency of sureties and to modify a security upon a change of circumstances); Miller v. Kennedy & 
Minshew, Prof’l Corp.., 80 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he trial court, 
during its plenary power or after the expiration of its plenary power, possesses authority to review the 
sufficiency of the sureties on a supersedeas bond without regard to whether circumstances have 
changed since the district clerk approved the bond.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a))); Gullo-Haas 
Toyota, Inc. v. Davidson, Eagleson & Co., 832 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, 
no writ) (per curiam) (stating despite the loss of plenary power the trial court has continuing jurisdiction 
to order or modify a security and continue suspension of the judgment pending appeal). 
1549. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(b) (mandating the judgment debtor notify the appellate court of 
any modifications of the security made by the trial court). 
1550. See id. 24.4(a), (d) (implying once the court of appeals gains jurisdiction, the ability of the 
trial court to modify a security does not affect appellate court jurisdiction over the case); Gullo-Haas 
Toyota, 832 S.W.2d at 419 (finding an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court’s orders or 
modifications of securities upon motion by a party). 
1551. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(c), (d); see Lowe v. Monsanto Co., 965 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1998, pet. denied) (per curiam) (vacating trial court’s order and remanding the issue to the trial 
court for entry of “findings of fact and for the taking of evidence as to the estimated duration of the 
appeal and for a proper amount of post-judgment interest”); Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 
455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (setting aside the order of the trial court 
regarding the amount of supersedeas and remanding to the trial court with instructions to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the sufficiency of supersedeas bond). 
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debts.”1552  Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code,1553 commonly referred to as the “turnover” statute, is a procedural 
device that allows creditors to reach certain assets of debtors that are usually 
“‘difficult to attach or levy on by [normal] legal process.’”1554  Under the 
statute, a judgment creditor may “apply to a court for an injunction or other 
means to satisfy a judgment debt through a judgment debtor’s property, 
including present or future property rights.”1555  The trial court may order 
property in the judgment debtor’s possession or control to be turned over 
to a sheriff, and “may also appoint a receiver to take possession of the 
property.”1556  If the trial court’s turnover order is the functional equivalent 
of a mandatory injunction, then it is a final and appealable order.1557  If the 
trial court denies a motion for a turnover order, it is a final and appealable 
judgment.1558  A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a turnover order is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.1559 
VII.    RULINGS ON BILL OF REVIEW 
A bill of review is a procedural vehicle closely related to the other 
weapons in an appellate lawyer’s arsenal.  The bill of review is also an 
interesting application of the abuse of discretion standard of review. 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) provides that “[o]n expiration  
of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment 
cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient 
cause[.]”1560  A bill of review “is the proper method to attack a judgment 
when the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the  
 
1552. Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., 
540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. § 31.002). 
1553. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a). 
1554. Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 
223, 224 (Tex. 1991)); Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 224; In re C.H.C., 290 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2009, no pet.); see Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C., 948 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied) (discussing whether appellant’s property is exempt from turnover 
order). 
1555. Burns, 948 S.W.2d at 321 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a)). 
1556. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(b)). 
1557. Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 582. 
1558. See In re Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ) 
(announcing the nature of a turnover order). 
1559. See In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (reviewing 
trial court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard as mandated by Buller). 
1560. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f). 
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merits.”1561  Unlike the restricted appeal, which is authorized by the Texas 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the bill of review is “an equitable proceeding 
brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that is no longer 
subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal.”1562  The purpose 
of the bill of review proceeding is to launch a direct attack, as opposed to a 
collateral attack,1563 on the former judgment, and to “secure the entry of a 
correct judgment[.]”1564  It allows the trial court to rectify its own error, 
which eliminates the need for appellate review, permits the trial court to 
consider all of the facts rather than only those facts apparent “on the face 
of the record[,]” and “it avoids the need to follow both avenues of appeal 
seriatim.”1565 
Using a bill of review to attack a judgment is a difficult task.1566  
Generally, a bill of review is available “only if a party has exercised due 
diligence in pursuing all adequate legal remedies  against a former judgment 
and, through no fault of its own, has been prevented from making a 
meritorious claim or defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the 
opposing party.”1567  It is an independent proceeding that is only used “to 
 
1561. Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (citing 
Gonzalez v. Mann, 584 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
1562. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Baker v. 
Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)); accord King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 
751 (Tex. 2003) (describing a bill of review as an “equitable proceeding”). 
1563. See Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (explaining void judgments, such 
as those from courts without jurisdiction, are subject to collateral attack, whereas non-jurisdictional 
errors must be attacked within statutory time limits).  “Collateral attacks on final judgments are 
generally disallowed because it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.”  
Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005) (citing Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 
700, 703 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)). 
1564. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973) 
(distinguishing between a direct attack and a collateral attack). 
1565. See Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (first citing Caldwell v. 
Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); Stankiewicz v. Oca, 991 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 1999, no pet.); then citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture, 
811 S.W.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Tex. 1991)) (analyzing the purposes and benefits of the bill of review). 
1566. W. Wendell Hall, Appeal, Writ of Error or Bill of Review . . . Which Should I Choose?, 1 APP. 
ADVOC. 3, 4 (1988). 
1567. Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Tice, 
767 S.W.2d at 702; Petro-Chem. Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974)); accord 
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (explaining when “a bill of review is proper”); Carroll, 514 S.W.2d at 243–
44 (outlining a number of factors the defendant must show under a bill of review); see Gold, 145 S.W.3d 
at 214 (describing “legal remedies” as a motion to reinstate, motion for new trial, or direct appeal). 
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prevent manifest injustice[,]”1568 which permits a trial court to “set aside a 
judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new 
trial[,]”1569 within the regular time frames. 
The rules fail to define what “sufficient cause” means in Rule 329b(f), but 
the courts have established several requirements that must be satisfied 
before a complainant is entitled to relief by bill of review.1570  “Although it 
is an equitable proceeding, the [mere] fact that an injustice [may have] 
occurred is not sufficient [grounds] to justify relief by bill of review.”1571  
“If legal remedies were available but ignored, relief by equitable bill of 
review is unavailable.”1572  From the date a complainant learns of the 
judgment, or by the exercise of due diligence could have learned of it, the 
complainant must pursue all legal remedies still available.1573  Accordingly, 
if a party permits a judgment to become final by neglecting to file a motion 
for new trial or appeal, then the party “is precluded from proceeding on 
petition for bill of review” unless the complainant can show a good excuse 
 
1568. French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967); see Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927–28 
(“Although it is an equitable proceeding, the fact that an injustice has occurred is not sufficient to 
justify relief by bill of review.” (citing Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950))). 
1569. Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987) (citing Baker 
v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 866 
(Tex. 2010) (noting a trial court may set aside a judgment by bill of review).  
1570. E.g., Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406–07 (identifying the requirements of “sufficient cause” to 
allow for a bill of review). 
1571. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 998); accord Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 
at 751 (“The grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the procedure 
conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.” (citing 
Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 998)); Crouch v. McGaw, 138 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1940) (orig. proceeding) 
(noting a successful bill of review requires “more than [an] injustice” being shown). 
1572. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998)); 
accord Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702 (noting a party must have “exercised due diligence” in availing “himself 
of all adequate legal remedies” prior to pursuing a bill review); Cannon v. ICO Tubular Servs., Inc., 
905 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (reiterating when a bill of review 
would not be available to a party), abrogated in part by Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 
10 S.W.3d 308, 313–14 (Tex. 2000)).  A restricted appeal is not an “adequate legal remedy” that a bill 
of review plaintiff must pursue.  Gold, 145 S.W.3d at 214.  Failure to file a restricted appeal is not a bar 
to a bill of review unless it is relevant to fault or negligence.  Id. 
1573. See Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773, 775–76 (Tex. 1980) (stating availability of appeal bars 
relief by way of bill of review).  A bill of review is not a mere alternative of review on motion for new 
trial or upon appeal, and may be successfully urged only when there remains no other method of 
assailing the judgment.  See Gold, 145 S.W.3d at 214 (explaining failure to file a restricted appeal is not 
a bar to a bill of review proceeding unless relevant to fault or negligence); Law v. Law, 792 S.W.2d 150, 
153 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stressing the remedy of a bill of review is only 
available after a final judgment). 
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for failure to exhaust adequate legal remedies.1574  However, if the party is 
not guilty of failing to pursue legal remedies, a delay in bringing a bill of 
review proceeding does not bar relief “absent some element of estoppel or 
extraordinary circumstance that would render” granting relief 
inequitable.1575  The burden on the complainant is harsh, but the 
fundamental policy that finality must be accorded to judgments makes the 
grounds upon which a bill of review will be granted narrow and 
restricted.1576 
A bill of review proceeding contains a series of steps.  The equitable 
powers of the court are invoked when a bill of review petitioner files a 
petition (“a separate proceeding from the underlying suit”).1577  The 
petition must be brought in the same court that rendered the prior 
judgment.1578  To be entitled to relief on a bill of review, the bill of review 
plaintiff must plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense; (2) that he or she 
was prevented from making “due to [the] fraud, accident, or wrongful act 
of” his or her opponent; and (3) that the failure to appear was “unmixed 
with any fault or negligence” of his or her own.1579  “The petitioner must 
further allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute a 
defense and, as a pretrial matter, present prima facie proof to support the 
contention.”1580  Before conducting an actual trial of the issues, the trial 
court must determine whether the complainant’s defense is barred as a 
matter of law.1581  The supreme court has “directed that the petitioner be 
required to present prima facie proof of a meritorious defense as a pretrial 
 
1574. Steward v. Steward, 734 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); accord 
French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967) (determining “[r]espondent permitted the judgment 
to become final by his failure” to appeal the judgment and “[n]o reason [was] advanced” for his failure 
to do so, thus, “relief by bill of review” was unavailable). 
1575. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 928. 
1576. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751; Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.), overruled in part by Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc). 
1577. Ross v. Nat’l Ctr. for the Emp’t of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (citing Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)). 
1578. Pursley v. Ussery, 937 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). 
1579. Ross, 197 S.W.3d at 797 (citing Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1979); 
Sedgwick v. Kirby Lumber Co., 107 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Tex. 1937)). 
1580. State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) 
(citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 464).  A prima facie meritorious defense is shown when the trial court 
determines “that the complainant’s defense is not [automatically] barred as a matter of law[,] and that 
he [would] be entitled to judgment . . . if no evidence to the contrary is offered.”  Baker, 582 S.W.2d 
at 408–09. 
1581. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09. 
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matter” to “assure that valuable court time is not wasted by conducting a 
spurious ‘full-blown’ [trial on] the merits[.]”1582  A trial of the issues is 
required if a prima facie meritorious defense has been shown.1583  
“However, if the trial court determines that a prima facie defense [has] not 
[been] made out, it may dismiss the case.”1584  The petitioner “must open 
and assume the burden of” proof on this issue.1585 
At trial, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
“that the judgment was rendered as the result of . . . fraud, accident or 
wrongful act of the opposite party[,] or official mistake unmixed with any 
negligence of his own.”1586  “In relation to attacks on final judgments, fraud 
[may be] classified as either extrinsic or intrinsic”;1587 “[o]nly extrinsic fraud 
will support [relief by] bill of review.”1588  “Extrinsic fraud . . . denies a 
losing party the opportunity to fully litigate at trial all the rights or defenses 
that could have been asserted.”1589  Generally, the fraud involves wrongful 
conduct “outside of the adversarial proceedings[,] . . . collateral to the matter 
tried[,] and” something not “actually or potentially in issue.”1590  
“[A]llegations of fraud or negligence on the part of a party’s attorney[s] [will 
 
1582. Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1989) (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09). 
1583. Id. 
1584. Id. 
1585. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409; see id. (noting the relevant inquiry is whether petitioner 
presented evidence of a meritorious defense). 
1586. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409 (citing McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. 1961), 
overruled in part by PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. 2012)). 
1587. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. 1984); accord King Ranch, Inc. v. 
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. 2003) (explaining in a bill of review, fraud is characterized as 
“either extrinsic or intrinsic”); see Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 347–48 (Tex. 2005) (setting 
out reasons for distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). 
1588. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); accord 
Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312 (noting only extrinsic fraud will entitle a party to bill of review relief).  
Extrinsic fraud requires some proof of deception by the adverse party, not directly connected to the 
issues in the case, that prevented the bill of review plaintiff from fully presenting his claim or defense 
in the underlying action.  See Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702 (noting extrinsic fraud denies a party the ability to 
fully present its case at trial); Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312–13 (describing extrinsic fraud as 
“collateral,” in that the fraud was not at issue in the trial). 
1589. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312); accord Chapman, 
118 S.W.3d at 752 (defining extrinsic fraud). 
1590. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347 (first citing Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1002 
(Tex. 1950); then citing Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312); accord Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 1002 
(“[E]xtrinsic fraud is wrongful conduct of the successful party practiced outside of an adversary trial 
and which is practiced directly and affirmatively upon the defeated party . . . .”). 
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not] . . . support a bill of review.”1591  By contrast, intrinsic fraud “‘relates 
to the merits of the issues’” presented at trial that were, or should have been, 
determined in the former suit,1592 such as “fraudulent instruments, perjured 
testimony, or any matter which was actually presented to and considered by 
the trial court in rendering judgment.”1593 
There is an exception to the general rule of requiring (1) a showing of a 
meritorious defense and (2) a showing that “fraud, accident, wrongful act or 
official mistake prevented the plaintiff from presenting such a defense.”1594  
A meritorious defense is not required if the service of the petition was 
invalid,1595 and the defendant was not given notice in a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner so that the defendant would have had the 
opportunity to be heard.1596  “[S]uch a requirement, in the absence of 
notice, violates [the] [D]ue [P]rocess” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.1597 
When the trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a judgment in a 
prior case, the subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case occurs in the 
same proceeding as the trial on the bill of review.1598  And if the bill of 
 
1591. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 752 (citing Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 
407, 408 (Tex. 1987); Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 918–19 (Tex. 1968)). 
1592. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347–48 (quoting Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702); accord Chapman, 
118 S.W.3d at 752 (defining intrinsic fraud). 
1593. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 348 (citing Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702; Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d 
at 313); accord Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 752 (providing examples of intrinsic fraud). 
1594. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 97–98 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Caldwell v. 
Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1975) 
(per curiam)); accord Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998) (providing an exception to 
the bill of review requirements). 
1595. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96.  “[T]he testimony of a bill of review plaintiff alone, without 
corroborating evidence, [will not] . . . overcome the presumption that the plaintiff was served.”  Id. 
at 97–98 n.3.  “The recitations in the return of service carry so much weight that they cannot be 
rebutted by the uncorroborated proof of the moving party.”  Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 
151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972); Sanders v. 
Harder, 227 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1950); Gatlin v. Dibrell, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (Tex. 1889); Pierce-
Fordyce Oil Ass’n v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814, 815 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1916, no writ)). 
1596. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96; Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 537; Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 
723 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d 28, 29–30 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1988, no writ). 
1597. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723; see Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Fluitt, 754 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (holding due process of law is afforded when defendant is properly 
served with citation, and requiring him to allege facts in his motion for new trial does not conflict with 
Peralta). 
1598. See State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) 
(affirming a trial on a bill of review necessarily includes a determination of the original cause of action). 
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review defendant (the plaintiff in the original proceeding) proves his original 
case, the trial court may “substitute a new judgment which properly 
adjudicates the entire controversy”1599 that is reviewable according to those 
standards that would normally apply after a trial. 
When reviewing the grant or denial of a bill of review, a court of appeals 
must evaluate its jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to the bill of 
review itself, rather than the underlying suit.1600  The denial of a bill of 
review is reviewed for abuse of discretion.1601  The grant of “[a] bill of 
review [that] sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose of the case on 
the merits is interlocutory and not appealable.”1602  There was a split in 
authority as to whether an interlocutory grant of a bill of review itself is 
reviewable for abuse of discretion by mandamus1603 or whether the proper 
remedy is “appeal from the entire reinstated cause, when that judgment 
becomes appealable.”1604  “In reviewing the grant or denial of a bill of 
review, every presumption is indulged in favor of the court’s ruling, which 
will not be disturbed unless it is affirmatively shown that there was an abuse 
of judicial discretion.”1605 
 
1599. In re J.B.A., 127 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex. 
Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Arnold, 88 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. 1935); Shahbaz v. Feizy Import & Export Co., 
827 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 627 S.W.2d 
486, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, no writ)). 
1600. See In re L.N.M., 182 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding 
appellate court jurisdiction with respect to the appeal of the denial of a bill of review seeking to set 
aside termination order is to be determined under general rules of appellate procedure). 
1601. Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no 
pet.), overruled in part by Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc). 
1602. Jordan v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Tesoro Petroleum 
v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Warren v. Walter, 414 S.W.2d 423, 423 (Tex. 
1967) (per curiam)). 
1603. See In re Nat’l Unity Ins. Co., 963 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. 
proceeding) (finding “[a]n erroneously granted bill of review is effectively a void order granting a new 
trial and is an abuse of discretion that affords no adequate remedy at law[,]” and therefore reviewable 
by mandamus (citing Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding) (per 
curiam))); Schnitzius v. Koons, 813 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, orig. proceeding) 
(asserting mandamus is available if a trial court improperly grants a petition for bill of review). 
1604. Compare In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d 42, 48–49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, orig. 
proceeding) (“[M]andamus may be available to review an order granting a bill of review.”), with Tex. 
Mexican Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 726 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proceeding) 
(asserting mandamus was not a proper remedy), abrogated in part by In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d at 48–49.  
1605. Nguyen, 93 S.W.3d at 293 (citing Interaction, Inc./State v. State/Interaction, Inc., 
17 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)); accord Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811, 
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VIII.    APPELLATE RULINGS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The proper application of any given standard of review is impacted by a 
number of issues related to the procedural posture of the case.  An 
incomplete record, for example, may severely limit the scope of review and 
hence the types of errors that might be challenged.  The following section 
outlines some of these considerations that may impact the advocate’s 
briefing and consideration of applicable standards. 
A. Presumptions from an Incomplete Record 
In the absence of a clerk’s record, there can be no appeal.1606  Without 
a complete reporter’s record or a complete clerk’s record, the appellate court 
will presume that the omitted evidence supports the trial court’s 
judgment.1607  Stated another way, when an appellant fails to bring forward 
a complete record on appeal, it is presumed that the omitted portions are 
relevant to the disposition of the appeal.1608  This precludes the reviewing 
court from finding reversible error1609 because “[a] reviewing court must 
examine the entire record . . . to determine whether an error was reasonably 
calculated to cause[,] and probably did cause[,] the rendition of an improper 
judgment.”1610  An incomplete reporter’s record prevents the reviewing 
court from determining whether a particular ruling by the trial court is 
reversible error in the context of the entire case.1611 
When there is no reporter’s record, appellate court review is generally 
limited to complaints involving errors of law, erroneous pleadings or rulings, 
erroneous charges, irreconcilable conflicts of jury findings, summary 
 
815 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting the granting or denying of a bill of review is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion). 
1606. See W. Credit Co. v. Olshan Enters., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1986, no writ) (dismissing an appeal for failing to file a transcript or what is now referred to as 
the clerk’s record). 
1607. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); Murray v. Devco, 
Ltd., 731 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1987). 
1608. Enter. Leasing Co. of Hous. v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549–50 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); 
Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965). 
1609. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1)–(2) (stating reversible error is precluded unless the court of 
appeals “concludes that the error complained of: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper 
judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of 
appeals”). 
1610. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Gomez 
Leon v. State, 426 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tex. 1968)). 
1611. Id. 
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judgments, and fundamental error.1612  The reviewing court cannot review 
the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a complete 
record.1613  When the appellant, through no fault of his own, is unable to 
obtain a reporter’s record, the appellate court may reverse the judgment.1614 
There is an exception to the general rule requiring a complete reporter’s 
record on appeal.1615  Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c), an 
appellant may bring forward a partial reporter’s record if the appellant 
includes in the request for a partial reporter’s record a statement of the issues 
or points of error to be relied upon on appeal.1616  When an appellant 
complies with this rule, including setting forth the statement of issues to be 
presented on appeal,1617 a presumption on appeal exists that nothing 
omitted from the record is relevant to any of the specified points or to the 
disposition of the case on appeal.1618  However, the failure of the appellant 
to comply with Rule 34.6(c) will cause the reviewing court to presume that 
the omitted evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.1619 
B. Agreed Factual Statement 
A case may be submitted to the trial court upon an agreed stipulation of 
facts.1620  This procedure is similar to a special verdict and constitutes a 
 
1612. Protechnics Int’l, Inc. v. Tru-Tag Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Collins v. Williamson Printing Corp., 746 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1988, no writ); see Bexar Cty. Criminal Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 643 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ) (declaring conclusions of law will not bind the appellate court 
if erroneous). 
1613. Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968) (per curiam); Andrews v. 
Sullivan, 76 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). 
1614. See Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976) (granting a new trial to the petitioner 
based on his “inability to procure a statement of facts” or reporter’s record). 
1615. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c) (allowing an appellant to bring a partial reporter’s record if the 
appellant includes a statement of which points will be relied upon on appeal). 
1616. Id. 
1617. Id.; Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Tex. 2001); Gardner v. 
Baker & Botts, 6 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).  See generally id. 
at 296 n.1 (comparing current Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c)(1) with its precursor, Texas 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(d), which according to the reviewing court, “contains . . . identical 
language” regarding requests for a partial reporter’s record). 
1618. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 377; Producer’s Constr. Co. v. Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. 
1984) (per curiam). 
1619. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Sandoval v. 
Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 25 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 
denied); Kwik Wash Laundries, Inc. v. McIntyre, 840 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no 
writ). 
1620. TEX. R. CIV. P. 263. 
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request for judgment in accordance with applicable law.1621  “[U]nless 
provided otherwise in the agreed statement,” neither the trial court nor the 
reviewing court may “find any facts not conforming to the agreed 
statement.”1622  Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether “‘the trial 
court correctly appl[ied] the law to the admitted facts[.]’”1623 
C. Restricted Appeals 
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30: 
A party who did not participate—either in person or through counsel—in 
the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did not 
timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time permitted by 
Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of appeal within the time permitted by 
Rule 26.1(c).1624   
The notice of appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment 
or order is signed.1625  A restricted appeal (formerly an appeal by writ of 
error)1626 “is not an equitable proceeding[,] such as [a] bill of review[.]”1627  
 
1621. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Sherman, 945 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1995, no writ). 
1622. Sherman, 945 S.W.2d at 228 (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203, 205 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)). 
1623. Id. (citing Faubion, 821 S.W.2d at 205); Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Port Arthur 
Teachers Ass’n, 990 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied) (per curiam) (“In a 
trial to the trial court under an agreed statement of facts . . . the only issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court correctly applied the law to the stipulated facts.” (citing Stewart v. Hardie, 978 S.W.2d 203, 
206 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied))). 
1624. TEX. R. APP. P. 30.   
1625. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). 
1626. The cases interpreting appeals by writ of error apply to restricted appeals.  See TEX. R. 
APP. P. 30 (“Restricted appeals replace writ of error appeals to the court of appeals.”); Coastal Banc 
SSB v. Helle, 988 S.W.2d 214, 215 n.1 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (“[W]rit of error procedure has been 
replaced by the restricted appeal.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 30)).  The former appeal by writ of error 
should not be confused with the application for writ of error, which was the briefing mechanism to 
invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court.  TEX. R. APP. P. 130, 49 TEX. B.J. 586 
(Tex. 1986, amended 1997) (current version at TEX. R. APP. P. 53).  
1627. Texaco, Inc. v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1996); see supra 
Part VII (discussing bill of review). 
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It is simply another method of appeal,1628 and it “is filed directly in an 
appellate court.”1629 
To bring a restricted appeal, a party must show that:  
(1) [I]t filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the 
judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not 
participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did 
not timely file any postjudgment motions or requests for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record.1630   
“The six-month time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional.”1631  Whether 
the appellant participated in the hearing that resulted in the judgment, 
thereby precluding a restricted appeal, depends upon the nature and extent 
of participation.1632  “[T]he question is whether the appellant has 
participated in ‘the decision-making event’” resulting in the complained of 
judgment.1633  “The policy behind the nonparticipation requirement” is to 
preclude a restricted appeal by an appellant who should have “resort[ed] to 
the quicker method of appeal.”1634 
“As in any other appeal, the appellate court does not take testimony or 
[otherwise] receive evidence[,]” and “the review is limited to errors apparent 
on the face of the record.”1635  The “face of the record” means “the entire 
record of a case in court up to the point at which reference is made to 
 
1628. Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 590. 
1629. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 30). 
1630. Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. R. APP. 
P. 26.1(c); Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)); see 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.013 (providing the time for taking a restricted appeal to the 
court of appeals); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c) (designating the time to file a restricted notice of appeal). 
1631. Quaestor, 997 S.W.2d at 227 (citing Linton v. Smith, 154 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. [Comm’n 
Op.] 1941)). 
1632. See Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 589 (“The nature and extent of participation . . . in any particular 
case is a matter of degree . . . .”). 
1633. Id.  
1634. Id. at 590 (citing Lawyers Lloyds of Tex. v. Webb, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (Tex. 1941)).  
1635. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (citing Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848); accord Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430, 432–33 
(Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (noting a party must show error on the face of the record in a restricted 
appeal); Wachovia Bank of Del. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848, 849 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (“As the 
restricted appeal was filed within six months by a party that did not participate in the default hearing, 
the only question was whether error was apparent on the face of the record.” (citing TEX. R. APP. 
P. 30; Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848)). 
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it.”1636  The reviewing court is not limited to a review of the clerk’s record 
(transcript).1637  The reviewing court may test the validity of a judgment by 
reference to all of the papers on file in the case, including the reporter’s 
record (statement of facts).1638 
In the absence of a reporter’s record, the reviewing court may assume 
“that every fact necessary to support the judgment, within [the] limits of the 
pleadings, was proved at trial.”1639  Therefore, when an appellant fails to 
bring forward a reporter’s record or when there is no evidence that a 
reporter’s record was not made, the court may hold that the appellant failed 
to establish “error on the face of the record.”1640  The supreme court has 
“clearly said that silence is not enough.”1641  For example, the rules do not 
impose upon the clerk an affirmative duty to record the mailing of the 
required notices.1642 
A restricted appeal constitutes a direct attack on a judgment, and when 
appropriate, affords review of the trial proceedings of the same scope as an 
ordinary appeal.1643  “Generally, the same standards of review and powers 
 
1636. Barnes v. Barnes, 775 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) 
(quoting First Dallas Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no 
writ)). 
1637. Morales v. Dalworth Oil Co., 698 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
1638. Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam); 
DSC Fin. Corp. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d 551, 551 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).  Extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to challenge a judgment on appeal.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint 
Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1991); see Garcia v. Arbor Green Owner’s Ass’n, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 
800, 803 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding when extrinsic evidence is 
necessary to challenge a judgment, the appropriate remedy is by motion for new trial, under Texas Rule 
of Civil Procedure 320, 324(b)(1), or by equitable bill of review); Robert S. Wilson Invs. No. 16 Ltd. v. 
Blumer, 837 S.W.2d 860, 862 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting alternatives 
of motion for new trial or bill of review). 
1639. Jaramillo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Bell Helicopter Int’l, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 524, 526 
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Novak v. DeWied, 574 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
1640. Id.; see Salazar v. Tower, 683 S.W.2d 797, 799–800 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no 
writ) (holding appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations that the court reporter would not respond to his 
request for a record were insufficient to establish a point of error). 
1641. Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). 
1642. Id. 
1643. Norman Commc’ns, 955 S.W.2d at 270; Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 
1965); Autozone, Inc. v. Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); 
Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 78 S.W.3d 666, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see Pace Sports, Inc. v. Davis Bros. Publ’g Co., 514 S.W.2d 247, 247 (Tex. 1974) 
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of disposition [that] govern ordinary direct appeals” also govern review of 
default judgments.1644  However, like summary judgments, the usual 
presumption of the validity of the judgment does not apply when the 
reviewing court considers a judgment by restricted appeal,1645 and “[t]here 
are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of 
citation.”1646 
“No-answer and post-answer default judgments differ in the issues a 
plaintiff is required to prove.”1647  In cases of no-answer default, a 
defaulting defendant admits all facts properly pled in the plaintiff’s petition 
except for the amount of unliquidated damages.1648  Thus, the plaintiff is 
only required to prove its claim for unliquidated damages.1649  But if the 
defendant files an answer, a trial court may not render judgment on the 
pleadings, and the plaintiff is required to offer evidence and prove all aspects 
of its claim.1650  When the evidence is legally insufficient to support either 
a no-answer or post-answer default judgment, the proper disposition is to 
remand for a new trial.1651 
D. Objections to Appellate Judges 
A party may object to a judge or justice who is assigned to hear that party’s 
case on appeal.1652  If a party files a timely objection to the assignment of 
the judge or justice, the assigned judge may not hear the case.1653  The 
 
(per curiam) (criticizing a court of appeals for suggesting that a restricted appeal requires a higher 
burden than a regular appeal). 
1644. Lakeside Leasing Corp. v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park Phase 3, 750 S.W.2d 847, 849 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ). 
1645. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Lakeside Leasing, 750 S.W.2d at 849. 
1646. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per 
curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) 
(per curiam)); accord Wachovia Bank of Del. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) 
(asserting “the face of the record must reflect” valid service). 
1647. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). 
1648. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). 
1649. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 243 (stating in an unliquidated damages cause of action, the court 
will render judgment after hearing evidence as to damages). 
1650. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 930. 
1651. Id.; see SACMD Acquisition Corp. v. Trevino, No. 13-07-00509-CV, 2009 WL 2541840, 
at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing a default judgment on 
restricted appeal based on legally insufficient evidence to support damages); Jackson v. Gutierrez, 
77 S.W.3d 898, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (discussing the scope of review 
in a legal insufficiency claim). 
1652. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.551. 
1653. Id. § 75.551(b). 
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objection “must be filed not later than the seventh day after the date the 
party receives actual notice of the assignment or before the date the case is 
submitted to the court, whichever date occurs earlier.”1654  In addition, 
each party is only entitled to one objection for the case in the appellate 
court.1655  Finally, a former judge or justice who is not officially retired may 
not hear a case on appeal if either party timely objects to the assignment.1656 
E. Frivolous Appeals 
Because meritless litigation constitutes an unnecessary burden on parties 
to the litigation and diverts judicial resources from legitimate appeals,1657 
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62 shift to the appellant part of 
the prevailing party’s expense and burden of defending a frivolous 
appeal.1658  Additionally, Rule 52.11 permits “just sanctions” for filing a 
frivolous original proceeding.1659  The State Bar Disciplinary Rules and the 
Standards for Appellate Conduct also provide that a “lawyer shall not bring 
or defend” a frivolous proceeding or assert a frivolous issue.1660 
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62 provide that if the supreme 
court or the courts of appeals determine that an appeal is “frivolous,”1661 
the courts may award “just damages” to any prevailing party on their own 
 
1654. Id. § 75.551(c). 
1655. Id. § 75.551(b). 
1656. Id. § 75.551(d). 
1657. Chapman v. Hootman, 999 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no 
pet.). 
1658. See Starcrest Trust v. Berry, 926 S.W.2d 343, 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) 
(explaining the purpose of former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84, which is currently codified 
as Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62); Roever v. Roever, 824 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (quoting in full former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84); see also 
TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (giving appellate courts the authority to award damages if an appeal is determined 
to be frivolous in a civil case); TEX. R. APP. P. 62 (reiterating the ability of an appellate court to award 
damages for frivolous appeals). 
1659. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11; see Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (Green, J., concurring) (recommending sanctions be applied to 
lawyers and parties who file frivolous appeals). 
1660. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); see Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals: Standards for Appellate Conduct, 62 TEX. B.J. 399, 400 (1999) (detailing a lawyer’s 
duty to the court to pursue only warranted issues for appeal). 
1661. See generally Villanueva v. State, 209 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) 
(defining “frivolous” as not arguable on the merits or as lacking basis in law or fact); Frivolous, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit”); 
Frivolous, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 913 (2002). 
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motion or the motion of any party.1662  The appellate courts are no longer 
limited to assessing damages against the offending party alone; the attorney 
may also be sanctioned.1663  “[T]o objectively determine whether an appeal 
is frivolous, [the court] . . . look[s] at the record from the viewpoint of the 
advocate and decide[s] whether he had reasonable grounds to believe that 
the case could be reversed.”1664  The decision to grant sanctions is within 
the reviewing court’s discretion.1665  In determining the propriety of 
awarding sanctions, the courts may not consider any matter that is not in 
“the record, briefs, or other papers filed in the court of appeals” or supreme 
court.1666 
There are two competing concerns in awarding damages for frivolous 
appeals.  First, the “right to an appeal is a sacred and valuable right.”1667  
As a result, frivolous appeal damages are to be assessed “with prudence, 
caution, and after careful deliberation.”1668  As long as the argument had a 
reasonable basis in law, even if unconvincing, “and constituted an informed, 
good-faith challenge to the trial court[’s] judgment[,]” frivolous appeal 
 
1662. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62.  Under the old rules (84 and 182(b)), if an appeal was taken for 
delay and without sufficient cause, the supreme court or court of appeals could award each prevailing 
party an amount not to exceed ten percent of the amount of damages awarded to such appellee or 
respondent as damages against such appellant or petitioner.  Lewis v. Deaf Smith Elec. Coop., Inc., 
768 S.W.2d 511, 513–14 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); see Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co., 
839 S.W.2d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (recognizing the court must make two 
findings before assessing damages: that the appeal was brought “for delay and without sufficient cause” 
(emphasis added) (citing Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Whatley, 742 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1987, no writ))).  If there was no money damage award, then the court could award each prevailing 
party an amount not to exceed ten times the total taxable costs as damages.  Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356. 
1663. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62. 
1664. Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) 
(citing Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)). 
1665. Goss v. Hous. Cmty. Newspapers, 252 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2008, no pet.). 
1666. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62. 
1667. Masterson v. Hogue, 842 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, no writ) (citing Loyd 
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Millett, 767 S.W.2d 476, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Trinity 
Universal Ins. Co. v. Farley, 408 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1966, no writ)); Smith, 51 S.W.3d 
at 381; Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 78; Millett, 767 S.W.2d at 484. 
1668. Tate v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 954 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (citing Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)); accord City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331, 
340 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“Whether to grant sanctions is a matter of 
discretion, which we exercise with prudence and caution, and only after careful deliberation.” (citing 
Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no 
pet.))). 
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damages are not appropriate.1669  Thus, reviewing the case from the 
appealing party’s point of view at the time of appeal, the appellant will not 
be penalized absent a clear showing that there was no reasonable basis to 
conclude that the judgment could be reversed.1670  In the absence of some 
evidence showing that the appeal was taken in bad faith, or, for some courts, 
a lack of good faith,1671 “poor lawyering” alone is not a basis for 
sanctions.1672  However, the First Court of Appeals has held that “bad faith 
is not required under Rule 45[.]”1673  “[W]hether the matter is groundless 
and thus without sufficient cause must be decided on the basis of objective 
legal expectations . . . .”1674  There is not a consensus among the courts of 
appeals as to the standard applicable for imposing sanctions under 
Rule 45.1675  Some of the principles applied include: “the appeal was taken 
 
1669. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. 
1991) (per curiam); In re Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ). 
1670. Faddoul, Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
2001, no pet.).  An unconvincing argument does not constitute a frivolous appeal.  Smith v. Renz, 
840 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). 
1671. See Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
1996, writ denied) (noting damages will be imposed for appeals not pursued in good faith). 
1672. See Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 948 S.W.2d 858, 873 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, 
no writ) (reasoning sanctions for “poor lawyering” would only punish the client).  But see Mid-Continent 
Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 2 S.W.3d 393, 396–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) 
(rejecting bad faith as a prerequisite to Rule 45 sanctions). 
1673. Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).  
Most of the courts of appeals continue to apply a bad faith or lack of good faith standard.  See Tex. 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Beckner, 74 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (listing courts of 
appeals’ decisions that required good faith).  But see Compass Expl., Inc. v. B-E Drilling Co., 60 S.W.3d 
273, 279 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (stating bad faith is not required to find a frivolous appeal, 
but noting its relevance in determining damages). 
1674. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied) (per 
curiam).  Texas courts have applied the following factors to determine if the appeal is frivolous: (1) an 
unexplained absence of part of the record; (2) the unexplained absence of a motion for new trial, if 
necessary; (3) a poorly written brief that does not raise any arguable points of error; (4) the failure to 
appear at oral argument with no explanation; and (5) the filing of a supersedeas bond.  See Tate v. E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 954 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) 
(outlining factors to consider when determining if a penalty should be imposed); Baw v. Baw, 
949 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (listing items considered in determining 
whether appeal was granted without sufficient cause); Morriss, 948 S.W.2d at 872 (enumerating factors 
which indicate an appeal was filed for delay and without sufficient cause); Hicks v. W. Funding, Inc., 
809 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (stating “factors which tend 
to indicate an appeal was filed for delay and without sufficient cause”). 
1675. See Beckner, 74 S.W.3d at 105 (recognizing lack of uniformity of standard for imposing 
sanctions); Compass Expl., 60 S.W.3d at 279–80 (giving examples of different standards used to decide 
whether to impose sanctions).  The Eighth Court of Appeals observed that the courts of appeals have 
identified “four factors which tend to indicate that an appeal is frivolous: (1) the unexplained absence 
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for delay and . . . there was no sufficient cause for appeal”;1676 “the 
appellant ha[d] no reasonable expectation of reversal” and pursued the 
appeal in bad faith;1677 the appellant had no “reasonable expectation of 
reversal or . . . pursued the appeal in bad faith”;1678 the circumstances for 
taking the appeal “are truly egregious”;1679 or the appeal is “objectively 
frivolous and injures the appellee.”1680 
Second, judicial resources are severely strained, and frivolous appeals 
seriously harm the orderly administration of justice by “divert[ing] scarce 
resources away from” cases deserving more attention.1681  One court has 
 
of a statement of facts [(reporter’s record)]; (2) the unexplained failure to file a motion for new trial 
when it is required to successfully assert factual sufficiency on appeal; (3) a poorly written brief raising 
no arguable points of error; and (4) the appellant’s unexplained failure to appear at oral argument.”  
Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d at 213 (citing In re S.R.M., 888 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1994, no writ); Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 687; James v. Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
1994, writ denied)). 
1676. See Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. dism’d) (citing 
Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d at 424) (adopting old Rule 84 standards for new Rule 45). 
1677. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d at 213; Guajardo v. Conwell, 30 S.W.3d 15, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2000) (per curiam), aff’d, 46 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam); Easter v. Providence 
Lloyds Ins. Co., 17 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied); Bridges v. Robinson, 
20 S.W.3d 104, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).  The Fourth Court of Appeals 
has not formulated a consistent standard.  See San Antonio State Hosp. v. Lopez, 82 S.W.3d 566, 570 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (denying the requested sanctions because although the 
court disagreed with the movant’s position, it did not find the appeal to be frivolous and filed only 
with the intent to delay); King v. Graham, 47 S.W.3d 595, 612 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) 
(suggesting lack of good faith is a consideration), rev’d, 126 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Herring 
v. Welborn, 27 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (stating bad faith is a 
consideration in determining whether an appeal is frivolous). 
1678. Diana Rivera & Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App.—Corpus 
Christi 1999, pet. denied) (emphasis added) (citing Tate, 954 S.W.2d at 875). 
1679. Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 78 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 282 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)); see Brazos Transit Dist. v. Lozano, 72 S.W.3d 442, 
445 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (holding circumstances were not so egregious as to warrant 
sanctions). 
1680. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 2 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (“Under the current rule, ‘just damages’ are permitted if an appeal is 
objectively frivolous and injures the appellee.  [But, b]ad faith is thus no longer dispositive or necessarily 
even material.” (citation omitted) (first citing David Lopez, Why Texas Courts Are Defenseless Against 
Frivolous Appeals: A Historical Analysis with Proposals for Reform, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 147 (1996); then 
citing Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d at 799)); see also Mallios v. Standard Ins. Co., 237 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (concluding that, not only was appeal not frivolous, 
but the filed briefs were in response to appellee’s request for sanctions). 
1681. Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, 
writ denied) (Green, J., concurring); see Lewis v. Deaf Smith Elec. Coop., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 511, 514 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ) (stating a frivolous appeal “requires judicial time and effort that 
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observed that “the decision to appeal ‘should not be driven by comparative 
economics or wishful thinking; rather it should be based on professional 
judgment made after careful review of the record for preserved error’” and 
the standard of review applicable to the error.1682  The court also noted 
that a bad result at the trial level is not, by itself, reason enough to 
appeal.1683  In addition, the court observed that the decision to appeal “is 
not a mechanical exercise, but requires the dutiful application of lawyering 
skills.”1684  While the old rules in effect at the time limited the court’s 
authority to deal with the problem,1685 the court reaffirmed that the 
appellate courts “must not be hesitant to use the tools that we have.”1686  
“‘[T]he practice of ‘let’s just throw as much mud as we can up on the wall 
and see if any of it sticks’ must be discouraged.’”1687  However, where a 
party’s argument on appeal fails to convince the appellate court, but “ha[s] 
a reasonable basis in law and constitute[s] an informed, good-faith challenge 
to a trial court judgment[,]” sanctions are not appropriate.1688 
 
would be better spent on meritorious cases” (quoting Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 662 S.W.2d 655, 657–
58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ))). 
1682. In re S.B.C., 952 S.W.2d 15, 20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (quoting Campos, 
917 S.W.2d at 357 (Green, J., concurring)); accord Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Beckner, 74 S.W.3d 98, 105 
(Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (reiterating a decision to appeal should be based on professional 
judgment); see Elm Creek Villas Homeowner Ass’n, Inc. v. Beldon Roofing & Remodeling Co., 
940 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (rendering judgment for sanctions 
against appellants for filing a frivolous appeal).  Justice Green, writing for the court, stated, “[T]he mere 
fact that an . . . appeal is theoretically possible does not mean one should be filed . . . .  An appeal must 
be based upon more than wishful thinking.”  Id.  
1683. See Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356 (Green, J., concurring) (“A bad result below, by itself, is 
simply not a reason to appeal—not every case is properly appealable.”). 
1684. Id. at 357. 
1685. Id. at 357 n.4.  Under the old rules, the appellate court could only award damages “against 
the offending party and not the attorney[.]”  Id.  Justice Green invited the supreme court to remove 
that limitation.  Id.  The supreme court did so in Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62.  See 
TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (awarding “each prevailing party just damages”); id. 62 (excluding language that 
would prevent the awarding of damages against attorneys). 
1686. Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 357 (Green, J., concurring); see Dolenz v. A__ B__, 742 S.W.2d 
82, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (“Spurious litigation, unnecessarily burdening parties and 
courts alike, should not go unsanctioned.”). 
1687. In re S.B.C., 952 S.W.2d at 20 (quoting Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356–57 (Green, J., 
concurring)).  
1688. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. 
1991) (per curiam). 
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F. Power to Sanction 
Like trial courts, appellate courts retain an inherent power to discipline 
misconduct before the court when reasonably necessary and to the extent 
deemed appropriate.1689  In Johnson v. Johnson,1690 the appellant’s attorney 
insulted the trial judge by questioning both his ability to understand the 
complexities of the case and his decision to uphold the law.1691  Because 
the appellant’s attorney chose to attack a trial judge personally, instead of 
addressing the legal issues presented, the court held that its duty to maintain 
confidence in the legal system obligated it to assess monetary sanctions 
against the attorney and to forward the court’s opinion to the Office of the 
General Counsel for the State Bar of Texas for investigation and any action 
it deemed necessary.1692  Subsequently, in In re Maloney,1693 an attorney was 
ordered to answer a show cause order of the Fourth Court of Appeals based 
upon her accusations that the court made its decision based on politics and 
her comment that “[i]t must be embarrassing to take such a pro-rapist, pro-
big-insurance-defense-firm position with so appallingly non-existent legal or 
logical basis[.]”1694  The court held: 
A distinction must be drawn between respectful advocacy and judicial 
denigration.  Although the former is entitled to a protected voice, the latter 
can only be condoned at the expense of the public’s confidence in the judicial 
process.  Even were this court willing to tolerate the personal insult levied by 
[counsel], we are obligated to maintain the respect due this Court and the legal 
system we took an oath to serve.1695 
 
1689. See In re Ryan, 993 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (recognizing 
the inherent power of the court to sanction, “to aid in the exercise of [its] jurisdiction, in the 
administration of justice, and in the preservation of [its] independence and integrity” (first quoting 
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979); then citing Kutch v. Del Mar College, 
831 S.W.2d 506, 509–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ))); Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 
835, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (“[W]hen attorneys speak disrespectfully of the 
trial court, they ‘exceed their rights and evidence a want of proper respect for the court . . . .’” (quoting 
Mossop v. Zapp, 179 S.W. 685 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1915, no writ))). 
1690. Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied). 
1691. Id. at 840 n.1. 
1692. Id. at 841. 
1693. In re Maloney, 949 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
1694. Id. at 386 (first alteration in original). 
1695. Id. at 388. 
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The court held the attorney’s comments in her “original motion for 
rehearing and her response to [the court’s] show cause order are direct 
attacks on the integrity of the justices of this Court” and referred the court’s 
opinion to the State Bar for its consideration of disciplinary action.1696 
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner,1697 the Texas Supreme Court 
was confronted with a similar attack on the integrity of the court.1698   
In its order overruling the petitioner’s motion for rehearing, the court  
noted that “[c]ourts possess the inherent power to discipline an attorney’s 
behavior” and that “[c]ourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be 
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and 
decorum, in their presence.”1699  The court added: “A lawyer should 
demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, 
including judges, other lawyers and public officials.  While it is a lawyer’s 
duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a 
lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.”1700  Following the reasoning of the 
Fourth Court of Appeals’ decisions in Johnson and In re Maloney, the  
Texas Supreme Court referred the offending attorneys to the State Bar  
 
 
1696. Id. (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.02(a), reprinted in TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)). 
1697. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997). 
1698. See id. at 732 (addressing the behavior of respondents’ counsel).  The supreme court did 
not identify in the order the nature of the offensive conduct.  Id.  The following are a few of the likely 
candidates from the respondents’ motion for rehearing: “Outlined against a hazy July sky, the four 
horsemen rode again last Wednesday, July 9, 1997.  You know them: Pestilence, Death, Famine, and 
this Texas Supreme Court”; “Shucking its collective black robe and confidently donning the familiar, 
white lab coat, . . . this Court has taken on the world of science.  Almost.  Instead, [the opinion] is no 
more than a detailed, 58-page, science fiction, filled with skewed observations and prissy platitudes . . . .  
This Texas Supreme Court, fervent to follow the law laid out for it by those who would kill and injure 
for profit, stand stiffly in a row, nine nutty professors, hands clasped tightly together, shoulder to 
shoulder, chanting with glazed eyes and cultlike precision”; “A simple, painful truth: No little girl, or 
anyone else, will take away corporate money, no matter what—not on our watch”; and “Justice is no 
longer for sale in Texas, the money has been escrowed, the deed has been signed, the deal has been 
done.”  Respondents’ Motion for Rehearing at 1–5, Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (No. 95-1036); see Vincent 
R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 811, 811–12 (1998) (quoting the 
colorful language used by the respondents’ attorney, and arguing that “efforts to personalize, rather 
than professionalize, the process of judicial criticism suggest the development of an unfortunate trend 
of abusing judges for personal or political advantage”). 
1699. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 732 (first quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 
(1991); then citing Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988); Johnson, 
948 S.W.2d at 840–41). 
1700. Id. at 733 (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 1, reprinted 
in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)).  
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Grievance Committee.1701 
It is likely that the standards applicable to the trial courts apply to the 
courts of appeals—the sanction must be just, there must be a direct 
relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and 
the sanction must not be excessive.1702  The scope of review would be the 
entire record before the court of appeals and the supreme court’s standard 
of review of a court of appeal’s sanction would be abuse of discretion. 
G. Conclusions of Law 
“[C]onclusions of law are always reviewable.”1703  In fact, “conclusions 
of law in a nonjury trial are reviewable . . . [even] without preservation” 
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1.1704  “Conclusions of law 
will be upheld on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory 
supported by the evidence . . . .”1705  “Conclusions of law . . . will not be 
reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter of law.”1706  In addition, a 
trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo as legal questions,1707 
and the reviewing court affords no deference to the lower court’s 
 
1701. Id. at 732–33. 
1702. See id. (acknowledging courts possess the power to discipline an attorney’s behavior and 
impose respect and decorum in their presence); see also supra Part IV(Q) (explaining jury demands in 
Texas). 
1703. Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (citing 
Westech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., a Div. of Phelps, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 
App.—Austin 1992, no writ)); Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 
883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Spiller, 901 S.W.2d at 556). 
1704. Sammons v. Elder, 940 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied); see TEX. 
R. APP. P. 33.1(d) (explaining the requirements for preservation of error).  But see Tex. Dep’t of Transp. 
v. City of Sunset Valley, 92 S.W.3d 540, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (rejecting an argument because 
it was raised for the first time on appeal and indicating that it therefore cannot serve as the basis of the 
party’s complaint), rev’d, 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004); Regan v. Lee, 879 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (per curiam) (noting preservation of error is the “general rule”); 
Winters v. Arm Ref. Co., 830 S.W.2d 737, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) 
(requiring that post-judgment request, objection, or motion in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33.1, always be made to preserve the trial court’s conclusions of law for review). 
1705. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Stockton, 53 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2001, pet. denied); accord Charette v. Fitzgerald, 213 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2006, no pet.) (stating when an appellate court will uphold conclusions of law). 
1706. Stockton, 53 S.W.3d at 423 (citing Spiller, 901 S.W.2d at 556); accord State v. Harrell Ranch, 
Ltd., 268 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (explaining when an appellate court will 
reverse a trial court’s conclusions of law). 
1707. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Tex. 2002); 
State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996); Alan Reuber Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.  
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decision.1708  Under de novo review, the reviewing court exercises its own 
judgment and redetermines each legal issue.1709  Incorrect conclusions of 
law will not require a reversal if the controlling finding of facts support a 
correct legal theory.1710 
H. Error 
The standards of review define the parameters of a reviewing court’s 
authority in determining whether a trial court erred.  But the existence of 
error does not necessarily result in appellate relief.  Before the appellate 
court addresses error, it will look to see if the complaint has been 
preserved.1711  Even carefully preserved error will be subjected to an 
evaluation of harm. 
1. Preservation of Complaints or Waiver and the Issue of Harm 
Preservation of complaints and waiver must be carefully distinguished 
from harm.  Simply because a party has failed to preserve a complaint, or 
has waived it, does not lessen the harm caused by an error.  Nonetheless, 
unpreserved complaints generally cannot be reviewed on appeal, regardless 
of any harmful effects.1712  Appellate advocates and courts should be 
careful to analyze an argument first in terms of waiver, rather than harmless 
error. 
2. Invited Error 
The doctrine of invited error provides that a party cannot complain on 
appeal about an action or ruling which the party requested the trial court to 
take.1713  The doctrine makes sense.  It would be a waste of judicial 
 
1708. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998); Heal, 917 S.W.2d at 9; Alan Reuber 
Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.  
1709. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex. 2002) (Hecht, J., concurring); Subaru of Am., 84 S.W.3d 
at 222; Quick, 7 S.W.3d at 116; Alan Reuber Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.  
1710. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). 
1711. For a more detailed look at how to preserve error in the trial court, see generally Polly J. 
Estes, Preservation of Error: From Filing the Lawsuit Through Presentation of Evidence, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 997 
(1999). 
1712. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (requiring preservation of a complaint before it can be presented 
on appeal); Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 662–63 (Tex. 2009) (illustrating the complexity 
of error preservation). 
1713. In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009); Tittizer v. 
Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984). 
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resources to permit a party to ask a trial court to render a particular ruling 
and then ask the appellate court to reverse the trial court for that ruling.  If 
a party asks a trial court to commit an error, the party has waived the 
complaint for appellate review.1714 
3. Reversible Error and Harmless Error 
Assessing the harm caused by an error (neither invited nor waived) is 
analytically distinct from the question of whether error in fact occurred.  
Lawyers, and sometimes appellate courts, confuse these two terms, and thus 
the law.  A party can be grievously harmed by a trial court ruling that is 
perfectly correct under the law.  Likewise, a trial court can make an error of 
the worst magnitude that has absolutely no effect on a party’s rights.  By 
keeping the two concepts of error and harm distinct, the appellate court not 
only will improve its own decision making but will make the handling of 
future appeals that much easier for counsel and the courts.  Similarly, by 
presenting the concepts separately in their briefs, appellate lawyers can aid 
the court’s decision making and the future development of the law. 
The standard of review provides the level of deference a court must give 
to a trial court in finding error.  Once found, however, the harmless error 
doctrine serves as a further check upon the reviewing court’s authority to 
tamper with the trial court’s rulings.  If no error exists under the applicable 
standard of review, the court can stop its inquiry unless it wishes to make 
alternative holdings.  Only if the court finds error under the applicable 
standard of review must the court confront the concept of reversible 
error.1715  The requirement of reversible error serves administrative policies 
by moving cases through the system.  It also mitigates expense to parties 
and taxpayers by precluding reversal of cases for technical errors that in 
reality did not affect the outcome.  Similarly, errors that made a difference, 
but did not cause an incorrect result, will not be grounds for reversal.1716  
As the Fifth Circuit explained: 
 
1714. Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 862. 
1715. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1)–(2) (stating a judgment will not be reversed by a court of 
appeals unless the error complained of “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or 
“probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals”); id. 61.1 
(providing the same language for reversible error as Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1, but 
applicable to the supreme court). 
1716. See Miles v. M/V Miss. Queen, 753 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing error to 
be present and properly preserved, but not affecting the substantial rights of the parties so as to warrant 
reversal). 
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These rules are based on the sensible concept that a new trial should not be 
granted because of an error that inflicted no harm.  Perfection is an aspiration, 
but the failure to achieve it in the judicial process, as elsewhere in life, does 
not, absent injury, require a repeat performance.1717 
Stated another way, litigants are “‘entitled to a fair trial[,] . . . not a perfect 
one[.]’”1718 
Before a judgment can be reversed and a new trial ordered on the ground 
that an error of law has been committed by the trial court, the reviewing 
court must find that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of 
the appellant’s rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did 
cause “the rendition of an improper judgment,” or that the error “probably 
prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case [on appeal].”1719 
In determining whether an error rises to the level of reversible error, the 
courts do not apply a “but for” test; instead, courts apply a test of 
probability.1720  Various formulations of the test reach the same end: Is it 
more likely than not (i.e., probable) that the preserved error caused an 
improper judgment?1721  If the reviewing court answers in the affirmative, 
then the error is reversible; if not, the error is harmless. 
 
1717. Id. 
1718. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (quoting Brown 
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–232 (1973)). 
1719. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1, 61.1.  The supreme court has observed that the harmless error rule 
“ebbs and flows” in Texas practice.  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979).  
A careful practitioner should keep this in mind when considering the harm analysis of any given case.  
See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 n.7 (Tex. 2000) (observing “[t]he harmless error 
standard [was] . . . recodified without substantive change as [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1]” 
(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1, 61.1)); Franco v. Franco, 81 S.W.3d 319, 343 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, 
no pet.) (stating while “[f]ormulations of the harmless error rule [have varied] from time to time[,]” 
since 1989, the supreme court has repeatedly followed the rule in former Rule 81(b)(1)).  Under the 
former rule, harmful error is shown “when the evidence is controlling on a material issue and is not 
cumulative.”  Id. at 344 (citing Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994)).  See generally Robert 
W. Calvert, The Development of the Doctrine of Harmless Error in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1952) 
(explaining the development of the harmless error doctrine in Texas); Robert W. Calvert & Susan G. 
Perin, Is the Castle Crumbling?  Harmless Error Revisited, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 3 (1979) (detailing the harmless 
error doctrine); Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Jr., Analysis of Cumulative Error in the Harmless Error Doctrine, 
12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 561, 568 (1981) (analyzing cumulative error in the harmless error doctrine). 
1720. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1 (using the word “probably”); see also Tex. Power & Light Co. v. 
Hering, 224 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. 1949) (recognizing the complaining party must show at least that 
the error “probably resulted” in prejudice instead of a “but for the erroneous ruling” query). 
1721. E.g., King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970) (declaring reversal should not occur 
unless the erroneous admission “was calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper 
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The harmless error rule applies to all errors.1722  The reviewing court will 
review the record to determine if the complaining party failed to prove his 
cause of action or defense, in which case the trial court’s error could not 
have resulted in a “materially unfair” trial.1723  However, if “the trial is 
contested and the evidence is sharply conflicting, the [trial court’s] error 
results in a materially unfair trial without showing more[.]”1724  This 
determination is a judgment call delegated to the reviewing court’s “sound 
discretion and good sense” upon evaluation of the entire case.1725  
The chart on the following page may assist in analyzing whether the 
record demonstrates reversible error or harmless error and its application to 
a particular challenged error. 
 
judgment”); Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 260 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. 1953) (reiterating the 
“probably did cause” standard). 
1722. Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. 1980).  Ironically, Lorusso 
is also credited as applying a “relaxed” harmless error rule to cases involving peremptory challenges.  
See, e.g., Wells v. Barrow, 153 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (describing the 
“materially unfair” harm analysis as a “relaxed” harmless error standard). 
1723. Lorusso, 603 S.W.2d at 820–21. 
1724. Id. at 820 (quoting Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979)). 
1725. First Emps. Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 646 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1983). 
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4. Fundamental Error 
The Texas Supreme Court first recognized fundamental error in 1846 as 
a principle rooted in the common law.1726  The court observed that “if the 
foundation of the action has manifestly failed, we cannot, without shocking the 
common sense of justice, allow a recovery to stand.”1727  Fundamental 
error describes those situations in which a reviewing court reviews sua 
sponte “error that was neither raised in the trial court nor assigned on 
appeal.”1728  While a party may raise fundamental error for the first time 
 
1726. Jones v. Black, 1 Tex. 527, 530 (1846); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 288–93 (Tex. 2002) 
(Hankinson, J., dissenting, joined by Enoch, J.) (recounting the history of fundamental error in Texas). 
1727. Jones, 1 Tex. at 530. 
1728. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003) (citing McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters, 
304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. 1957) (per curiam)); see Cent. Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8–9 
(Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (discussing the applicability of the fundamental error principle).  But see Pirtle 
v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (reasoning error preservation avoids 
surprising the opponent and decrying the ability of appellate courts to consider unassigned errors). 
 
Is the complaint preserved by: 
1. A timely objection, request, or 
motion on the record; and 
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on appeal,1729 it is used very infrequently1730 and has been called “a 
discredited doctrine.”1731  Fundamental error survives only in those rare 
situations in which the appellate record shows on its face that the court 
lacked jurisdiction1732 or that public policy or public interest would be 
directly and adversely affected.1733 
5. Cumulative Error 
Generally, when an appellant argues that a case should be reversed 
because of cumulative error, the appellant is alleging that the trial court’s 
errors, nonreversible or harmless errors individually, pervaded the trial, and 
in the aggregate, caused the rendition of an improper verdict.1734  The 
doctrine is seldom used to reverse a case.1735 Generally, appellants make 
the mistake of simply restating their complaints in one final issue.1736  
 
1729. Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. 
denied).  But see Country Vill. Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 449 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (requiring error preservation). 
1730. See Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. 1982) 
(“Fundamental error has become a rarity.”). 
1731. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) 
(per curiam)). 
1732. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993) 
(stating lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court); 
McCauley, 304 S.W.2d at 266 (holding a lack of jurisdiction as fundamental error can be considered by 
the court without preservation of error). 
1733. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 293 (Tex. 2002) (Hankinson, J., dissenting) (arguing the 
doctrine should apply to involuntary termination of parental rights cases as a matter of public policy); 
In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Tex. 1999) (concluding the fundamental error standard is to be used 
in matters of public policy); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 205 S.W.2d 979, 985 (Tex. 1947) (Alexander, J., 
concurring) (stating the court is authorized to reverse a judgment of fundamental error if it involves a 
“matter of public interest”).   
1734. See Scoggins v. Curtiss & Taylor, 219 S.W.2d 451, 453–54 (Tex. 1949) (stating acts of 
misconduct, when taken together, probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict); Smerke v. 
Office Equip. Co., 158 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1941) (expressing the errors, taken in the aggregate, 
probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict). 
1735. See Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. 1980) (concluding cumulative 
effects did not result in probable harm); Nat’l Freight, Inc. v. Snyder, 191 S.W.3d 416, 424 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2006, no pet.) (recognizing a “cumulative-error doctrine,” but holding it does not apply); 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 79 S.W.3d 113, 125 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002) (explaining 
multiple errors may have cumulative effect of harm), rev’d on other grounds, 159 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. 2004). 
1736. See Crescendo Invs., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 481 n.16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2001, pet. denied) (expressing that some cases refuse to discuss cumulative error points as redundant); 
Sanchez ex rel. Estate of Galvan v. Brownsville Sports Ctr., Inc., 51 S.W.3d 643, 667 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted) (declining to address each point of error because appellant simply 
restated the issues in raising cumulative error). 
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Reversal based upon cumulative error is predicated upon meeting the 
standards of reversible error in Rule 44.1.1737  That is, the errors 
complained of must amount to such a denial of the rights of the appellant 
as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did “cause [the] rendition 
of an improper judgment or prevented [the appellant] from making a proper 
presentation of the case to [the] court.”1738  The cumulative error doctrine 
“infrequently finds favor with appellate courts[,]”1739 and it “has evolved 
almost exclusively in cases involving [improper] jury argument or jury 
misconduct.”1740 
The doctrine, in practice, makes little sense and has little impact on 
appeal.  In determining whether an error constitutes reversible error, the 
appellate court almost always reviews the entire record.  One error under 
scrutiny will be considered against the whole record, including the other 
errors in the case.  If the other errors compound the harm caused by the 
error under scrutiny, then reversible error exists from a review of the record 
as a whole.  Consequently, the doctrine is essentially swallowed up by the 
reversible error analysis. 
IX.    CONCLUSION 
While standards of review are, by their very nature, imprecise, they 
identify the fundamental questions for the reviewing court and narrow the 
focus of those questions for the court.  Without identifying and applying the 
standard, an appellate brief will not present a coherent or persuasive 
argument.  Although there are certainly no guarantees of success in the 
appellate process—sometimes it is like another throw of the dice—the 
appellate advocate will be most effective when he or she focuses on the 
applicable standard of review and demonstrates for the appellate court how 
that standard, as applied through the scope of review, mandates the result 
the party advocates.  Equally important to success on appeal is a forceful 
 
1737. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; see Mercy Hosp. of Laredo v. Rios, 776 S.W.2d 626, 637–38 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (holding appellant’s cumulative effects point failed since it did 
not show error or that the trial was materially unfair); McCormick v. Tex. Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 
751 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (“Reversal based upon 
cumulative error is predicated upon meeting the standards of Texas Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 81(b).”).  Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(1) has been recodified as Rule 44.1.  
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 n.7 (Tex. 2000). 
1738. McCormick, 751 S.W.2d at 892.  
1739. Ramirez, 79 S.W.3d at 125 (citing Brice, 61 S.W.3d at 481 n.16). 
1740. Town E. Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 809–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no 
writ). 
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and persuasive brief that demonstrates the harmfulness or harmlessness of 
the error—without demonstrating harm or lack of harm, an advocate has 
not advanced the client’s position by simply showing a trial court error.  
Hopefully, this Article will assist practitioners with their brief writing and 
help sharpen their advocacy skills on appeal.  
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